Saturday, August 15, 2015

[aaykarbhavan] Judgments and Information [5 Attachments]




Glen Williams vs. ACIT (ITAT Bangalore)

COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: August 7, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 12, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
FILE: Click here to download the file in pdf format
CITATION:
S. 41(1)/ 68: Old unclaimed liabilites which are not written back by the assessee can neither be assessed as "cash credits" u/s 68 nor assessed u/s 41(1) as "remission or cessation of liability"
The assessee claimed that addition u/s. 68 of the Act could not be made because the credits in question did not relate to the previous year relevant to AY 2009-10 and therefore the provisions of section 68 will not be attracted. On the question of cessation of liability, it was assessee submitted that there is no evidence brought on record to show that liability of the assessee vis-à-vis creditors has ceased to exist. HELD by the Tribunal:
(i) In Shri Vardhaman Overseas Ltd 343 ITR 408 (Del) it has clearly laid down that neither section 41(1) nor section 68 of the Act can be applied. On the applicability of section 68, we are of the view that those provisions will not apply as the balances shown in the creditors account do not arise out of any transaction during the previous year relevant to AY 2009-10. The provisions of sec. 68 are clear inasmuch as they refer to "sum found credited in the books of account of an assessee maintained for any previous year". Since the credit entries in question do not relate to previous year relevant to AY 2009-10, the same cannot be brought to tax u/s. 68 of the Act. The proper course in such cases for the Revenue would be to find out the year in which the credits in question were credited in the books of account and thereafter make an enquiry in that year and make an addition in that year, if other conditions for applicability of section 68 are satisfied.
(ii) As far as applicability of section 41(1) of the Act is concerned, Explanation 1 which was inserted w.e.f. 1.4.1997 is not attracted to the present case since there was no writing off of the liability to pay the sundry creditors in the assessee's accounts. The question has to be considered de hors Explanation 1 to Section 41(1). In order to invoke clause (a) of Sec.41(1) of the Act, it must be first established that the assessee had obtained some benefit in respect of the trading liability which was earlier allowed as a deduction. There is no dispute in the present case that the amounts due to the sundry creditors had been allowed in the earlier assessment years as purchase price in computing the business income of the assessee. The second question is whether by not paying them for a period of four years and above the assessee had obtained some benefit in respect of the trading liability allowed in the earlier years. The words "remission" and "cessation" are legal terms and have to be interpreted accordingly. In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that there was either remission or cessation of liability of the assessee. In fact, there is no reference either in the order of the AO or CIT(A) to the expression "remission or cessation of liability". In such circumstances, we are of the view that the provisions of section 41(1) of the Act could not be invoked by the Revenue. In fact the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Vardhaman overseas Ltd. (supra) clearly supports the plea of the Assessee in this regard.

Related Judgements

  1. Perfect Paradise Emporium Pvt. Ltd vs. ITO (ITAT Delhi) 
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  2. CIT vs. Bhogilal Ramjibhai Atara (Gujarat High Court) 
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Glen Williams vs. ACIT (ITAT Bangalore)

by editor
On the applicability of section 68, we are of the view that those provisions will not apply as the balances shown in the creditors account do not arise out of any transaction during the previous year relevant to AY 2009-10. The provisions of sec. 68 are clear inasmuch as they refer to "sum found credited in the books of account of an assessee maintained for any previous year". Since the credit entries in question do not relate to previous year relevant to AY 2009-10, the same cannot be brought to tax u/s. 68 of the Act. The proper course in such cases for the Revenue would be to find out the year in which the credits in question were credited in the books of account and thereafter make an enquiry in that year and make an addition in that year, if other conditions for applicability of section 68 are satisfied

CIT vs. Pudumjee Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd (Bombay High Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: August 5, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 12, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
FILE: Click here to download the file in pdf format
CITATION:
S. 36(1)(vii)/ 36(2): The principal part of the Inter-corporate Debt (ICD) can be claimed as a bad debt if the interest thereon has been offered to tax in some year
The Assessee made an inter corporate deposit of Rs.1 Crore with M/s. GSB Capital Markets Ltd. Thereafter, during the subsequent Assessment Years, the interest of Rs.42.65 lakh was received and offered for tax. The amount of Rs.49.82 lakhs being the aggregate of the principal amount as well as the interest was treated as doubtful debts from the Assessment Year 1998-99 onwards. In AY 2004-05, a settlement was arrived at between M/s. GSB Capital Market Ltd. and the Assessee whereby an amount of Rs.15 lakhs was paid to the Assessee and the balance amount of Rs.34.82 lakh were written off by the Assessee as bad debts. The Assessee claimed deduction on account of bad debts of Rs.34.82 lakhs being the debts written off out of inter corporate deposit given to GSB Capital Markets Ltd. The AO did not accept the contention and disallowed the claim for bad debts on the ground that the condition of Sections 36(1)(vi) read with Section 36(2)(i) of the Act were not satisfied inasmuch as the amount of Rs.34.82 lakhs being claimed as bad debts was not the income offered to tax either in the relevant Assessment Year or in the earlier Assessment Years. The claim was allowed by the Tribunal. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD:
So far as first part of Section 36(2)(i) of the Act is concerned, the Assesee had during the earlier Assessment Years offered to tax an amount of Rs.42.65 lakhs received as interest on the deposit made with M/s. GSB Capital Market Ltd. The Appellant had since Assessment Year 1998-99 claimed an amount of Rs.49.82 lakhs as doubtful debts from M/s. GSB Capital Market Ltd. This consisted of the aggregate of principal and interest payable by M/s. GSB Capital Market Ltd. It was in the subject Assessment Year that a settlement was arrived at between the parties and the Assessee received Rs.15 lakhs from M/s. GSB Capital Market Ltd. and the balance amount of Rs.34.82 lakhs being non recoverable was being claimed as bad debts by writing off the same in its books of account. It would thus be noticed the amount of Rs.34.82 lakhs which constitutes partly the principal amount of the inter corporate deposits and partly the interest which is unpaid on the principal debt. The Assessing Officer's contention that amount of Rs.34.82 lakhs was not offered to tax earlier and, therefore, deduction under Section 36(2)(i) of the Act is not available, is no longer res integra. This very issue came up for consideration before this Court in Shreyas S. Morakhia 342 ITR 285 wherein the assessee was a stock broker and engaged in the business of sale and purchase of shares. The brokerage payable by the client was offered for tax. Subsequently, it was found that the principal amount which was to be received from its clients would not be received. The assessee sought to claim as bad debts not only the brokerage amounts not received but the aggregate of principal and brokerage amounts not received in respect of the shares transacted. This Court held that the debt comprises not only the brokerage which was offered to tax but also principal value of shares which was not received. Therefore, even if a part of debt is offered to tax, Section 36(2)(i) of the Act, stands satisfied. The test under the first part of Section 36(2)(i) of the Act is that where the debt or a part thereof has been taken into account for computing the profits for earlier Assessment Year, it would satisfy a claim to deduction under Section 36(1)(vii) read with Section 36(2)(i) of the Act.

Related Judgements

  1. ACIT vs. Upper India Paper Mills Co Pvt. Ltd (ITAT Lucknow) 
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CIT vs. Pudumjee Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd (Bombay High Court)

by editor
The debt comprises not only the brokerage which was offered to tax but also principal value of shares which was not received. Therefore, even if a part of debt is offered to tax, Section 36(2)(i) of the Act, stands satisfied. The test under the first part of Section 36(2)(i) of the Act is that where the debt or a part thereof has been taken into account for computing the profits for earlier Assessment Year, it would satisfy a claim to deduction under Section 36(1)(vii) read with Section 36(2)(i) of the Act


Jagati Publications Ltd vs. President, ITAT (Bombay High Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: August 13, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 12, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to download the file in pdf format
CITATION:
S. 253: Severe strictures passed regarding the conduct of the Vice President and President of the ITAT and the CBDT for seeking to constitute Special Bench for non-judicial reasons and on grounds of "political sensitivity"
(i) Having rejected the contention that the Regular Bench had recommended a special bench and that it constituted sufficient material for the president, we now come to the second material placed before the president, that is the recommendation of the Vice president.
(ii) This is the most distressing part. The president forwarded the letter of the Board to the Vice president for his comments. This was purely an internal movement of the file. It was not that the matter was judicially assigned to the Vice president and notified on his board. There was no indication for any litigant to know that the file was now before the Vice president. In spite of this position, the Special counsel who was to be engaged by the Revenue met the Vice president and explained him the need for a special bench. How the Special counsel knew that the file of the matter was before the Vice president, is a mystery. This was a private meeting and the Petitioner was not informed. The matter was seized before the regular bench and the revenue was a contesting party. The Petitioner was completely unaware that any such private meeting had taken place between the counsel and the Vice president. Permitting a party to the litigation to meet privately in absence of other side in respect of an ongoing litigation and then base an opinion on such meeting ,was most improper on the part of the Vice president. The Vice president did not even find it improper and he has proceeded to place the said private meeting on record as if nothing was wrong about the same. Not only holding such private meetings is opposed to judicial conduct, but not knowing that it is an improper judicial conduct, makes the matters worse.
(iii) The Vice president had played a major role in the decision making process to constitute the special bench. After he received the file from the president for his opinion, he suggested that the Regular Bench should give their opinion. He asked them to consider formation of a special bench and for that purpose hold a hearing, if necessary. When the opinion was received from the Regular Bench, he gave his own comment that the Bench had recommended a special bench, omitting to mention that the Bench had recommended a bench outside Andhra Pradesh. The Vice president, therefore, was an integral part and in fact played a major role in a decision to constitute a special bench.
(iv) It is true that the final order of the president is not a judicial order. Nevertheless, even when a judicial body acts in administrative capacity, in midst of the litigation, which order will have effect on the ultimate outcome, the judicial body, must act with fairness, and not allow itself to be influenced. This is a fundamental principle. We will be failing in our duty if we do not uphold this most important principle. No attempts to influence a judicial body by non judicial methods can be permitted and tolerated. If a litigant, be it the State, indulges in such acts, it shall not derive any benefit there from. Such tainted process must be obliterated and undertaken again. This course of action is necessary to retain the faith of litigants in the quality of justice rendered by the Tribunal. It is also necessary to send a strong signal to all the litigants, including the State, to make no attempts to influence a judicial body by non judicial methods.
(v) What is further troubling is that is the introduction of 'political sensitivity'.In fact, the request letter of the Board does not specifically invoke this concept. It is the Vice president who has introduced this concept. This concept is then carried forward by the Regular Bench and during the arguments before us. We fail to understand how 'political sensitivity' is relevant in tax litigation. Tax is levied and collected under the sovereign power of the State. The Revenue is entrusted with collecting the tax and employ all legitimate methods to bring the tax evaders to book. The Tribunal is established to adjudicate disputes arising from the application of the Act. In the scheme of the Act, political affiliation of an assessee is irrelevant. The Vice president thought the case was politically sensitive. This was after the private meeting with the representative of the Board. So are we to presume that politics was discussed in the meeting? The Vice president has sown a seed of an irrelevant and potentially dangerous concept in the income tax litigation. Consider a converse scenario. There could be situation where an assessee may send its representative to hold a private meeting to refer the entire matter to special bench because the result before regular bench may affect his political career or that the issue in his case is politically sensitive. We therefore strongly deprecate the invocation of this criterion. The collection of tax and the adjudication must move unconcerned with political identity.

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Jagati Publications Ltd vs. President, ITAT (Bombay High Court)

by editor
This is the most distressing part. The president forwarded the letter of the Board to the Vice president for his comments. This was purely an internal movement of the file. It was not that the matter was judicially assigned to the Vice president and notified on his board. There was no indication for any litigant to know that the file was now before the Vice president. In spite of this position, the Special counsel who was to be engaged by the Revenue met the Vice president and explained him the need for a special bench. How the Special counsel knew that the file of the matter was before the Vice president, is a mystery. This was a private meeting and the Petitioner was not informed. The matter was seized before the regular bench and the revenue was a contesting party. The Petitioner was completely unaware that any such private meeting had taken place between the counsel and the Vice president. Permitting a party to the litigation to meet privately in absence of other side in respect of an ongoing litigation and then base an opinion on such meeting ,was most improper on the part of the Vice president. The Vice president did not even find it improper and he has proceeded to place the said private meeting on record as if nothing was wrong about the same. Not only holding such private meetings is opposed to judicial conduct, but not knowing that it is an improper judicial conduct, makes the matters worse

Fibre Boards (P) Ltd vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: August 11, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 12, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1991-92
FILE: Click here to download the file in pdf format
CITATION:
S. 54G does not require that the machinery etc has to be acquired in the same AY in which the transfer takes place. It is sufficient if the capital gain is "utilized" towards purchase of P&M by giving advances to suppliers. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act applies also to 'omissions' along with `repeals' and saves rights given by subordinate legislation
The assessee, a private limited company, had an industrial unit at Majiwada, Thane, which was a notified urban area. With a view to shift its industrial undertaking from an urban area to a non-urban area at Kurukumbh Village, Pune District, Maharashtra, it sold its land, building and plant and machinery situated at Majiwada, Thane to Shree Vardhman Trust for a consideration of Rs.1,20,00,000/-, and after deducting an amount of Rs.11,62,956/-, had earned a capital gain of Rs.1,08,33,044/-. Since it intended to shift its industrial undertaking from an urban area to a non-urban area, out of the capital gain so earned, the appellant paid by way of advances various amounts to different persons for purchase of land, plant and machinery, construction of factory building etc. Such advances amounted to Rs.1,11,42,973/- in the year 1991-1992. The appellant claimed exemption under Section 54G of the Income Tax Act on the entire capital gain earned from the sale proceeds of its erstwhile industrial undertaking situate in Thane in view of the advances so made being more than the capital gain made by it. The AO & CIT(A) rejected the claim though the Tribunal upheld it. The High Court reversed the Tribunal and held that as the notification declaring Thane to be an urban area stood repealed with the repeal of the Section under which it was made, the appellant did not satisfy the basic condition necessary to attract Section 54G, namely that a transfer had to be made from an urban area to a non urban area. Further, the expression "purchase" in Section 54G cannot be equated with the expression "towards purchase" and, therefore, admittedly as land, plant and machinery had not been purchased in the assessment year in question, the exemption contained in Section 54G had to be denied. On appeal by the assessee HELD reversing the High Court:
(i) On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid Budget Speech, notes on clauses and memorandum explaining the Finance Bill of 1987, it becomes clear that the idea of omitting Section 280ZA and introducing on the same date Section 54G was to do away with the tax credit certificate scheme together with the prior approval required by the Board and to substitute the repealed provision with the new scheme contained in Section 54G. It is true that Section 280Y(d) was only omitted by the Finance Act, 1990 and was not omitted together with Section 280ZA. However, we agree with learned counsel for the appellant that this would make no material difference inasmuch as Section 280Y(d) is a definition Section defining "urban area" for the purpose of Section 280ZA only and for no other purpose. It is clear that once Section 280ZA is omitted from the statute book, Section 280Y(d) having no independent existence would for all practical purposes also be "dead". Quite apart from this, Section 54G(1) by its explanation introduces the very definition contained in Section 280Y(d) in the same terms. Obviously, both provisions are not expected to be applied simultaneously and it is clear that the explanation to Section 54G(1) repeals by implication Section 280Y(d).
(ii) From a reading of the notes on clauses and the Memorandum of the Finance Bill, 1990, it is clear that Section 280Y(d) which was omitted with effect from 1.4.1990 was so omitted because it had become "redundant". It was redundant because it had no independent existence, apart from providing a definition of "urban area" for the purpose of Section 280ZA which had been omitted with effect from the very date that Section 54G was inserted, namely, 1.4.1988. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court in not referring to Section 24 of the General Clauses Act has fallen into error.
(iii) It is clear that even an implied repeal of a statute would fall within the expression "repeal" in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. This is for the reason given by the Constitution Bench in M.A. Tulloch & Co. that only the form of repeal differs but there is no difference in intent or substance. If even an implied repeal is covered by the expression "repeal", it is clear that repeals may take any form and so long as a statute or part of it is obliterated, such obliteration would be covered by the expression "repeal" in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
(iv) On omission of Section 280ZA and its re-enactment with modification in Section 54G, Section 24 of the General Clauses Act would apply, and the notification of 1967, declaring Thane to be an urban area, would be continued under and for the purposes of Section 54A.
(v) A reading of Section 54G makes it clear that the assessee is given a window of three years after the date on which transfer has taken place to "purchase" new machinery or plant or "acquire" building or land. We find that the High Court has completely missed the window of three years given to the assessee to purchase or acquire machinery and building or land. This is why the expression used in 54G(2) is "which is not utilized by him for all or any of the purposes aforesaid….". It is clear that for the assessment year in question all that is required for the assessee to avail of the exemption contained in the Section is to "utilize" the amount of capital gains for purchase and acquisition of new machinery or plant and building or land. It is undisputed that the entire amount claimed in the assessment year in question has been so "utilized" for purchase and/or acquisition of new machinery or plant and land or building.
(vi) The aforesaid construction by the High Court of Section 54G would render nugatory a vital part of the said Section so far as the assessee is concerned. Under sub-section (1), the assessee is given a period of three years after the date on which the transfer takes place to purchase new machinery or plant and acquire building or land or construct building for the purpose of his business in the said area. If the High Court is right, the assessee has to purchase and/or acquire machinery, plant, land and building within the same assessment year in which the transfer takes place. Further, the High Court has missed the key words "not utilized" in sub-section (2) which would show that it is enough that the capital gain made by the assessee should only be "utilized" by him in the assessment year in question for all or any of the purposes aforesaid, that is towards purchase and acquisition of plant and machinery, and land and building. Advances paid for the purpose of purchase and/or acquisition of the aforesaid assets would certainly amount to utilization by the assessee of the capital gains made by him for the purpose of purchasing and/or acquiring the aforesaid assets. We find therefore that on this ground also, the assessee is liable to succeed.
(CIT v. Venkateswara Hatcheries (P) Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 632, Poonjabhai Vanmalidas v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 182, State of Punjab v. Harnek Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 481, Rayala Corporation (P) Ltd. and M.R. Pratap v. Director of Enforcement, New Delhi, (1969) 2 SCC 412, Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2000) 2 SCC 536 referred)

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Fibre Boards (P) Ltd vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

by editor
The aforesaid construction by the High Court of Section 54G would render nugatory a vital part of the said Section so far as the assessee is concerned. Under sub-section (1), the assessee is given a period of three years after the date on which the transfer takes place to purchase new machinery or plant and acquire building or land or construct building for the purpose of his business in the said area. If the High Court is right, the assessee has to purchase and/or acquire machinery, plant, land and building within the same assessment year in which the transfer takes place. Further, the High Court has missed the key words "not utilized" in sub-section (2) which would show that it is enough that the capital gain made by the assessee should only be "utilized" by him in the assessment year in question for all or any of the purposes aforesaid, that is towards purchase and acquisition of plant and machinery, and land and building. Advances paid for the purpose of purchase and/or acquisition of the aforesaid assets would certainly amount to utilization by the assessee of the capital gains made by him for the purpose of purchasing and/or acquiring the aforesaid assets

Compulsory catering in Rajdhani, differential railway e-ticket price levy not dominance abusive

CCI (majority opinion) confirms Director General's report, rejects complaint against Ministry of Railway & IRCTC alleging abuse of dominant position by Indian Railway Group by imposing unfair and discriminatory conditions in sale / price of e-tickets, in-built component of catering charges in fares of Rajdhani and Shatabdi amounts to tie-in sales; Though confirms undisputable dominant position of Indian Railways in the market of "transportation of passengers through railways across India including the ancillary segments like ticketing, catering on board, platform facilities etc. provided by Indian Railways", holds that it is optional for customers to book tickets either through internet or at manual reservation counters; Rejects contention that cancellation charges imposition is unfair, holds that such levy is statutory in nature; On the allegation of compulsory catering charges in Rajdhani/Shatabdi/Duronto trains, mention that "There are only 61 trains..in which compulsory catering is provided...The compulsory catering is provided in these premium trains because they have very limited stoppages and for short duration where it is not possible to provide quality catering from outside."; Further, on the allegation in respect of single food court monopoly at larger stations, CCI agrees to DG's report that allotment and contract management of food units is made through open, competitive, two-bid tendering system, thus, not anti-competitive; Also rejects the contention that Railways has abused its dominant position by not making adequate efforts to improve safety features, increase the frequency of trains etc, holds the allegations as 'general and vague in nature', states that Railways have taken various steps taken to improve such services; Noting the efficacy of e-ticketing, states that. "the Commission hopes and trusts that the Railways may do away with service charges and other unnecessary restrictions on booking of e-tickets which may not affect its revenues in any significant manner";  CCI Member MS Sahoo writes dissenting opinion, states that Indian Railways "have adopted a practice that charges more for electronic service and less for brick-mortar service. It distorts choice of customers in favour of brick-mortar service and thereby penalises the use of technology which conserves resources for the OPs as well as the economy" :CCI

The majority judgment was authored by Shri. Ashok Chawla (Chairperson), Shri. S. L. Bunker, Shri. Sudhir Mital and Shri. Augustine Peter (Members), while minority opinion was given by Shri. M.S. Sahoo (Member).
Advocates M. M. Sharma and Deepika Rajpal argued for Ministry of Railways and IRCTC alongwith Mr. Jagdish Goyal, Law Officer of IRCTC

BANGALORE, AUG 14, 2015: THE issue before the Bench is - Whether Sec 54F benefit is available to the assessee when construction work though has started but is not yet complete in all respects within the stipulated period. YES is the answer.
Facts of the case
The assessee is an individual. He filed return for relevant AY. During the year, assessee sold one property. The capital gain on sale of the aforesaid property was invested by the assessee in purchasing another house. The Assessee claimed deduction u/s 54F of the Act. To verify the claim of the Assessee, AO issued summons, u/s 131 of the Act. Response on behalf of assessee was recorded. Based on data collected, AO was of the view that the assessee had not satisfied the conditions laid down in Sec. 54F of the Act as assessee had not completed construction of the residential house within a period of 3 years from the date of sale of the property. Entire capital gains was brought to tax under the head LTCG. Aggrieved by the order of AO, the assessee filed appeal before the CIT(A). The assessee pointed out that to claim deduction u/s. 54F of the Act, it was not a condition that the construction of the house should have been completed within the stipulated period of three years and that if it was proved that the consideration received on transfer of the asset giving rise to capital gains had been invested in the construction of residential house, the assessee was entitled to benefit of section 54F of the Act, though the construction was not complete in all respects. CIT(A) passed order in favour of Assessee. Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the revenue preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.
After hearing parties, Tribunal held that,
++ in our view, the order of the CIT(A) does not call for any interference. It is clear from the order of the CIT(A) that the assessee had commenced construction of the building within a period of three years from the date on which the property on the transfer of which capital gain arose. In fact even at the stage of purchasing the plot of land on which construction was put up by the Assessee, the entire capital gain had been invested. The intention of the assessee was to construct a residential house and in this regard, we find that the assessee had applied for a sanction of the building plan and got sanction of the building plan as early as on 02.06.2010. The construction, however, could not be completed by the assessee, though construction had been started. The Karnataka High Court, in the decision rendered in the case of Sambandam Udaykumar, had taken a view that under the provisions of section 54F of the Act, the condition precedent was that the capital gain realized from sale of capital asset should have been parted by the assessee and invested in constructing a residential house. If the money is invested in constructing the residential house, merely because the construction was not complete in all respects and was not in a condition to be occupied within the stipulated period, that cannot be a ground for rejecting the benefit of deduction u/s. 54F to the assessee.


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Posted by: Dipak Shah <djshah1944@yahoo.com>


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