STEP - WISE GUIDE SHOWING PROCEDURE FOR AVAILING BENEFIT OF THE SERVICE TAX VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE ENCOURAGEMENT SCHEME (AMNESTY SCHEME)
Procedure for availing the VCES scheme
♦ | Step 1 | |
If the declarant is not registered, then he is first required to get himself registered and then apply for this scheme. | ||
♦ | Step 2 | |
| After registration, the declarant shall make a declaration in Form VCES-1 to the designated authority (AC/DC Technical, Head quarter office) before 31.12.2013. | |
♦ | Step 3 | |
| On receipt of Form VCES- 1, the designated authority will issue acknowledgement of declaration in Form VCES-2 within 7 working days from the date of receipt of declaration. | |
♦ | Step 4 | |
| The declarant is required to pay not less than 50% of tax dues by 31st December 2013. Balance by 30th June 2014 and if not paid, can be paid by 31st December, 2014 alongwith interest from 1st July 2014. | |
Cenvat credit cannot be utilized for payment of dues (Rule 6(2)). | ||
| Amount paid shall not be refundable. | |
♦ | Step 5 | |
| On full payment of taxes, the designated authority will issue acknowledgement of discharge in VCES-3 within 7 working days from the date of furnishing of details of tax dues paid in full, along with interest if any. Last date for payment of first installment of 50% of total tax dues is 31.12.2013 and balance amount by 30.06.2014 or 31.12.2014 (with interest). |
Persons not eligible for the scheme
I. | Person cannot make declaration of tax dues for which |
(a) | SCN (u/s 73 or 73A) | |
(b) | Order (u/s 72, 73, 73A) | |
| has been issued as on 01-03-2013. [section106(1)] |
II. | A person who has filed return, declared tax liability but not paid [106(1) proviso] | |
| If a SCN or order has been issued on any issue (say taxability or valuation), declaration can not be filed on same issue for subsequent period [106 (1) proviso] |
A. | Where any inquiry or investigation has been initiated and is pending as on 01.03.2013 by way of |
(a) | Search u/s 82 of FA 1994 | |
(b) | Issue of summons u/s 14 of CEA 1944 | |
(c) | Issue of notice requiring production of accounts or documents u/s 72 (for best judgment assessment) or under Rule 5A of STR 1994 [Section 106(2)] |
B. | Where audit has been initiated. |
However, letters requiring production of documents, not mentioning sections 14 (CEA), 72(FA) and rule 5A(STR), would not be treated as covered under section 106(2). [ TRU Circular dated 13.05.2013]
Source : cbec.gov.in
IT: Order issued by CBDT for waiver of interest under sections 234A to 234C not only applies to cases where orders are passed by jurisdictional High Court but also to a decision of any other High Court
■■■
[2013] 35 taxmann.com 336 (Karnataka)
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
UB Global Corporation Ltd.
v.
Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore-II*
RAM MOHAN REDDY, J.
WRIT PETITION NO. 16136 OF 2011 ( T-IT)
MARCH 11, 2013
Section 234B, read with section 119, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Interest, chargeable as [Waiver of] - Assessment year 2001-02 - Whether where, as per paragraph 2(c) of Order F 400/234/95, IT(B), dated 30-1-1997, income of an assessee, was not chargeable to income-tax on basis of any order passed by High Court within whose jurisdiction he is assessable to income tax and as a result assessee did not pay tax in relation to such income in any previous years and by a decision of Supreme Court, advance tax paid by an assessee was found to be less than amount of advance tax payable on current income, Chief Commissioner/Director General would be justified in holding that it was a fit case for waiver of interest under section 234B or 234C - Held, yes - Whether it would be incongruous to held that paragraph 2(c) would apply not only to cases of orders passed by Jurisdictional High Court but also to decision of any other High Court as under law of precedents too judgments of other High Courts are persuasive - Held, yes [Paras 10 & 15] [Partly in favour of petitioner]
Circulars and Notifications : Order F 400/234/95, IT(B), dated 30-1-1997 and F. 400/129/2002 IT (B), dated 26-6-2006
FACTS
■ | The petitioner-company was extended benefits of deduction under section 80HHC by the Assessing Officer for the assessment year 1996-97. On appeal by the revenue, the Commissioner (Appeals) reversed the order of the Assessing Officer. On further appeal, the Tribunal upheld the order of the Assessing Officer on the basis of the Kerala High Court decision in CIT v. A.V. Thomas & Co. Ltd. [1997] 225 ITR 29/93 Taxman 695. | |
■ | The petitioner claimed deduction under section 80HHC on basis of 90 per cent export incentives and under bona fide belief that the benefits of deduction under section 80HHC was available to it during previous year 2000-01 did not pay the required advance tax. | |
■ | On the other hand, the revenue carried the order of the Tribunal allowing appeal of the petitioner for the assessment year 1996-97 before the instant Karnataka High Court. During its pendency, the Apex Court in IPCA Laboratory Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2004] 266 ITR 521/135 Taxman 594declared the law over applicability of section 80HHC. Following that order, the petitioner became liable to pay the tax for the assessment year 2001-02. | |
■ | The Assessing Officer passed an order levying interest under section 234B for delay in payment of advance tax. The petitioner filed an application for waiver of interest which was rejected by the Chief Commissioner. | |
■ | In writ petition, the revenue contended that the assessee in State of Karnataka did not take the benefit of any order of the instant Karnataka Court permitting deduction under section 80HHC and as a result, the assessee was disentitled to such deduction on the basis of the decision of the Kerala High Court. |
HELD
■ | The Tribunal was initially bound by the decision in A.V. Thomas' case (supra), which held the field then in the circumstances petitioner's bona fidebelief that he was entitled to the deduction under section 80HHC of the Act during the previous year 2000-01, cannot be found fault with. | |
■ | A bare reading of paragraph 2(c) of the order F. 400/234/95 IT(B), dated 30-1-1997 as modified by Order F. 400/129/2002-IT(B), dated 26-6-2006 indicates that income when not chargeable to income tax in the case of an assessee on the basis of any order passed by the High Court within whose jurisdiction he is assessable to income tax and as a result did not pay income tax in relation to such income in any previous years, and by a decision of the Supreme Court any assessment or reassessment proceeding the advance tax paid by an assessee is found to be less than the amount of the advance tax payable as the current income, the Chief Commissioner /Director General is satisfied that it is a fit case for waiver of interest under section 234B or 234C, is entitled to such a benefit. [Para 10] | |
■ | Order F. No. 400/129/2002 - IT does not enumerate all kinds of hardships that would befall an assessee to be considered for waiver of interest under section 234B or 234C. Paragraph 2(c) of this order refers to any income not chargeable to Income Tax in the case of an assessee on the basis of any order passed by the High Court within whose jurisdiction he is assessable to income-tax and did not pay income-tax in relation to such income, and subsequently as a consequence of a decision of the Supreme Court, in an assessment or reassessment if it is found that the advance tax paid is less than the amount payable on his current income; paragraph 2(d) provides for instances where return of income could not be filed by the assessee due to unavoidable circumstances and such return of income is filed voluntarily by the assessee or his legal heirs without detection by the Assessing Officer. | |
■ | Paragraph 2(d) of the order dated 23-5-1996 read that where any income which was not chargeable to income-tax on the basis of any order passed in the case of an assessee by the High Court within whose jurisdiction he is assessable to income-tax, and as a result, he did not pay income-tax in relation to such income in any previous year and subsequently, in consequence of any retrospective amendment of law or as the case may be, the decision of the Supreme Court, in his own case, which event has take place after the end of any such previous year, in any assessment or reassessment proceeding the advance tax paid by the assessee during the financial year immediately preceding the relevant assessment year is found to be less than the amount of advance tax payable on his current income, the assessee is chargeable to interest under section 234B or section 234C and the Chief Commissioner of Director General is satisfied that this is a fit case for reduction of waiver of such interest. | |
■ | In partial modification of this para of the Order, the Central Board of Direct Taxes has decided vide order dated 30-1-1997, that there would be no condition that the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court, as referred to therein, must be given in the assessee's own case. Also the condition that any retrospective amendment of law or the decision of the Supreme Court or the jurisdictional High Court must have been made after the end of the relevant year stand withdrawn. [Para 13] | |
■ | Viewed in this perspective, the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court need not be in the case of the assessee. In other words the decision of incidence and applicability of income tax under the Act need not necessarily be in the case of the assessee but could be in any other casei.e. of any other assessee or otherwise. As long as the decision covers the field of income tax legislation, as may be applicable to any assessee, would be a circumstance for reduction of waiver of interest under section 234A to 234C as the case may be. [Para 14] | |
■ | In the instant case, petitioner bona fide believed that the decision of the High Court of Kerala in A.V. Thomas' case (supra) was applicable, entitling the petitioner to the deduction under section 80HHC. The Tribunal bound by the said decision had no option but to apply the same to the case of the petitioner. The appeal filed before the instant High Court, was allowed following the opinion of the Supreme Court in IPCA Laboratory Ltd.' case (supra) impliedly overruling the decision in A.V. Thomas' case (supra). In the circumstances, it would be incongruous to hold that paragraph 2(c) applies only to cases of orders passed by the High Court within whose jurisdiction the assessee is assessable to income tax under the Act and not to a decision of any other High Court. Under the law of precedent too judgments of other High Courts are persuasive. [Para 15] | |
■ | The petitioner having made out a case for consideration over reduction or waiver of interest under section 234B, the Chief Commissioner was not justified in rejecting the claim by the orders impugned, on the premise that the petitioner an assessee not within the jurisdiction of High Court of Kerala was disentitled to rely upon the decision of that Court in A.V. Thomas' case (supra). [Para 18] | |
■ | Since no useful purpose will be served by merely quashing the orders of the Chief Commissioner and remitting the proceeding for consideration afresh, after applying its mind to the facts of the case it was to be held that the ends of justice would be met by waiving interest up to 75 per cent. [Para 19] |
CASES REFERRED TO
CIT v. V.T. Joseph [1997] 225 ITR 731/91 Taxman 311 (Ker.) (para 1), CIT v. A.V. Thomas [1997] 225 ITR 29/93 Taxman 695 (Ker.) (para 1),IPCA Laboratory Ltd. v Dy. CIT [2004] 266 ITR 521/135 Taxman 594 (SC) (para 2) and Bhanuben Panchal and Chandrikaben Panchal v.Chief CIT [2004] 269 ITR 27/136 Taxman 237 (Guj.) (para 4).
Malhara Rao and Vijaykumar Punna for the Petitioner. K.V. Aravind and M.V. Seshachala for the Respondent.
ORDER
1. Petitioner company was extended the benefit of deduction under Section 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for short 'Act' for the assessment year 1996-97 by order dt. 31.3.1999 under Section 143(3) of the Act. That order when called in question by the revenue before the Commissioner of Income-tax, the Appellate Authority, by order dt. 7.4.2000 held that the assessing officer was not justified in extending the benefit and accordingly allowed the appeal following the decision of the Kerala High Court in CIT v. V.T.Joseph [1997] 225 ITR 731/91 Taxman 311. Petitioner having filed an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, for short 'Tribunal', brought to its notice the decisions of the learned Single Judge in V.T.Joseph's case (supra) and the subsequent opinion of another learned Single Judge in CIT v. A.V. Thomas & Co. Ltd. [1997] 225 ITR 29/93 Taxman 695 (Ker.)taking a contrary view by extending the benefit of Section 80HHC. The Tribunal, following the subsequent opinion, allowed the appeal by order dt. 29.12.2000.
2. Petitioner under the bona fide belief that the Judgment of the learned Single Judge in A.V. Thomas case (supra) dt 10.1.1997 insofar as it related to extending the benefit of deduction under Section 80HHC of the Act was available to it during the previous year 2000-2001 did not pay the advance tax during the three quarters ending December 2000 and thereafterwards. However, the revenue carried the order of the 'Tribunal' in Income-tax Appeal No. 127/2001 before this Court, and during its pendency, the Apex Court in IPCA Laboratory Ltd. v. Dy CIT [2004] 266 ITR 521/135 Taxman 594declared the law over applicability of Section 80HHC of the Act, following which this court by order dated 8.12.2006 allowed the appeal of the Revenue disentitling the petitioner to the deduction. In effect the benefit allowed to the petitioner by the Assessment Officer and the Income-tax Tribunal was nullified. In other words petitioner on being liable to pay the tax for the assessment year 2001-02, the previous year 2000-01 did make payment.
3. The Assessing Officer passed an order levying interest under Section 234-B of the Act for the delay in making payment, which led the petitioner to file an application for waiver of interest invoking Order F.No.400/234/95-IT(B) Dated 30.1.1997 as modified by Order F.No.400/129/2002-IT(B) dated 26.6.2006 under Section 119(2)(a) of the Act, for short 'Order'. That application when rejected by order dated 12.12.2006 Annexure-D of the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore-2 followed by the rejection of the request for rectification, by order dt.29.10.2010, Annexure-J has resulted in this petition.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that under Section 119(2)(a) of the Act, the Central Board of Direct Taxes passed the 'Order' investing the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax and Director General of Income-tax with the jurisdiction to reduce or waive interest charged under Section 234-A or 234-B or 234-C of the Act in classes of cases or classes of income, specified in Paragraph 2 of the said order. According to the learned counsel Paragraph 2(c) of the said order though illustrative, but not exhaustive, takes into its fold a situation where any income was not chargeable to income of an assessee on the basis of any order of the High Court within whose jurisdiction he is assessable to Income Tax and did not pay Income Tax in relation to such income in any previous year and subsequently as a consequence of a decision of the Supreme Court of India, in any assessment or reassessment proceedings the advance tax paid is less than the tax payable on his current income, the assessee is chargeable to interest under Section 234B or 234C and the Chief Commissioner is satisfied that it is a fit case for reduction or waiver, of such interest, may exercise such jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel the Authority ought to have exercised a jurisdiction vested in it under clause 2(c) of the 'Order' dt. 26.6.2006 and waived interest under Section 234-B. Learned counsel hastens to add that though the revenue preferred IT Appeal No.127/2001 against the order of the Tribunal, nevertheless this court having not directed an interim order of stay of the order of the 'Tribunal' and the appeal was disposed of on 8.12.2006 following the decision of the Apex Court in IPCA Laboratory Ltd.'s case (supra), the Chief Commissioner was not justified in denying waiver of interest. It is lastly submitted that petitioner being under the bona fide belief that the decision in A.V.Thomas' case (supra) of the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala did hold the field insofar as Section 80HHC of the Act, was entitled to the benefit of that Judgment and justified in not making payment of advance tax during the first three quarters of the previous year 2000-01, hence, there was no justification to decline the benefit of waiver of interest. Learned counsel places reliance upon the decision of the High Court of Gujarat in Bhanuben Panchal and Chandrikaben Panchal v. Chief CIT[2004] 269 ITR 27/136 Taxman 237.
5. Per contra learned counsel for the Revenue seeks to sustain the order impugned as being well merited, fully justified and not calling for interference.
6. According to the learned counsel paragraph 2(c) takes into fold only one class of case i.e. where any income was not chargeable to income of an assessee on the basis of an order of the High Court within whose jurisdiction he is assessable to Income Tax and as the order of the 'Tribunal' subject matter of ITA 127/2001, paragraph 2(c) has no application. Learned counsel further submits that paragraph 7 of the Judgment of the High Court of Gujarat is an obiter and not a ratio decidendi, hence inapplicable to the facts of the case. It is further submitted that the Order F.No.400/ 129/02-IT(B) dated 26.6.2006 issued under Subsection (2) of section 119 of the Act specifies class of cases in which paragraph 2(c) applies and not otherwise.
7. Having heard the learned counsel and perused the pleadings, the point for consideration is
"Whether the petitioner an assessee in the State of Karnataka is entitled to maintain a claim for reduction of waiver of interest under Section 234B pursuant to paragraph 2(C) of the 'Order', on the premise that its income for the assessment year 2001-2002, was not chargeable to Income Tax under Sec. 80 HHC of the Act, in the light of the order in CIT -v- A.V.Thomas of High Court of Kerala?"
8. There is no dispute that the petitioner during the accounting year 2001-02 i.e. previous year 2000-01 claimed deduction under Section 80HHC on the basis of 90% of export incentives as worked out under the proviso to Subsection (3) of Section 80 HHC of the Act, by ignoring losses under clauses (a) and (b) of the said section, which was accepted by the Assessing Officer. That order when carried in appeal by the revenue before the Commissioner was reversed, while the further appeal preferred by the petitioner before the 'Tribunal' led to restoration of the order of the Assessing Officer on the basis of the decision in A.V.Thomas' case (supra) rendered by a learned Single Judge of High Court of Kerala. It is also not in dispute that the decision inA.V.Thomas' case (supra) D.D. 10.01.1997 was a judgment passed after the decision in V.T.Joseph's case (supra). The further fact not in dispute is that ITA 127/2001 preferred by the revenue was pending before this court without an interim order of stay of the order of the 'Tribunal' It is also undisputed that Tribunal was bound by the decision in A.V. Thomas' case (supra), which held the field. In the circumstances petitioner's bona fide belief that he was entitled to the deduction under Section 80HHC of the 'Act' during the previous year 2000-01, cannot be found fault with.
9. Section 234B provides for interest for default in payment of advance tax by an assessee who is liable to pay advance tax under Section 208 or when the advance tax paid by such assessee under Section 210 is less than 90% of the assessed tax. In such cases assessee is liable to pay simple interest at the rate of one per cent for every month or part of a month comprised in the period from the 1st day of April next following such financial year to the date of determination of total income under sub-section (1) of section 143 and where a regular assessment is made to the date of such regular assessment on an amount equal to the assessed tax or, as the case may be, on the amount by which the advance tax paid as aforesaid falls short of the assessed tax.
10. In order to obviate the hardship of the assessee the 'Order' F.400/234/95 IT(B) dated 30.1.1997 was issued under Section 119(2)(a) of the Act, as modified by order F.400/129/2002-IT(B) dated 26.6.2006. Paragraph 2(c) of the said order reads thus:
"2. The class of incomes or class of cases in which the deduction or waiver of interest under Section 234A or section 234B or, as the case may be section 234C can be considered, are as follows:
(a) and (b)** | ** | ** |
(c) where any income was not chargeable to income-tax in the case of an assessee on the basis of any order passed by the High Court within whose jurisdiction he is assessable to income-tax, and as a result, he did not pay income-tax in relation to such income in any previous year, and subsequently, in consequence of any retrospective amendment of law or the decision of the Supreme Court of India, or as the case may be, a decision of a larger Bench of the jurisdictional High Court (which was not challenged before the Supreme Court has become final), in any assessment or re-assessment proceedings the advance tax paid by the assessee during such financial year is found to be less than the amount of advance tax payable on his current income, and the assessee is chargeable to interest under Section 234B or section 234C, and the Chief Commissioner/Director General is satisfied that this is a fit case for reduction or waiver of such interest."
A bare reading of paragraph 2(c) indicates that income when not chargeable to Income Tax in the case of an assessee on the basis of any order passed by the High Court within whose jurisdiction he is assessable to Income Tax and as a result did not pay Income Tax in relation to such income in any previous years, and by a decision of the Supreme Court any assessment or reassessment proceeding the advance tax paid by an assessee is found to be less than the amount of advance tax payable as the current income, the Chief Commissioner/Director General is satisfied that it is a fit case for waiver of interest under Section 234B or 234C, is entitled to such a benefit.
11. In the facts of this case the bone of contention of the revenue is that the assessee in the State of Karnataka did not have the benefit of any order of this Court permitting deduction under Section 80HHC of the Act, therefore is disentitled to that deduction on the basis of the decision in A.V.Thomas'case (supra).
12. The preamble to the Order F.No.400/129/2002 IT (B) dated 26.6.2006 makes reference to the words 'class of cases or class of incomes' as specified in paragraph 2 thereunder. A reading of paragraphs 2(a), (b), (c) and (d) what can be deciphered is that instances are illustrative and not exhaustive since, it is not possible to enumerate all kinds of hardships that would befall an assessee to be considered for waiver of interest under Section 234B or 234C. The waiver or reduction in interest under Sec. 234A or 234B or 234C, in paragraph 2(a) is if the delay on the part of the assessee in filing the return is due to seizure of books of account and other documents during search and seizure under Sec 132 of the Act; Paragraph 2(b) provides that if any income chargeable to Income Tax under any head of income other than "capital gains" is received or accrued after the due date of payment of the first or subsequent instalment of advance tax, neither anticipated nor in the contemplation of the assessee; paragraphs 2(c) refers to any income not chargeable to Income Tax in the case of an assessee on the basis of any order passed by the High Court within whose jurisdiction he is assessable to income - tax and did not pay income - tax in relation to such income, and subsequently as a consequence of a decision of the Supreme Court, in an assessment or reassessment if it is found that the advance tax paid is less than the amount payable on his current income; paragraph 2(d) provides for instances where return of income could not be filed by the assessee due to unavoidable circumstances and such return of income is filed voluntarily by the assessee or his legal heirs without detection by the assessing officer.
13. Interestingly paragraph 2(d) as it existed in the order dated 23.05.1996 was modified by the order dt. 30.01.1997, and reads thus :-
"The clause "d" of para 2 of the said order read as under:
"Where any income which was not chargeable to income-tax on the basis of any order passed in the case of an assessee by the High Court within whose jurisdiction he is assessable to income-tax, and as a result, he did not pay income-tax in relation to such income in any previous year and subsequently, in consequence of any retrospective amendment of law or as the case may be, the decision of the Supreme Court, in his own case, which event has take place after the end of any such previous year, in any assessment or reassessment proceedings the advance tax paid by the assessee during the financial year immediately preceding the relevant assessment year is found to be less than the amount of advance tax payable on his current income, the assessee is chargeable to interest under section 234B or section 24C and the Chief Commissioner or Director General is satisfied that this is a fit case for reduction of waiver of such interest."
"2. In partial modification of this para of the Order, the Central Board of Direct Taxes has decided that there shall be no condition that the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court, as referred to therein, must be given in the assessees's own case. Also the condition that any retrospective amendment of law or the decision of the Supreme Court or the jurisdictional High Court must have been made after the end of the relevant year stand withdrawn."
14. Viewed in this perspective the decision of the High Court or Supreme Court need not be in the case of the assessee. In other words the decision of incidence and applicability of Income Tax under the Act need not necessarily be in the case of the assessee but could be in any other case i.e. of any other assessee or otherwise. As long as the decision covers the field of Income Tax legislation, as may be applicable to any assessee, would be a circumstance for reduction of waiver of interest under Sec. 234 A to 'O' as the case may be.
15. In the facts noticed supra, petitioner bona fide believed that the decision of the High Court of Kerala in A.V. Thomas' case (supra) was applicable, entitling the petitioner to the deduction under Sec. 80HHC of the Act. The Tribunal bound by the said decision had no option but to apply the same to the case of the petitioner, aggrieved by which ITA 127/01 filed by the revenue before this court, was allowed following the opinion of the Supreme Court in IPCA Laboratory's case (supra), impliedly overruling the decision in A.V.Thomas' case (supra). In the circumstances, it would be incongruous to hold that paragraph 2 (c) applies only to cases of orders passed by the High Court within whose jurisdiction the assessee is assessable to Income Tax under the Act and not to a decision of any other High Court. Under the law of precedents too judgments of other High Courts are persuasive.
16. A division bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Bhanuben Panchal and Chandrikaben Panchal's case (supra) regard being had to the facts obtaining therein over delay in filing the return of income resulting in late payment of taxes, an unavoidable circumstance, observed thus:
"7. It is thus clear that Clause (a) to (d) all state the circumstances beyond the control of the assessee and they may be considered as the species or illustrations of unavoidable circumstances or circumstances beyond the control of the assessee which is the genus contained in Clause (e) providing that where a return of income could not be filed by the assessee due to unavoidable circumstances and such return of income is filed voluntarily by the assessee or his legal heirs without detection by the AO, waiver of interest can be. considered. It appears to the Court that when the circumstances leading to delay in filing of return of income are also the circumstances resulting into late. payment of taxes and when the same set of circumstances are considered to be unavoidable circumstances responsible for the delay in filing of the return of income, ordinarily, such circumstances would also qualify to be considered as unavoidable circumstances responsible for the delay in late payment of taxes."
17. As regards extending the benefit of waiver of interest under Section 234B, learned counsel for Revenue submits that in Bhanuben Panchal and Chandrikaben Panchal's case (supra), the Division Bench of High Court of Gujarat extended the relief up to 75% and directed the assessee to pay 25% of the interest levied.
18. In the circumstances the point for consideration is answered in the affirmative. Petitioner having made out a case for consideration over reduction or waiver of interest under Sec. 234B of the Act, the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax was not justified in rejecting the claim by the orders impugned, on the premise that the petitioner an assessee not within the jurisdiction of High Court of Kerala was disentitled to rely upon the decision of that court in A.V. Thomas' case, (supra).
19. Apparently the order Annexure-D is dt. 12.12.2006 while assessment year is 2001-02 and no useful purpose will be served by merely quashing the orders Annexures-D & J of the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and remitting the proceeding for consideration afresh, after applying its mind to the facts of the case, ends of justice would be met by waiving interest up to 75%.
In the result, petition is allowed in part. The orders Annexures-D and J of the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore are quashed and the petitioner is directed to pay 25% of the interest levied under section 234B of the Act for the assessment year 2001-02.
Introduction
1. Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act provides, while computing income under the head "business or profession", for disallowance of an expenditure of the nature of "interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resident, or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), (Let us call it specified expenditure in short) on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been deducted or, after deduction, has not been paid on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139"... A controversyhas arisen on the interpretation of the expression "payable" used in section 40(a)(ia). Special Bench of the ITAT inMerilyn Shipping & Transports v. Asstt. CIT [2012] 20 taxmann.com 244/136 ITD 23 (Visakhapatnam) by majority had taken a view that the word "payable" used in section 40(a)(ia) of the Act would make the provision applicable only to expenditure payable on 31st March of a particular year and that such provision cannot be invoked to disallow the amounts which had already been paid during such year, even though tax may not have been deducted at source. The Hon'ble Accountant Member in that case expressing a dissenting view held that "The provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are applicable not only to the amount which is shown as payable on the date of balance-sheet, but it is applicable to such expenditure, which become payable at any time during the relevant previous year and was actually paid within the previous year." Thus, the majority view was in favour of the taxpayers resulting into allowance of specified expenditure paid during the financial year without deduction of tax, which tax was otherwise deductible under Chapter VII-B. Such allowance of specified expenditure was also held permissible, if after deduction such tax is not paid to the Govt. The revenue took up the matter before the High Courts in other cases where such disallowance of expenditure paid without deduction of tax was deleted by the Tribunal following the decision of the Special Bench in Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra). The Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Md. Jakir Hossain Mondal [2013] 33 taxmann.com 123 and in CIT v. Crescent Export Syndicate [2013] 33 taxmann.com 250 (Kol.) and the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Sikandarkhan N Tunvar [2013] 33 taxmann.com 133 disapproved of the majority view in Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra) and held that expression "payable" used in the section does not mean that only the amount of expenditure pending for payment at the end of the Financial year alone is subject to disallowance and that which is already paid during the Financial Year without deduction of tax can be allowed. The two High Courts took the common view that section 40(a)(ia) would cover not only the amounts which are payable as on 31st March of a particular year, but also which are payable at any time during the year. In essence they approved of the view of the Hon'ble Accountant Member in Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra). In this article all the four judgments have been analysed and salient points and reasoning have been highlighted.
2. Comments
2.1 As per ruling in Merilyn Shipping & Transports v. Asstt. CIT - Any amount of expenditure under section 40(a)(ia) cannot be disallowed if it is not found payable at the end of the F.Y.
In Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra) the Special Bench of the tribunal by majority had taken the view that disallowance of an expenditure of the nature of interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services as envisaged in section 40(a)(ia) can be done only when such expenditure is payable at the end of the accounting period and on which tax is not deducted or where the tax is deducted but the same is not paid within the time allowed. As a consequence to this view any amount of expenditure of the nature as described in section 40(a)(ia) cannot be disallowed for non-deduction of tax, or after deduction, for non-payment thereof to the Govt. within the time allowed, if such specified amount is actually paid during the F.Y., i.e., if it is not found payable at the end of the F.Y. While taking this view the special bench gave following reasonings:
(a) | A comparison of the draft of the provision as introduced in the Parliament and the Act which was finally passed showed that the expression earlier proposed was "amount credited or paid" which was replaced in the final enactment by the word "payable". The Legislature knew that if the amount is already paid TDS cannot be deducted. Therefore, only outstanding amount or the provision for expenses liable for TDS is sought to be disallowed in the event when there is a default of TDS. | |
(b) | It was only after receiving the representation from professional bodies that the Legislature replaced the words from "credited or paid" to "payable". | |
(c) | When the language of the Statute is clear the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language used. | |
(d) | As per dictionary meaning "Paid" means actually paid or incurred according to the method of accounting, whereas "Payable" means which is required to be paid. It means a debt to be discharged, legally due, collectable. Thus, where amount is already paid the provisions of this section will not apply. | |
(e) | While interpreting the word "Payable" in section 40(a)(ia) the words of the Statute must be understood in its natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to its grammatical meaning and such construction should not lead to absurdity. As per literal interpretation of the statute the word used should be read as it is without doing any violence to the language. | |
(f) | Section 40(a)(ia) creates a legal fiction by virtue of which even the genuine and admissible expenses are disallowed from the computation of income under the head "Business and Profession", if TDS is not made or after deduction such tax is not paid to the Govt. The legal fiction cannot be extended any further for taxing the amount already paid and has to be limited to the area for which it is created, i.e., for the amounts outstanding or remaining payable at the end of every year as on 31st March. |
2.2 Dissenting view by Accountant Member – The intention of the Legislature must be seen from the Statute passed by the Parliament - On the other hand the Hon'ble Accountant Member expressing dissenting view gave following reasoning for his conclusion:
(a) | The intention of the Legislature must be seen not from the draft of the proposed bill but from the Statute which is passed by the Parliament. Therefore, the comparison of the draft with the final enactment cannot help to find out intention of the Legislature. | |
(b) | The difference between the terms "credited" or "paid" or "payable" is relevant for the purposes of TDS provisions under Chapter XVII-B but has no relevance for making disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) and, therefore, the Legislature has dropped the word "credited" or "paid" from the final enactment. | |
(c) | Section 40(a)(ia) was inserted in order to ensure a scrupulous adherence to the TDS provisions. If narrow interpretation was assigned to the word "payable" as suggested by the assessee then the very object of incorporation of section 40(a)(ia) would be defeated. | |
(d) | Therefore, the contention that amount contemplated for tax deduction under Chapter XVII-B has been segregated in two parts - one part which has been paid within the F.Y. without making TDS and the other part which is payable at the end of the year would only be covered for disallowance was never intended by the Legislature. | |
(e) | Section 40(a)(ia) is applicable irrespective of method of accounting followed by an assessee, therefore, the word "payable" includes within its ambit entire accrued liability. In mercantile system of accounting the TDS is required to be made the moment amount is credited to the account of the payee on accrual of liability. In cash system of accounting TDS is required to be made the moment amount is paid to the payee. | |
(f) | The insertion of expression "on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B" in the final enactment clearly shows the intention of the Legislature that deductibility is to be seen from the point view of Chapter XVII-B. | |
(g) | Had the intention of the Legislature been to disallow only items outstanding as on 31st March, then the term "payable" would have been qualified by the phrase as outstanding as on 31st March. In the absence of such qualification the same cannot be read in the section. | |
(h) | When one goes through the provisions of TDS as contained in Chapter XVII-B, there is use of the term "shall". It makes it clear that these are mandatory provisions and are applicable to the entire sum contemplated under the respective sections. These sections do not give any leverage to the assessee to make the payment without making the TDS. | |
(i) | As per principle of ejusdem generis the term "payable" in section 40(a)(ia) has to be interpreted in the light of the sums referred to in various sections contained in Chapter XVII-B. Therefore, emphasis is on liability to pay on which tax is deductible and not on actual payment. | |
(j) | If the contention of the assessee was accepted then section 40(a)(ia) would become otiose in respect sums paid during the F.Y. | |
(k) | Rule 30 merely contemplates the procedure for deposit of the TDS amount and merely because different time-limits are prescribed, it would not follow that different considerations would apply while considering the term "payable" under section 40(a)(ia). Further, it is only a procedural provision which cannot override the substantive provisions of the Act. |
2.3 Rationale of the decision of the Calcutta High Court against the majority view in case of Merilyn Shipping & Transports v. Asstt. CIT - In the case of Crescent Export Syndicate (supra)theHon'ble Calcutta High Court held against the majority view of the Special Bench of the ITAT in Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra). The rationale of the decision was as under:
(a) | Comparison between the pre-amendment and post-amendment law is permissible for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief sought to be remedied or the object sought to be achieved by an amendment. This is precisely what was done by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Kelvinator [2010] 187 Taxman 312. But the same comparison between the draft and the enacted law is not permissible, nor can the draft or the bill be used for the purpose of regulating the meaning and purport of the enacted law. It is the finally enacted law which is the will of the Legislature. | |
(b) | What the Tribunal by majority (in Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra)) did was to supply the casus omissus (by way of reading into the section 40(a)(ia) that it cannot be invoked by Assessing Officer to disallow the genuine and reasonable expenditure on the amounts of expenditure already paid) which was not permissible and could only have been done by the Supreme Court in an appropriate case. | |
(c) | Only Hon'ble Supreme Court may supply the casus omissus, but it would be in the rarest of the rare case when such supplying ofcasus omissus would be extremely necessary due to the inadvertent omission on the part of the Legislature. | |
(d) | The key words used in section 40(a)(ia), are "on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII–B". What is to be disallowed is those expenses on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII–B. Once this is realized nothing turns on the basis of the fact that the Legislature used the word 'payable' and not 'paid or credited'. Unless any amount is payable, it can neither be paid nor credited. If an amount has neither been paid nor credited, there can be no occasion for claiming any deduction. | |
(e) | There can be no denial that the provision in question is harsh, but that is no ground to read the same in a manner which is not intended by the Legislature. The law is deliberately made harsh to secure compliance of the provisions requiring deductions of tax at source. It is not the case of an inadvertent error. |
2.4 Another decision of the Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Md. Jakir Hossain Mondal reaffirming non-acceptance of ITAT's decision in Merilyn Shipping Transport (supra) - Decision in case of Crescent Export Syndicate was followed by Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in Md. Jakir Hossain Mondal (supra) while holding that the decision of the SB of ITAT in Merilyn Shipping & Transports(supra) was not acceptable.
2.5 Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Sikandarkhan N Tunvar also holds decision in Merilyn Shipping & Transports v. ACIT as erroneous - Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in Sikandarkhan N Tunvar (supra) considered the issue in further details while holding that the view in Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra) was erroneous. Their Lordships gave following reasons:
(a) | As section 40(a)(ia) of the Act creates an artificial charge on an amount which is otherwise not an income of the assessee, it cannot be construed liberally. The provision makes disallowance of an expenditure which has otherwise been incurred and is eligible for deduction, on the ground that, though tax was required to be deducted at source it was not deducted or if deducted, had not been deposited before the due date. | |
(b) | The terms "payable" and "paid" are not synonymous. In the context of section 40(a)(ia) they are not used interchangeably. Word "paid" as defined in section 43(2) of the Act means actually paid or incurred according to the method of accounting. The word "payable" has been described in Webster's Third New International Unabridged Dictionary as requiring to be paid: capable of being paid. | |
(c) | In the context of section 40(a)(ia), the word "payable" would not include "paid". In other words, an amount which is already paid ceases to be payable and conversely, what is payable cannot be one that is already paid. Term "payable" cannot be seen to be including the expression "paid". | |
(d) | The provisions contained in Chapter VII-B nowhere require that the amount which is payable must remain so payable throughout the year. | |
(e) | The language used in section 40(a)(ia) is not that such amount must continue to remain payable till the end of the accounting year. Any such interpretation would require reading words which the Legislature has not used. | |
(f) | The Legislature could not have intended to bring about any such distinction nor does the language used in the section bring about any such meaning. If the interpretation as advanced by the assessees is accepted, it would lead to a situation where the assessee who thought he was required to deduct the tax at source but no such deduction was made or more flagrantly deduction, though made was not paid to the Government, would escape the consequence only because the amount was already paid before the end of the year in contrast to another assessee who would otherwise be in similar situation but in whose case the amount remained payable till the end of the year. The Legislature would not have desired to bring about incongruous and seemingly irreconcilable consequences. | |
(g) | Merely because accounts are closed on the last date of the accounting year and the computation of profit and loss is to be judged with reference to such date, it does not mean whether an amount is payable or not in the context of section 40(a)(ia) must be ascertained on the strength of the position emerging on 31st March. | |
(h) | The proceedings in the Parliament, its debates and even the speeches made by the proposer of a bill are ordinarily not considered as relevant or safe tools for interpretation of a Statute. The debates in the Parliament at best indicate the opinion of the individual members and are ordinarily not relied upon for interpreting the provisions, particularly when the provisions are plain. | |
(i) | The reason why a certain language was used in a draft bill and why the provision ultimately enacted carried a different expression cannot be gathered from mere comparison of the two sets of provisions. There may be variety of reasons why the ultimate provision may vary from the original draft. | |
(j) | The principle of casus omissus is applied mainly when an existing provision is amended and a change is brought about. While interpreting such an amended provision, the Courts would immediately inquire what the statutory provision was before and what changes the Legislature brought about and compare the effect of the two. | |
(k) | The other occasion when this principle of casus omissus is applied is when the language of the Legislature is compared with some other analogous Statute or other provisions of the same Statute or with expression which could apparently or obviously be used if the Legislature had different intention in mind, while framing the provision. | |
(l) | The Tribunal in Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra) committed an error in applying the principle of casus omissus . Firstly, there is serious doubt whether such principle can be applied by comparing the draft presented in the Parliament and ultimate legislation which may be passed. Secondly, the statutory provision is amply clear. |
Analysis of the language used in section 40(a)(ia)
3. For appreciating the views expressed by the Hon'ble Calcutta and the Gujarat High Court let us analyse the language used in section 40(a)(ia). The relevant part for the purposes of present controversy is as under:
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sections 30 to 38 the following amounts shall not be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head 'profits and gains of business or profession' ... Section 40(a)(ia):- any interest, commission or brokerage, [rent, royalty,] fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resident, or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been deducted or, after deduction, has not been paid ......... "
3.1 The basic ingredients of section 40(a)(ia)-
(i) | It applies to interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services. | |
(ii) | The aforementioned amounts are payable to a resident. | |
(iii) | The amounts are payable to a contractor or sub-contractor being resident. | |
(iv) | Tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B in respect of amounts payable in respect of aforementioned items. | |
(v) | Tax has not been deducted as per requirement of Chapter XVII-B. | |
(vi) | After deduction of tax, amount has not been paid. |
3.2 Crucial words used in section 40(a)(ia) - The crucial words used in the section 40(a)(ia) are "................payable to a resident, or amounts payable to a contractor ..... on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B......." One should not read the word "payable" in isolation or on standalone basis. The amount "payable" is qualified by the expression "on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B". In fact, this expression qualifies the word "amount", or the sums of the specified nature claimed as deduction from the business profits, that is, if the specified sum is the one on which tax is deductible under Chapter VII-B then it will be subject to disallowance, if tax is not deducted or after deduction is not paid to the Central Govt. Conversely, if no tax is required to be deducted under Chapter VII-B on an amount of expenditure claimed, no disallowance need be made. Before relying on the interpretation given by majority in Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra) one has to examine whether tax was deductible: (i) only on the amount paid, or (ii) only on the amount payable at the end of the financial year, or (iii) on both. If tax was deductible on both the amounts "paid" and "payable", then the distinction made by the Special Bench to the effect that section 40(a)(ia) is applicable for disallowance only on the amount "payable" as on the last day of the F.Yr. and not what is already paid during the financial year without deduction of tax is only artificial and has been rightly held as erroneous. Further, the meaning of the term "payable" as construed in Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra) is not sustainable for another reason. Though the dictionary meaning of the term "payable" has been rightly explained by the Tribunal as what is required to be paid; a debt to be discharged, legally due, or collectable, but further presumption that it means "payable" at the end of the Financial Year is not warranted. It actually means "a liability or debt created or an amount has legally become due to someone else". When a transaction is completed, the other party has completed his part of the performance in the contract, an amount legally becomes due to him and an enforceable claim of the other party crops up and then the amount becomes "payable" to him. The specified sum becomes "payable" at any time during the financial year, depending upon the accrual of the enforceable claim.
3.2.1 The term 'payable' – It clearly indicates an amount that has crystallized - The term 'payable' is not defined in the Act. The ordinary meaning of the word 'payable' is a sum/money to be paid. The term can also be understood as liability to be discharged because of the statute or by virtue of contract, though the liability to pay may have accrued at any time [Shanmugam Narayanaswami v. ITO [2005] 97 ITR 1(Hyd.)(SMC)]. This word is used with reference to the payer. It expresses an existing obligation or simply indebtedness. It also indicates a certain and fixed sum, though payable in future [CIT v. Upnishad (P.) Ltd.[2003] 131 Taxman 20 (Guj.)]. Thus, the word 'payable' used in section 40(a)(ia) can be seen to mean some amount which has become due to be paid by virtue of contract for services rendered but it still to be paid. It certainly indicates execution of work/services for which assessee is required to make the payment to the other party. It clearly indicates an amount that has crystallized.
3.3 The term 'payable' is transaction-specific - The interest accrues and is payable at the end of the specified period of the deposit. Commission or brokerage is payable when the underlying contract or transaction is completed on behalf of the assessee by the claimant of commission or brokerage. Rent or royalty becomes payable at the end of the specified period in the contract. Fee for professional or technical services becomes payable on rendering of requisite services in the contract. An amount becomes payable to a contractor when he completes the work assigned to him. Thus, the ambit of the term "payable" is not circumscribed by any particular date. It is transaction-specific. Its creation or cropping up is simultaneous to the accrual of liability. For appreciating the scope of the term "payable", one may also refer to Chapter VII-B. The tax under the provisions of Chapter VII-B is deductible in both the situations when such amount as specified in that Chapter is paid or is credited. Thus, first step is to know whether the specified amount as per section 40(a)(ia) is "payable". Second step is whether tax is deductible thereon under relevant provision of Chapter VII-B. Third step is to know as to when that amount is paid or credited to the payee. It is only at the time of third step when the specified amount which is payable and on which tax is deductible is paid or credited to the account of the payee that tax has to be simultaneously deducted from the payment or credit and the last step is to make the payment of the tax so deducted to the Central Govt. If tax is not deducted from the specified amount "paid" or "credited", or after deduction of such tax it is not paid to the Central Govt., then section 40(a)(ia) is invoked to disallow the amount paid or credited to the payee. Thus, the scope of expression "payable" is anterior in effect to the application of the terms "paid" or "credited". It is incorrect to compare "paid" with "payable", as "payable" precedes the "paid" or "credited". "Payable' here really means "accrual of liability". It is for this reason that the Legislature substituted "paid" or "credited" by the term "payable" in the final enactment.
3.4 More reasons to hold interpretation in Merilyn Shipping & Transports v. ACIT as erroneous - There is yet another reason to hold the interpretation given by the Special Bench of ITAT in Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra) as erroneous. If we exempt those taxpayers who have paid the specified amount during the financial year from the rigours of section 40(a)(ia), then in addition to it becoming discriminatory between two class of taxpayers for similar default, it further keeps the protected class of those taxpayers who have paid the specified sum without deduction of tax, (by the decision of Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra)) to additional advantage. They can retain the govt. money, being the tax deducted by them at the time of payment of the specified sum during the financial year without subjecting the concerned amount to disallowance under section 40(a)(ia). No interpretation which dilutes or makes the collection or recovery provisions otiose can be acceptable. It is not relevant that interest or penalty can be charged for this default. But mere thought of protecting a taxpayer for retaining the govt. money will not be acceptable.
There is another reason to disagree with the interpretation given by the Special Bench of the ITAT in Merilyn Shipping & Transports(supra). Merely because a sum is payable at the end of the year, it cannot be disallowed from the computation of income. It has to be further shown that it has been claimed as an expenditure in the profit and loss account while computing business income at the end of the year. This means that such amount is either credited to the account of the payee or actually paid to him, creating a simultaneous entry by debiting the P/L account. If no claim in the P/L account is made, no disallowance of such amount can be made under section 40(a)(ia). Therefore, crucial event for deciding the disallowability of specified sum is claim in the P/L account with simultaneous payment or credit thereof to the payee. It is not sufficient to know whether an amount is payable to decide invoking of section 40(a)(ia). One has to further decide about claim thereof in the P/L account. However, the impact of provisions of section 201/201(1A) and penalty provisions under section 271C are independent of section 40(a)(ia). They can be simultaneously invoked with section 40(a)(ia) or independent of it (if conditions laid down in section 40(a)(ia), like not making any claim in the P/L account are not satisfied). If tax is not deducted, though otherwise deductible under Chapter VII-B then section 201/201(1A) and penalty provisions under section 271C can be invoked, but if claim is not made in the P/L account then section 40(a)(ia) cannot be invoked.
Conclusion
4. The decision of the Special Bench of the ITAT in Merilyn Shipping & Transports (supra) centres around the interpretation of the term "payable" used in section 40(a)(ia). It is held therein that if specified amount is paid during the F.Yr., then it is not payable and, therefore, it cannot be disallowed even if tax has not been deducted or after deduction it has not been paid to the Govt. However, the Calcutta High Court and the Gujarat High Court did not approve of this view. In brief, their view was: (i) Section 40(a)(ia) creates a fiction by which the genuine payment of a specified sum claimed in the P/L account is disallowed for either not deducting the tax or after deduction for not paying to the Govt., therefore, the provision should be interpreted strictly; (ii) the debate in the Parliament does not reflect the intention of the Legislature, but it is only the final enactment which reflects the intention behind the legislation; (iii) 'Payable' means amount which has accrued in favour of payee; (iv) the assumption that it should be shown at the end of the Financial Year is like putting another condition in the provision which is not intended by the Legislature; (v) paid comes after an amount becomes payable. A sum cannot be paid unless it first becomes payable. The moment agreed work is completed, agreed services are rendered and the other party has performed its part of contract the sum would become payable. It is anterior in time as compared to term paid. Whatever is paid prior to completion of agreed work/services would only be in the nature of advance to be adjusted against final payment on completion of work/service. Therefore, it is not fair to compare "paid" and "payable" by keeping them at par and then hold that only time of payment differentiates them.
The view of the ITAT, that by not putting the expression after the word "payable" to the effect that the sum is pending/payable at the end of the accounting year is only a casus omissus is not acceptable because the casus omissus is generally supplied by the Hon'ble Apex Court and only in rare cases when the language of the Legislature is compared with some other analogous statute or if the Legislature had different intention in mind, while framing the provision.
Thus, for the above reasons the decision of the Special Bench in MerilynShipping & Transports (supra) does not lay down a correct law and it was rightly disapproved by the Hon'ble High Courts in Md. Jakir Hossain Mondal (supra); Crescent Export Syndicate (supra) &Sikandarkhan N Tunvar (supra).
IT : Where material facts, namely, purchase of flat along with details, like, location and description of flat and proof of payment was filed along with return in respect of exemption claimed under section 54, it could not be held that assessee had failed to disclose material facts for assessment, and, thus, reassessment proceedings were to be quashed
■■■
[2013] 35 taxmann.com 364 (Gujarat)
HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Shirish C. Parikh
v.
Income-tax Officer*
MS. HARSHA DEVANI AND MS. BELA TRIVEDI, JJ.
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7822 OF 2001
APRIL 1, 2011
Section 147, read with section 54, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Income escaping assessment - Non-disclosure of primary facts [To disallow exemption under section 54] - Assessment year 1991-92 - Assessee claimed exemption under section 54 on ground that he had purchased a flat - Claim was accepted in original assessment - Subsequently assessment was sought to be reopened on ground that receipts filed could not prove investment of purchase of flat and that no evidence like purchase deed, etc., were obtainable on records - Whether material facts, namely, purchase of flat along with details, like, location and description of flat and proof of payment were filed along with return, it could not be held that assessee had failed to disclose material facts for assessment - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, reopening of assessment after four years could not be sustained - Held, yes [Paras 10 & 11] [In favour of assessee]
FACTS
■ | The assessee claimed exemption under section 54 on the ground that he had purchased a flat. In the statement of income filed along with return, the assessee had stated the description of the property as well as the purchase price. | |
■ | The Assessing Officer accepted claim for exemption under section 54 in the assessment proceedings completed under section 143(3). | |
■ | Subsequently, the Assessing Officer issued notice under section 148 to the assessee stating that since the receipts filed could not prove the investment made for purchase of flat, and also no evidence like purchase deed, etc., were obtainable on record, the same amounted to failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. | |
■ | On writ petition: |
HELD
■ | Under section 54 if in the case of an assessee the capital gain arises from transfer of a long term capital gain as envisaged under the said provision and the assessee within a period of one year before or two years after the date on which the transfer took place, inter alia, has purchased a residential house, then to that extent the capital gain shall not be charged under section 45. A perusal of the prescribed return form as existing at the relevant time and the notes thereto indicates that there was no requirement of producing any document like purchase deed, etc., at the time of assessment proceedings in support of a claim for exemption under section 54. In respect of his claim for exemption under section 54 the petitioner in the statement of income had stated the material facts, namely, that the assessee had purchased a flat at Shreeji Apartment, Near Law Garden, Ahmedabad, for Rs. 4,15,000. It appears that at the time of original assessment, the assessee has produced proof of payment by submitting receipts of two parties, (1) 'G'; and (2) 'S'. The Assessing Officer, at the relevant time, on the basis of the material produced by the assessee, has accepted the claim for exemption under section 54. [Para 9] | |
■ | From the language employed in section 147, it is evident that what is required to be submitted is material facts. In the present case, as noted hereinabove, the material facts, namely, purchase of the flat for Rs. 4,15,000 along with other details like location and description of the flat have been stated in the statement of income submitted along with the return. Proof of payment of the aforesaid sum had been produced by way of two receipts. According to the respondent, the assessee had not produced material facts by way of proof of investment and purchase deed, etc. As noted hereinabove, the section requires furnishing of material facts and not submission of proof thereof. In fact wherever proof of a transaction or a claim is required to be furnished, the Act and the rules impose an obligation on the assessee to produce the same. In respect of a claim under section 54 there is no such requirement. It appears that the respondent has mixed up the requirement of submitting material facts with the submission of proof. In the opinion of this Court, submission of proof cannot be equated with furnishing of material facts and as such, the contention raised on behalf of the Revenue that the assessee has failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment as he had not submitted the proof of investment made for the purchase of flat as well as purchase deed, does not merit acceptance. [Para 10] | |
■ | Moreover, in the entire reasons recorded, except for stating that the receipts filed could not prove investment of purchase of flat and that no evidence like purchase deed, etc., were obtainable on records, there is not even a whisper to the effect that there is any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. The reasons recorded do not speak of any obligation on the assessee to produce such documents or that by not producing the same the assessee had failed to disclose full and true material facts. All that is stated that in absence of the said documents exemption granted under section 54 as inadmissible. In the affidavit in reply it has been averred that the assessee had not disclosed fully and truly all material facts in support of his claim for claiming exemption under section 54. However, no foundation is laid in respect of the said averment in the reasons recorded. Moreover, as noted hereinabove, the assessee was required to state material facts in respect of the claim for exemption under section 54 which he had duly stated, hence, merely because the Assessing Officer who has sought to reopen the assessment finds the proof submitted by the assessee at the time of assessment proceedings to be not sufficient for the purpose of admitting the claim, it cannot be said that there was any failure on the part of the assessee so as to invoke the provisions of section 147. The impugned notice under section 148, therefore, cannot be sustained. [Para 11] |
S.N. Soparkar for the Petitioner. Mrs. Mauna M. Bhatt for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
Ms. Harsha Devani, J. - By this petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the notice dated March 30, 2001, issued by the respondent under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ("the Act") reopening the petitioner's assessment for the assessment year 1991-92.
2. The petitioner, an individual, filed his return of income for the assessment year 1991-92 declaring total income of Rs. 83,400. The case of the petitioner was selected for scrutiny assessment and the assessment came to be framed on January 28, 1994, under section 143(3) of the Act at a total income of Rs. 1,26,120.
3. Thereafter, the petitioner received the impugned notice dated March 30, 2001, reopening the assessment for the assessment year 1991-92. The petitioner requested the respondent to supply the reasons recorded by him for reopening the assessment, pursuant to which a copy of the reasons recorded came to be furnished. Upon perusing the reasons recorded, according to the petitioner, the respondent had no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment, he, therefore, filed the present petition challenging the aforesaid notice.
4. Mr. S. N. Soparkar, senior advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that, in the present case, the impugned notice has been issued on March 30, 2001, in relation to the assessment year 1991-92 which is clearly beyond a period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. It was submitted that an assessment framed under section 143(3) of the Act can be reopened beyond a period of four years only if an income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment by reason of failure on the part of the petitioner : (i) to make a return under section 139 or in response to a notice issued under sub-section (1) of section 142 or section 148 ; or (ii) to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. It was submitted that, admittedly, the first situation is not present in this case. It was further submitted that on a perusal of the reasons recorded, it is apparent that there is no allegation to the effect that the petitioner has not disclosed fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment, and as such, the second situation is also not satisfied. Hence, the very assumption of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer under section 147 of the Act is invalid.
5. Referring to the reasons recorded, it was submitted that, according to the respondent, the receipts filed by the petitioner showing deposit of amounts with two parties could not prove the investment made in the purchase of flat and that evidence like purchase deed, etc., was not obtainable on record. Inviting attention to the statement of income submitted by the petitioner at the time of the original assessment, Mr. Soparkar pointed out that it was clearly stated therein that the petitioner had purchased a flat at Shreeji Apartment, Near Law Garden, Ahmedabad. It was submitted that before an assessment is framed there are two stages when documents or other material are to be submitted by the assessee. At the first stage, while filing the return of income, when the assessee is required to furnish all the information and documents as required under the Act and the rules framed thereunder. At the second stage, if the Assessing Officer during the course of assessment proceedings calls for any further information or production of documents the assessee is required to furnish the same. It was submitted that the test of full and true disclosure has to be considered in the light of the relevant statutory provisions. It was submitted under the Income-tax Act or the rules framed thereunder there is no obligation cast on the petitioner to submit purchase deed while claiming exemption under section 54 of the Act. The calculation of capital gains by the petitioner in the statement of income submitted by him clearly shows purchase of property for Rs. 4,15,000 in respect of which exemption had been claimed under section 54 of the Act. It was submitted that during the course of original assessment proceedings the petitioner had produced proof to the satisfaction of the then Assessing Officer who had accordingly allowed the exemption under section 54 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, to sustain an allegation of failure there has to be an obligation cast on the petitioner to submit purchase deed while filing the return or during the course of assessment proceedings. There being no such obligation, it cannot be said that there was any omission or failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment.
6. Opposing the petition Mr. M. R. Bhatt, senior advocate, learned counsel for the respondent invited attention to the reasons recorded, to submit that the petitioner had merely submitted two receipts showing that he had deposited an amount of Rs. 4,15,000 with two different parties, which were not sufficient to prove the investment made for purchase of flats. It was submitted that by not producing supporting evidence like purchase deed, etc., evidencing proof of purchase of the flat in support of his claim for exemption of the said amount under section 54 of the Act, the petitioner had failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment and as such, the Assessing Officer is justified in invoking the provisions of section 147 of the Act, even beyond the period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year.
7. In the present case, the original assessment came to be framed under section 143(3) of the Act and admittedly the assessment is sought to be reopened after the expiry of a period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, hence, the proviso to section 147 of the Act would clearly be attracted. In the circumstances for the Assessing Officer to assume valid jurisdiction under section 147 of the Act, two conditions precedent are required to be satisfied. Firstly, that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment ; and, secondly, that such escapement is by reason of failure on the part of the petitioner to (i) make a return under section 139 or in response to a notice issued under sub-section (1) of section 142 or section 148 ; or (ii) disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. In the present case, admittedly, the first situation does not exist. In the circumstances, for the purpose of assumption of valid jurisdiction on the part of the Assessing Officer, he should have reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment by reason of failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment.
8. In the light of the aforesaid legal position, what is required to be examined is as to whether there was any failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose full and true material facts which has resulted into escapement of income. In this regard, a perusal of the reasons recorded indicates that the sole ground on which assessment is sought to be reopened is that the petitioner had been allowed exemption of Rs. 4,15,000 for the purchase of a residential house while computing his income, and that, in support of such purchase the petitioner had produced receipts showing deposit of the said amount with two different parties, viz., M/s. Gopinath Corporation and M/s. Shreehari Association. According to the respondent, since the receipts filed could not prove the investment made for purchase of flat, and also no evidence like purchase deed, etc., were obtainable on record, the same amounts to failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts.
9. The question that, therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether not furnishing the purchase deed, etc., at the time of the original assessment amounts to omission or failure to disclose full and true material facts as contemplated under the proviso to section 147 of the Act. The material on record indicates that the petitioner had, in his return of income, claimed exemption under section 54 of the Act on the ground that he has purchased a flat at Shreeji Apartment, near Law Garden, Ahmedabad. In the statement of income filed along with the return, the petitioner had stated the description of the property as well as the purchase price. Under section 54 of the Act, if in the case of an assessee the capital gain arises from transfer of a long term capital gain as envisaged under the said provision and the assessee within a period of one year before or two years after the date on which the transfer took place, inter alia, has purchased a residential house, then to that extent the capital gain shall not be charged under section 45 of the Act. A perusal of the prescribed return form as existing at the relevant time and the notes thereto indicates that there was no requirement of producing any document like purchase deed, etc., at the time of assessment proceedings in support of a claim for exemption under section 54 of the Act. In respect of his claim for exemption under section 54 of the Act the petitioner in the statement of income had stated the material facts, namely, that the petitioner had purchased a flat at Shreeji Apartment, Near Law Garden, Ahmedabad, for Rs. 4,15,000. It appears that at the time of original assessment, the petitioner has produced proof of payment by submitting receipts of two parties, (1) M/s. Gopinath Corporation ; and (2)Shreehari Association. The Assessing Officer, at the relevant time, on the basis of the material produced by the petitioner, has accepted the claim for exemption under section 54 of the Act.
10. From the language employed in section 147 of the Act, it is evident that what is required to be submitted is material facts. In the present case, as noted hereinabove, the material facts, namely, purchase of the flat for Rs.4,15,000 along with other details like location and description of the flat have been stated in the statement of income submitted along with the return. Proof of payment of the aforesaid sum had been produced by way of two receipts issued by M/s. Gopinath Corporation and Shreehari Association. According to the respondent, the petitioner had not produced material facts by way of proof of investment and purchase deed, etc. As noted hereinabove, the section requires furnishing of material facts and not submission of proof thereof. In fact wherever proof of a transaction or a claim is required to be furnished, the Act and the rules impose an obligation on the assessee to produce the same. In respect of a claim under section 54 there is no such requirement. It appears that the respondent has mixed up the requirement of submitting material facts with the submission of proof. In the opinion of this court, submission of proof cannot be equated with furnishing of material facts and as such, the contention raised on behalf of the Revenue that the assessee has failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment as he had not submitted the proof of investment made for the purchase of flat as well as purchase deed, does not merit acceptance.
11. Moreover, in the entire reasons recorded, except for stating that the receipts filed could not prove investment of purchase of flat and that no evidence like purchase deed, etc., were obtainable on records, there is not even a whisper to the effect that there is any failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. The reasons recorded do not speak of any obligation on the petitioner to produce such documents or that by not producing the same the petitioner had failed to disclose full and true material facts. All that is stated that in absence of the said documents exemption granted under section 54 of the Act was inadmissible. In the affidavit-in-reply it has been averred that the petitioner had not disclosed fully and truly all material facts in support of his claim for claiming exemption under section 54 of the Act. However, no foundation is laid in respect of the said averment in the reasons recorded. Moreover, as noted hereinabove, the petitioner was required to state material facts in respect of the claim for exemption under section 54 of the Act which he had duly stated, hence, merely because the Assessing Officer who has sought to reopen the assessment finds the proof submitted by the petitioner at the time of assessment proceedings to be not sufficient for the purpose of admitting the claim, it cannot be said that there was any failure on the part of the petitioner so as to invoke the provisions of section 147 of the Act. The impugned notice under section 148 of the Act, therefore, cannot be sustained.
12. For the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned notice dated March 30, 2001, issued under section 148 of the Act for the assessment year 1991-92 (annexure A to the petition) is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.
2013-TIOL-589-HC-AHM-IT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
AT AHMEDABAD
Special Civil Application No. 16062 of 2012
JAGAT JAYANTILAL PARIKH
Vs
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
Akil Kureshi And Sonia Gokani, JJ
Dated : February 28, 2013
Appellant Rep. by : Mr. Manish J Shah, Adv
Respondent Rep. by : Mrs Mauna M Bhatt, Adv
Respondent Rep. by : Mrs Mauna M Bhatt, Adv
Income Tax - Writ - Sections 37, 147, 148 - key words - "audit party", "objective opinion", "application of mind" - Whether assessment can be reopened at the mere behest of the objections raised by the audit party, when the AO was himself not convinced with such objections - Whether the AO can be said to have independently applied his mind, when the reasons recorded for reopening assessment are almost identical to the objections raised by the audit party - Whether no assessment can be reopened based on the observations of the audit party, even though when the AO has formed his own objective independent opinion on such reassessment
The assessee, Shri Jagat Jayant Parikh, an individual, a dealer in securities, filed its return of income for the AY 2007-2008 declaring total income, including salary income at Rs.1,89,040. The return was processed accepting the same income. Thereafter, the return was selected for scrutiny and the same was finalized determining total income Rs. 2,12,320.
Audit scrutiny of the assessment records revealed that the assessee had returned gross total salary income of Rs. 2,99,040 and gross business loss of Rs.15,85,666 as per the statement of computation of total income. It was, further, noticed that the assessee had debited an amount of Rs. 1,24, 31,189.18 towards â€Å“Provision for purchase (short sale-inclusive of interest) in the Money Market Trading Account and out of this, an amount of Rs. 52, 65, 699.26 had been credited towards â€Å“Provision for purchase reversed .†The net loss of Rs. 13, 22, 953.43 of this Money Market Trading Account was debited to the Profit and Loss Account and net business loss of Rs. 11, 52, 464 was take for computation of business income. After adjustment of various items including depreciation etc., the net business loss of Rs. 15,85,666 was claimed to be carried forward for set off in future assessment years.
Thus, allowance of net provision of Rs.71,65,489.92 (1,24,31,189.18- 52,65,699) was not, therefore, laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business or profession and was, therefore, not an admissible expenditure being a provisionally. On the basis of such audit objection, notice had been issued to the assessee without furnishing copy of reasons recorded for reopening the assessment. Later on reasons were furnished to the assessee vide letter dated 22.08.2012, which almost similarly worded as the audit objection.
Aggrieved, the assessee has filed this writ petition before the High Court.
The counsel of the assessee raised an objection that the notice was based on one of the issues, already previously raised in the scrutiny assessment. Further, the AO had not applied his mind independently, but acted on the objection of audit party and reopening, therefore, was based on the change of opinion only. The counsel has also taken a firm stand that while issuing notice for reopening the assessment, action has been initiated at the instance of the audit party and therefore also, notice was contrary to the well laid down ratio that any notice for reopening solely on the objection of audit party without application of mind, cannot be sustained.
On the other hand, the Departmental Representative contended that the AO has independently examined the question. It was further submitted that the AO had a reason to believe that taxable income since has escaped assessment. Further it was urged that the AO, on the basis of the report of the audit party, has right to form his own opinion with respect to escapement of the income and only because the indication has come from the audit party, that itself cannot be the ground of holding the opinion of the AO invalid.
Having heard the parties, the High Court held that,
+ it is thus clear from this communication that the Assessing Officer himself was convinced that audit party's query was raised on wrong understanding of accounting principles and on failure to differentiate between business expenditure and personal expenditure. The Assessing Officer also opined that as far as the personal expenditure was concerned that was pure and simple business expenditure on which liability was booked on provisional value till the actual event get crystallized;
+ it is a well laid down principle that the Assessing Officer requires to form his own belief at the time of reopening the assessment & while issuing notice of reopening. However, on having noticed certain aspects from the report of the audit party if the Assessing Officer chooses to form his opinion to reopen, validity of reopening of such assessment cannot be challenged on the ground of such reopening of assessment being at the instance of audit party;
+on 01.04.1989, after the Amending Act, 1989, the powers of reopening assessment under Section 147 have been made very wide. What is predominantly questioned in this petition is the absence of exercise of powers given by the Statute under Section 147 by the Assessing Officer and his having reopened the assessment despite his own objection. The Assessing Officer needs to have reason to believe that income has escaped assessment for any assessment year. The term reason to believe provided in Section 147 of the Act would indicate that it is his own subjective satisfaction based on reasonable grounds;
+ under the circumstances, it clearly emerges from the record that the Assessing Officer was of the opinion that no part of the income of the assessee has escaped assessment. In fact, after the audit party brought the relevant aspects to the notice of the AO, she held correspondence with the assessee. Taking into account the assessee's explanation regarding non-requirement of TDS collection and ultimately accepted the explanation concluding that in view of the Board's circular, tax was not required to be deducted at source. No income had therefore escaped assessment. Despite such opinion of the Assessing Officer, when ultimately the impugned notice came to be issued the only conclusion we can reach is that the Assessing Officer had acted at the behest of and on the insistence of the audit party. It is well settled that it is only the Assessing Officer whose opinion with respect to the income escaping assessment would be relevant for the purpose of reopening of closed assessment. It is, of course true, as held by the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of P.V.S.Beedies Pvt. Ltd. and Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society, if the audit party brings certain aspects to the notice of the Assessing Officer and thereupon, the Assessing Officer forms his own belief, it may still be a valid basis for reopening assessment. However, in the other line of judgment noted by us, it has clearly been held that mere opinion of the Audit Party cannot form the basis for the Assessing Officer to reopen the closed assessment that too beyond four years from the end of relevant assessment year.†;
+ as is more than apparent, assessment was completed on scrutiny. In post assessment period, audit party raised the objection and Assessing Officer had strongly objected to such objections by communicating internally as mentioned hereinabove. In such background, reasons for reopening if are noted, they are almost identically worded as that of audit report. No material worth the name emerges to indicate any independent application of mind. Facts are quite glaring on the contrary & they clearly establish absence of subjective satisfaction of Assessing Officer. Thus, the ground raised by the petitioner that such notice of reopening is invalid for the Assessing Officer having not formed his independent belief requires to be sustained.
Assessee's writ petition allowed
Case followed:
Cadila Healthcare Limited
JUDGEMENT
Per : Sonia Gokani, J :
1. The petitioner is an individual assessed in the same status for last several years under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short, hereinafter referred to as â€Å“the Act†). The petitioner herein has challenged the validity of the notice issued under Section-148 of the Act dated 21.11.2011, seeking to reopen the assessment framed by the Assessing Officer on scrutiny under Section-143(3) of the Act for the Assessment Year 2007-2008. The facts & details for appreciating the issue raised by the petitioner herein in the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are as under.
1.1 The petitioner, in the Assessment Year 2007-2008, declared his total income of Rs.1,89,040/- in the return filed by him under Section 139 of Act. The statement of income and audit report under Section 44AB accompanied the return. In the audit report, under the heading of â€Å“Money Market Trading Account-Tax Free†reflected computation of the transaction. The petitioner had claimed a net loss of Rs.13,22,953.43 in one account. All other accounts clubbed together had shown a net loss of Rs.11,52,464/-.
1.2 A notice under Section 143(2) was issued on 30.10.2009. A letter was addressed by the petitioner-assessee to the Assessing Officer on 09.11.2009, inter alia, urging that qualitative particulars along with valuation had already been furnished in terms of the account. On the basis thereof, the Assessing Officer completed scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3) & passed an order on 14.12.2009.
1.3 Subsequent thereto, it emerges from record that the audit objection in this regard was raised. The Assessing officer, of course, did not agree with office objection. However, on 21.11.2011, the petitioner received a notice under Section 148 of the Act for reopening of the assessment on the ground that the income of the petitioner has escaped the assessment & he was directed to file his return within 30 days.
1.4 The return was submitted by the petitioner and the ground was raised in the communication dated 20.12.2011 that such reopening was in direct response to the audit objection which was untenable as advance sale securities is a regular feature in the petitioner's business. Request was made for furnishing of copies of return. The reasons were furnished vide letter dated 22.08.2012 which are required to be reproduced as under:
â€Å“It is seen that you had returned gross total salary income of Rs.2,99,040 and gross business loss of Rs.15,85,666 as per the statements of computation of total income. It is further, noticed that you have debited an amount of Rs.1,24,31,189 towards â€Å“provision for purchase†(short sale-inclusive of interest) in the Money Market Trading Account and out of this, an amount of Rs.52,65,699/- had been credited towards â€Å“provision for purchases reversed.†The net loss of Rs.13,22,953.43 of this Money Market Trading Account was debited to the Profit & Loss Account and net business loss of Rs.11,52,464/- was taken for computation of business income. After adjustment of various items depreciation etc. the net business loss of Rs.15,85,666 was claimed to be carried forward for set off in future assessment years. Thus, allowance of net provision of Rs.71,65,489.92 (1,24,189.18-52,65,669) was not therefore, laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business profession and was, therefore, not an admissible expenditure leaving a provision only. Thus there was escapement of taxable income for the assessment year 2007- 2008, and as such notice u/s. 148 has been issued.â€
1.5 Objections were filed by the petitioner on 05.09.2012 wherein it is emphasized that the said notice is nothing but a mere change of opinion on the part of the Assessing Officer. Instead of dealing with these objections and pass any order, Assessing Officer passed straightway an assessment order dated 17.10.2012 making an addition of Rs.71,65,490/- and sent a demand notice dated 17.10.2012 of Rs.34,96,100/-.
1.6 Resultantly, this petition with a prayer to quash and set aside the notice.
2. On issuance of notice to the other side, affidavit-in-reply has been filed by the Deputy Commissioner, Income-tax, denying all averments of the petition. It is urged that the notice has been issued as the income chargeable to the tax has escaped the assessment and the reasons recorded are also provided for such reopening. The assessee also appeared during the re-assessment proceedings and sought various details. It is further contended that the assessee-petitioner had not objected to such reopening. It is only after tax liability fixed to the tune of Rs.34,96,100/-, such objection have been raised.
2.1 It is further contended that the petitioner has also filed an appeal before the CIT (A) and on his having availed alternative remedy, this petition is not maintainable.
3. Heard learned senior counsel Mr. J.P. Shah with learned counsel Mr. M.J. Shah for the petitioner who submitted that the notice is based on one of the issues, already previously raised in the scrutiny assessment. The Assessing Officer had not applied his mind independently but acted on the objection of audit party and reopening, therefore, is based on the change of opinion only. Learned counsel has also taken a firm stand that while issuing notice for reopening the assessment, action has been initiated at the instance of the audit party and therefore also, notice is contrary to the well laid down ratio that any notice for reopening solely on the objection of audit party without application of mind, cannot be sustained. He further urged that even the basis of the plea that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, lacks validity. It is urged further that the Assessing Officer has proceeded to frame fresh assessment without disposing of the objections of the petitioner separately and thereby, violated the ratio laid down by the Apex Court reported in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. I.T.O. reported 259 ITR 19 = (2002-TIOL-634-SC-IT).
4.1 Learned counsel Ms. Mauna Bhatt has objected to entertain this petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to her, the Assessing Officer has independently examined the question. She has further submitted that the Assessing Officer had a reason to believe that taxable income since has escaped assessment, impugned notice requires no interference at this stage.
4.2 Learned counsel has also urged that the Assessing Officer, on the basis of the report of the audit party, has right to form his own opinion with respect to escapement of the income and only because the indication has come from the audit party, that itself cannot be the ground of holding the opinion of the Assessing Officer invalid.
5. Upon thus hearing both the sides and also on perusal of the original file of the Assessing Officer pertaining to the assessment in question, this petition requires to succeed for the following reasons.
5.1 As can be noted from submissions made by both the sides, on three grounds, challenge is made to the notice of re-assessment.
i) On scrutiny assessment, the issue raised in the impugned notice has been finalized and therefore, this notice of reopening is nothing but only a change of opinion on the part of the Assessing Officer.ii) The Assessing Officer proceeded to frame fresh assessment without disposing of the objections by a separate reasoned order and thereby, violated the law on the subject.iii) Despite the initial disagreement of Assessing Officer to the objections raised by the audit party, this notice of reopening is issued only at the instance of the audit party.
5.2 Taking firstly, the last contention of the petitioner, it can be noted that for the Assessment Year 2007-2008, a return of income was filed by the petitioner on 31.10.2007, giving all details and statements coupled with the audit report. A notice was issued by the Assessing Officer under Section 143(2) on 30.10.2009 which was replied to on 09.11.2009. It also enclosed along with the monthly particulars of the trading in G-Security, MMD and Bonds by further mentioning that qualitative particulars with money value had already been given in the account. No further queries were raised and the assessment order was passed on 14.12.2009 on scrutiny, under Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act taking into account all these aspects.
5.3 It appears that, subsequent to this, audit objections were raised in the following manner:
â€Å“Under Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, any expenditure, not being expenditure of the nature described in Section 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital or personal expenses of the assessee laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business or profession shall be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head â€Å“Profit and gains of business or profession.The assessee, Shri Jagat Jayant Parikh, an individual, a dealer in securities, filed its return of income for the Assessment Year 2007-2008 on 30.10.2007 declaring total income, including salary income at Rs.1,89,040 under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The return was processed on 19.3.2009 accepting the same income. Thereafter, the return was selected for security under Section 143(3) and the same was finalized on 24.12.2009 determining total income Rs. 2,12,320.Audit scrutiny of the assessment records revealed that the assessee had returned gross total salary income of Rs. 2,99,040 and gross business loss of Rs.15,85,666 as per the statement of computation of total income. It is, further, noticed that the assessee had debited an amount of Rs. 1,24, 31,189.18 towards â€Å“Provision for purchase (short sale-inclusive of interest) in the Money Market Trading Account and out of this, an amount of Rs. 52, 65, 699.26 had been credited towards â€Å“Provision for purchase reversed .†The net loss of Rs. 13, 22, 953.43 of this Money Market Trading Account was debited to the Profit and Loss Account and net business loss of Rs. 11, 52, 464 was take for computation of business income. After adjustment of various items including depreciation etc., the net business loss of Rs. 15,85,666 was claimed to be carried forward for set off in future assessment years.Thus, allowance of net provision of Rs.71,65,489.92(1,24,31,189.18- 52,65,699) was not, therefore, laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business or profession and was, therefore, not an admissible expenditure being a provisionally.This resulted in irregular allowance of expenses of Rs. 71,65,490 involving short levy of tax of Rs. 32,07,832 as mentioned belowâ€
5.4 On the basis of such audit objection, notice had been issued to the petitioner on 21.11.2012 under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without furnishing copy of reasons recorded for reopening the assessment. The same were supplied to the assessee on 29.08.2012. The reasons recorded are as follows:
â€Å“It will be appreciated that under section 37 of the Income tax act, 1961, any expenditure, not being expenditure of the nature described in section 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure of personal expenses of the assessee laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of profession shall be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head â€Å“Profit and gains of business or profession.It is seen that you are a dealer in Securities. You filed return of income for the A.Y.2007-2008 on 3.10.2007 declaring total income, including salary income at Rs.1,89,040. The return was processed on 19.03.2009 accepting the same income. Thereafter, the return was selected for scrutiny under section 143(3) and the same was finalized on 24.12.2009 determining total income at Rs.2,12,320.It is seen that you had returned gross total salary income of Rs.2,99,040/- and gross business loss of Rs.15,85,666/- as per the statements of computation of total income. It is further noticed that you have debited an amount of Rs.1,24,31,189 towards â€Å“provision for purchase†(short sale-inclusive of interest) in the Money Market Trading Account and out of this, an amount of Rs.52,65,699/- had been credited towards â€Å“provision for purchases reversed†. The net loss of Rs.13,22,953.43 of this Money Market Trading Account was debited to the Profit & Loss Account and net business loss of Rs.11,52,464/- was take for computation of business income. After adjustment of various items depreciation etc., the net business loss of Rs.15,85,666/- was claimed to be carried forward for set off in future assessment years. Thus, allowance of net provision of Rs.71,65,489.92 (1,24,189.18 â€" 52,65,669) was not therefore, laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business profession and was, therefore, not an admissible expenditure leaving a provision only. Thus there was escapement of taxable income for the assessment year 2007-08, and as such notice u/s.148 has been issued.â€
5.5 After such reasons were supplied to the petitioner which are similarly worded as the objection of audit party, he addressed a letter dated 08.10.2012 to the Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, containing specifically that all these aspects have been duly examined and this is nothing but a change of opinion on the part of the Assessing Officer. It was also contended that the inquiry based on the report of the audit party cannot be the ground for reopening the assessment & entire issue for which reopening was done, was examined in scrutiny assessment by stating thus.
â€Å“[5] Sir, a sale is complete only when the delivery is made. The Assessee maintains the books of account of Mercantile basis and hence a contract is recorded when prices tend to move in either directions or real time basis. However, a sale remains incomplete when the goods are not delivered. And it is for this reason that an incomplete sale cannot contribute to the profit or loss for any period. It is equally true that accounting entries do not create an income or expenditure and Court have ruled in number of cases that Income Tax is not dependent on the accounting entries passed. Under the circumstances the sales recorded in our books does not give rise to any surplus or loss. However by way of abundant caution the assessee has balance a contractual sale (incomplete) by way of purchases MTM against these incomplete sales to ascertain true profit for the said previous year, had the transaction was completed at the year end at prices prevailing on last day of the previous year.[6] Your Honor's observation that any provision in the books does not constitute expenditure and hence must be disallowed does not hold good ground. The proposal to tax the difference between provision for purchase in the beginning of the year and the provision at year end is mere hypothetical and has no legal or account base. The description â€Å“provision for purchase†is a nomenclature to describe purchases at MTM for all pending sale deals and cannot be treated at par with any accounting provision to meet any contingent future liability.â€
5.6 In the instant case, we deemed it appropriate to call for the record of the Assessing Officer for our perusal.
5.7 It could be noticed from the said record that the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax had serious objections to the said report of audit party & vide his letter dated 23.03.2011 addressed to the Senior Audit Officer, he, in his communication, ventilated his objections in following fashion:
â€Å“2. The main contention of the Audit Party is that the assessee has debited an amount of Rs.1,24,31,189 towards the provision of purchase and out of this an amount of Rs.52,65,699 has been credited towards provisions for purchase reverse. The provisions for the expenses is not admissible expenditure.3. The audit objection raised is not acceptable as it is contrary to the facts of the case. It may be mentioned that every expenditure related to business transaction is allowable in Income tax and when there is a determined and defined expenditure there is entry in the books of accounts. When such defined but indetermined expenditure in incurred, it referred to as provision. This provision is allowable as expenditure in Income Tax Act. Only un ascertained transactions when provided, are disallowed.4. In the present case of the assessee is a dealer in securities, transactions of buying and selling are defined and determined. These are based on deals entered into at the relevant time. However, when sale-deal is entered into without holding the stock of the said script, these are settled by bought deal at a future date, either by delivery or settlement of difference in price prevailing on the date of settlement. In such cases, transactions are defined but purchase price is not determined till the date of settlement. It gets determined on the date of settlement.5. When such a deal is entered into just prior to the date of annual closing day, i.e. before 31st March, actual profit or loss gets divided between two financial years. The same needs to be bifurcated based on the price prevailing on the last day of the financial year. Here, assessee made the entries in the books for short sale of securities and provided for purchase of those securities on the last day of Financial year at prices prevailing on that day. Thus correct profit or loss for this financial year can be ascertained. In the subsequent year, this provision for purchaser are reversed on the first day of the Financial year and when actual purchases are made, the net profit or loss relating to subsequent financial year is ascertained. Thus correct bifurcation of profit/loss between two financial years get ascertained and taxed in respective years.6. The provision sought to be disallowed is not appropriation of profit or contingent expenditure or income of the assessee but a liquidated, ascertained and defined liability as creditors for purchases and purchase of stock is reflected in the books of accounts. This is basic and fundamental principle of accountancy and only method to ascertain correct profit or loss for any financial year.7. Thus query raised by the audit party is based on the wrong understanding of accounting principles and failure to differentiate between business expenditure and personal expenditure. This provision has no personal nature of expenditure. It is pure and simple business expenditure for which liability is booked on provisional value till the actual event get crystalized.â€
5.8 It is thus clear from this communication that the Assessing Officer himself was convinced that audit party's query was raised on wrong understanding of accounting principles and on failure to differentiate between business expenditure and personal expenditure. The Assessing Officer also opined that as far as the personal expenditure was concerned that was pure and simple business expenditure on which liability was booked on provisional value till the actual event get crystalized.
5.9 It is a well laid down principle that the Assessing Officer requires to form his own belief at the time of reopening the assessment & while issuing notice of reopening. However, on having noticed certain aspects from the report of the audit party if the Assessing Officer chooses to form his opinion to reopen, validity of reopening of such assessment cannot be challenged on the ground of such reopening of assessment being at the instance of audit party.
5.10 On 01.04.1989, after the Amending Act, 1989, the powers of reopening assessment under Section 147 have been made very wide. What is predominantly questioned in this petition is the absence of exercise of powers given by the Statute under Section 147 by the Assessing Officer and his having reopened the assessment despite his own objection. The Assessing Officer needs to have reason to believe that income has escaped assessment for any assessment year. The term reason to believe provided in Section 147 of the Act would indicate that it is his own subjective satisfaction based on reasonable grounds.
5.11 This Court has also examined identical issue in yet another matter where other judgments of the Apex Court on the issue are also taken into account. It would be relevant to reproduce some of the relevant paragraphs from the case of Cadila Healthcare Limited (supra), as under:
â€Å“Counsel vehemently contended that the entire issue has cropped up on the insistence of the Audit Party. He submitted that mere opinion of the audit party cannot form a basis for the Assessing Officer to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. In this regard, counsel relied on the following decisions :(i) CIT v. Lucas T.V.S. Ltd., 249 ITR 306 in which the Apex Court upheld the the decision of the High Court in which the High Court had quashed the reopening proceedings wherein apart from the information furnished by the audit party, the Income Tax Officer had no other information for reopening the assessment.(ii) Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. ITO, (2011) 15 Taxmann.com. 170 (Gujarat) wherein Division Bench of this Court was pleased to quash the notice for reopening where the only basis was the revenue audit objection as regards the eligibility of the assessee for exemption.(iii) Adani Exports v. Deputy C.I.T., 240 ITR 224 wherein Division Bench of this Court held as under:Court held as under: â€Å“It is true that satisfaction of the assessing officer for the purpose of reopening is subjective in character and the scope of judicial review is limited. When the reasons recorded show a nexus between the formation of belief and the escapement of income, a further enquiry about the adequacy or sufficiency of the material to reach such belief is not open to be scrutinised. However, it is always open to question existence of such belief on the ground that what has been stated is not correct state of affairs existing on record. Undoubtedly, in the face of record, burden lies, and heavily lies, on the petitioner who challenges it. If the petitioner is able to demonstrate that in fact the assessing officer did not have any reason to believe or did not hold such belief in good faith or the belief which is projected in papers is not belief held by him in fact, the exercise of authority conferred on such person would be ultra vires the provisions of law and would be abuse of such authority. As the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court indicates that though audit objection may serve as information, the basis of which the ITO can act, ultimate action must depend directly and solely on the formation of belief by the ITO on his own where such information passed on to him by the audit that income has escaped assessment. In the present case, by scrupulously analysing the audit objection in great detail, the assessing officer has demonstrably shown to have held the belief prior to the issuance of notice as well as after the issuance of notice that the original assessment was not erroneous and so far as he was concerned, he did not believe at any time that income has escaped assessment on account of erroneous computation of benefit u/s 80HHC. He has been consistent in his submission of his report to the superior officers. The mere fact that as a subordinate officer he added the suggestion that if his view is not accepted, remedial actions may be taken cannot be said to be belief held by him. He has no authority to surrender or abdicate his function to his superiors, nor the superiors can arrogate to themselves such authority. It needs hardly to be stated that in such circumstances conclusion is irresistible that the belief that income has escaped assessment was not held at all by the officer having jurisdiction to issue notice and recording under the office note on 8.2.97 that he has reason to believe is a mere pretence to give validity to the exercise of power. In other words, it was a colourable exercise of jurisdiction by the assessing officer by recording reasons for holding a belief which in fact demonstrably he did not held that income of assessee has escaped assessment due to erroneous computation of deduction u/s 80HHC, for the reasons stated by the audit. The reason is not far to seek.â€
On the other hand, learned counsel Shri Bhatt appearing for the Revenue opposed the petition contending that the petitioner had not made full and true disclosures in the return filed. Relying on the explanation to section 147, counsel submitted that mere indication that any tax was required to be deducted at source in the return would not absolve the assessee from disclosing other relevant aspects.
Counsel further submitted that the Assessing Officer, on the basis of what is pointed out by the audit party, can still form his own opinion with respect to escapement of income and merely because it was pointed out by the Audit party would not render his opinion invalid or the notice illegal. In this regard, counsel relied on the decision of C.I.T. v. P.V.S.Beedies Pvt. Ltd., 237 ITR 13 and in the case of Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. C.I.T. 119 ITR 996.
Having thus heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are not required to go into several contentions put forth by both sides. This is so, because on the available material on record, we are inclined to hold that the Assessing Officer could not have reopened the assessment by issuing the impugned notice.
The petitioner has been contending that the Assessing Officer had no independent reason to hold a belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. It is only at the insistence of the audit party that he had issued notice for reopening. In the petition, it is averred that â€Å“the issue on which the case of the petitioner has been reopened is based on the objection raised by the audit party. It is a matter of record that the Audit Party had raised an objection in regard to non deduction of tax under section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of international transactions with associated enterprises in regard to payment for product registration services availed amounting to Rs.51,94,204/- and based on the same opined that the said expenditure was liable to be disallowed under section 40(1)(i) of the Act. The petitioner respectfully submits that since this objection had been raised on the basis of the information available on the assessment records of the petitioner's case for the A.Y. 2004-05, it clearly establishes that there was no default on the part of the petitioner in fully and truly disclosing the primary facts.â€
Since the specific case of the petitioner was that the Assessing Officer had acted at the behest of the Audit Party and held no independent opinion on its own with respect to the income escaping assessment, we had called for the original records pertaining to the files of the assessee from the Revenue Department. Learned counsel Shri Bhatt after detailed search, made available a copy of the letter dated 21.5.2009 from one Ritu Singh Sharma, Asstt. Commissioner of Income-tax, in charge of this case at the relevant time addressed to the Senior Audit Officer. In the said letter, she has stated that the audit party has observed that for the amount in question TDS was required to be deducted. Thereupon, details were called for. She concluded that looking to the Board's circular dated 8th August 1995, TDS was not required to be deducted. Taking note of the explanation of the assessee she stated as under:
â€Å“In view of the above explanation, there was no under assessment in the assessee company's case in both the assessment years i.e. A.Y.2004-05 & A.Y. 2005-06.Further, basis requirement of deducting tax u/s.195 is that whether payment of sum to an non-resident is chargeable to tax under the provisions of the Act or not. TDS liability u/s.195 arises only when income is credited to account of payee or on actual payment of same.Therefore, as the above mentioned expenditure is in the nature of reimbursement of expenses no TDS is required to be deducted in view of Board's circular No.715 dt. Aug 8,1995.â€
Under the circumstances, it clearly emerges from the record that the Assessing Officer was of the opinion that no part of the income of the assessee has escaped assessment. In fact, after the audit party brought the relevant aspects to the notice of the AO, she held correspondence with the assessee. Taking into account the assessee's explanation regarding non-requirement of TDS collection and ultimately accepted the explanation concluding that in view of the Board's circular, tax was not required to be deducted at source. No income had therefore escaped assessment. Despite such opinion of the Assessing Officer, when ultimately the impugned notice came to be issued the only conclusion we can reach is that the Assessing Officer had acted at the behest of and on the insistence of the audit party. It is well settled that it is only the Assessing Officer whose opinion with respect to the income escaping assessment would be relevant for the purpose of reopening of closed assessment. It is, of course true, as held by the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of P.V.S.Beedies Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society (supra), if the audit party brings certain aspects to the notice of the Assessing Officer and thereupon, the Assessing Officer forms his own belief, it may still be a valid basis for reopening assessment. However, in the other line of judgment noted by us, it has clearly been held that mere opinion of the Audit Party cannot form the basis for the Assessing Officer to reopen the closed assessment that too beyond four years from the end of relevant assessment year.â€
6. As is more than apparent, assessment was completed on scrutiny. In post assessment period, audit party raised the objection and Assessing Officer had strongly objected to such objections by communicating internally as mentioned hereinabove.
7. In such background, reasons for reopening if are noted, they are almost identically worded as that of audit report. No material worth the name emerges to indicate any independent application of mind. Facts are quite glaring on the contrary & they clearly establish absence of subjective satisfaction of Assessing Officer. Thus, the ground raised by the petitioner that such notice of reopening is invalid for the Assessing Officer having not formed his independent belief requires to be sustained.
8. As regards other two grounds raised by the petitioner which are also contested heavily, petitioner sought support from the decision of the Apex Court in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. which makes it obligatory on the part of Assessing Officer to pass a reasoned order on receipt of objections from assessee before finalizing assessment and from CIT vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd. [2010] 320 ITR 561 (SC) = (2010-TIOL-06-SC-IT) which does not permit change of opinion of Assessing Officer at the time of reopening of assessment. These aspects need not be gone into when the challenge of petitioner on the main ground itself has succeeded effectively.
Resultantly, the impugned notice of re-opening dated 21.11.2011 needs to be quashed. Petition is allowed and the same stands disposed of in the above terms. No order as to costs
2013-TIOL-591-HC-DEL-IT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
ITA No. 155/2011
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
Vs
AJAY KAPOOR
Sanjiv Khanna And Sanjeev Sachdeva, JJ
Dated : July 24, 2013
Appellant Rep. by : Mr. Sanjeev Rajpal, Sr. Standing Counsel.
Respondent Rep. by : Mr. Kaanan Kapur, Adv
Respondent Rep. by : Mr. Kaanan Kapur, Adv
Income Tax Act, 1961 - Sections 132 & 158BC - Gross profit rate - GP rate - peak credit.
Whether in case of unaccounted sales it can be presumed that the assessee had made some unaccounted investments - Whether in such a case onus lies on the assessee to establish that there is a nexus between the unaccounted investment and the accounted stock - Whether once an unaccounted income as declared by the assessee is taxed, there is no illegitimacy if the Revenue taxes even the peak investment - Whether even in the case of unaccounted transactions the onus can be put on the Revenue to explain the source of unaccounted investments.
The assessee is a dealer in dyes and chemicals. The Revenue conducted a search under section 132 at the office and residential premises of the assessee and found cash and jewleery but only cash was seized. Revenue issued notice u/s 158BC, and the assessee replied to the same by filing return declaring undisclosed income for the block period 1st April, 2001 to 6th November, 2001. The AO upon scrutiny made two additions, one on account of unrecorded purchases and the other on account of undeclared profit i.e the difference between unrecorded purchases and unrecorded sales during the block period. The AO used a gross profit rate of 53.76 percent.
On appeal, the CIT(A) reduced the addition on account of undisclosed profit by appying the GP rate of 2.25 percent and also deleted the entire addition on account of investment in unaccounted purchases. He held that the assessee had been making unrecorded sales out of the accounted stock kept by the assessee for his regular business and the assessee used to replenish the stock by making unrecorded purchases to make good the shortfall in the accounted stock.
On appeal, the ITAT held that the GP rate of the recorded transactions of various years was a fair indicator of the gross profit, which would have been earned by the assessee in unrecorded transactions and hence, the GP rate applied by the CIT(A) was valid.. Further the assessee did not maintain any day-to-day stock record and, therefore, unrecorded sales could have been out of accounted stock, which was later on replenished from the sale proceeds of unrecorded sales. Thus, the assessee had not made any investment for the unrecorded transactions. The peak investment which had occurred on 29th September, 2001 were to be added and brought to tax as unaccounted investment and hence, no addition should be made on account of unrecorded purchases and sales as peak credit had already been brought to tax.
On appeal, the High Court held that,
++ there are substantial and good reasons for adopting the GP rate of 2.25 percent, as it is apparent that GP rate of 53.76 percent adopted by the AO is too high and unacceptable;
++ regarding wether the addition should have been made on account of unaccounted investment the order of the tribunal that there were no unaccounted sales is contradictory as the assessee had himself accepted the said fact and the onus is on the assessee to prove the source of funds;
++ the assessee had unaccounted turnover of approximately Rs.5 lacs per day during the block period and transactions of such value do require investment. Plea of the assessee that existing or available investment in the books was sufficient, has to be made good with material and proof by the assessee. The assessee had to explain that purchases recorded in the books were sufficient after adjustment of the recorded sales. In cases of unaccounted sales and purchases all documents may not be available and certain amount of guess work is always required as noticed earlier but a realistic and common sense approach is required;
++ the finding recorded by the tribunal that proof of unaccounted purchases did not prima facie indicate or show that unaccounted investment was made, as there was other apparent evidence to the contrary is not accepted. Onus, in such cases, is on the assessee to show that unaccounted investment was made out of accounted stock. There cannot be any assumption or presumption that unaccounted sales must be from accounted purchases. Unaccounted sales may result and can contribute towards the investment, but there has to be initial investment. Profits and income earned are also used for personal needs and are taken out of business;
++ the tribunal's order that as unaccounted income of has been brought to tax, no addition on account of peak investment is justified is not accepted. The unaccounted income represents the gross profits earned in the block period. Further, the profit earned from unaccounted transactions can be and are used and consumed by the assessee for their own personal uses. The tribunal did not deal with the second issue in the right perspective by placing the onus on the Revenue to explain the source of investment made by the assessee though there were unaccounted sale transactions. It has ignored relevant and material facts and has gone on a tangent without examining the real issue and the controversy, i.e., has the assessee explained the source of funds required for making investment to have turnover of Rs.9.73 crores. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that this part of the order is perverse and cannot be accepted;
++ perversity, in the present case, is occasioned due to two reasons: firstly, by wrongly placing onus on the revenue though the facts were in personal knowledge of the assessee, and secondly, by ignoring the admission of the assessee that they had indulged in unaccounted sales of Rs 9.7 crores. In spite of admission and the seized document, it has been observed that there was no material with the revenue to prima facie justify any addition towards unrecorded investment in stock. Allegations, in the present case, are not based upon weighing of evidence but for altogether a wrong decision. The decision suffers from vice of irrationality, rendering it infirm in law;
++ referring to various judgements, it has been held that onus of proving, what is apparent is not real, is on the party who claims it to be so. There should be direct nexus between the conclusions of fact arrived at, or inferred, and the primary facts upon which the conclusion is based. When irrelevant consideration and extraneous materials form the substratum of an order, or the authority has proceeded in a wrong presumption which is erroneous in law, as in the present case, question of law arises and when the said contention is found to be correct, then the order is perverse. A factual decision is perverse when it is without any evidence or when the factual decision, in view of the fact on record, cannot be reasonably entertained. Finding based upon surmises, conjectures or suspicion or when they are not rationally possible have to be struck down. A factual conclusion is regarded as perverse when no person duly instructed or acting judicially could upon the record before him, have reached the conclusion arrived at by the tribunal/ authority;
++ the assessee will pay costs of Rs.20,000/- to the Revenue.
Revenue's appeal allowed
Cases followed:
Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB (2010) 13 SCC 216
Dhirajlal Girdharilal v. CIT (2002-TIOL-623-SC-IT)
CIT v. Daulat Ram Rawat Mull (1973) 87 ITR 349
JUDGEMENT
Per : Sanjiv Khanna, J :
This appeal by the Revenue under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act, for short) raises the following the substantial question of law:-
"Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right and not perverse in holding that no addition should be made on account of unrecorded purchases and sales as unaccounted income of Rs.21,90,685/- has been brought to tax?"
2. The impugned order passed by the tribunal is dated 16th April, 2010 and relates to the block period ending 6th November, 2001.
3. Search and seizure action under Section 132 of the Act was carried out in the residential and office premises of respondent-assessee on 6th November, 2011. The respondent was a dealer in dyes and chemicals. At the time of search, cash of Rs.17,43,180/- was found in the residential and office premises of respondent. Out of the said cash amount, Rs.16,14,200/- was seized. Jewellery worth Rs. 20,40,688/- was also found, but no seizure of jewellery was made.
4. In response to the notice under Section 158BC, the respondent filed his return declaring undisclosed income of Rs.18,00,000/-. The Assessing Officer in the assessment order dated 28th November, 2003 made several additions and assessed the total income of the respondent-assessee at Rs.9,91,63,790/-. The aforesaid addition included additions on the basis of a document mentioning undisclosed sales of Rs.9,73,63,789/- between the period 1st April, 2001 to 6th November, 2001. This document was accepted by the respondent-assessee in their letter dated 6th June, 2000 as a record of their unaccounted sales. The Assessing Officer made addition on account of unrecorded purchases of Rs.4,50,17,616/- on the basis of the said paper. The Assessing Officer held that the difference between unrecorded purchases (Rs.450,17,616/-) and unrecorded sales figures (Rs.9,73,63,789/-) i.e. Rs.5,23,46,173/- should be treated as undeclared profit earned during the block period. Thus two additions of Rs.4,50,17,616/- and Rs.5,23,46,173/- were made.
5. Respondent substantially succeeded in the first appeal as the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) in his order dated 5th November, 2004 observed that the profits of the block period between 1st April, 2001 to 6th November, 2001 of Rs.5, 23, 46,173/- as calculated by the Assessing Officer was abnormally high and gross profit rate 53.76% (G.P. rate) had been applied on a turnover of Rs.9.73 crores. He referred to the GP rate of the assessee during the period 1996-97 to 2000-2001 which was between 1.92% to 2.83% giving an average GP rate of 2.19%. In the preceding assessment year i.e. 2001-02, the GP rate declared was 2.25%. By applying the GP rate of 2.25%, CIT (Appeals) came to the conclusion that undisclosed income from unrecorded sales was Rs.21,90,685/-.
6. CIT (Appeals) also deleted the entire addition of Rs.4,50,17,616/- on account of investment in unaccounted purchases observing that the assessee had been making unrecorded sales out of the accounted stock kept by the assessee for his regular business. The assessee used to replenish the stock by making unrecorded purchases to make good the short fall in the accounted stock. The exact findings, recorded by the CIT (Appeals) reads:
"5(iii) Now another question which is to be decided is the investment made by the appellant for effecting unrecorded sales. The AO has added a sum of Rs.4,50,17,616/- i.e. the entire purchases as worked out by the assessee from the seized material. The assessee's contention is that he had been making unrecorded sales out of the accounted stock kept by the assessee for his regular business. It has been explained that in the course of making unrecorded sales when the accounted stock falls below a limit the assessee used to replenish the stock by making unrecorded purchases to make good short fall in the accounted stock. This explanation was given to the AO. The AO has rejected the explanation on the ground that no day to day stock statements have been maintained by the assessee. It was also explained to the AO by the assessee that there was no necessity of making separate investment for effecting unaccounted sales because item dealt in by the assessee both for accounted sales and unaccounted sales are same and there is no distinction between the categories of sales on the basis of the items dealt. The explanation of the assessee was rejected by the AO on the ground that stock register is not maintained by the assessee on day to day basis. The argument of the Ld. AR that as the assessee was dealing in same items for making the recorded and unrecorded sales and the regular stock sold outside the books used to be replenished out of sales proceeds of unrecorded sales as some merit in it because no excess stock was found during the course of search operation. Also, no evidence or material has been referred to or relied upon for adopting the figure of Rs.4,50,17,616/- for making investment. Thus, there was no material before the AO to hold that the assessee made an undisclosed investment to that extent. For any addition to be made in the block assessment it has to be based on material found during the course of search or in the course of post search proceeding. The addition in the block assessment cannot be made only on guess work basis or surmises. For the proposition that investment in stock has to be based on material found during the course of search or post search enquiries or any other positive material pointing to the factum of investment in stock, the following case law are relied upon:i) Ashok Kumar Rastogi Vs. Gotan Lal Khanji Udyog CIT 100 CTR 204 (All)ii) CIT Vs. Bal Chand Ajit Kumar 263 ITR 610 (M.P.)iii) CIT Vs. President Industria 258 ITR 654 (Guj.)iv) S.M. Tomar 201 ITR 608v) ITO Vs. Gurbachansingh Juneja 54 TTJ (Ahm.) T.M.P. No. 1In these circumstances the addition made by the AO is deleted."
7. It is clear from the order of the CIT (Appeals) that he referred to the explanation of the assessee and the stand of the Revenue and thereafter observed that the addition was a guess work or surmises and there should have been positive material to show that there was in fact investment in stocks. Explanation of the assessee that there was no necessity to make separate investment for unaccounted sales should be accepted.
8. Tribunal in the impugned order has recorded the contention of the Departmental Representative that the gross profit in unaccounted business was always more than profits in the regular business recorded in the books of account. Revenue had submitted that the assessee had not maintained day-to-day stock book and, therefore, it was not possible to accept that unrecorded sales were made out of regular stock, which was later on replenished. He had also referred to the peak investment which had occurred on 29th September, 2001 of Rs.17,03,546/- and had stated that at least this amount should be added and brought to tax as unaccounted investment. There was substantial investment made in the form of unaccounted purchases as per seized documents.
9. Tribunal in the impugned order has mentioned that the unrecorded sales to the extent of Rs.9,73,63,789/- were made by the respondent-assessee and this figure had not been challenged by the respondent/assessee. This factum is recorded in para 5.1 and it was observed that this figure had become final figure. The first question examined by the tribunal was whether the GP rate applied by the CIT (Appeals) was correct. They observed that the GP rate of the recorded transactions of various years was a fair indicator of the gross profit, which would have been earned by the respondent in unrecorded transactions. The tribunal distinguished their earlier decision in the case of Vijay Protein Ltd. on the ground that in the said case the assessee had not been able to produce any evidence regarding purchases made from 33 parties. The books of account were rejected in the said case, with the tribunal holding that 25% of the purchase price accounted for in the books through invoices could be disallowed for working out the income. Tribunal accordingly affirmed the view taken by the CIT (Appeals) directing the Assessing Officer to adopt gross profit rate of 2.25% and thus upheld and maintained the addition to the extent of Rs.21,90,685/- as against Rs.5,23,46,173/- made by the Assessing Officer.
10. On reading the reasoning given by the tribunal, we are not inclined to interfere with the said part of the order on the ground that it is perverse. We may have some reservations, but the basic facts have been noticed and form the core and foundation of the order. These include the GP rate of the respondent-assessee as recorded in the books of accounts for this year and the earlier years. We have some reservations on the observation made by the tribunal that as it was a case of unrecorded sales, benefit of tax was passed on the third parties. Further, observation of the tribunal that the Assessing Officer had not analyzed the item-wise purchase and sale price though the documents seized reflect the item-wise sales and purchases is debatable. Nevertheless, there are substantial and good reasons for adopting the GP rate of 2.25%, as it is apparent that GP rate of 53.76% adopted by the Assessing Officer is too high and unacceptable.
11. However, on the next issue whether any addition should have been made on account of unaccounted investment, we are unable to comprehend the reasoning and logic given by the tribunal. They have recorded that the respondent-assessee did not maintain day-to-day stock record/register and, therefore, it cannot be said that unrecorded sales could not have been of accounted stock, which was later on replenished from the sale proceeds of unrecorded sales. Thus, the respondent-assessee had not made any investment for the unrecorded transactions. It is held that no evidence of unaccounted investment was found at the time of search. Once the stock register was not there as recorded by the tribunal in its order, the said finding itself apparently is contradictory. The finding that no incriminating document regarding investment was found is contradictory because the tribunal has accepted and admitted that the assessee had himself confirmed that he had made sales of Rs.9.73 crores outside the books of accounts. These were unaccounted sales. Thereafter, it was for the assessee to explain and state the source/funds for conducting and entering into the said transaction. In other words, the assessee had unaccounted turnover of approximately Rs.5 lacs per day during the period 1st April to 6th November, 2001. Transactions of such value do require investment. Plea of the assessee that existing or available investment in the books was sufficient, has to be made good with material and proof by the assessee. The assessee had to explain that purchases recorded in the books were sufficient after adjustment of the recorded sales. In cases of unaccounted sales and purchases all documents may not be available and certain amount of guess work is always required as noticed earlier but a realistic and common sense approach is required. To say that there was no evidence to show that the assessee had made unexplained investment would be to write off and erase the earlier finding of the tribunal that the assessee had made unaccounted sales of Rs.9.73 crores. Unrecorded purchases as mentioned in the seized document were more than Rs.4.50 crores. We also do not agree with the finding recorded by the tribunal that proof of unaccounted purchases did not prima facie indicate or show that unaccounted investment was made, as there was other apparent evidence to the contrary. Onus, in such cases, is on the assessee to show that unaccounted investment was made out of accounted stock. There cannot be any assumption or presumption that unaccounted sales must be from accounted purchases. Unaccounted sales may result and can contribute towards the investment, but there has to be initial investment. Profits and income earned are also used for personal needs and are taken out of business.
12. On the question whether the peak credit should be added and brought to tax, tribunal has held as under:-
"6.1 Coming to the alternative submission that at least peak of unaccounted investment, worked out on the basis of unrecorded purchases should have been brought to tax, we have only to mention that the same could be taxed only if there is some evidence on record regarding undisclosed income in the seized material or otherwise. There is no such evidence and, therefore, in view of arguments in paragraph 6 (supra), the stand of the learned DR cannot be accepted. Notwithstanding this argument, the working of peak submitted by the ld. DR at Rs.17,03,546/- is lower than the unaccounted income brought to tax by the ld. CIT(Appeals) at Rs.21,90,685/-. The ld. DR has not been able to show that the peak exceeded the unaccounted profit in any year. Therefore, it is held that the assessee was in possession of money by way of profit on unrecorded sales, which could have been used for funding the purchases."
13. First part of the reasoning has been dealt with above and it has been recorded that onus has been wrongly placed on the Revenue. Once unaccounted for turnover of Rs.9.73 crores is accepted, then the assessee must explain the source of investment. The true facts were in his knowledge. We do not agree with the tribunal that as unaccounted income of Rs. 21,90,685/- has been brought to tax, no addition on account of peak investment of Rs.17,03,546/- is justified. This figure of Rs. 21,90,685/- represents the gross profits earned in the block period. Further, the profit earned from unaccounted transactions can be and are used and consumed by the assessee for their own personal uses. We do not think that the tribunal dealt with the second issue in right perspective by placing the onus on the Revenue to explain the source of investment made by the assessee though there were unaccounted sale transactions. It has ignored relevant and material facts and has gone on a tangent without examining the real issue and the controversy, i.e., has the assessee explained the source of funds required for making investment to have turnover of Rs.9.73 crores. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that this part of the order is perverse and cannot be accepted.
14. Perversity, in the present case, is occasioned due to two reasons: firstly, by wrongly placing onus on the revenue though the facts were in personal knowledge of the assessee, and secondly, by ignoring the admission of the respondent that they had indulged in unaccounted sales of Rs 9.7 crores. In spite of admission and the seized document, it has been observed that there was no material with the revenue to prima facie justify any addition towards unrecorded investment in stock. Allegations, in the present case, are not based upon weighing of evidence but for altogether a wrong decision. The decision suffers from vice of irrationality, rendering it infirm in law. In Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB (2010) 13 SCC 216 it has been held that:
"28. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from the vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjecture and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and thus, stands vitiated. (Vide].)"
15. Earlier in Dhirajlal Girdharilal v. CIT (1954) 26 ITR 736 (SC) = (2002-TIOL-623-SC-IT) it was observed:-
"….if the court of fact, whose decision on a question of fact is final, arrives at this decision by considering material which is irrelevant to the enquiry, or by considering material which is partly relevant and partly irrelevant, or bases its decision partly on conjectures, surmises and suspicions, and partly on evidence, then in such a situation clearly an issue of law arise….…..It is well established that when a court of fact acts on material, partly relevant and partly irrelevant, it is impossible to say to what extent the mind of the court was affected by the irrelevant material used by it in arriving at its finding. Such a finding is vitiated because of the use of inadmissible material and thereby an issue of law arises."
16. In CIT v. Daulat Ram Rawat Mull (1973) 87 ITR 349 it has been held that onus of proving what is apparent is not real is on the party who claims it to be so. There should be direct nexus between the conclusions of fact arrived at, or inferred, and the primary facts upon which the conclusion is based. When irrelevant consideration and extraneous materials form the substratum of an order, or the authority has proceeded in a wrong presumption which is erroneous in law, as in the present case, question of law arises and when the said contention is found to be correct, then the order is perverse. A factual decision is perverse when it is without any evidence or when the factual decision, in view of the fact on record, cannot be reasonably entertained. Finding based upon surmises, conjectures or suspicion or when they are not rationally possible have to be struck down. In CIT v. S.P. Jain (1973) 87 ITR 370 (SC)it has been observed that a factual conclusion is regarded as perverse when no person duly instructed or acting judicially could upon the record before him, have reached the conclusion arrived at by the tribunal/ authority.
17. In view of the aforesaid position, we partly answer the question of law mentioned above in affirmative i.e. in favour of the appellant and against the respondent. The respondent will pay costs of Rs.20,000/- to the appellant.
18. To expedite and curtail further delay, the parties it is directed, will appear before the tribunal on 26th August, 2013, when a date of hearing will be fixed. We further clarify that the observations made in this order are for the purpose of disposal of this appeal and the tribunal will reconsider the matter objectively keeping in view the contentions of the parties.
Regards,
Pawan Singla
BA (Hon's), LLB
Audit Officer
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