CAG and IT Department at loggerheads - Puts a question mark on efforts towards strengthening the tax base
In this article, the author has analysed the report of the CAG relating to the functioning of the Income Tax Department (ITD) for the F. Y. 2011-12 on the subject of strengthening of the tax base through the use of information. The report should be considered constructively by the ITD and areas where deficiencies have been noticed should be strengthened, so that the number of taxpayers in the country, which is abysmally low compared to its population, is increased. Special attention needs to be paid to the information relating to high value taxpayers, so that their number increases, which regretfully is very low at present compared to the country's population and the ITD has often to face criticism for the same.
Introduction
1. Very often the ITD is criticized for less number of taxpayers vis-à-vis the country's population. The criticism, prima facie seems justified, having only 3.5 crore persons in the income-tax net in a population of nearly 121 crores which is abysmally low. The CAG in its latest report (No. 4 of 2013) has systematically analyzed the reasons for this and has come to the conclusion that the low number of taxpayers is because of the fact that, though the information collected concerning taxpayers' activities, leading to generation of incomes, is quite substantial, the ITD is not making full use of the same in making income-tax assessments. The Report of CAG, prepared on the basis of audit conducted under section 16 of the Comptroller & Auditor General of India (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971, was placed in both the Houses of the Parliament on 30th April, 2013. The report relates to the F.Y. 2011-12. The important aspects of the report have been examined in this article.
Objectives of the study
2. The CAG has expressed the view that expansion of tax base is necessary to bring more persons under the tax net by the ITD so that more revenue may be generated. Keeping this aspect in view, the CAG settled for following objectives for its study:—
| (a) | Evaluation of the process of collection, collation, transmission and utilization of information by ITD towards widening and deepening the tax base. | |
| (b) | Evaluation of the effectiveness of working of Central Information Branch (CIB), NSDL, DGIT-S, CsIT, Assessing Officers and DG (Investigation)/CsIT (TDS) with regard to the flow of information. | |
| (c) | Evaluation of the effectiveness of the scheme of furnishing of annual information return (AIR) through CIB/NSDL under section 285BA as implemented since 1st April, 2005. |
The CAG has mentioned the reasons for choosing the topic in para 1.9 in the report, where it has been said that it was over 20 years ago that audit had reviewed [in CAG's Report No.5 of 1991, Union Government (Revenue Receipts – Direct Taxes) the functioning of CIB. The present performance audit on 'Strengthening the Tax Base through use of Information' seeks to study the developments in strengthening of tax database, especially with reference to the scheme of furnishing of Annual Information Return (AIR) through CIB/NSDL under section 285BA of the Act implemented since 1st April, 2005.
3. Scope of the audit
3.1 Period covered - The study covers the period from F.Y. 08 to F.Y. 11. CAG's parties carried out examination of records of CIB and DGIT-S and cross-checked the utilization of information provided by them to AOs in 16 States, viz., Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi, Haryana, Gujarat, Kolkata, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. Information collected by 17 CIB offices in these States has been examined.
3.2 Methodology of Audit - Records of CIB offices were examined and review of procedures to receive and upload information in TIN Facilitation Centres (TIN-FCs) of National Securities Depository Ltd. (NSDL) was undertaken. Five TIN-FCs in each State were selected. To see the utilization of information during the assessment, top 30% CsIT subject to maximum of five CsIT in each State with all assessment charges under the selected CsIT [in all 60 CsITs] were selected on the basis of risk-analysis. Further, a maximum of 100 assessment cases for cross verification on the basis of stratified random sampling per year per selected charge were taken up for study.
ITD's target of increasing taxpayers vis-a-vis the results achieved
4. Through Annual Central Action Plans, the ITD aimed at 15% annual growth in taxpayers. However, the achievements have been disappointing. During the period of F.Y. 02 to F.Y. 11, the average increase in number of assessees was merely 3.1%.
Machinery for information collection
5. Member (Investigation) of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) has the overall responsibility of investigation management in ITD. Prior to formation of DGIT-I&CI in August, 2011, the CIB offices functioned under DGIT (Investigation) in each State.
The Directorate of Income-tax (System) created in the year 1981 and headed by DGIT-S, coordinates at the apex level all activities relating to introduction of computerization in ITD. DGIT-S is assisted by 5 Directors of Income-tax (DsIT) and 3 Officers on Special Duty (OSD). DIT-II is in-charge of National Securities Depository Ltd. (NSDL), Online Tax Accounting System (OLTAS) and CIB module.
It has been stated in the Report that there was overall shortage of 599 (53.63%) persons against the sanctioned strength of 1,117 in DGIT-I&CI.
Even in the matter of incurring of expenditure for information gathering, laxity has been reported. Even the budgets sanctioned have not been utilized in full.
Legal provisions for information collection
6. The Act contains statutory provisions for collecting the information on specified transactions from specified persons and quotation of PAN. In addition, CBDT has issued various instructions from time-to-time in this regard. A summary of provisions and CBDT's Circulars are given in later paragraph:—
| ♦ | Section 285BA is specific to the functioning of CIB. CBDT Circular No.7/2005, dated 24th August, 2005 prescribes that AIR is to be filed in terms of rule 114E by the 'specified persons' in respect of those 'specified transactions', which are registered or recorded by them during the financial year. The Board has authorized NSDL as the agency to receive AIRs on behalf of CIB. NSDL has started receiving AIRs from August, 2005. | |
| ♦ | Section 139A, read with rules 114B & 114C specifies compulsory quoting of PAN in certain transactions. | |
| ♦ | Board's Instruction No.1943, dated 22nd August, 1997, revised instruction vide letter F.No.414/47/2002 IT(Inv. I), dated 5th September, 2002 and further rationalized instructions vide Letter No.414/66/2009 (Inv. 1), dated 22nd December, 2009 laying down importance of sources of information. | |
| ♦ | Instruction Nos.6/2006 of 1st August, 2006 and 01/2009 of 12th February, 2009, etc., deal with utilization of information in AIR during assessment. |
Analysis of information collection and its utilization by the ITD and CAG's comments/observations on the same
7. The analysis has been done under certain heads.
7.1 Collection, collation and dissemination of information
7.1.1 Need for information - Information is required by the ITD regarding income generating transactions from varied sources to identify potential sources of income to check whether those disclosing information are truthfully doing so? It is to be an ongoing process not only to skilfully continue information collection with the existing sources but also to widen and strengthen these and plan for collection of information from new sources. Presently, information is collected through AIR and CIB. In this process banks, credit card companies, mutual funds, registrar/sub-registrar of properties, RBI, Central Excise/Custom/Sales Tax Departments, Post Offices, local authorities, hotels/clubs/caterers, telephone providers, insurance companies, etc., are tapped.
7.1.2 Flow of information - This has been explained by CAG through a Flow Chart in the following way:-
| CIB | NSDL |
| (Non-AIR information) | (AIR information) |
Collation of information I Computer System (DGIT-System) I Dissemination of information to CCsIT/CsIT I Assessment charges | |
7.1.2.1 THE TWO SOURCES CONTRIBUTING TO FLOW OF INFORMATION TO THE ITD
7.1.2.1.1 ANNUAL INFORMATION RETURN [AIR] - Section 285BA of the Act and Rule 114E of the Rules specify that persons are required to furnish AIR immediately following F.Y. to the prescribed IT authority or agency. CBDT has notified NSDL as prescribed agency to receive AIR from the specified persons. At present seven categories of persons are required to compulsorily file AIR, which are Banks accepting cash deposit of Rs.10 lakh or more in a year, Bank or company issuing credit card where payment against bill exceeds Rs. 2 lakh in a year, Mutual Funds collecting Rs. 2 lakh or more for sale of units, company receiving Rs. 5 lakh or more against issue of shares, Registrars/sub-registrars in respect of sale/purchase of immovable property exceeding Rs. 30 lakh and RBI for issue of bonds exceeding Rs. 5 lakh or more.
7.1.2.1.2 INFORMATION THROUGH CIB - CIB module of ITD systems assists in identifying PAN of the transaction. It also allows updating of PAN information in cases where this is obtained by issuing query letter by the Designated A.O. [DAO]/Jurisdictional AO [JAO]. The information collected from various internal and external sources is thereafter disseminated to AOs and the Investigation Wing. Assistance to AO at the time of scrutiny is provided in the form of the Individual Transaction Statement (ITS) report, which brings together information from multiple sources against a PAN in a single report and gives a comprehensive financial profile of a taxpayer.
Deficiencies noticed in regard to collection of information
8. Some of these deficiencies have been summarized at page 5 in the report thus:-
| ♦ | CIB did not collect information from all the compulsory source Codes and approved optional source Codes. A large number of collected pieces of information were without PAN and had zero value. | |
| ♦ | ITD did not take penal action against the persons, who did not furnish the required information, did not file AIR, filed AIR belatedly and who gave incomplete information in AIR. | |
| ♦ | ITD did not have any system to ensure the compliance with rule 114B, which requires mentioning of PAN in documents pertaining to specified transaction. | |
| ♦ | CIB did not maintain database for collecting the information and for identifying prospective AIR filers/non-filers. | |
| ♦ | CIB did not upload collected information in a timely and complete manner in CIB module. It faced problems in uploading information due to technical reasons. | |
| ♦ | Information of earlier years was uploaded as information of current year. | |
| ♦ | CIB did not digitize and disseminate declarations received in Form 60/61. | |
| ♦ | CIB did not use all functionalities available in CIB module. |
8.1 Other deficiencies mentioned in the report
| ♦ | Information collected had not been maintained in uniform format. | |
| ♦ | There were no checks to ensure that persons furnishing the information had included all eligible transactions in their report and that the information was correct in the form of AIR. Mechanism was needed to be devised to ensure this. | |
| ♦ | In the cases checked incorrect information was found to have been furnished with impunity. An illustration of this could be seen from a case of in the charge of CIT-III, Bengaluru (A.Y. 06). |
The AIR information wrongly mentioned registration fee payment of Rs.75,790 as Rs. 75.75 lakh as sale value of the property. As a result, AO reopened the assessment by issue of notice under section 148 and concluded it under section 143(3), read with section 147 in December, 2010 without any addition. Thus, incorrect information led to reopening the case, which otherwise would not have been reopened resulting in wastage of manpower.
| ♦ | Audit also observed that AIR filers did not furnish information in the correct way. Names of assessees were wrong or misspelt or abbreviated; addresses of the transacting party were clubbed with the names of the transacting parties; addresses of the transacting parties were not correct, leading to significant information deficit and non-identification of PAN. |
Persons, furnishing such information, need to be punished. The report gives instances from some charges to support the conclusion reached. CAG had given valuable suggestions to correct the deficiencies noticed.
9. Observations and recommendations
| (a) | ITD may collect information from all the compulsory as well as approved optional source Codes. Information gathering for compulsory as well as approved optional source Codes is done as a policy matter considering emerging priorities vis-à-visavailable sources. ITD is facing acute shortage of manpower at different levels, which poses serious limitations on various intended outcomes. | |
| (b) | CIB/NSDL may upload the entire collected information in the same year, so that it can be used in scrutiny assessment. Bottlenecks in uploading the information may be removed. ITD had made consistent efforts to overcome the problems and upload data seamlessly. Specific targets have been assigned in the Central Action Plan 2012-13 for import of financial transactions into CIB module. | |
| (c) | ITD should put in place a system which ensures correctness and reliability of data received through AIR/CIB before its dissemination to the field. There is also a need for effective penal provisions in the Act for furnishing factually incorrect information in AIR or in reply to notices issued by ITD. The Ministry has noted (Dec., 2012) the recommendations and agreed to examine the desirability of legislative change, if any. | |
| (d) | ITD may evaluate the feasibility of developing a web based information collection system to avoid the problems in collecting non-AIR information. This would take care of redundant data and data mismatch. The Ministry informed (Dec., 2012) that the issue was already under consideration of the CBDT. | |
| (e) | ITD may also initiate internal review to gauge the utility and effectiveness of system of filing of AIR. The Ministry noted the suggestion and informed (Dec., 2012) that from time-to-time CBDT has set-up Committee/s to review, inter alia, the module and functionality in various forms. | |
| (f) | ITD may define timelines for issuing query letters as also for referring back cases to DIT-CIB, as control mechanism to ensure that the query letters are issued by a specified time/date. If the letters return as un-served, the cases are referred to DIT-CIB within a defined time period, enabling effective monitoring of the activity. The Ministry replied (Dec., 2012) that the query letters issued by DIT (Intelligence) were system generated and were sent within time prescribed in the Action Plan for 2012-13. However, the human resources constraints posed a limitation on the intended outcomes. | |
| (g) | ITD may devise a suitable mechanism, including business intelligence tools to ensure effective utilization of information collected at high cost, both to ITD and for the agencies responsible for collecting and providing such information to ITD to achieve the objective of deepening and widening of tax base. The Ministry replied (Dec., 12) that a separate project relating to data warehousing was proposed to be undertaken to address these and the related issues by DIT-S. Also, the new application,viz., Income Tax Business Application would suitably address the suggestion. | |
| (h) | ITD needs to use the available functionalities of CIB module. The Ministry replied (Dec., 12) that with continuous evolution of IT technologies, CIB functionalities are improving. The efforts are further continuing. |
Utilization of information
10. After mentioning the flaws noticed in regard to collection, collation and dissemination of information, CAG has next examined the utilization of information collected from the sources mentioned. The observations in the report regarding the position in regard to the utilization of information has been summed up thus in the report:—
| ♦ | CASS system of ITD selected cases for scrutiny, out of which only 24% of cases had AIR information. | |
| ♦ | AOs did not utilize the useful available information in 285 high value cases or finalise the assessments, relying on the reply of the assessees without verifying the facts and correctness of the transactions. | |
| ♦ | ITD identified 2,45,843 number of non-filers/stop filers. ITD did not notify Designated AOs (DAOS) for following up on information in selected CsIT charges in Gujarat, Punjab, U.P. and West Bengal. | |
| ♦ | ITD identified PANs in 22.7 to 26.2% cases during the period FY 08 to FY 11. ITD did not issue notices in 2,496 non-PAN cases, where addresses were incomplete. Notices issued in 5,355 cases had returned undelivered. | |
| ♦ | AIR information could not be considered during assessment, as the jurisdictional CIB did not respond to the request of AO. | |
| ♦ | AO did not refer back the information to jurisdictional CIB for confirmation. | |
| ♦ | AOs did not have data relating to action taken on the disseminated AIR information. In the selected charge, AOs did not maintain the information in the prescribed register. |
10.1 Further observations in regard to collection of information
| (a) | ITD did not utilize AIR information effectively for scrutiny assessments. The worrying fact was non-utilization of available information in 285 high value cases and completion of assessments in some cases, merely relying on the replies of the assessees without verifying the facts and correctness of the transactions. Such views have been supported by 3 instances in the report. One such instance was from the charge of CIT-II, Kolkata, for AY 09, where it was noticed that the assessee denied investment of Rs. 6.45 crore in mutual funds which appeared in ITS. AO issued letter for confirmation under section 133(6) on 27-12-2010 to the principal officers of the mutual fund, which remained unanswered. AO made assessment on 30-12-2010 without drawing any inference. | |
| (b) | ITD needs to exercise vigilance on this aspect to increase the number of such assessees and also to collect correct taxes from such assessees and give exemplary punishments to the delinquents. | |
| (c) | Three instances of inadequate follow up have been given in the report. One of these shows that the AO selected this case for scrutiny on the basis of AIR information of sale of immovable property for Rs. 79.99 lakh on 7-09-2007, which was also confirmed by the Sub-Registrar and notice under section 143(2) was issued on 20-08-2009. Scrutiny proceedings were dropped on 9-12-2010 stating that notice was not served on to the assessee. | |
| (d) | CAG's report shows that in two cases, which were selected for scrutiny under CASS on the basis of AIR information but AO did not consider the information despite the assessee offering the amount of AIR reported information as income in his revised return and paid tax on this amount. | |
| (e) | Report shows that five selected cases were not taken up for scrutiny by the concerned AOs resulting in non-verification of AIR information of Rs. 8.61 crore. | |
| (f) | CAG has compiled the extent of usage of disseminated information in CASS [Computer Assisted Scrutiny Selection) system followed by the ITD in selected cases for scrutiny [out of which only 24% cases had AIR information] which is shown in a tabulated form as under:— |
Cases selected for scrutiny by CASS
| A.Y. | PANs for which information was available | Total cases selected in CASS | AIR cases selected | % of PAN cases selected by CASS-AIR | AIR cases completed | ||
| No | %age | No | %age | ||||
| AY 08 | 4,19,879 | 82,024 | 14,112 | 17 | 3.4 | 2,959 | 21 |
| AY 09 | 5,73,891 | 2,31,145 | 36,910 | 16 | 6.4 | 13,747 | 37 |
| AY 10 | 7,22,829 | 2,32,303 | 80,681 | 35 | 11.2 | 70,433 | 87 |
| Total | 17,16,599 | 5,45,473 | 1,31,703 | 24 | 7.7 | 87,139 | 66 |
This shows that only 17 to 35% of cases selected in CASS for scrutiny related to AIR cases. Further, AIR related cases were on an average only 7.7% of total PAN cases, for which AIR information was available. Thus, ITD did not utilize AIR information effectively for scrutiny assessments.
10.2 Recommendation of CAG in regard to utilization of information - These are as under:–
| (a) | Compliance to the monitoring system put in place by CBDT needs to be ensured at different levels of ITD. The Ministry replied (Dec., 12) that with continuous evolution, functionalities were improving. The efforts were further continuing. However, implementation and monitoring issues required additional manpower for which proposal was under consideration. | |
| (b) | Utilization of declarations received in Form 60/61 may be ensured by digitizing and disseminating them. The Ministry noted the observations and informed (Dec., 12) that high value Form 60/61 was being digitized. | |
| (c) | Nomination of DAOs on regular basis to deal with non-PAN AIR cases may be emphasized. The Ministry replied that an expert group had been set-up to suggest modalities for better utilization of non-PAN AIR and CIB data. On receipt of recommendations, further action would be taken. | |
| (d) | ITD may fix definite responsibility on AOs, who fail to record or utilize the information available to them in course of their assessments. The Ministry replied that the issue of feedback system in respect of such information was under consideration of the CBDT. The modalities would be worked out to see how the objectives could be achieved under the given constraints of shortage of manpower. |
Conclusion
11. An analysis of the CAG's report titled 'Strengthening of the Tax Base through use of Information" has been done. The report shows that the ITD has gone a long way in updating its system to collect and utilize information available from different sources through the Information Technology. The CAG's report has indicated some deficiencies in this regard, which need to be considered constructively – not as a fault-finding exercise from CAG's side. Improvements can be made in the systems in use to ensure making of quality assessments in a more effective manner. The report needs to be seen in the backdrop that despite wide scale of computerization in functioning of the ITD, the decisions in the matter of determination of taxable income after taking into account various facets collected and regard to decision making in the matter of utilization of information and its evaluation, human factor is still very important. Hence, genuine and honest mistakes in this regard need to be seen, keeping human factor in view and the quantum of work required to be done by an AO. While deliberate disregard of information available in the records and negligence in its utilization noticed in the matter of making of assessment need to be seriously viewed and punished, the genuine faults and those arising because of human failure need to be sympathetically viewed. Not doing so would discourage honest and hard working people in the ITD. The CAG has done a good job of picking up an area for examination, which is of vital importance for the working of the ITD.
IT : Where Assessing Officer disallowed depreciation on goodwill for earlier years but allowed same for current assessment year and for subsequent years, Commissioner rightly assumed jurisdiction under section 263 on premise that order was erroneous and had deprived revenue of certain amount of taxes
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[2013] 36 taxmann.com 527 (Karnataka)
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Fibres and Fabrics International (P.) Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore I*
D.V. SHYLENDRA KUMAR AND MRS. B.S. INDRAKALA, JJ.
IT APPEAL NOS. 119 & 120 OF 2013†
JUNE 21, 2013
Section 32, read with section 263, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Depreciation - Allowance/rate of - Assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08 - Whether Commissioner, assumes jurisdiction on premise that order is erroneous and had deprived revenue of certain amount of taxes, which is a legitimate due by allowing a deduction otherwise not entitled for deduction - Held, yes - Commissioner proposed to revise assessment on ground that assessee had been disallowed depreciation on goodwill for earlier years but for assessment year in question and for subsequent years such depreciation had been allowed by Assessing Officer without assigning any reason - Assessee raised objection pointing out that there was no error in order passed by Assessing Officer, and that without order being erroneous, Commissioner did not assume jurisdiction - Tribunal observed that Commissioner assumed jurisdiction only on assessing authority having not given reason for passing of order; therefore, Tribunal thought it not necessary to interfere on that ground and remanded matter to Assessing Officer directing not to go by directions issued by Commissioner - Whether no prejudice was caused to assessee under impugned order and in fact, it was an order more in favour of assessee - Held, yes [Paras 16 & 17] [In favour of revenue]
FACTS
| ■ | The assessee had been disallowed depreciation on goodwill for earlier years but for the assessment year in question and for subsequent years the Assessing Officer had allowed the depreciation on the goodwill part without assigning any reason. | |
| ■ | The Commissioner proposed to revise that part of the assessment order. | |
| ■ | The assessee raised a preliminary objection pointing out that there was no error in the order passed by the Assessing Officer; that without order being erroneous, Commissioner does not assume jurisdiction and therefore, he cannot pass any orders by issuing directions but Commissioner nevertheless proceeded to pass an order that it had jurisdiction to issue directions to the assessee to redo the assessment in a particular manner. | |
| ■ | The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to redo the matter after giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee with a categorical direction to the assessing authority not to go by the directions issued by the Commissioner. |
HELD
| ■ | The Tribunal has rightly observed that the Commissioner assumed jurisdiction only on the assessing authority having not given reason for passing of the order and therefore, the Tribunal thought it not necessary to interfere on this ground, more importantly the Tribunal directing the Assessing Officer for re-examining the matter in the light of the existing position of law. [Para 13] | |
| ■ | Where an Assessing Officer does not assign any reason for passing an order having effect on the revenue in the sense that allowing or disallowing a claim put forth by the assessee and if that is not the correct thing, it can amount to an erroneous order. [Para 14] | |
| ■ | The Commissioner whether he is right or wrong, assumes jurisdiction on the premise that the order is erroneous and had deprived the revenue of certain amount of taxes, which is a legitimate due by allowing a deduction otherwise not entitled for deduction. The question is not that, Commissioner is right or wrong but whether bona fide had assumed jurisdiction under section 263. [Para 16] | |
| ■ | Be that as it may. Now that the direction issued by the Commissioner has been set aside and the Tribunal by setting aside the direction issued by the Commissioner has remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer applying the relevant case law, no prejudice is caused to the assessee under the impugned order and in fact, it is an order more in favour of the assessee. [Para 17] |
CASES REFERRED TO
CIT v. Smifs Securities Ltd. [2012] 210 Taxman 428/24 taxmann.com 222 (SC) (para 10), CIT v. L.F. D'Silva [1991] 192 ITR 547/[[1992] 62 Taxman 161 (Kar.) (para 12) and CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd.[2012] 205 Taxman 98/17 taxmann.com 203 (Kar.) (para 14).
Nageswar Rao for the Appellant. K.V Aravind for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
1. These appeals by the assessee is directed against the order dated 9th November, 2012 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in ITA Nos. 557 and 558/Bang/2012 for the assessment years 2006-2007 and 2007-2008.
2. Assessee is a Private Limited Company. Under the impugned order, the Appellate Tribunal had in fact allowed the appeals of the assessee though termed it as for statistical purposes, had directed the Assessing Officer to examine the claims put forth by the assessee to reconsider the question of allowing depreciation on goodwill part of the assessee and for such purposes, the Tribunal had directed the Assessing Officer to ignore the earlier direction that had been issued by the Commissioner of Income Tax while revising the assessment order to disallow depreciation on the goodwill part.
3. The assessee, it appears, had been disallowed such depreciation for earlier years but for the assessment year in question, the Assessing Officer had allowed the depreciation on the goodwill part and for subsequent years without assigning any reason, but it was done otherwise.
4. It is this part of the assessment orders the Commissioner proposed to revise and the assessee had raised a preliminary objection pointing out that there was no error in the order passed by the Assessing Officer; that without order being erroneous, Commissioner does not assume jurisdiction and therefore, he cannot pass any orders by issuing directions but Commissioner nevertheless proceeded to pass an order that it has jurisdiction to issue directions to the assessee to redo the assessment in a particular manner.
5. It is aggrieved by this order, the assessee had approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal examined the contention of the assessee and thought it proper to interfere with the direction given by the Commissioner to the Assessing Officer and instead, directed the Assessing Officer to redo the matter after giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee with a categorical direction to the assessing authority not to go by directions issued by the Commissioner (Appeals) which virtually amounts to the Tribunal as appellate authority has set aside the direction issued by the Commissioner.
6. It is against this remand order for the two assessment orders, the present appeals by the assessee. Appearing on behalf of the appellant/assessee, submission of Sri Nageshwar Rao, learned Counsel is that the Tribunal has committed an error in not deciding the question of jurisdiction which has been specifically raised by the assessee in the appeal; that in the first instance, the Commissioner assumed jurisdiction by over looking the objections raised by the assessee that the order was not erroneous and secondly, the question is also concluded by a judgment of the Supreme Court on the issue and therefore, the Tribunal should have allowed the appeal on that ground instead of remanding the matter to the Assessing Officer.
7. It is also submitted that an Assessing Officer will not be in a position to over look the directions that had been earlier issued by the Commissioner, a Superior Officer and in this state of affairs, the Tribunal instead of remanding the matter on such question, and for overlooking the direction of the Commissioner, it should have proceeded to hold that the Commissioner did not have any jurisdiction to pass any order and therefore should have set aside the order passed in its totality.
8. Notice had been issued to the respondent/revenue and the revenue is represented by Mr. K.V. Aravind, learned standing Counsel. Both Counsel for appellant and respondent being present and making submissions, we have heard for disposal though the appeals have come up only for Admission.
9. Mr. Aravind, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/revenue points out that it is only a remand order passed by the Tribunal and the order passed by the Assessing Authority for the subsequent years without assigning reasons is an erroneous order coming within the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act').
10. Mr. Nageshwar Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant places strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case ofCIT v. Smifs Securities Ltd. [2012] 210 Taxman 428/24 taxmann.com 222. Submission placed on this decision is that a goodwill is held as part of the asset within the scope of Section 32 of the Act in that case and therefore, depreciation can be claimed etc.
11. We notice that the question really does not arise from the order of the Tribunal for the simple reason that the Tribunal has not decided the issue. Question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal only when the question is decided by the Tribunal, one way or the other.
12. Mr. Nageshwar Rao, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner also places reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case ofCIT v. L.F. D'Silva [1991] 192 ITR 547/[1992] 62 Taxman 161. Submission is that reasoning given by the Commissioner alone will be the criteria for invoking jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Act and other authorities cannot supplement or give their own reasons and therefore, the Tribunal could not have given any further reasons to uphold the order of the Commissioner on the question of jurisdiction. Submitted that the Tribunal giving the reasons that the question was covered by the decision of the Supreme Court on the aspect whether the Assessing Officers action was right or wrong could have been set right by the Tribunal etc.
13. The Tribunal has rightly observed that the Commissioner assumed jurisdiction only on the Assessing Authority having not given reason for the passing of the order and therefore, the Tribunal thought it not necessary to interfere on this ground, more importantly the Tribunal directing the Assessing Officer for re-examining the matter in the light of the existing position of law. In that view of the matter, we do not think that the Tribunal has committed any error at variance with the judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel and rendered by this Court in the case of L.F. D'silva (supra).
14. So far as the jurisdiction is concerned, that was not an issue before the Supreme Court in the case relied on. We find by a judgment of this Court, it has been held that where an Assessing Officer does not assign any reason for passing an order having effect on the revenue in the sense that allowing or disallowing a claim put forth by the assessee and if that is not the correct thing, it can amount to an erroneous order. The Tribunal as well as the Commissioner of Income Tax have placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd.[2012] 205 Taxman 98/17 taxmann.com 203.
15. Mr. Aravind, learned Standing Counsel for the revenue points out to this decision and submits that an assessment order without assigning reasons is erroneous and prejudice to the interest of revenue if it has resulted in loss of revenue or has resulted in reducing the tax liability of an assessee.
16. It is not for us to go into further facts on this aspect. The Commissioner whether he is right or wrong, assumes jurisdiction on the premise that the order is erroneous and had deprived the revenue of certain amount of taxes, which is a legitimate due by allowing a deduction otherwise not entitled for deduction. The question is not that, Commissioner is right or wrong but whether bona fide had assumed jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Act.
17. Be that as it may. Now that the direction issued by the Commissioner has been set aside and the Tribunal by setting aside the direction issued by the Commissioner has remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer applying the relevant case law, we do not think any prejudice is caused to the assessee under the impugned order and in fact, as pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel for the revenue, it is an order more in favour of the assessee, it is not necessary for us to go into further aspects in this appeal when such facts had not been decided by the Tribunal itself and therefore, these appeals are dismissed at the admission stage as not raising questions of law which are required to be examined in an appeal under Section 260-A of the Act.
Tale of soaring tax arrears & recovery failure - Will Shome Commission do something?
TIOL - COB( WEB) - 360
SEPTEMBER 05, 2013
SEPTEMBER 05, 2013
By Shailendra Kumar, Editor
MR Parthasarthy Shome-headed Tax Administration Reforms Commission is yet to hold its first meeting but nothing could have come as more timely input than the PAC Report on Tax Administration. The Report released last week has touched virtually all the dimensions of tax administration. And one of them, which commanded copious attention of the Members of the House, was the ever-swelling tax arrears. As per the Finance Minister's statement given in December, 2012, the direct tax arrears had ballooned to Rs 4.2 lakh Crore. And, in addition, the indirect tax arrears are in the range of Rs 50,000 Crore. By now, the total revenue arrears for both the Revenue Boards must have exceeded the infamous milestone of Rs 5 lakh crore.
However, since the PAC's report is based on the CAG reports, its comments are confined to data relating to FY 2010-11. A detailed study of the observations of the PAC and the replies furnished by the CBDT in response to various queries may produce useful clues for Dr Shome to identify the major areas of reforms. By the end of the FY 2010-11, the total arrears were about 2.9 lakh, and notwithstanding constant efforts if one may call them, the tally of arrears has been only growing and not showing any sign of decline. In next FY, it soared beyond Rs four lakh crore. As per the Report, the recovery apparatus in the Income Tax is so inefficient that even certified demand that remained uncollected rose from Rs 26700 Cr to Rs 1.06 lakh crore between 2006 to 2011.
In response to poor recovery performance the CBDT reported to the PAC that there are various reasons for the same. And some of them are as follows:
++ The taxpayer has no assets or income flows from which recovery could be made. Further the arrears relating to such tax payers keep increasing as interest is regularly loaded;
++ The taxpayer has no assets or income flows from which recovery could be made. Further the arrears relating to such tax payers keep increasing as interest is regularly loaded;
++ Taxpayer is not traceable;
++ Recovery of demand is stayed by the court or ITAT considering the facts of the case or the legal points involved. Sometimes the tax authority also stay the recovery on grounds of equity as a tax demand pertains to issues similar to those decided in earlier years in favour of the tax payers by the appellate authorities but the issue is kept alive as the Department is pursuing appeal before higher courts;
++ Recovery of demand is stayed by the court or ITAT considering the facts of the case or the legal points involved. Sometimes the tax authority also stay the recovery on grounds of equity as a tax demand pertains to issues similar to those decided in earlier years in favour of the tax payers by the appellate authorities but the issue is kept alive as the Department is pursuing appeal before higher courts;
++ The demand is covered by installments for tax-payments granted by the income tax authorities considering genuine financial constraints of the tax payer;
++ At times, protective demand is created which is not enforceable till the matter is finally decided in appeal;
++ Approx. 45% of the demand pertains to Money laundering and Security Scam cases ( in Hassan Ali Khan Group, Harshad Mehta Group, Ketan Parekh Group and Dalal Group). In Hassan Ali Group, the recovery is not possible though all known immovable and moveable assets belonging to the group have been attached. As per the existing guidelines, recovery through sale of attached properties can be made only after the decision of appeal filed before ITAT. Further, the attached assets are inadequate to recover the entire dues. In Securities Scam cases also the recovery is not possible as it pertains to persons notified under the Special Court (TORT Act 1992) and no recovery can be made directly from these persons.
++ Case is before BIFR and so recovery cannot be enforced;
++ Case is before BIFR and so recovery cannot be enforced;
++ Company is under liquidation.
++ Case is before Settlement Commission and so the income tax authorities cannot proceed with recovery proceedings.
++ Sometimes the demand raised has not fallen due or is under verification;
++ Further, some cases pertain to proceedings related to Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) in terms of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement where bank guarantee are available but recovery has to await MAP decision.
++ Case is before Settlement Commission and so the income tax authorities cannot proceed with recovery proceedings.
++ Sometimes the demand raised has not fallen due or is under verification;
++ Further, some cases pertain to proceedings related to Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) in terms of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement where bank guarantee are available but recovery has to await MAP decision.
A close study of some of the reasons prominently listed out may reveal that if the CBDT streamlines its internal procedures and improves its recovery mechanism, a good number of cases clubbed as untraceable can be traced effectively. Even in today's society where too many legal requirements are to be fulfilled before one can even contemplate of doing any business, the CBDT notes that a good number of taxpayers are untraceable. Indeed, there is something wrong with our system. How can one disappear after having generated such a quantum of income that there is huge income tax liability but the Department has no means to trace such a taxpayer. To earn any significant chunk of income, which may invite the eyeballs of the Revenue, one needs to do business for many years. If one has done so and also filed returns and the Department has details of one's transactions and bank accounts and also details of one's associates with whom one has done business, such a taxpayer cannot simply vanish into the thin air unless no worthwhile efforts are made to trace them.
Secondly, the CBDT needs to expand the ambit of its Directorate of Intelligence to generate meaningful alerts for the recovery to move faster than a company moves for liquidation or BIFR option. Nowadays, corporate reporting of every large company is so extensive that time-sensitive clues can be processed based on information available in public domain and the same can be passed on to the AOs or the Recovery wing. For instance, a lot of defaults were reported against the Kingfisher Airlines. Had the CBDT paid a little careful attention to the media reports about repeated defaults in paying TDS and Service Tax, a clear message was available with the Board that its legitimate tax was going to be stuck in litigation unless it moved fast. Had it done so, it may have not only recovered TDS fully but also helped thousands of its employees who could not claim tax credit for taxes deducted but not deposited.
The CBDT has finally accepted that as much as half of its arrears are with respect to money-laundering cases and they have become unrecoverable. Let's take a look at some of the sample demands:
++ Hassan Ali Khan - Rs 116774 Crore - After adjustment of seized cash, there are no known assets of the assessee in India. All known immovable properties are under attachment. The references have been made to various countries through FT&TR CBDT to obtain further information in this regard. ED has been requested to share the information relating to assets gathered during investigation.
++ Late Harshad Mehta - Rs 18463 Cr - It is a security scam related case and assessee is a notified person. All assets of notified person are dealt with exclusively under Special Court (TORTS) Act 1992. No recovery can be made directly from these persons.
++ Chandrika Tapuriah - Rs 47040 Cr - Linked to Hassan Ali Case. Sufficient assets are not available for recovery. The references have been made to various countries through FT&TR CBDT to obtain further information in this regard. ED has been requested to share the information relating to assets gathered during investigation.
A few interesting live cases:
++ LIC of India - Rs 10468 Cr - After recent collection of Rs 1825 crore, the demand is at Rs 10468 Cr. The demand of Rs 10397.83 crore related to A.Y. 08-09 and 09- 10 is under appeal before CIT(A). The CIT (A) has been requested to dispose of the case early. The balance demand has been recently raised.
++ State Bank of India - Rs 4530 Cr - During the quarter ending March 2012, the assessee has paid Rs 2439.88 crore for the A.Y. 10-11. The balance demand of Rs 4530.90 crore is protective in nature. The assessee's appeal is pending before CIT(A).
++ Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co Ltd - Rs 3730 Cr - There has been a collection of Rs 13.68 crore and remission of Rs 37.92 crore during the quarter ending March 2012. The demand of Rs 3271.79 crore is stayed by the ITAT and High Court. Balance demand covered by stay by field authority till disposal of first appeal.
++ Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd - Rs 2049 Crore - From an opening arrear demand of Rs 3415 crore on 1.4.2011, the demand is down to Rs 2049 crores. The balance demand is stayed by the High Court. However efforts are on to revisit the stay.
Even a fleeting glance at the arrears owed by these taxpayers reveals that a major part of the arrears is dead and an equally significant chunk is stuck with other Government-owned establishments. So, if an effective mechanism is built, litigation with Govt-owned enterprises can be avoided, and genuine revenue can be mopped up in the relevant AY. So, what it calls for is the twin strategy to do away with dead arrears and collect whatever is legitimately possible from the enterprises owned by the Government. There is no point in pursuing serious litigation with PSUs provided the Revenue is willing to drop frivolous demands and convince the taxpayers to pay up genuine dues.
Let's now look at one of the futuristic measures taken by the Board to enable its officers to make effective recovery. In this context, the Board extensively talked about the National Judicial Reference System (NJRS) before the PAC. The CBDT Chairperson heaped praise on this system in the making. But what she forgot to disclose was that because of their inefficient handling this future project has suffered several setbacks. After years of homework and rephrasing of its goals and standards it was finally floated in the form of tenders. But even a cursory glance at the pre-qualification conditions by a third party could have revealed that the entire tender was either tailor-made for some specific vendor or was designed to fail. Indeed, it did not care about serious and fair competition from serious bidders. When the project is futuristic where it required headnoted case laws for only 4-5% of cases decided, it asked for 50,000 cases with headnotes if any content provider wanted to bid for. But why 50,000 and not 60,000 or even 10,000 cases? What was the rationale? If the rationale was to filter out non-serious bidders where was the need to ask for more than 10,000 cases. Does anyone in the CBDT know that even to report 10,000 cases with quality headnotes it takes 5-7 years. And if any bidder has such a number and is in the business for 7 years, it cannot be construed as non-serious content provider. Secondly, there were other stages of the bid where non-serious could have been filtered out. But, since the Niyat(Intention) was to fail the scheme, it failed, and the tender is learnt to have been cancelled. Indeed, it is a major setback for such a project, which could be a powerfulenabling tool for the officers doing actual revenue collection as well as policy-making work. But, it seems for some officers in the Board, the rationale and the concept of fair competition are of lesser virtues! The future efficiency of their Department is of no concern to them except for the fact that the NJRS project was designed during their tenure!
Anyway, it is high time a fresh approach is initiated towards arrears management, which must inspire at least the honest taxpayers to believe that the taxes paid or dues are in good hands. Similarly, all good measures or ideas or schemes or systems conceived must be implemented with honesty and the Department must reap the full benefits to help the cause of public interests. Let's hope the Shome Commission pays adequate attention to all these points.
[2011] 199 TAXMAN 14 (Ker.)
HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Sree Bhagawathy Textiles Ltd.
v.
Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax *
C.N. RAMACHANDRAN NAIR AND HARUN-UL-RASHID, JJ.
IT APPEAL NO. 74 OF 2010†
MARCH 3, 2011
Section 115JA, read with section 154, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Minimum alternate tax - Assessment year 1997-98 - Whether as per scheme of section 115JA, Assessing Officer should start with profit available in profit and loss account prepared in terms of Parts II and III of Schedule VI of Companies Act, 1956, wherefrom only deductions permissible in terms of clauses (i) to (ix) of Explanation to section 115JA would be admissible - Held, yes - Whether prior period expense is not an item that can be deducted from profit in terms of any of clauses covered by Explanation to section 115JA and, therefore, same cannot be allowed as deduction in MAT assessment - Held, yes
FACTS
The Assessing Officer accepted the loss return submitted by the assessee for the relevant assessment year and completed the assessment on 30 per cent of the book profits under section 115JA. However, later on, the Assessing Officer noticed that the profit and loss account prepared by the assessee under Parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956, disclosed a profit of Rs. 1,01,37,664, wherefrom the assessee had made a deduction towards prior period expenses which was impermissible under the statute and that mistake was rectified in proceedings initiated under section 154 disallowing deduction claimed by the assessee from the profit available under the profit and loss account above referred. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) noticed that the debit made towards prior period expenses was not in the profit and loss account prepared under the Companies Act but the deduction was shown in the profit and loss appropriation account which was not relevant for the purpose of assess- ment under section 115JA. Therefore, he held that the mistake in the original assessment, which was a patent deviation from the statutory provision, was a mistake apparent which could be corrected under section 154. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) confirming the rectification order passed by the Assessing Officer under section 154.
On appeal to the High Court :
HELD
From a reading of section 115JA, it is clear that the Assessing Officer should start with the profit available in the profit and loss account prepared in terms of Parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act. In the instant case, the profit under the said profit and loss account, admittedly, was Rs. 1,01,37,664. The assessee made a further deduction from the profit available under profit and loss account prepared under the Companies Act. Obviously, unless the deduction made by the assessee was permissible in terms of clauses (i ) to (ix) of the Explanation to section 115JA, the same was inadmissible. The assessee had no case that the prior period expense was an item that could be deducted from the profit in terms of any of the clauses covered by the Explanation to section 115JA. So much so, the claim was not a deduction allowable from the profit taken from the profit and loss account prepared under the Companies Act. When the deduction was, admittedly, not admissible under the provisions of the Act, the assessee wanted to bank on the technicality that the deduction, though wrongly allowed in the assessment based on the wrong claim made by the assessee, yet it could not be revised in rectification proceedings under section 154. That contention could not be accepted because it is the settled position that the Assessing Officer has to start assessment by adopting the profit available in the profit and loss account prepared in terms of Parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act and if the assessee had made a claim of deduction from this profit not enumerated in the clauses (i) to (ix) covered by the Explanation to section 115JA, the assessment so completed based on the profit taken from the profit and loss appropriation account submitted by the assessee happened to be an apparent mistake which can be rectified in proceedings to be initiated under section 154. The Tribunal, having satisfied on the factual mistake committed by the Assessing Officer in the original assessment, rightly upheld the revised assessment issued under section 154 by reversing its earlier order. [Para 4]
Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT [2002] 255 ITR 273/ 122 Taxman 562 (SC) [Para 2], CIT v. Khaitan Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd. [2008] 307 ITR 150/ 175 Taxman 195 (Delhi) [Para 3], CIT v. Inden Biselers [1990] 181 ITR 69/[1989] 47 Taxman 225 (Mad.) [Para 3], T.R.F. Ltd. v. CIT [2010] 323 ITR 397 (SC) [Para 3] and CIT v. HCL Comnet Systems & Services Ltd. [2008] 305 ITR 409/ 174 Taxman 118 (SC) [Para 3].
R. Vijaya Raghavan and Saji Varghese for the Appellant. P.K.R. Menon and Jose Joseph for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
C.N. Ramachandran Nair, J. - Appeal by the assessee is against the order of the Tribunal issued under section 154 of the Income-tax Act (hereinafter called "the Act") rectifying and reversing an order in appeal that was decided in favour of the appellant-assessee. We have heard Adv. Sri. R. Vijaya Raghavan appearing for the appellant-assessee and Standing Counsel for the respondent-revenue.
2. The assessment involved is for the year 1997-98. The Assessing Officer accepted the loss return submitted by the assessee and, therefore, proceeded to make MAT assessment on 30 per cent of the book profit under section 115JA of the Act. The assessee disclosed a book profit of Rs. 78,43,643 and accepting the same the Assessing Officer completed the assessment on 30 per cent of the book profit i.e., fixing the income at Rs. 23,53,093. However, later the Assessing Officer noticed that the Profit and Loss Account prepared by the assessee under Parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act disclosed a profit of Rs. 1,01,37,664, wherefrom the assessee had made a deduction of Rs. 23,29,726 towards prior period expenses which is impermissible under the statute and this mistake was rectified in proceedings initiated under section 154 of the Act by disallowing deduction claimed by the assessee from the profit available under the Profit and Loss Account above referred. The assessee challenged the rectification order before the first appellate authority namely, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). However, the CIT (Appeals) verified the Profit and Loss Account prepared under Parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act and noticed that the profit available in the said Profit and Loss Account was Rs. 1,01,37,664. The debit made towards prior period expenses was not in the Profit and Loss Account prepared under the Companies Act as stated above but the deduction was shown in the Profit and Loss Appropriation Account which is not relevant for the purpose of assessment under section 115JA of the Act. Even though assessee relied on decision of the Supreme Court in Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT [2002] 255 ITR 2731, the CIT (Appeals) held that assessee has claimed a deduction from the profit available in the Profit and Loss Account prepared under the above provisions of the Companies Act which is not authorised under clauses (i) to (ix ) of Explanation to section 115JA of the Act. Therefore, he held that the mistake in the original assessment which is a patent deviation from the statutory provision is a mistake apparent which could be corrected under section 154. When the assessee filed second appeal, Tribunal initially allowed the same without considering the case on merits, but by holding that admissibility of item of expenditure towards deduction in the computation of book profit under section 115JA is a debatable point on which no rectification can be made under section 154 of the Act. The appeal filed by the assessee was accordingly allowed by the Tribunal. However, department filed a rectification application pointing out the scheme of assessment under section 115JA to the Tribunal wherein the basis to be adopted is the profit as shown in the Profit and Loss Account prepared under the above provisions of the Companies Act and therefrom the adjustments permissible are limited to the nine items provided in clauses (i) to (ix) of Explanation to section 115JA. The Tribunal after verifying the facts found that the assessee has returned the book profit not based on Profit and Loss Account prepared under the Companies Act, but based on the profit available under the Profit and Loss Appropriation Account which is against section 115JA of the Act and, therefore, the Tribunal rectified their earlier order and upheld the order of the CIT (Appeals) confirming the rectification order passed by the Assessing Officer under section 154 of the Act. It is against this order of the Tribunal, passed under section 154 the assessee has filed the appeal.
3. There is no dispute on the factual position inasmuch as the profit available as per Profit and Loss Account prepared by the assessee in terms of Parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act based on which assessment under section 115JA has to be made was Rs. 1,01,37,664. The only question to be considered is whether assessee is entitled to deduction of prior period expenditure which is ex gratia payments made to employees for the services rendered for the last several years which is a debit made by the assessee under the Profit and Loss Appropriation Account and if the same was wrongly allowed based on assessee's claim, the Assessing Officer could rectify the same in proceedings initiated under section 154 of the Act. Counsel for the assessee relied on several decisions including that of the Supreme Court in Apollo Tyres Ltd.'s case (supra). The other decisions relied on by the assessee's counsel are that of Delhi High Court in CIT v. Khaitan Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd. [2008] 307 ITR 1501, that of Madras High Court in CIT v. Inden Biselers[1990] 181 ITR 692 and decisions of the Supreme Court in TRF Ltd. v. CIT [2010] 323 ITR 397 andin CIT v. HCL Comnet Systems & Services Ltd. [2008] 305 ITR 409 3. Standing Counsel appearing for the Revenue on the other hand contended that section 115JA is a self-contained scheme of assessment and the basis for assessment is the Profit and Loss Account prepared under the above referred provisions of the Companies Act.
4. After hearing both sides and after going through the judgments above referred, we are unable to uphold the assessee's contention because what the Supreme Court has held in Apollo Tyres Ltd.'s case (supra) is that the Assessing Officer is bound to accept the Profit and Loss Account prepared in terms of the above provisions of the Companies Act. The assessee also does not dispute the fact that the profit available under the Profit and Loss Account prepared under the Companies Act is Rs. 1,01,37,664. However, the assessee's contention is that the debit of prior period expenses made in the Profit and Loss Appropriation Account should also be allowed as a deduction. We are unable to accept this contention because MAT assessment has to be completed strictly in terms of the statutory provision which is as follows :
"115JA. Deemed income relating to certain companies.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act, where in the case of an assessee, being a company, the total income, as computed under this Act in respect of any previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1997 (hereafter in this section referred to as the relevant previous year) is less than thirty per cent of its book profit, the total income of such assessee chargeable to tax for the relevant previous year shall be deemed to be an amount equal to thirty per cent of such book profit.
(2) Every assessee, being a company, shall, for the purposes of this section prepare its profit and loss account for the relevant previous year in accordance with the provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
******
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, "book profit" means the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account for the relevant previous year prepared under sub-section (2), as increased by—
(a)******
if any amount referred to in clauses (a ) to (f) is debited to the profit and loss account, and as reduced by,—
(i )the amount withdrawn from any reserves or provisions if any such amount is credited to the profit and loss account :
******
(ii)the amount of income to which any of the provisions of Chapter III applies, if any such amount is credited to the profit and loss account; or
(iii)the amount of loss brought forward or unabsorbed depreciation, whichever is less as per books of account.
Explanation. —For the purposes of this clause, the loss shall not include depreciation; or
(iv)the amount of profits derived by an industrial undertaking from the business of generation or generation and distribution of power; or
(v)the amount of profits derived by an industrial undertaking located in an industrially backward State or district as referred to in sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (iv ) of sub-section (2) of section 80-IA, for the assessment years such industrial undertaking is eligible to claim a deduction of hundred per cent of the profits and gains under sub-section (5) of section 80-IA; or
(vi)the amount of profits derived by an industrial undertaking from the business of developing, maintining and operating any infrastructure facility as defined under sub-section (12) of section 80-IA, and subject to fulfilling the conditions laid down in sub-section (4A) of section 80-IA, or
(vii)the amount of profits of sick industrial company for the assessment year commencing from the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the said company has become a sick industrial company under sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986), and ending with the assessment year during which the entire net worth of such company becomes equal to or exceeds the accumulated losses.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, "net worth" shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (ga) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986).
(viii)the amount of profits, eligible for deduction under section 80HHC, computed under clause (a), (b) or (c ) of sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A), as the case may be, of that section and subject to the conditions specified in sub-sections (4) and (4A) of that section;
(ix)the amount of profits eligible for deduction under section 80HHE, computed under sub-section (3) of that section."
What is clear from the above is that the Assessing Officer should start with the profit available in the Profit and Loss Account prepared in terms of Parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act. The profit under the said Profit and Loss Account admittedly is Rs. 1,01,37,664. The way assessee has claimed deduction based on the Profit and Loss Appropriation Account is detailed in the order of the CIT (Appeals). What is clear from the said order is that the assessee made a further deduction from the profit available under Profit and Loss Account prepared under the Companies Act. Obviously unless the deduction made by the assessee is permissible in terms of clauses (i ) to (ix) of Explanation to section 115JA above stated, the same is inadmissible. Assessee has no case that the prior period expenses is an item that could be deducted from the profit in terms of any of the clauses covered by Explanation to section 115JA. So much so, the claim is not a deduction allowable from the profit taken from the Profit and Loss Account prepared under the Companies Act. When the deduction is admittedly not admissible under the provisions of the Act, assessee wants to bank on the technicality that the deduction, though wrongly allowed in the assessment based on the wrong claim made by the assessee, cannot be revised in rectification proceedings under section 154. We are unable to accept this contention because it is the settled position as revealed from the decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by the assessee itself that the Assessing Officer has to start assessment by adopting the profit available in the Profit and Loss Account prepared in terms of Parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act. If the assessee has made a claim of deduction from this profit not enumerated in the clauses (i) to (ix) covered by Explanation to section 115JA, the assessment so completed based on the profit taken from the Profit and Loss Appropriation Account submitted by the assessee happens to be an apparent mistake which could be rectified in proceedings to be initiated under section 154. The Tribunal having satisfied on the factual mistake committed by the Assessing Officer in the original assessment, rightly upheld the revised assessment issued under section 154 by reversing their earlier order. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
[2013] 36 taxmann.com 512 (Karnataka)
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Ms. Latha Ramachandra Inamdar
v.
Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle -5(1)*
D.V. SHYLENDRA KUMAR AND MRS. B.S. INDRAKALA, JJ.
IT APPEAL NO. 30 OF 2013†
JULY 23, 2013
Section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Capital gains - Exemption of, in case of investment in residential house [Long-term capital assets] - Assessment year 2008-09 - Assessee sold an agricultural land and claimed exemption under section 54F on ground that it was a transfer of long-term capital asset - Whether since there was no evidence that assessee was in possession of subject land pursuant to an agreement of purchase any time beyond period of 3 years, assessee would not be entitled for exemption as provided for under section 54-F - Held, yes [Para 16] [In favour of revenue]
FACTS
| ■ | The assessee claimed exemption under section 54F on sale of agricultural land. | |
| ■ | The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that property had been purchased by the assessee as per sale deed dated 7-10-2005, and it was registered on 10-10-2005 while it had been sold on 23-1-2008 and, thus, it was held by the assessee for less than 36 months. | |
| ■ | On appeal, before the Commissioner (Appeals) the assessee took up the stand that the possession of the property had been taken earlier by the assessee pursuant to an agreement to sell dated 15-9-2004 and such transaction agreement coupled with transfer of possession would come under the definition of the word 'transfer' within the meaning of section 2(47) and on the strength of the sale agreement, laid claim to the exemption. However, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that no agriculturist would transfer possession of his agricultural property on receipt of only a sum of Rs. 1 lakh without receiving huge balance amount being substantial sum of Rs. 8 lakhs for over a year. Further, the sale deed to the agreement dated 15-9-2004 showed that the entire sale consideration was received by the assessee only under the sale deed and there was no mention of the earlier payment of Rs. One lakh. The Commissioner (Appeal) therefore, confirmed decision of the Assessing Officer. | |
| ■ | On second appeal, the Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals). | |
| ■ | On appeal: |
HELD
| ■ | It is no doubt true as contended by the appellant that the definition of the word 'transfer' under section 2(47) includes situation where transaction involving allowing of possession of any immovable property in part performance of the contract. But that should be made good on material placed on record and through cogent evidence. The claim of the assessee that there was transfer of possession to her under the agreement dated 15-9-2004 has not been made out on acceptable material facts before the three authorities and the finding of all the three authorities is that there is nothing to indicate that assessee was in possession of the subject land even as on 15-9-2004. If that is the finding of fact, the Court concluded that there is no scope for interference for examination of the questions of law as raised by the appellant-assessee in this appeal. | |
| ■ | Therefore, this appeal is dismissed. |
Mallaharao and S Parthasarathi for the Appellant. K.V. Aravind for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J. - The appeal by the assessee directed against the order dated 28.09.2012 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore Bench 'B', in ITA No. 145/Bang/2012 : where under the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.
2. The assessee is an individual and assessment year is 2008-09. In this appeal, the appellant has sought to raise the following substantial questions of law as arising out of the order of the Tribunal for our consideration.
| "1. | Whether in law, the Tribunal was justified in sustaining the action of Assessing Officer in denying the benefit of exemption u/s. 54F of the Act to the Appellant overlooking the evidences produced? | |
| 2. | Whether in law, the Tribunal was justified in negating the view of the Appellant by terming the evidences produced are 'not credible as such' when such evidences clearly establish the fact that the appellant held the subject property for more than 3 years to suit the requirement of section 54F of the Act? | |
| 3. | Whether in law, the Tribunal was justified in taking the date of acquisition of property as 10.10.2005 when such property was actually taken into possession on 15.09.2004 duly entering into agreement for sale? | |
| 4. | Whether in law, the findings recorded by the Tribunal in the context of accepting the Revenue's plea is vitiated on account of the issue being considered on surmise and conjectures and not on the basis of the material on record?" |
3. The bone of contention between the parties is as to whether the assessee is entitled for exemption as provided for under section 54-.F of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [for short 'the Act'] or is not entitled to for the same as urged by the respondent.
4. The brief facts are that during the accounting period relevant for the assessment year, the assessee had sold immovable property, namely, agricultural land as per sale transaction dated 23.01.2008 for valuable consideration. The assessee had claimed that it is a transfer of long term capital asset and therefore the assessee is entitled for the benefit of exemption under section 54-F of the Act. The assessing authority who examined the claim of the assessee and passed the assessment order in question on the other hand noticed that the property in question had been purchased by the assessee as per sale deed dated 7.10.2005 registered on 10.10.2005 and it had been sold on 23.1.2008; that it was less than 36 months and consequently the assessee was not entitled to lay claim to exemption under section 54-F of the Act and concluded the assessment on the premise that it was only short term capital gain after discussion with the representative of the assessee at the time of hearing.'
5. The assessee appealed to the Appellate Commissioner that the assessing authority was not right in denying the benefit of exemption under section 54-F of the Act in respect of sale transaction dated 23.1.2008. Before the appellate authority, the assessee took up the stand that though no doubt the assessee had purchased the property in question as per sale deed dated 7.10.2005 registered on 10.10.2005, the possession of the property had been taken earlier by the assessee pursuant to an agreement to sell dated 15.09.2004 and such transaction agreement coupled with transfer of possession would come under the definition of the word 'transfer' within the meaning of section 2[47] of the Act and on the strength of the sale agreement, laid claim to the exemption,. The assessee sought to place before the appellate authority the copy of the sale agreement dated 15.09.2004.
6. The Appellate Commissioner on examining the appeal on this aspect, noticed that the interval between the so called agreement from the date of registration of the sale deed is more than one year; that no agriculturist would transfer possession of his agricultural property on receipt of only a sum of Rs.1 lakh without receiving the balance amount agreed and in the present transaction the amount being substantial sum of Rs.8 lakhs and not making any payment for the same for more than one year; that the assessee had also not justified his claim for having taken possession of the property by showing any agricultural operations carried on in the subject land and the agreement being not registered document and moreover there being no reference at all in the sale deed to the agreement dated 15.09.2004 and the entire sale consideration having been received by the assessee only under the sale deed, no mention of the earlier payment of Rs.1 lakh figuring in the sale deed, opined that the self serving document like the agreement to sell which is not registered document cannot be accepted and agreeing with the view taken by the assessing officer of denial of exemption under section 54F of the Act, is justified and on this aspect, dismissed the appeal to the extent of the claim under section 54F of the Act is concerned. However, the assessee got the relief in respect of other aspects which we care not concerned with in this appeal.
7. In her further appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee reiterated her stand of the sale transaction having been preceded by earlier agreement for sale and putting the assessee in possession and therefore contended that the orders passed by the assessing authority and first appellate authority are liable to be set aside and prayed for setting aside the same. Quite naturally, the appeal was resisted by the revenue.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant - assessee contended before the Tribunal that it is customary in such transactions to put the purchaser in possession of the subject property even on the date of the agreement and on receiving some advance amount; that it need not be preceded by registration of a document and therefore urged for setting aside the orders passed by the lower authorities and allowing the benefit of section 54-F of the Act to the assessee.
9. On the other hand, the revenue contended that the assessee had not produced the so called agreement at the earliest point of time before the assessing officer; that it cannot be accepted and produced at a belated stage being not a registered document either and urged for dismissal of the appeal.
10. The Tribunal, on examining the material on record and considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant - assessee, found that the view taken by the Commissioner of Income Tax [Appeals] in rejecting the claim of the assessee under section 54-F of the Act and affirming the assessment order was more than justified and even the judicial pronouncement did not favour the assessee in such a situation and the assessee having failed to bring on record any credible documentary evidence to substantiate her claim of the property having been in her possession under an agreement dated 15.09.2004, there is no merit in the appeal and that the benefit under section 54-F of the Act cannot be claimed, dismissed the appeal.
11. It is as against these orders, the present appeal by the assessee and on the questions as noticed earlier.
12. Appearing on behalf of the appellant - assessee, Sri. Mallaharao, learned counsel has vehemently urged that the definition of the word 'transfer' under section 2[47] of the Act includes transfer in the nature of agreement coupled with transfer of possession and therefore the authorities have committed a clear error when it is definite stand of the assessee that the assessee had got into possession of the subject land even on 15.09.2004 as per the agreement; that the copy produced before the appellate authority should have been accepted and acted upon.
13. On the other hand, Sri. K.V. Aravind, learned standing counsel appearing for the revenue has submitted that the recital in the sale deed very clearly says that the property in question was put in possession of the assessee - purchaser only under the sale deed and not under any agreement entered into earlier; that, in fact, no reference is made to any such agreement nor any mention made of any advance amount received by the vendor prior to execution of the sale deed; that the assessee having not produced the agreement of sale earlier and having come up before the same before the appellate authority and that too in the form of an unregistered document, no credence can be given to such document said to be of the year 2004 to place before the authorities for the first time only before the Appellate Commissioner during| the pendency of the appeal in the year 2011 or thereabouts.
14. It is also submitted that no question of law arises as it is only a finding of fact by the authorities, that the assessee got possession of the property only on 10.10.2005 as per the recital in the sale deed and therefore section 54-F of the Act was clearly not attracted, as to on what date assessee got possession being pure question of fact and even assertion by the assessee that she had got possession of the land earlier to the sale deed, having not been made good on cogent and reliable evidence on record, there is absolutely no need for interference.
15. We have bestowed our attention to the submissions made at the Bar and examined the memorandum of appeal and grounds urged therein.
16. It is no doubt, true as contended by Sri. Mallaharao, learned counsel for the appellant that the definition of the word 'transfer' under section 2[47] of the Act includes situation where transaction involving allowing of possession of any immovable property in part performance of the contract. But that should be made good on material placed on record and through cogent evidence. The claim of the assessee that there was transfer of possession to her under the agreement dated 15.09.2004 has not been made out on acceptable material facts before the three authorities and the finding of all the three authorities is that there is nothing to indicate that assessee was in possession of the subject land even as on 15.09.2004. If that is the finding of fact, we are afraid that there is no scope for interference for examination of the questions of law as raised by the appellant - assessee in this appeal.
17. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed as one not giving rise to examination of the questions of law as raised in the memorandum of appeal.
IT: Where assessee had failed to produce documents during assessment and failed to establish reasonable cause therefor and, further, did not comply with notices of Assessing Officer, additional evidence could not be accepted in appeal
■■■
[2013] 36 taxmann.com 508 (Chandigarh - Trib.)
IN THE ITAT CHANDIGARH BENCH 'A'
Rishi Sagar
v.
Income-tax Officer -III, Khanna*
T.R. SOOD, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
AND MS.SUSHMA CHOWLA, JUDICIAL MEMBER
AND MS.SUSHMA CHOWLA, JUDICIAL MEMBER
IT APPEAL NO. 10 (CHD.) OF 2013
[ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009-10]
[ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009-10]
MAY 23, 2013
I. Section 250 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 - Commissioner (Appeals) - Powers of [Power to admit additional evidence] - Assessment year 2009-10 - During assessment, assessee failed to produce books of account or vouchers as directed by Assessing Officer - Further, assessee had failed to establish reasonable cause in not being in possession of documents during assessment proceedings; neither did he comply with notices issued by Assessing Officer - Whether application for admission of additional evidence was to be rejected - Held, yes [Para 17] [In favour of revenue]
II. Section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Method of accounting - Estimation of profit [Rejection of books of account] - Assessment year 2009-10 - Whether assessee had failed to produce books of account before authorities below and revised books of account produced by way of additional evidence have been rejected by Commissioner (Appeals), authorities below was justified in applying gross profit rate shown by assessee in preceding year in order to work out gross profits of year under consideration - Held, yes [Para 20] [In favour of revenue]
FACTS
| ■ | The case of assessee was selected for scrutiny and various notices under section 143(2) and 142(1) and questionnaire for compliance were issued by the Assessing Officer. | |
| ■ | The Assessing Officer directed the assessee to furnish information as per questionnaire and to produce complete books of account alongwith vouchers and bills. | |
| ■ | The assessee did not produce any books of account, vouchers or sale/purchases bills. Furthermore, the Assessing Officer noted that there was an increase in paid up share capital of the assessee for which no explanation was provided by assessee. He, thus, made certain additions to the income of the assessee. | |
| ■ | On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) refused to admit additional evidences submitted by the assessee. | |
| ■ | On appeal: |
HELD-I
| ■ | In order to establish the claim of the various receipts and expenditure during the year under consideration, the onus was upon the assessee to establish its claim by producing the books of account before the Assessing Officer and also produce the relevant vouchers and bills in respect thereof. But the assessee failed to comply with various notices issued by the Assessing Officer and even failed to reply with the show-cause notice(s) issued by the Assessing Officer from time to time. The Assessing Officer had also obtained information in respect of certain sundry creditors and there was variance in the balances shown by the assessee and the balances shown in the account of the assessee in the books of account of the sundry creditors. The specific queries raised by the Assessing Officer in respect of the sundry creditors were not replied to by the assessee despite the Assessing Officer having show caused assessee and in the absence of books of account, the provisions of section 145(3) were applied in order to estimate the income of the assessee on the basis of the gross profit shown by the assessee in the preceding year. Part of the expenses were also disallowed as the assessee had failed to produce the vouchers in respect of the said expenditure. The assessment was completed in the hands of the assessee by making various additions. [Para 15] | |
| ■ | In order to avail the benefit of rule 46A in relation to admission of additional evidence, the assessee is to show as to how its case of admission of additional evidence is covered by the conditions provided under sub-rule (1) to rule 46A. The case of the assessee was that as the entries of the cash credit limit and its application were not available with it during the course of assessment proceedings, the same was now being produced by way of additional evidence, does not merit admission as the assessee has failed to establish the reasonableness of the evidence not being available during the course of assessment proceedings. Further the said evidence, otherwise also cannot be admitted as additional evidence because in the first instance, the assessee has failed to produce books of account before the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings and the books of account now being sought to be produced are admittedly written by the assessee after the completion of the assessment proceedings as the assessee himself claims that it was not aware of the cash credit limit bank entries not being included in the hands of the assessee while preparing the original balance sheet. | |
| ■ | The assessee has failed to establish its case of reasonable cause in not being in possession of the said documents during the course of assessment proceedings and also the conduct of the assessee during the assessment proceedings of having not complied with various notices and put in appearance before the Assessing Officer does not merit the admission of such evidence at the stage of appellate proceedings. The assessee failed to produce the books of account during the assessment proceedings. The exceptions laid out under sub-rule (1) by way of clause (b) and (c) are thus, not satisfied by the assessee and hence, we find no merit in the application made by the assessee for the admission of the additional evidence. Admittedly, it is not a case where the Assessing Officer had made the additions without giving sufficient opportunity to the assessee to adduce evidence relevant to any ground of appeal. On the contrary, the Assessing Officer had time and again issued notices, show-cause notices and raised queries to the assessee to explain its stand and also to explain the discrepancies in the copies of account of the sundry creditors and the explanation filed by the assessee at this stage does not merit any admission. | |
| ■ | The assessee has failed to establish its case of admission of additional evidence and in view thereof, there is no merit in assessee's appeal. [Para 17] | |
| ■ | The Assessing Officer during the course of assessment proceedings noted that there was a difference in the balance shown in the account of two parties when compared with the copy of account of the assessee in the books of account of the respective parties. The assessee having failed to reconcile the difference except by way of additional evidence, which has not been admitted, the addition made by the Assessing Officer merits to be upheld in the hands of the assessee. [Para 19] |
HELD-II
| ■ | Question was raised against rejection of books of account under section 145(3) and application of net profit rate of the earlier year to the receipts declared during the year resulting in addition of Rs.2,68,412. The assessee had failed to produce the books of account before the authorities below and the revised books of account produced by way of additional evidence have been rejected by the Commissioner (Appeals). Hence, there was no alternative left but to estimate the trading income in the hands of the assessee and application of net profit rate to the sales receipts shown by the assessee. There is merit in the orders of the authorities below in applying gross profit rate shown by the assessee in the preceding year in order to work out gross profits of the year under consideration. The assessee's appeal is dismissed. [Para 20] |
CASES REFERRED TO
CWT v. Gurdial Singh [1980] 123 ITR 483/4 Taxman 246 (Delhi) (para 4), CIT v. Segu Buchian Setty [1970] 77 ITR 539 (SC) (para 4), Miri Mal Mahajan v. CIT [1974] 95 ITR 186 (Punj. & Har.) (para 4) and CIT v. Mukta Metal Works [2012] 210 Taxman 106/20 taxmann.com 774 (Punj. & Har.) (para 18).
Sudhir Sehgal for the Appellant. N.K. Saini for the Respondent.
ORDER
Ms. Sushma Chowla, Judicial Member - The appeal filed by the assessee is against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-II, Ludhiana dated 15.11.2012 relating to assessment year 2009-10 against the order passed u/s 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short 'the Act').
2. The grounds of appeal raised by the assessee read as under:
"1. That the Worthy Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) has erred in confirming the order of the Assessing Officer thereby assessing the income at Rs.44,12,380/- against the returned income of Rs.2,43,980/-.
2. (a) That the Worthy CIT(A) has erred in not admitting the additional evidence as filed before him vide submissions dated 15.06.2012 and such denial of admission of additional evidence is against the facts and circumstances of the case.
(b) That the Worthy CIT (A) has erred in not admitting the additional evidence specially when he had called for the remand report from the Assessing Officer.
(c) That the CIT(A) in a summary manner not considered the judgment of Jurisdictional High Court in the case of M/s Mukta Metal Works as reported in 336 ITR 555 and relied upon certain other judgments where the facts and circumstances were different.
(d) That the CIT(A) has failed to consider the fact that' the evidences as furnished by way of additional evidences were necessary for 'just decision' of the case.
3. Notwithstanding the above said grounds of appeals, the CIT (A) has erred in considering the issues on merits without taking into consideration the additional evidence and has erred in confirming the following additions:-
| (a) | Addition of Rs.6,99,980/- on account of difference in the account of M/s Dewan Steel Industries as per para 6.5 of the order. | |
| (b) | The CIT(A) has also erred in confirming the addition of Rs.30 lacs in respect of alleged unexplained difference in the account of M/s Regent Steel Industries as per para 7.3 of the order. | |
| (c) | The CIT (A) has erred in confirming the addition of Rs.2,68,412/-on account of G.P. Rate as per para 8.3 of the order. | |
| (d) | The CIT (A) has erred in confirming the addition of Rs.2 lacs on account of expenses debited in the profit and loss account in a ad hoc manner. |
4. That the CIT(A) has also erred in not considering the detailed submissions of the assessee and also that the assessee was willing to produce the books of account during the course of appellate proceedings to substantiate the various submissions as made before the Worthy CIT(A)."
3. Before addressing the issues raised by the assessee, the facts of the case need to be referred to. The assessee, during the year under consideration had furnished return of income declaring total income of Rs.243,980/- filed on 30.09.2009. The case of the assessee was selected for scrutiny and various notices u/s 143(2) and 142(1) of the Act were issued. The AO also issued questionnaire for compliance to the assessee. Despite repeated notices being issued to the assessee from time to time, no information was furnished by the assessee and only adjournments were sought on some dates. On other dates, none attended the proceedings on behalf of the assessee, nor any application was moved for adjournment. On 23.11.2011, the assessee attended the proceedings alongwith Shri Hukminder Sahi, C.A. for the assessee. However, no information was furnished but request was made for adjournment. The AO asked the assessee to furnish the information as per the questionnaire already issued and further additional information was sought from the assessee and also the assessee was directed to produce complete books of account alongwith vouchers and bills. On the appointed date of hearing, another application was moved for adjournment and none appeared on the adjourned date of hearing also. The AO notes that part of the information/clarification in reply to the questionnaire issued, and queries raised by order-sheet entry were filed by the assessee. The assessee had furnished the names and addresses of the sundry creditors outstanding as on 31.3.2009 in the balance-sheet of the assessee. On 30.12.2011, the assessee filed confirmed copies of the creditors as on 31.3.2009. The AO notes that "the assessee did not produce any books of account what-so-ever maintained, no vouchers, no sales/purchases bills/vouchers were produced except bank account statements in respect of Allahabad Bank Khanna." The AO further noted that there was an increase in the paid-up share capital of the assessee by Rs.11,24,310/- for which no explanation was given by the assessee and the same was thus, added as income of the assessee. Further, in respect of the sundry creditors totalling Rs.12,43,54,396/- as on 31.3.2009, the assessee had furnished documents of the creditors but had not furnished their PAN numbers or where they were assessed. However, on 30.12.2011, the assessee filed copies of account of creditors as in the books of the assessee duly endorsed by the respective creditors but without any PAN numbers or Ward Nos., where assessed. The AO further forwarded the copies of account to the respective AOs for necessary verification. One such sundry creditor was M/s Diwan Steel Industries where credit of Rs.699,982/- was shown in the books of the assessee. However, in the books of account of the said party, the account of the assessee reflected 'zero' balance. Similarly, in the case of M/s Regent Steel Industries, Loha Bazar, Mandi Gobindgarh, the assessee had shown credit balance of Rs.30 lacs as on 31.3.2009. However, the said party in its books of account, reflected 'zero' balance. Both these amounts i.e. Rs.699,982/- and Rs.30 lacs were added as income of the assessee. Further, in the absence of the books of account, the AO applied the provisions of section 145(3) of the Income-tax Act and estimated the income of the assessee on the basis of the gross profit shown by the assessee in the preceding year, resulting in an addition of Rs.268,412/-. Further, an addition was made by way of disallowance of the expenses to the extent of Rs.2 lacs out of total expenditure of Rs.671,872/- as the assessee had failed to produce books of account, vouchers etc.
4. Before the CIT(Appeals), in the written submissions, it was claimed by the assessee that it had taken a cash credit limit from State Bank of Patiala, Mandi Gobindgarh and all the entries relating to the said limit and the applications of such limit were not entered in the regular books of account. The assessee further claims that "we have now made the books relating to such limit only. The books include the balance-sheet and the ledger which are enclosed herewith at pages No. 3 to 12." Thereafter, the assessee tried to reconcile the differences in the account of M/s Diwan Steel Industries by pointing out that cheque payment of Rs.14 lacs was made to the said party out of the cash credit limit and further purchase of Rs.700,018/- was not reflected in the original copy of account of M/s Diwan Steel Industries. If the entries are merged, the net effect would be 'zero' and the balance thus, stands reconciled. Some explanation was given in respect of other creditor M/s Regent Steel Industries, Loha Bazar, Mandi Gobindgarh. The assessee vide application dated 15.6.2012 requested the CIT(Appeals) to admit the additional evidence by way of copy of accounts of the two parties, cash credit limit statement from State Bank of Patiala, Mandi Gobindgarh, Allahabad Bank current account statement of the assessee and copy of account of M/s Regent Steel & Agro Industries alongwith audited balance-sheet for the year under consideration. The CIT(Appeals) forwarded the request for admission of the additional evidence to the AO, who in-turn submitted its report which is referred to at page 5 of the appellate order and part of it is reproduced at page 6 of the appellate order. The CIT(Appeals) refused to admit the additional evidence as the assessee had failed to satisfy the conditions laid down under Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules. The CIT(Appeals) also observed that the AO had given sufficient opportunities to the assessee, who failed to appear before the AO during the course of assessment proceedings and furnish the requisite details. Applying the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in CWT v. Gurdial Singh [1980] 123 ITR 483/4 Taxman 246 (Delhi), CIT v. Segu Buchian Setty [1970] 77 ITR 539 (SC) and Miri Mal Mahajan v. CIT [1974] 95 ITR 186 (Punj. & Har.), the CIT(Appeals) observed as under :
"If the facts of the present case are analysed, it is absolutely clear that the Assessing Officer gave the assessee many opportunities to produce books of account and vouchers and other details. There was no response. The appellant did not reply even to the specific letters issued by the AO. The ratio of the above said judicial opinions is on all fours and applicable to the present case. The Assessing Officer has framed the assessment in a very judicious manner and not in arbitrary manner. The appellant does not deserve any relief in view of his recalcitrant and totally non-cooperative attitude.
Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, additional evidences filed by the appellant is not admitted. The case laws relied upon by the appellant pertain to the admission of additional evidences by the Tribunal and not by the CIT(Appeal). As such, the case laws relied upon by the appellant (Mukta Steels Works) is not applicable to the facts of the case. The issues are therefore being considered on merits."
5. The CIT(Appeals) further upheld the addition of Rs.699,980/- on account of difference in the account of M/s Diwan Steels Industries; Rs.30 lacs in the account of M/s Regent Steel Industries. The CIT(Appeals) also upheld the addition of Rs.268,412/- on account of application of higher GP rate. The CIT(Appeals) further dismissed the ground of appeal raised by the assessee against the addition of Rs.2 lacs on account of disallowance out of expenses debited to the Profit & Loss Account.
6. The assessee is in appeal against the order of the CIT(Appeals). Shri Sudhir Sehgal appeared for assessee and Shri N.K. Saini appeared for revenue and put forward their contentions.
7. Ground No.1 raised by the assessee, being general is dismissed.
8. Ground No.2 raised by the assessee is against the order of CIT(Appeals) in not admitting the additional evidence filed before him. Vide ground No.3 the assessee has raised the alternate plea against the issues on merits being confirmed by the CIT(Appeals).
9. The ld. AR for the assessee admitted that there was non-compliance before the AO during the course of assessment proceedings and also no books of account were produced before the AO. The ld. AR for the assessee, however, stressed that the difference in the accounts were because of the non inclusion of entries of one of the bank accounts wherein the assessee had raised cash credit limit. Our attention was drawn to the copy of the bank account placed at page 13 of the Paper Book. The ld. AR for the assessee stressed that in case the said entries are accounted for, then the accounts stand reconciled and there is no merit in the addition. The ld. AR for the assessee further pointed out that the CIT(Appeals) had failed to consider the additional evidence and the order passed was in violation of Rule 46A of Income-tax Rules.
10. The ld. DR for revenue pointed out that the perusal of the assessment order reflects total non-compliance by the assessee during the assessment proceedings wherein even the books of account or vouchers, bills were not produced before the AO. Our attention was drawn to the provisional balance-sheet filed by the assessee which is sought to be admitted as additional evidence, which in-turn is placed at page 3 of the Paper Book. The ld. DR for the revenue pointed out that in addition to the entries relating to the parties, the assessee had reflected the VAT account at Rs. 26924/- and closing stock at Rs. 673094/- and such evidence being available with the assessee was withheld by the assessee and the same cannot be admitted under Rule 46A of IT Rules. It was further pleaded by the ld. DR for the revenue that the original balance-sheet filed by the assessee cannot be relied upon in view of the so called entries in the provisional balance sheet. The plea of the assessee that it is ready to produce books of account now was also objected to by ld. DR for the revenue as the assessee had failed to produce the original books of account before the AO during assessment proceedings.
11. We have heard rival contentions and perused the record. The assessee vide ground No.2 is aggrieved by the non-admission of so called additional evidence under Rule 46A of the IT Rules. Rule 46A of the IT Rules provide as under :
"46A. (1) The appellant shall not be entitled to produce before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals), any evidence, whether oral or documentary, other than the evidence produced by him during the course of proceedings before the Assessing Officer, except in the following circumstances, namely :—
| (a) | where the [Assessing Officer] has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted ; or | |
| (b) | where the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from producing the evidence which he was called upon to produce by the Assessing Officer ; or | |
| (c) | where the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from producing before the Assessing Officer any evidence which is relevant to any ground of appeal ; or | |
| (d) | where the Assessing Officer has made the order appealed against without giving sufficient opportunity to the appellant to adduce evidence relevant to any ground of appeal. |
(2) No evidence shall be admitted under sub-rule (1) unless the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals) records in writing the reasons for its admission.
(3) The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals) shall not take into account any evidence produced under sub-rule (1) unless the Assessing Officer has been allowed a reasonable opportunity—
| (a) | to examine the evidence or document or to cross- examine the witness produced by the appellant, or | |
| (b) | to produce any evidence or document or any witness in rebuttal of the additional evidence produced by the appellant. |
(4) Nothing contained in this rule shall affect the power of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals) to direct the production of any document, or the examination of any witness, to enable him to dispose of the appeal, or for any other substantial cause including the enhancement of the assessment or penalty (whether on his own motion or on the request of the Assessing Officer under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 251 or the imposition of penalty under section 271."
12. Under the provisions of Rule 46A, it is provided that the appellant shall not be entitled to produce any evidence, whether oral or documentary before the CIT(Appeals) except the evidence produced by him during the assessment proceedings. However, certain exceptions are provided under sub-rule 1 to Rule 46A of the IT Rules, which are as under :
| "(a) | where the Assessing Officer has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted; or | |
| (b) | where the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from producing the evidence which he was called upon to produce by the Assessing Officer ; or | |
| (c) | where the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from producing before the Assessing Officer any evidence which is relevant to any ground of appeal; or | |
| (d) | where the Assessing Officer has made the order appealed against without giving sufficient opportunity to the appellant to adduce evidence relevant to any ground of appeal." |
13. As per the first exception where any evidence was sought to be produced before the AO and the same has not been admitted by the AO, then such evidence can be produced by way of additional evidence before the CIT (Appeals). Admittedly, the assessee has to satisfy that it had the alleged evidence in its possession and wanted to produce the same before the AO. The next exception is in such cases where the assessee was prevented by reasonable cause from producing such evidence, which has been called upon by the AO. The assessee in the given circumstances has to establish the reasonableness of his non- production of the evidence called upon by the AO during the assessment proceedings and in case he is not able to justify his non-production of the relevant evidence called upon by the AO during the assessment proceedings, the same cannot be admitted as additional evidence. Under clause (c) to Rule 46A(1), in all such cases where the assessee was prevented by reasonable cause from producing any evidence which is relevant to establish the case of the assessee during the assessment proceedings, then where the assessee establishes his claim of being prevented by sufficient cause, then such additional evidence which is necessary to adjudicate the issues raised vide grounds of appeal before the CIT(Appeals) may be admitted by the CIT(Appeals). The last exception to Rule 46A is where the order appealed against has been passed by the AO without giving sufficient opportunity to the assessee to adduce the evidence relatable to any ground of appeal.
14. Under sub-rule (2) to rule 46A, it is further provided that no evidence shall be admitted under sub-rule (1) by the CIT(Appeals) unless he records reasons in writing for its admission. Under sub-rule 3 to rule 46A, it is further provided that the additional evidence before being admitted, would be confronted to the AO, who in-turn would examine the evidence or documents or cross-examine the witness produced by the appellant. Further, the said sub-rule also provides that the AO can produce any evidence or documents or any witness in rebuttal of the additional evidence produced by the appellant. The power of the CIT(Appeals) to call upon the appellant to produce any document or examine any witness in order to dispose of the appeal or any other substantial cause including enhancement of the assessment or penalty or imposition of penalty u/s 271, is not impaired.
15. Now coming to the facts of the present case before us, the grievance of the assessee vide ground No.2 is against the non-admission of the additional evidence produced during the course of appellate proceedings. As pointed out in the paras hereinabove, the assessment proceedings in the case were prolonged over a long period of time and various opportunities were given to the assessee to reply to various questionnaires and queries raised during the course of assessment proceedings and also to produce the books of account and vouchers in respect of its claim. The assessee during the year under consideration had declared income from business and was statutorily required to maintain books of account. In order to establish its claim of the various receipts and expenditure during the year under consideration, the onus was upon the assessee to establish its claim by producing the books of account before the AO and also produce the relevant vouchers and bills in respect thereof. As pointed out in para 3 above, the assessee failed to comply to the various notices issued by the AO and even failed to reply with the show-cause notice(s) issued by the AO from time to time. The AO had also obtained information in respect of certain sundry creditors and there was variance in the balances shown by the assessee and the balances shown in the account of the assessee in the books of account of the sundry creditors. The AO show caused the assessee to explain the differences, but except for filing the copy of the account in its books of account, no other exercise was made by the assessee to reconcile the difference or to offer any explanation. The perusal of the assessment order reflects that despite the non cooperative attitude of the assessee, the AO time and again issued various notices, show-cause notices to the assessee and in reply the assessee appeared on some of the dates and furnished part of the information. However, complete information was not furnished and the books of account were not produced. The specific queries raised by the AO in respect of the sundry creditors were not replied to by the assessee despite the AO having show caused assessee and in the absence of books of account, the provisions of section 145(3) of the Act mere applied in order to estimate the income of the assessee on the basis of the gross profit shown by the assessee in the preceding year. Part of the expenses were also disallowed as the assessee had failed to produce the vouchers in respect of the said expenditure. The assessment was completed in the hands of the assessee by making various additions which are being agitated by the assessee vide ground No.3.
16. The case of the assessee before the CIT(Appeals) was that one of the bank accounts under which cash credit limit was raised by the assessee was not reflected in the original balance sheet filed alongwith the return of income implying that the entries of the cash credit limit raised and its application were not reflected in the original balance sheet filed by the assessee. The assessee claims to have prepared a provisional balance sheet incorporating the abovesaid entries which, in turn had affected the trading account, Profit & Loss Account and also balance sheet figures originally filed by the assessee alongwith the return of income. The assessee further claims that it had now prepared the books of account incorporating the abovesaid entries and the said provisional balance-sheet alongwith other statements and the books of account be admitted as additional evidence.
17. In order to avail the benefit of Rule 46A of the IT Rules in relation to admission of additional evidence, the assessee is to show as to how its case of admission of additional evidence is covered by the conditions provided under sub-rule (1) to rule 46A of the IT Rules. As referred to by us in the paras herein above, it is not a case of the application of clause (a) under which such evidence could be admitted by way of additional evidence where the AO had refused to admit the evidence. The case of the assessee was that as the entries of the cash credit limit and its application were not available with it during the course of assessment proceedings, the same was now being produced by way of additional evidence, does not merit admission as the assessee has failed to establish the reasonableness of the evidence not being available during the course of assessment proceedings. Further the said evidence, otherwise also cannot be admitted as additional evidence because in the first instance, the assessee has failed to produce books of account before the AO during the assessment proceedings and the books of account now being sought to be produced are admittedly written by the assessee after the completion of the assessment proceedings as the assessee himself claims that it was not aware of the cash credit limit bank entries not being included in the hands of the assessee while preparing the original balance sheet. Further, perusal of the figures of application of the limit of cash credit raised by the assessee from the bank also includes sum of Rs.26924/- paid in the VAT account and further closing stock of Rs.673,094/-. The non inclusion of the entries very clearly establish that the original accounts prepared by the assessee were non-reliable and the same have justifiably been not accepted by the AO because of the discrepancies in the books of account. The re-conciliation, now by way filing the provisional balance sheet and Profit & Loss Account is nothing but an exercise to circumvent the findings of the AO and also escape the rigours of the additions made in the hands of the assessee. The same cannot be permitted at this stage by way of additional evidence. The assessee has failed to establish its case of reasonable cause in not being in possession of the said documents during the course of assessment proceedings and also the conduct of the assessee during the assessment proceedings of having not complied with various notices and put in appearance before AO does not merit the admission of such evidence at the stage of appellate proceedings. The assessee failed to produce the books of account during the assessment proceedings. The exceptions laid out under sub-rule (1) by way of clause (b) and (c) are thus, not satisfied by the assessee and hence, we find no merit in the application made by the assessee for the admission of the additional evidence. Admittedly, it is not a case where the AO had made the additions without giving sufficient opportunity to the assessee to adduce evidence relevant to any ground of appeal. On the contrary, the AO had time and again issued notices, show-cause notices and raised queries to the assessee to explain its stand and also to explain the discrepancies in the copies of account of the sundry creditors and the explanation filed by the assessee at this stage does not merit any admission. Even in the second explanation filed, it has been pointed out by the assessee that certain entries relating to each of the party was not reflected in the original books of account and even the balance shown in the account of one M/s Regent Steel Industries actually related to two parties and not to the said party itself. The assessee has failed to establish its case of admission of additional evidence and in view thereof, we find no merit in the ground No.2 raised by the assessee and the same is dismissed.
18. The reliance placed by the ld. AR for the assessee on the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in CIT v. Mukta Metal Works [2012] 210 Taxman 106/20 taxmann.com 774 is misplaced in view of the facts being at variance. In the facts of the case before the Hon'ble High Court, the additional evidence was in the form of the report of Forensic Science Laboratory and an affidavit dated 27.12.2004 of the searched person. However, in the facts of the present case, additional evidence is by way of books of account being re-written including certain entries relating to sundry creditors, closing stock and even VAT in the provisional balance sheet, which as per the assessee were prepared on the basis of the books of account now written and permission for producing the same was sought from CIT(Appeals) as additional evidence under Rule 46A of IT Rules. The stand of the assessee in this regard is thus, dismissed.
19. Now coming to the alternate plea raised by the assessee by way of ground No.3 in relation to the additions made in the hands of the assessee on account of the difference in the account of M/s Diwan Steel Industries, M/s Regent Steel Industries and further addition made by rejecting the books of account and also disallowance of expenses. The assessee by way of ground No.4 agitates that the CIT(Appeals) had erred in not considering detailed submissions filed before him and also that the assessee was willing to produce the books of account to substantiate various submissions made. The AO during the course of assessment proceedings noted that there was a difference in the balance shown in the account of M/s Diwan Steel Industries of Rs.699,980/- and of M/s Regent Steel Industries of Rs.30 lacs, when compared with the copy of account of the assessee in the books of account of the respective parties. The assessee having failed to reconcile the difference except by way of additional evidence, which has not been admitted by us in the paras hereinabove, the addition made by the AO merits to be upheld in the hands of the assessee. We are in conformity with the order of CIT(Appeals) in this regard and dismiss ground No. 3(a) and 3(b) raised by the assessee.
20. The issue in ground No. 3(c) is against rejection of books of account u/s 145(3) of the Act and application of net profit rate of the earlier year to the receipts declared during the year resulting in addition of Rs.268,412/-. The assessee had failed to produce the books of account before the authorities below and the revised books of account produced by way of additional evidence have been rejected by CIT(Appeals) and upheld by us in paras hereinabove. Hence, there was no alternative left but to estimate the trading income in the hands of the assessee and application of net profit rate to the sales receipts shown by the assessee. We find merit in the orders of the authorities below in applying gross profit rate shown by the assessee in the preceding year in order to work out gross profits of the year under consideration. Thus, ground No. 3(c) raised by the assessee is dismissed.
21. Ground No.4 raised by the assessee is also dismissed as we have already dismissed the plea of the assessee with regard to admission of additional evidence.
22. In the result, appeal of the assessee is dismissed.
SB2013-TIOL-688-HC-DEL-IT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
AT NEW DELHI
AT NEW DELHI
ITA NO. 24/2013
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX XIII
Vs
NARESH KUMAR
Appellants Rep by: Ms Suruchi Aggarwal, Sr Standing Counsel
Respondents Rep by: None
Respondents Rep by: None
ITA NO. 218/2013
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX DELHI VI
Vs
M/s TALBROS PVT LTD
Sanjiv Khanna, And Sanjeev Sachdeva, JJ
Dated: September 6, 2013
Appellants Rep by: Ms Suruchi Aggarwal, Sr Standing Counsel
Respondents Rep by: Dr Rakesh Gupta, Adv
Respondents Rep by: Dr Rakesh Gupta, Adv
Income tax - Sections 40(a)(ia), 139(1) - Whether the amendments made to Section 40(a)(ia) by Finance Act, 2010 is restrospective in effect as it is only a procedural change in the Act - Whether remedial amendments are normally not restrospective in nature.
In the case of assessee there was late deposit of TDS. In the assessment proceedings AO observed that tax deducted at source prior to February, 2008 was required to be deposited by March, 2008 and TDS deducted in the month of March, 2008 had to be deposited before filing of the return. In such case assessee would not be entitled to expenditure actually incurred and would be disallowed and added back in the profit and loss account. CIT (A) confirmed the order of CIT (A). ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee as the amount was paid much before the date on which return of income u/s 139(1) had to be filed.
After hearing both the parties, the High Court held that,
++ provisions relating to deduction of tax at source are important as this ensures that tax so deducted gets deposited with the Government and non-taxpayers/filers can be identified. The deductee does not suffer and are not deprived of credit of deduction made from their income. Section 40(a)(ia) is a provision incorporated with the said objective and purpose in mind. It is not basically a penal provision as when the TDS is deposited, the amount on which deduction was made is allowed as an expenditure incurred in previous year in which the payment of TDS is made;
++ strict compliance of Section 40(1)(ia) may be justified keeping in view the legislative object and purpose behind the provision but a provision of such nature should not be allowed to be converted into an iron rod provision which metes out stern punishment and results in malevolent results, disproportionate to the offending act and aim of the legislation. Legislative purpose and the object is to ensure payment and deposit of TDS with the Government. TDS results in collection of tax. Legislature can and do experiment and intervene from time to time when they feel and notice that the existing provision is causing and creating unintended and excessive hardships to citizens and subjects or have resulted in great inconvenience and uncomfortable results. Obedience to law is mandatory and has to be enforced but the magnitude of punishment must not be disproportionate by what is required and necessary. The consequences and the injury caused, if disproportionate do and can result in amendments which have the effect of streamlining and correcting anomalies. The amendments made in 2010 were a step in the said direction and this aspect has to be kept in mind when we examine and consider whether the amendment should be given retrospective effect or not;
++ section 40(a)(ia) at least to the extent of the amendment is procedural as by enacting Section 40(a)(ia) the Legislature did not want to impose a new tax but wanted to ensure collection of TDS and the amendments made streamline and remedy the anomalies noticed in the said procedure by allowing deduction in the year when the expenditure is incurred provided TDS is paid before the due date for filing of the return. Remedial statutes are normally not retrospective, on the ground that they may affect vested rights. But these statutes are construed liberally when justified and rule against retrospectivity may be applied with less resistance;
++ the Section 40(a)(ia) has to be given full play keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the section. At the same time, the provision can be and should be interpreted liberally and equitable so that an assessee should not suffer unintended and deleterious consequences beyond what the object and purpose of the provision mandates.
In the case of assessee there was late deposit of TDS. In the assessment proceedings AO observed that tax deducted at source prior to February, 2008 was required to be deposited by March, 2008 and TDS deducted in the month of March, 2008 had to be deposited before filing of the return. In such case assessee would not be entitled to expenditure actually incurred and would be disallowed and added back in the profit and loss account. CIT (A) confirmed the order of CIT (A). ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee as the amount was paid much before the date on which return of income u/s 139(1) had to be filed.
After hearing both the parties, the High Court held that,
++ provisions relating to deduction of tax at source are important as this ensures that tax so deducted gets deposited with the Government and non-taxpayers/filers can be identified. The deductee does not suffer and are not deprived of credit of deduction made from their income. Section 40(a)(ia) is a provision incorporated with the said objective and purpose in mind. It is not basically a penal provision as when the TDS is deposited, the amount on which deduction was made is allowed as an expenditure incurred in previous year in which the payment of TDS is made;
++ strict compliance of Section 40(1)(ia) may be justified keeping in view the legislative object and purpose behind the provision but a provision of such nature should not be allowed to be converted into an iron rod provision which metes out stern punishment and results in malevolent results, disproportionate to the offending act and aim of the legislation. Legislative purpose and the object is to ensure payment and deposit of TDS with the Government. TDS results in collection of tax. Legislature can and do experiment and intervene from time to time when they feel and notice that the existing provision is causing and creating unintended and excessive hardships to citizens and subjects or have resulted in great inconvenience and uncomfortable results. Obedience to law is mandatory and has to be enforced but the magnitude of punishment must not be disproportionate by what is required and necessary. The consequences and the injury caused, if disproportionate do and can result in amendments which have the effect of streamlining and correcting anomalies. The amendments made in 2010 were a step in the said direction and this aspect has to be kept in mind when we examine and consider whether the amendment should be given retrospective effect or not;
++ section 40(a)(ia) at least to the extent of the amendment is procedural as by enacting Section 40(a)(ia) the Legislature did not want to impose a new tax but wanted to ensure collection of TDS and the amendments made streamline and remedy the anomalies noticed in the said procedure by allowing deduction in the year when the expenditure is incurred provided TDS is paid before the due date for filing of the return. Remedial statutes are normally not retrospective, on the ground that they may affect vested rights. But these statutes are construed liberally when justified and rule against retrospectivity may be applied with less resistance;
++ the Section 40(a)(ia) has to be given full play keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the section. At the same time, the provision can be and should be interpreted liberally and equitable so that an assessee should not suffer unintended and deleterious consequences beyond what the object and purpose of the provision mandates.
Revenue's appeal dismissed
JUDGEMENT
Per: Sanjiv Khanna:
These two appeals by Revenue under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act (Act, for short) in the case of Naresh Kumar and M/s Talbros (P) Ltd. relate to a common assessment year 2008-09, and raise a common question and, therefore, being disposed of by this common judgment at the stage of admission.
2. The contention of the Revenue is that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal, for short) in their impugned orders dated 21st May, 2012 (in the case of Naresh Kumar) and 8th October, 2012 (in the case of Talbros (P) Ltd.), has erred in holding that the amendments made to Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act by Finance Act, 2010 should be given retrospective effect. The contention of the Revenue is that these amendments are w.e.f. 1st April, 2010 and are not retrospective and, therefore, not applicable to the assessment year in question i.e. 2008-09.
3. Section 40(a)(ia) was inserted with effect from 1st April, 2005 by Finance (No.2), 2004 Bill and after retrospective amendment by Finance Act, 2008, w.e.f. 1st April, 2005, read as under:-
"40. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in Sections 30 to 38, the following amounts shall not be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head "profit and gains of business or profession"...(ia) any interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resi-dent, or amounts payable to a contactor or sub-contractor, being resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been paid,-(A) in a case where the tax was deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the previous year, on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139; or(B) in any other case, on or before the last day of the previous year;Provided that where in respect of any such sum, tax has been deducted in any subsequent year, or has been deducted-(A) during the last month of the previous year but paid after the said due date; or(B) during any other month of the previous year but paid after the end of the said previous year, such sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid."
4. Section 40(a)(ia) as amended by Finance Act, 2010, we.f. 1st April, 2010 and now reads:
"(ia) any interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resi-dent, or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been deducted or; after deduction, has not been paid on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of Section 139:Provided that where in respect of any such sum, tax has been deducted in any subsequent year, or has been deducted during the previous year but paid after the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139, such sum shall be allowed as a deducted in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid."(emphasis supplied)
5. Recently, we had occasion to deal with the said unamended and amended provisions and elucidate upon the section in ITA No. 65/2013 titled Commissioner of Income Tax-XIII vs. Rajinder Kumar decided on 1st July, 2013. Reference was made to the rationale behind the insertion made to Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act w.e.f. 1st April, 2005, which in the memorandum explaining the insertion was as under:
"With a view to augment compliance of TDS provisions, it is proposed to extend the provisions of section 40(a)(i) to payments of interest, commission or brokerage, fees for professional services or fees for technical services to residents, and payments to a resident contractor or sub-contractor for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax has not been deducted or after deduction, has not been paid before the expiry of the time prescribed under sub- section (1) of section 200 and in accordance with the other provisions of Chapter XVII-B. It is also proposed to provide that where in respect of payment of any sum, tax has been deducted under Chapter XVII-B or paid in any subsequent year, the sum of payment shall be allowed in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid.The proposed amendment will take effect from the 1st day of April, 2005 and will, accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 2005-06 and subsequent years. (clause 11)."(emphasis supplied)
6. The rationale behind the amendment 40(a)(ia) by Finance Act, 2010 in the Memorandum explaining the amendments was also reproduced and reads :
"Notes on Clauses:Clause 12 of the Bill seeks to amend section 40 of the Income-tax Act relating to amounts not deductible.Under the existing provisions contained in sub-clause (ia) of clause (a) of the aforesaid section, non-deduction of tax or non-payment of tax after deduction on payment of any sum by way of interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resident or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, results in the disallowance of the said sum, in the computation of income of the payer, on which tax is required to be deducted under Chapter XVII-B.It is proposed to amend sub-clause (ia) of clause (a) of the aforesaid section to provide that disallowance under the said sub-clause will be attracted, if, after deduction of tax during the previous year, the same has not been paid on or before the due date of filing of return of income specified in sub-section (1) of section 139.The proviso to the said sub-clause provides that where in respect of any such sum, tax has been deducted in any subsequent year, or has been deducted during the last month of the previous year but paid after the due date of filing of return or deducted during any other month of the previous year but paid after the end of the said previous year, such sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid.This amendment will take effect retrospectively from 1st April, 2010, and will, accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 2010-11 and subsequent years."
7. In Rajinder Kumar's case(supra), the assessee was following cash system of accountancy and had made certain payments and deducted TDS on the said amounts in March, 2007. TDS was thereafter paid in the month of April, 2007, before the due date i.e. date on which return of income under Section 139(1) of the Act was to be filed. The Revenue in the said case had relied upon the memorandum maintained by the assessee and contested. The contention of the Revenue was rejected observing that the memorandum did not make any difference and result in credit to the account of the payee. It was accordingly held as under:
"18. ……………………The first appellate order again does not specifically state so. In such circumstances, we feel a pragmatic and a practical approach has to be adopted. The respondent assessee had deducted tax at source when the payment was made in the month of March, 2007 and thereafter deposited the payment in the month of April, 2007. It is an accepted position that in case tax was deductible in the month of March, 2007 the due date of payment was in April, 2007 and before due date payment, Rs.4,40,843/- deducted as TDS in the month of March, 2007 was duly paid. It has to be accepted and it is logical that there would be some time gap between date of deduction of tax at source and when payment is deposited. Section 40(a)(ia) and the proviso as amended by Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005 notices and acknowledges the said position and, therefore, clause (A) states that where tax "was" deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the previous year but stands paid before the due date specified under sub-section (1) to Section 139, deduction shall be allowed in the said year.19. Proviso applies when tax was deducted in a subsequent year; when TDS has been deducted during any month of the previous year but paid after the end of the previous year; or TDS was deducted during the last month of the previous year but paid after the said due date. When proviso applies deduction is to be allowed in the year in which the payment is made. Clause A of the proviso has to be read with clause A of the main Section and not in isolation. Clause A of the main Section and clause A of the proviso will apply in different factual matrix or situations. Clause A of the main Section applies when the tax was deductable and was so deducted during the last month of the assessment year and was paid on or before the due date for filing of the return under Section 139(1). The proviso applies when tax has been deducted in any subsequent year or has been deducted as per clause A thereto during last month of the previous year, but has been paid after the said due date. The expression "said due date" cannot mean the date on which TDS as per the Chapter XVIII B should have been paid. It refers to the due date for filing of the return under Section 139(1) of the Act. Any other interpretation would lead to difficulties, incongruities and conflict between clause A of the main Section and clause A of the proviso. Both would be applicable to the same factual matrix/situation with contradictory stipulations or consequences. Under clause A of the main Section, the TDS deductable and so deducted during the last month should be paid on or before the due date for filing of the return under Section 139(1) but as per the Revenue under the proviso clause A, TDS should be deducted during the last month of the previous year but paid before the "said due date" i.e. the date by which TDS is payable under the Act. This interpretation if accepted means that clause A of the proviso and clause A of the main Section would become irreconcilable and mutually contradictory. Clause A of the proviso does not postulate the obvious but seeks to relax the rigor when tax deducted stands paid. This is the reason why the proviso in clause A does not use the expression "tax was deductable and was so deducted" but uses the expression "tax has been deducted …… during the last month of the previous year". The expression "said due date" in the clause A to the proviso does not mean and refer to the date on which tax should have been deposited without interest or penalty under Chapter XVII-B. This is obvious. Clause A to the proviso applies when the deduction is post the period specified by law but in the last month of a previous year. In such cases under the proviso clause A, TDS should be paid before "the said due date" i.e. the date on which return under Section 139(1) of the Act is to be filed."
8. Let us now refer to the facts of the present cases. In the case of Talbros (P) Ltd. there was late deposit of TDS on expenditure of Rs.66,29,926/- as per the following details:
Nature | Amount |
| Interest | 314465 |
| Contractor | 5650780 |
| Fees | 366586 |
| Rent | 612560 |
| INTEREST (GTF) | 420829 |
| Total | 7365220 |
9. The amount of TDS to be deducted has not been stated but it varied from 1.03% to 10.33% on the said amounts. No TDS was deducted on interest amount of Rs.7,35,294/-, and there is no quarrel that addition of this amount is justified and should be made under Section 40(a)(ia). The dispute pertains to other amount i.e. Rs.66,29,926/-. The assessment order and the appellate order do not mention the date on which deduction of tax was made or should have been made, but in the assessment order, it is indicated that tax deducted at source prior to February, 2008 was required to be deposited by March, 2008 and TDS deducted in the month of March, 2008 had to be deposited before filing of the return. If we accept the plea of the Revenue that in terms of Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, the respondent assessee i.e. Talbros (P) Ltd. would not be entitled to expenditure actually incurred and paid to the extent of Rs.66,29,926/-, then the said expenditure would be disallowed and added back in the profit and loss account. The assessee did not succeed in the first appeal but has succeeded before the Appellate Tribunal. Before the CIT (Appeal), the assessee has placed on record document to show that entire TDS amount was paid on or before 4th August, 2004, i.e. much before the date on which return of income under Section 139(1) had to be filed.
10. Naresh Kumar is an individual and had declared net profit from business of Rs.2,88,494/- on total receipts of Rs.61,14,467/-. No addition was made by the Assessing Officer to the business income as declared which was accepted. The Assessing Officer, however, noticed that in the audit report in column 27B, it has been disclosed as under:
Amount of Tax deducted /collected at Source (in Rs.) | Due date for emittance to Government | Details of payments; Date/ Amount (in Rs.) |
2869/- | 07/08/2007 | 23/09/2008 |
8180/- | 07/09/2007 | 23/09/2008 |
3881/- | 07/10/2007 | 23/09/2008 |
5446/- | 07/11/2007 | 23/09/2008 |
1678/- | 07/12/2007 | 23/09/2008 |
5853/- | 07/01/2007 | 23/09/2008 |
12239/- | 07/02/2007(2008) | 23/09/2008 |
13526/- | 07/03/2008 | 23/09/2008 |
11. The assessment order records that the assessee had failed to deposit TDS of Rs.52,672/- on or before 31st March, 2008 and, therefore, expenditure actually and duly incurred and paid of Rs.52,10,873/- cannot be allowed and has to be added to the taxable income. As is apparent from the table above, this amount of Rs.52,672/- being 1.03% of the expenditure of Rs.52,10,873/- was deposited on or before 30th September, 2008, i.e., before the date of filing of the return for the Assessment Year 2008-09. The consequence was addition of Rs.52,10,873/- to the total income of the assessee, which increased from Rs.2,81,471/- to Rs.54,97,592/-. In addition, the respondent-assessee became liable to pay interest under Section 234B, 234C, 234D as well as 244A of the Act. Penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) were also initiated. Of course, the assessee would be liable to pay interest on late deposit of TDS or penalty for the same.
12. Naresh Kumar, the respondent assessee succeeded in the first appeal and has succeeded before the Tribunal.
13. Failure to deduct or pay TDS results in several consequences. First being levy of interest under Section 201/201A which is mandatory. The second is levy of penalty under Section 221 and Section 271C of the Act. It can also result in prosecution under Section 276B which postulates punishment of upto seven years imprisonment and fine. Earlier even failure to deduct tax at source was punishable under Section 276B of the Act.
14. Provisions relating to deduction of tax at source are important as this ensures that tax so deducted gets deposited with the Government and non-taxpayers/filers can be identified. The deductee do not suffer and are not deprived of credit of deduction made from their income. Section 40(a)(ia) is a provision incorporated with the said objective and purpose in mind. It is not basically a penal provision as when the TDS is deposited, the amount on which deduction was made is allowed as an expenditure incurred in previous year in which the payment of TDS is made. Thus, it results in shifting of the year in which the expenditure can be claimed, even if payment has been made to the recipient and is to be allowed as expenditure in another year. Principle of matching i.e. matching of receipts with expenditure to the extent indicated in Section 40(a)(ia), therefore, gets affected. The provision can work harshly and may be very stringent in some cases as is apparent from these facts stated in the case of Naresh Kumar. Strict compliance of Section 40(1)(ia) may be justified keeping in view the legislative object and purpose behind the provision but a provision of such nature should not be allowed to be converted into an iron rod provision which metes out stern punishment and results in malevolent results, disproportionate to the offending act and aim of the legislation. Legislative purpose and the object is to ensure payment and deposit of TDS with the Government. TDS results in collection of tax. Legislature can and do experiment and intervene from time to time when they feel and notice that the existing provision is causing and creating unintended and excessive hardships to citizens and subjects or have resulted in great inconvenience and uncomfortable results. Obedience to law is mandatory and has to be enforced but the magnitude of punishment must not be disproportionate by what is required and necessary. The consequences and the injury caused, if disproportionate do and can result in amendments which have the effect of streamlining and correcting anomalies. The amendments made in 2010 were a step in the said direction and this aspect has to be kept in mind when we examine and consider whether the amendment should be given retrospective effect or not.
15. Question whether the amendment is retrospective or prospective is vexed and rigid rule can be applied universally. Various rules of interpretation have developed in order to determine whether or not, an amendment is retrospective or prospective. Fiscal statutes imposing liabilities are governed by normal presumption that they are not retrospective. The cardinal rule is that the law to be applied, is that which is in force on the first day of the assessment year, unless otherwise mandated expressly or provided by necessary implication. The aforesaid dictum is based upon the principle that a new provision creating a liability or an obligation, affecting or taking away vested rights or attaching new disability is presumed to be prospective. However, it is accepted that Legislatures have plenary power to make retrospective amendments, subject to Constitutional restrictions.
16. Based upon the aforesaid broad dictum, Judges and jurists have drawn distinction between procedural and substantive provisions. Substantive provisions deal with rights and the same are fundamental, while procedural law is concerned with the legal process involving actions and remedies. Amendments to substantive law are treated as prospective, while amendments to procedural law are treated as retrospective. This distinction itself is not free from difficulties as right to appeal has been held to be a substantive law, but law of limitation is regarded as procedural. There is an interplay and interconnect between what can be regarded as substantive and procedural law [see Commissioner of Income Tax versus Shrawan Kumar Swarup & Sons, (1998) 232 ITR 123(SC)].
17. There are decisions, which hold that process of litigation or enforcement of law is procedural. Similarly, machinery provision for collection of tax, rather than tax itself is procedural. Read in this context, it can be strongly argued that Section 40(a)(ia) at least to the extent of the amendment is procedural as by enacting Section 40(a)(ia)the Legislature did not want to impose a new tax but wanted to ensure collection of TDS and the amendments made streamline and remedy the anomalies noticed in the said procedure by allowing deduction in the year when the expenditure is incurred provided TDS is paid before the due date for filing of the return. Remedial statutes are normally not retrospective, on the ground that they may affect vested rights. But these statutes are construed liberally when justified and rule against retrospectivity may be applied with less resistance [See Bharat Singh versus Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, (1986) 2 SCC 614 and Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. Versus Management, AIR 1973 SC 1227].
18. It is interesting to note that earlier English decisions have held that an enactment fixing a penalty or maximum penalty for offence is merely procedural for the purpose of determining retrospectivity [See DPP versus Lamb, [1941] 2 KB 89) and R versus Oliver, (1944) 29 Cr. App. 137]. This view, however, has been criticized in Reherd Athlumney [1898] 2QB547 on the ground that higher or greater punishment impairs existing rights or obligation;-
"No rule of construction is more firmly established than this; that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only."
19. The word 'fairly' used in the aforesaid quotation is important and relevant, but for application of another rule of interpretation. G.P. Singh in "Principles of Statutory Interpretation", 13th Edition, 2012 at page 538 under the sub-heading "Recent statements of the rule against Retrospectivity" has greatly emphasized the principle of fairness and observed that classification of statute either substantive or procedural does not necessarily determine whether the enactment or amendment has retrospective operation, e.g., law of limitation is procedural but its application to past cause of action may result of reviving or extinguishing a right, and such operation cannot be said to be procedural. Similarly, when requisites of an action under the new statute, draws from a time incident to its passing, rule against retrospectivity may not be applicable.
20. In the said text, reference has been made to formulation by Dixon, C.J. in Maxwell versus Murphy, (1957) 96 CLR 261 holding:-
"The general rule of the common law is that a statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a way as to confer or impose or otherwise affect the rights or liabilities which the law had defined be reference to the past events. But given the rights and liabilities fixed by reference to the past facts, matters or events, the law appointing or regulating the manner in which they are to be enforced or their enjoyment is to be secured by judicial remedy is not within the application of such a presumption".
21. Identically, in Secretary of State for Social Security versus Tunnicliffe, (1991) 2 All ER 712, Staughton, L.J. has expressed the said principle in the following words:-
"The true principle is that Parliament is presumed not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events and transactions in a manner which is unfair to those concerned in them unless a contrary intention appears. It is not simply a question of classifying an enactment as retrospective or not retrospective. Rather it may well be a matter of degree- the greater the unfairness, the more it is to be expected that Parliament will make it clear if that is intended".
22. House of Lords in L' office Cherifien des Phosphates versus Yamashita Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd., (1994) 1 All ER 20 has said the question of fairness has to be answered by taking into account various factors, viz., value of the rights which the statute affects; extent to which that value is diminished or extinguished by the suggested retrospective effect of the statute; unfairness of adversely affecting the rights; clarity of the language used by Parliament and the circumstances in which the legislation was created. These factors have to be weighed together to provide an answer whether the consequences of reading the statute with suggested degree of retrospectivity is unfair; that the words used by the Parliament could not have been intended to mean what they might appear to say. This principle was applied while interpreting a new provision in Arbitration Act in this case observing that the delay attributable to the claimant in pursuing a claim before enactment of the new provision, could be taken into consideration for dismissal.
23. Principle of "fairness" has not left us untouched and was applied by the Supreme Court inVijay versus State of Maharashtra, (2006) 6 SCC 289 in the following words:-
"…The negotiation is not a rigid rule and varies with the intention and purport of the legislation, but to apply it in such a case is a doctrine of fairness. When a new law is enacted for the benefit of the community as a whole, even in absence of a provision the statute may be held to be retrospective in nature."
24. In Allied Motors (P) Limited versus Commissioner of Income Tax, 1997 (224) ITR 677= (2002-TIOL-588-SC-IT), it was held that the new proviso to Section 43B should be given retrospective effect from the inception on the ground that the proviso was added to remedy unintended consequences and supply an obvious omission. The proviso ensured reasonable interpretation and retrospective effect would serve the object behind the enactment.
25. In State through CBI, Delhi versus Gian Singh and Another, AIR 1999 SC 3450 extreme penalty of death was diluted to alternative option of imprisonment for life recording that the legislative benevolence could be extended to an accused, who awaits judicial verdicts against his sentence. Earlier in Ratan Lal versus State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444 reference was made to Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and it was observed that if the Act was not given retrospective operation, it would lead to anomalies and thus could not be the intention of the Legislature.
26. Principle of matching which is disturbed by Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, may not materially be of consequence to the Revenue when the tax rates are stable and uniform or in cases of big assessees having substantial turnover and equally huge expenses as they have necessary cushion to absorb the effect. However, marginal and medium taxpayers, who work at low G.P. rate and when expenditure which becomes subject matter of an order under Section 40(a)(ia) is substantial, can suffer severe adverse consequences as is apparent from the case of Naresh Kumar. Transferring or shifting expenses to a subsequent year, in such cases, will not wipe off the adverse effect and the financial stress. Nevertheless the Section 40(a)(ia) has to be given full play keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the section. At the same time, the provision can be and should be interpreted liberally and equitable so that an assessee should not suffer unintended and deleterious consequences beyond what the object and purpose of the provision mandates. Case of Naresh Kumar is not one of rare cases, but one of several cases as we find that Section 40(a)(ia) is invoked in large number of cases.
27. One important consideration in construing a machinery section is that it must be so construed so as to effectuate the liability imposed by the charging section and to make the machinery workable. However, when the machinery section results in unintended or harsh consequences which were not intended, the remedial or correction action taken is not to be disregarded but given due regard.
28. It is, in this context, that we had in Rajinder Kumar's case (supra) observed as under:
"22. Now, we refer to the amendments which have been made by the Finance Act, 2010 and the effect thereof. We have already quoted the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Virgin Creations (supra). The said decision refers to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Allied Motors (P) Limited (supra) and Commissioner of Income Tax versus Alom Extrusions Limited, (2009) 319 ITR 306 (SC) = (2009-TIOL-125-SC-IT). In the case of Allied Motors (P) Limited (supra), the Supreme Court was examining the first proviso to Section 43B and whether it was retrospective. Section 43B was inserted in the Act with effect from 1st April 1984 for curbing claims of taxpayers who did not discharge or pay statutory liabilities but claimed deductions on the ground that the statutory liability had accrued. Section 43B states that the statutory liability would be allowed as a deduction or as an expense in the year in which the payment was made and would not be allowed, even in cases of mercantile system of accountancy, in the year of accrual. It was noticed that in some cases hardship would be caused to assessees, who paid the statutory dues within the prescribed period though the payments so made would not fall within the relevant previous year. Accordingly, a proviso was added by Finance Act, 1987 applicable with effect from 1st April, 1988. The proviso stipulated that when statutory dues covered by Section 43B were paid on or before the due date for furnishing of the return under Section 139(1), the deduction/expense, equal to the amount paid would be allowed. The Supreme Court noticed the purpose behind the proviso and the remedial nature of the insertion made. Of course, the Supreme Court also referred to Explanation 2 which was inserted by Finance Act, 1989 which was made retrospective and was to take effect from 1st April, 1984. Highlighting the object behind Section 43B, it was observed that the proviso makes the provision workable, gives it a reasonable interpretation. It was elucidated:"12. In the case of Goodyear India Ltd. V. State of Haryana this Court said that the rule of reasonable construction must be applied while construing a statute. Literal construction should be avoided if it defeats the manifest object and purpose of the Act.13. Therefore, in the well-known words of Judge Learned Hand, one cannot make a fortress out of the dictionary; and should remember that statutes have some purpose and object to accomplish whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. In the case of R.B. Judha Mal Kuthiala v. CIT, this Court said that one should apply the rule of reasonable interpretation. A proviso which is inserted to remedy unintended consequences and to make the provision workable, a proviso which supplies an obvious omission in the section and is required to be read into the section to give the section a reasonable interpretation, requires to be treated as retrospective in operation so that a reasonable interpretation can be given to the section as a whole.14. This view has been accepted by a number of High Courts. In the case of CIT v. Chandulal Venichand, the Gujarat High Court has held that the first proviso to Section 43-B is retrospective and sales tax for the last quarter paid before the filing of the return for the assessment year is deductible. This decision deals with Assessment Year 1985-85. The Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Sri Jagannath Steel Corpn. has taken a similar view holding that the statutory liability for sales tax actually discharged after the expiry of the accounting year in compliance with the relevant statute is entitled to deduction under Section 43-B. The High Court has held the amendment to be clarificatory and, therefore, retrospective. The Gujarat High court in the above case held the amendment to be curative and explanatory and hence retrospective. The Patna High court has also held the amendment inserting the first proviso to be explanatory in the case of Jamshedpur Motor Accessories Stores v. Union of India. The special leave petition from this decision of the Patna High Court was dismissed. The view of the Delhi High Court, therefore, that the first proviso to Section 43-B will be available only prospectively does not appear to be correct. As observed by G.P. Singh in his Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 4th Edn. At p. 291: "It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended." In fact the amendment would not serve its object in such a situation unless it is construed as retrospective. The view, therefore, taken by the Delhi High Court cannot be sustained."23. Section 43B deals with statutory dues and stipulates that the year in which the payment is made the same would be allowed as a deduction even if the assessee is following the mercantile system of accountancy. The proviso, however, stipulates that deduction would be allowed where the statutory dues covered by Section 43B stand paid on or before the due date of filing of return of income. Section 40(a)(ia) is applicable to cases where an assessee is required to deduct tax at source and fails to deduct or does not make payment of the TDS before the due date, in such cases, notwithstanding Sections 30 to 38 of the Act, deduction is to be allowed as an expenditure in the year of payment unless a case is covered under the exceptions carved out. The amended proviso as inserted by Finance Act, 2010 states where an assessee has made payment of the TDS on or before the due date of filing of the return under Section 139(1), the sum shall be allowed as an expense in computing the income of the previous year. The two provisions are akin and the provisos to Sections 40(a)(ia) and 43B are to the same effect and for the same purpose.24. In Podar Cement Private Limited (supra), the Supreme Court considered whether term 'owner' would include unregistered owners who had paid sale consideration and were covered by Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the assessees was that the amendments made to the definition of term 'owner' by Finance Bill, 1987 should be given retrospective effect. It was held that the amendments were retrospective in nature as they rationalise and clear the existing ambiguities and doubts. Reference was made to Crawford: 'Statutory Construction' and 'the principle of Declaratory Statutes', Francis Bennion: 'Statutory Interpretation', Justice G.P. Singh's 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation', it was observed that sometimes amendments are made to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous provision. The issue was accordingly decided holding that in such cases the amendments were retrospective though it was noticed that as per Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act, etc. a legal owner must have a registered document.25. In view of the aforesaid discussion in paras 18,19 and 20, it is apparent that the respondent assesse did not violate the unamended section 40(a)(ia) of the act. We have noted the ambiguity and referred their contention of Revenue and rejected the interpretation placed by them. The amended provisions are clear and free from any ambiguity and doubt. They will help curtail litigation. The amended provision clearly support view taken in paragraphs 17 - 20 that the expression "said due date" used in clause A of proviso to unamended section refers to time specified in Section 139(1) of the Act. The amended section 40(a)(ia) expands and further liberalises the statue when it stipulates that deductions made in the first eleven months of the previous year but paid before the due date of filing of the return, will constitute sufficient compliance."
29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any merit in the present appeals filed by the Revenue and they are dismissed.
2013-TIOL-1351-CESTAT-MUM
IN THE CUSTOMS, EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
WEST ZONAL BENCH, MUMBAI
COURT NO.I
WEST ZONAL BENCH, MUMBAI
COURT NO.I
Appeal No.ST/21/06
Arising out of Order-in-Appeal No. P-II/BKS/392/2005 Dated: 11.11.2005
Passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax (Appeals), Pune-III
Passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax (Appeals), Pune-III
Date of Decision: 28.6.2013
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, PUNE-II
Vs
M/s CENTRAL PANCHYAT, KOLHAPURE
Appellant Rep by: Shri D D Joshi, Superintendent (AR)
Respondent Rep by: Shri M A Nyalkalkar, Adv.
Respondent Rep by: Shri M A Nyalkalkar, Adv.
CORAM: P R Chandrasekharan, Member (T)
Anil Choudhary, Member (J)
Anil Choudhary, Member (J)
ST - Marriage as a social institution existed much before the religions came into being and, therefore, it is futile to argue that the marriage is a religious function - law itself recognizes registered marriage as a legally valid form of marriage and there is no religious sanctity attached to such registered marriages - Therefore, the mode of conducting the marriages either by following religious rituals or otherwise does not make marriage a 'religious function' - explanation introduced by Finance Act, 2007 is only by way of abundant caution and, therefore, insertion of the same does not affect the levy of Service Tax on Mandap Keeper Service rendered in connection with marriages - ST payable: CESTAT [paras 6.1 & 6.2]
Limitation & Penalty - In view of the Tribunal's decision in the case of Krishapur Mutt case, the appellant could have been under the bona fide belief that their activity of letting out of hall for conducting marriage is not taxable - Accordingly, benefit of doubt given to the appellant to hold that Service Tax demand is sustainable only for the normal period of limitation - since issue relates to interpretation of the statute, penalties are not warranted: CESTAT [para 6.3 & 6.4]
Case laws cited -
Shree Gujarati Samaj Bhavan Vs. CCE, Bhopal - (2006-TIOL-899-CESTAT-DEL) …followed
Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Association Vs. Union of India - (2004-TIOL-36-SC-ST) …relied upon
CCE vs. Krishnapur Mutt - (2003-TIOL-262-CESTAT-BANG) …distinguished.
ORDER NO.A/1574/13/CSTB/C-I
Per: P R Chandrasekharan:
Revenue is in appeal against Order-in-Appeal No. P-II/BKS/392/2005 dated 11.11.2005 passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax (Appeals), Pune-II.
2. The respondent M/s Central Panchyat owned a hall. The said hall was rented out for conducting marriages and consideration was collected for such renting. The department was of the view that the said activity came under the purview of 'Mandap Keeper Services and accordingly issued two notices dated 29.9.2004 and 20.4.2005 demanding Service Tax of Rs. 1,00,842/- and Rs. 23,929/- for the period July, 1999 to March 2004 and April, 2004 to Sept, 2004 along with interest thereon and also proposing to impose penalties. The notices were adjudicated and the demands were confirmed and penalties were imposed. The appellant preferred an appeal before the lower appellate authority, who vide the impugned order held that marriage is a religious function and, therefore, the activity is not taxable as held inCommissioner of Central Excise, vs. Krishnapur Mutt- 2003 (157) ELT 182 = (2003-TIOL-262-CESTAT-BANG). Accordingly, he set aside the demand and allowed the appeal. Aggrieved of the same, the Revenue is before us.
3. The argument of the Revenue is that marriage is a 'social function' and not a 'religious function'. As regards the reliance placed on the Krishnapur Mutt case, the Revenue submits that in that case the Mandap was let out free of cost and, therefore, the ratio of the said decision does not apply.
4. Learned Superintendent (AR) appearing for the Revenue while reiterating the grounds adduced in the appeal memorandum placed reliance on the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Shree Gujarati Samaj Bhavan Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhopal - 2006 (4) STR 60 (Tri-Del) = (2006-TIOL-899-CESTAT-DEL), wherein it was held that marriage is a social function relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Association Vs. Union of India - 2006 (3) STR 260 (SC) = (2004-TIOL-36-SC-ST). In the said decision, the ratio of the Krishnapur Mutt (supra) was also distinguished as there was no consideration paid to the Mutt for conducting of marriage. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned order be set aside and the appeal be allowed.
5. The learned Counsel for the respondent submits that the marriage is a religious functions and Finance Act, 2007, added an explanation to specifically provide for marriage to be considered as a 'social function' for the purposes of levy of Service tax. Therefore, marriage has to be considered as a religious function only prior to 2007 and not otherwise. The explanation added in Finance Act, 2007 has only the prospective effect and cannot be applied retrospectively. It is also his contention that even if it is held that the marriage is a social function, the demand for the extended period of time is not sustainable as the appellant was under the bona fide belief that the marriage is a religious function as held in the Krishnapur Mutt case. Accordingly, it is pleaded that the demand for the extended period of time be set aside and penalty imposed on the appellant also be set aside for the same reason.
6. We have carefully considered the submissions made by both the sides.
6.1 Marriage as a social institution existed much before the religions came into being and, therefore, it is futile to argue that the marriage is a religious function. The law itself recognizes registered marriage as a legally valid form of marriage and there is no religious sanctity attached to such registered marriages. Therefore, the mode of conducting the marriages either by following religious rituals or otherwise does not make marriage a 'religious function'. Therefore, following the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Shri Gujarati samaj Bhavan (supra), we hold that the marriage is a social function and not a religious function.
6.2 The explanation introduced by Finance Act, 2007 is only by way of abundant caution. Therefore, insertion of the explanation, in our view, does not affect the levy of Service Tax on Mandap Keeper Service rendered in connection with marriages.
6.3 As regards the plea of time bar, there is merit in this submission. In view of the Tribunal's decision in the case of Krishapur Mutt case, the appellant could have been under the bona fide belief that their activity of letting out of hall for conducting marriage is not taxable. Accordingly, we give benefit of doubt to the appellant and hold that Service Tax demand is sustainable only for the normal period of limitation.
6.4 As regards the penalties imposed on the appellant, since the issue relates to interpretation of the statute, penalties are not warranted.
7. To sum up, we set aside the impugned order and allow Revenue's appeal subject to the modification that the demand is sustainable only for the normal period of limitation. Needless to say the respondent is liable to pay interest on the Service Tax demand. Imposition of penalty is not warranted in this case. Accordingly, the Revenue is directed to re-compute the Service Tax demand. Since the appellant has not collected the Service Tax separately, the amount received shall be considered as cum tax and Service Tax amount be computed accordingly.
8. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
(Dictated and pronounced in Court)
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Filing RTI Application Online
Moving towards greater transparency, the Government of India has made filing RTI application online possible by launching an online web portal.
Indian Citizens inclusive of those who are residing abroad will be able to file RTI application through this Portal.
http://www.lawweb.in/2013/09/filing-rti-application-online-by-indian.html]http://www.rtionline.gov.in/1
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2013-TIOL-688-HC-DEL-IT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
AT NEW DELHI
AT NEW DELHI
ITA NO. 24/2013
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX XIII
Vs
NARESH KUMAR
Appellants Rep by: Ms Suruchi Aggarwal, Sr Standing Counsel
Respondents Rep by: None
Respondents Rep by: None
ITA NO. 218/2013
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX DELHI VI
Vs
M/s TALBROS PVT LTD
Sanjiv Khanna, And Sanjeev Sachdeva, JJ
Dated: September 6, 2013
Appellants Rep by: Ms Suruchi Aggarwal, Sr Standing Counsel
Respondents Rep by: Dr Rakesh Gupta, Adv
Respondents Rep by: Dr Rakesh Gupta, Adv
Income tax - Sections 40(a)(ia), 139(1) - Whether the amendments made to Section 40(a)(ia) by Finance Act, 2010 is restrospective in effect as it is only a procedural change in the Act - Whether remedial amendments are normally not restrospective in nature.
In the case of assessee there was late deposit of TDS. In the assessment proceedings AO observed that tax deducted at source prior to February, 2008 was required to be deposited by March, 2008 and TDS deducted in the month of March, 2008 had to be deposited before filing of the return. In such case assessee would not be entitled to expenditure actually incurred and would be disallowed and added back in the profit and loss account. CIT (A) confirmed the order of CIT (A). ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee as the amount was paid much before the date on which return of income u/s 139(1) had to be filed.
After hearing both the parties, the High Court held that,
++ provisions relating to deduction of tax at source are important as this ensures that tax so deducted gets deposited with the Government and non-taxpayers/filers can be identified. The deductee does not suffer and are not deprived of credit of deduction made from their income. Section 40(a)(ia) is a provision incorporated with the said objective and purpose in mind. It is not basically a penal provision as when the TDS is deposited, the amount on which deduction was made is allowed as an expenditure incurred in previous year in which the payment of TDS is made;
++ strict compliance of Section 40(1)(ia) may be justified keeping in view the legislative object and purpose behind the provision but a provision of such nature should not be allowed to be converted into an iron rod provision which metes out stern punishment and results in malevolent results, disproportionate to the offending act and aim of the legislation. Legislative purpose and the object is to ensure payment and deposit of TDS with the Government. TDS results in collection of tax. Legislature can and do experiment and intervene from time to time when they feel and notice that the existing provision is causing and creating unintended and excessive hardships to citizens and subjects or have resulted in great inconvenience and uncomfortable results. Obedience to law is mandatory and has to be enforced but the magnitude of punishment must not be disproportionate by what is required and necessary. The consequences and the injury caused, if disproportionate do and can result in amendments which have the effect of streamlining and correcting anomalies. The amendments made in 2010 were a step in the said direction and this aspect has to be kept in mind when we examine and consider whether the amendment should be given retrospective effect or not;
++ section 40(a)(ia) at least to the extent of the amendment is procedural as by enacting Section 40(a)(ia) the Legislature did not want to impose a new tax but wanted to ensure collection of TDS and the amendments made streamline and remedy the anomalies noticed in the said procedure by allowing deduction in the year when the expenditure is incurred provided TDS is paid before the due date for filing of the return. Remedial statutes are normally not retrospective, on the ground that they may affect vested rights. But these statutes are construed liberally when justified and rule against retrospectivity may be applied with less resistance;
++ the Section 40(a)(ia) has to be given full play keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the section. At the same time, the provision can be and should be interpreted liberally and equitable so that an assessee should not suffer unintended and deleterious consequences beyond what the object and purpose of the provision mandates.
In the case of assessee there was late deposit of TDS. In the assessment proceedings AO observed that tax deducted at source prior to February, 2008 was required to be deposited by March, 2008 and TDS deducted in the month of March, 2008 had to be deposited before filing of the return. In such case assessee would not be entitled to expenditure actually incurred and would be disallowed and added back in the profit and loss account. CIT (A) confirmed the order of CIT (A). ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee as the amount was paid much before the date on which return of income u/s 139(1) had to be filed.
After hearing both the parties, the High Court held that,
++ provisions relating to deduction of tax at source are important as this ensures that tax so deducted gets deposited with the Government and non-taxpayers/filers can be identified. The deductee does not suffer and are not deprived of credit of deduction made from their income. Section 40(a)(ia) is a provision incorporated with the said objective and purpose in mind. It is not basically a penal provision as when the TDS is deposited, the amount on which deduction was made is allowed as an expenditure incurred in previous year in which the payment of TDS is made;
++ strict compliance of Section 40(1)(ia) may be justified keeping in view the legislative object and purpose behind the provision but a provision of such nature should not be allowed to be converted into an iron rod provision which metes out stern punishment and results in malevolent results, disproportionate to the offending act and aim of the legislation. Legislative purpose and the object is to ensure payment and deposit of TDS with the Government. TDS results in collection of tax. Legislature can and do experiment and intervene from time to time when they feel and notice that the existing provision is causing and creating unintended and excessive hardships to citizens and subjects or have resulted in great inconvenience and uncomfortable results. Obedience to law is mandatory and has to be enforced but the magnitude of punishment must not be disproportionate by what is required and necessary. The consequences and the injury caused, if disproportionate do and can result in amendments which have the effect of streamlining and correcting anomalies. The amendments made in 2010 were a step in the said direction and this aspect has to be kept in mind when we examine and consider whether the amendment should be given retrospective effect or not;
++ section 40(a)(ia) at least to the extent of the amendment is procedural as by enacting Section 40(a)(ia) the Legislature did not want to impose a new tax but wanted to ensure collection of TDS and the amendments made streamline and remedy the anomalies noticed in the said procedure by allowing deduction in the year when the expenditure is incurred provided TDS is paid before the due date for filing of the return. Remedial statutes are normally not retrospective, on the ground that they may affect vested rights. But these statutes are construed liberally when justified and rule against retrospectivity may be applied with less resistance;
++ the Section 40(a)(ia) has to be given full play keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the section. At the same time, the provision can be and should be interpreted liberally and equitable so that an assessee should not suffer unintended and deleterious consequences beyond what the object and purpose of the provision mandates.
Revenue's appeal dismissed
JUDGEMENT
Per: Sanjiv Khanna:
These two appeals by Revenue under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act (Act, for short) in the case of Naresh Kumar and M/s Talbros (P) Ltd. relate to a common assessment year 2008-09, and raise a common question and, therefore, being disposed of by this common judgment at the stage of admission.
2. The contention of the Revenue is that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal, for short) in their impugned orders dated 21st May, 2012 (in the case of Naresh Kumar) and 8th October, 2012 (in the case of Talbros (P) Ltd.), has erred in holding that the amendments made to Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act by Finance Act, 2010 should be given retrospective effect. The contention of the Revenue is that these amendments are w.e.f. 1st April, 2010 and are not retrospective and, therefore, not applicable to the assessment year in question i.e. 2008-09.
3. Section 40(a)(ia) was inserted with effect from 1st April, 2005 by Finance (No.2), 2004 Bill and after retrospective amendment by Finance Act, 2008, w.e.f. 1st April, 2005, read as under:-
"40. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in Sections 30 to 38, the following amounts shall not be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head "profit and gains of business or profession"...(ia) any interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resi-dent, or amounts payable to a contactor or sub-contractor, being resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been paid,-(A) in a case where the tax was deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the previous year, on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139; or(B) in any other case, on or before the last day of the previous year;Provided that where in respect of any such sum, tax has been deducted in any subsequent year, or has been deducted-(A) during the last month of the previous year but paid after the said due date; or(B) during any other month of the previous year but paid after the end of the said previous year, such sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid."
4. Section 40(a)(ia) as amended by Finance Act, 2010, we.f. 1st April, 2010 and now reads:
"(ia) any interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resi-dent, or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been deducted or; after deduction, has not been paid on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of Section 139:Provided that where in respect of any such sum, tax has been deducted in any subsequent year, or has been deducted during the previous year but paid after the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139, such sum shall be allowed as a deducted in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid."(emphasis supplied)
5. Recently, we had occasion to deal with the said unamended and amended provisions and elucidate upon the section in ITA No. 65/2013 titled Commissioner of Income Tax-XIII vs. Rajinder Kumar decided on 1st July, 2013. Reference was made to the rationale behind the insertion made to Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act w.e.f. 1st April, 2005, which in the memorandum explaining the insertion was as under:
"With a view to augment compliance of TDS provisions, it is proposed to extend the provisions of section 40(a)(i) to payments of interest, commission or brokerage, fees for professional services or fees for technical services to residents, and payments to a resident contractor or sub-contractor for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax has not been deducted or after deduction, has not been paid before the expiry of the time prescribed under sub- section (1) of section 200 and in accordance with the other provisions of Chapter XVII-B. It is also proposed to provide that where in respect of payment of any sum, tax has been deducted under Chapter XVII-B or paid in any subsequent year, the sum of payment shall be allowed in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid.The proposed amendment will take effect from the 1st day of April, 2005 and will, accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 2005-06 and subsequent years. (clause 11)."(emphasis supplied)
6. The rationale behind the amendment 40(a)(ia) by Finance Act, 2010 in the Memorandum explaining the amendments was also reproduced and reads :
"Notes on Clauses:Clause 12 of the Bill seeks to amend section 40 of the Income-tax Act relating to amounts not deductible.Under the existing provisions contained in sub-clause (ia) of clause (a) of the aforesaid section, non-deduction of tax or non-payment of tax after deduction on payment of any sum by way of interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resident or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, results in the disallowance of the said sum, in the computation of income of the payer, on which tax is required to be deducted under Chapter XVII-B.It is proposed to amend sub-clause (ia) of clause (a) of the aforesaid section to provide that disallowance under the said sub-clause will be attracted, if, after deduction of tax during the previous year, the same has not been paid on or before the due date of filing of return of income specified in sub-section (1) of section 139.The proviso to the said sub-clause provides that where in respect of any such sum, tax has been deducted in any subsequent year, or has been deducted during the last month of the previous year but paid after the due date of filing of return or deducted during any other month of the previous year but paid after the end of the said previous year, such sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid.This amendment will take effect retrospectively from 1st April, 2010, and will, accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 2010-11 and subsequent years."
7. In Rajinder Kumar's case(supra), the assessee was following cash system of accountancy and had made certain payments and deducted TDS on the said amounts in March, 2007. TDS was thereafter paid in the month of April, 2007, before the due date i.e. date on which return of income under Section 139(1) of the Act was to be filed. The Revenue in the said case had relied upon the memorandum maintained by the assessee and contested. The contention of the Revenue was rejected observing that the memorandum did not make any difference and result in credit to the account of the payee. It was accordingly held as under:
"18. ……………………The first appellate order again does not specifically state so. In such circumstances, we feel a pragmatic and a practical approach has to be adopted. The respondent assessee had deducted tax at source when the payment was made in the month of March, 2007 and thereafter deposited the payment in the month of April, 2007. It is an accepted position that in case tax was deductible in the month of March, 2007 the due date of payment was in April, 2007 and before due date payment, Rs.4,40,843/- deducted as TDS in the month of March, 2007 was duly paid. It has to be accepted and it is logical that there would be some time gap between date of deduction of tax at source and when payment is deposited. Section 40(a)(ia) and the proviso as amended by Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005 notices and acknowledges the said position and, therefore, clause (A) states that where tax "was" deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the previous year but stands paid before the due date specified under sub-section (1) to Section 139, deduction shall be allowed in the said year.19. Proviso applies when tax was deducted in a subsequent year; when TDS has been deducted during any month of the previous year but paid after the end of the previous year; or TDS was deducted during the last month of the previous year but paid after the said due date. When proviso applies deduction is to be allowed in the year in which the payment is made. Clause A of the proviso has to be read with clause A of the main Section and not in isolation. Clause A of the main Section and clause A of the proviso will apply in different factual matrix or situations. Clause A of the main Section applies when the tax was deductable and was so deducted during the last month of the assessment year and was paid on or before the due date for filing of the return under Section 139(1). The proviso applies when tax has been deducted in any subsequent year or has been deducted as per clause A thereto during last month of the previous year, but has been paid after the said due date. The expression "said due date" cannot mean the date on which TDS as per the Chapter XVIII B should have been paid. It refers to the due date for filing of the return under Section 139(1) of the Act. Any other interpretation would lead to difficulties, incongruities and conflict between clause A of the main Section and clause A of the proviso. Both would be applicable to the same factual matrix/situation with contradictory stipulations or consequences. Under clause A of the main Section, the TDS deductable and so deducted during the last month should be paid on or before the due date for filing of the return under Section 139(1) but as per the Revenue under the proviso clause A, TDS should be deducted during the last month of the previous year but paid before the "said due date" i.e. the date by which TDS is payable under the Act. This interpretation if accepted means that clause A of the proviso and clause A of the main Section would become irreconcilable and mutually contradictory. Clause A of the proviso does not postulate the obvious but seeks to relax the rigor when tax deducted stands paid. This is the reason why the proviso in clause A does not use the expression "tax was deductable and was so deducted" but uses the expression "tax has been deducted …… during the last month of the previous year". The expression "said due date" in the clause A to the proviso does not mean and refer to the date on which tax should have been deposited without interest or penalty under Chapter XVII-B. This is obvious. Clause A to the proviso applies when the deduction is post the period specified by law but in the last month of a previous year. In such cases under the proviso clause A, TDS should be paid before "the said due date" i.e. the date on which return under Section 139(1) of the Act is to be filed."
8. Let us now refer to the facts of the present cases. In the case of Talbros (P) Ltd. there was late deposit of TDS on expenditure of Rs.66,29,926/- as per the following details:
Nature | Amount |
| Interest | 314465 |
| Contractor | 5650780 |
| Fees | 366586 |
| Rent | 612560 |
| INTEREST (GTF) | 420829 |
| Total | 7365220 |
9. The amount of TDS to be deducted has not been stated but it varied from 1.03% to 10.33% on the said amounts. No TDS was deducted on interest amount of Rs.7,35,294/-, and there is no quarrel that addition of this amount is justified and should be made under Section 40(a)(ia). The dispute pertains to other amount i.e. Rs.66,29,926/-. The assessment order and the appellate order do not mention the date on which deduction of tax was made or should have been made, but in the assessment order, it is indicated that tax deducted at source prior to February, 2008 was required to be deposited by March, 2008 and TDS deducted in the month of March, 2008 had to be deposited before filing of the return. If we accept the plea of the Revenue that in terms of Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, the respondent assessee i.e. Talbros (P) Ltd. would not be entitled to expenditure actually incurred and paid to the extent of Rs.66,29,926/-, then the said expenditure would be disallowed and added back in the profit and loss account. The assessee did not succeed in the first appeal but has succeeded before the Appellate Tribunal. Before the CIT (Appeal), the assessee has placed on record document to show that entire TDS amount was paid on or before 4th August, 2004, i.e. much before the date on which return of income under Section 139(1) had to be filed.
10. Naresh Kumar is an individual and had declared net profit from business of Rs.2,88,494/- on total receipts of Rs.61,14,467/-. No addition was made by the Assessing Officer to the business income as declared which was accepted. The Assessing Officer, however, noticed that in the audit report in column 27B, it has been disclosed as under:
Amount of Tax deducted /collected at Source (in Rs.) | Due date for emittance to Government | Details of payments; Date/ Amount (in Rs.) |
2869/- | 07/08/2007 | 23/09/2008 |
8180/- | 07/09/2007 | 23/09/2008 |
3881/- | 07/10/2007 | 23/09/2008 |
5446/- | 07/11/2007 | 23/09/2008 |
1678/- | 07/12/2007 | 23/09/2008 |
5853/- | 07/01/2007 | 23/09/2008 |
12239/- | 07/02/2007(2008) | 23/09/2008 |
13526/- | 07/03/2008 | 23/09/2008 |
11. The assessment order records that the assessee had failed to deposit TDS of Rs.52,672/- on or before 31st March, 2008 and, therefore, expenditure actually and duly incurred and paid of Rs.52,10,873/- cannot be allowed and has to be added to the taxable income. As is apparent from the table above, this amount of Rs.52,672/- being 1.03% of the expenditure of Rs.52,10,873/- was deposited on or before 30th September, 2008, i.e., before the date of filing of the return for the Assessment Year 2008-09. The consequence was addition of Rs.52,10,873/- to the total income of the assessee, which increased from Rs.2,81,471/- to Rs.54,97,592/-. In addition, the respondent-assessee became liable to pay interest under Section 234B, 234C, 234D as well as 244A of the Act. Penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) were also initiated. Of course, the assessee would be liable to pay interest on late deposit of TDS or penalty for the same.
12. Naresh Kumar, the respondent assessee succeeded in the first appeal and has succeeded before the Tribunal.
13. Failure to deduct or pay TDS results in several consequences. First being levy of interest under Section 201/201A which is mandatory. The second is levy of penalty under Section 221 and Section 271C of the Act. It can also result in prosecution under Section 276B which postulates punishment of upto seven years imprisonment and fine. Earlier even failure to deduct tax at source was punishable under Section 276B of the Act.
14. Provisions relating to deduction of tax at source are important as this ensures that tax so deducted gets deposited with the Government and non-taxpayers/filers can be identified. The deductee do not suffer and are not deprived of credit of deduction made from their income. Section 40(a)(ia) is a provision incorporated with the said objective and purpose in mind. It is not basically a penal provision as when the TDS is deposited, the amount on which deduction was made is allowed as an expenditure incurred in previous year in which the payment of TDS is made. Thus, it results in shifting of the year in which the expenditure can be claimed, even if payment has been made to the recipient and is to be allowed as expenditure in another year. Principle of matching i.e. matching of receipts with expenditure to the extent indicated in Section 40(a)(ia), therefore, gets affected. The provision can work harshly and may be very stringent in some cases as is apparent from these facts stated in the case of Naresh Kumar. Strict compliance of Section 40(1)(ia) may be justified keeping in view the legislative object and purpose behind the provision but a provision of such nature should not be allowed to be converted into an iron rod provision which metes out stern punishment and results in malevolent results, disproportionate to the offending act and aim of the legislation. Legislative purpose and the object is to ensure payment and deposit of TDS with the Government. TDS results in collection of tax. Legislature can and do experiment and intervene from time to time when they feel and notice that the existing provision is causing and creating unintended and excessive hardships to citizens and subjects or have resulted in great inconvenience and uncomfortable results. Obedience to law is mandatory and has to be enforced but the magnitude of punishment must not be disproportionate by what is required and necessary. The consequences and the injury caused, if disproportionate do and can result in amendments which have the effect of streamlining and correcting anomalies. The amendments made in 2010 were a step in the said direction and this aspect has to be kept in mind when we examine and consider whether the amendment should be given retrospective effect or not.
15. Question whether the amendment is retrospective or prospective is vexed and rigid rule can be applied universally. Various rules of interpretation have developed in order to determine whether or not, an amendment is retrospective or prospective. Fiscal statutes imposing liabilities are governed by normal presumption that they are not retrospective. The cardinal rule is that the law to be applied, is that which is in force on the first day of the assessment year, unless otherwise mandated expressly or provided by necessary implication. The aforesaid dictum is based upon the principle that a new provision creating a liability or an obligation, affecting or taking away vested rights or attaching new disability is presumed to be prospective. However, it is accepted that Legislatures have plenary power to make retrospective amendments, subject to Constitutional restrictions.
16. Based upon the aforesaid broad dictum, Judges and jurists have drawn distinction between procedural and substantive provisions. Substantive provisions deal with rights and the same are fundamental, while procedural law is concerned with the legal process involving actions and remedies. Amendments to substantive law are treated as prospective, while amendments to procedural law are treated as retrospective. This distinction itself is not free from difficulties as right to appeal has been held to be a substantive law, but law of limitation is regarded as procedural. There is an interplay and interconnect between what can be regarded as substantive and procedural law [see Commissioner of Income Tax versus Shrawan Kumar Swarup & Sons, (1998) 232 ITR 123(SC)].
17. There are decisions, which hold that process of litigation or enforcement of law is procedural. Similarly, machinery provision for collection of tax, rather than tax itself is procedural. Read in this context, it can be strongly argued that Section 40(a)(ia) at least to the extent of the amendment is procedural as by enacting Section 40(a)(ia)the Legislature did not want to impose a new tax but wanted to ensure collection of TDS and the amendments made streamline and remedy the anomalies noticed in the said procedure by allowing deduction in the year when the expenditure is incurred provided TDS is paid before the due date for filing of the return. Remedial statutes are normally not retrospective, on the ground that they may affect vested rights. But these statutes are construed liberally when justified and rule against retrospectivity may be applied with less resistance [See Bharat Singh versus Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, (1986) 2 SCC 614 and Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. Versus Management, AIR 1973 SC 1227].
18. It is interesting to note that earlier English decisions have held that an enactment fixing a penalty or maximum penalty for offence is merely procedural for the purpose of determining retrospectivity [See DPP versus Lamb, [1941] 2 KB 89) and R versus Oliver, (1944) 29 Cr. App. 137]. This view, however, has been criticized in Reherd Athlumney [1898] 2QB547 on the ground that higher or greater punishment impairs existing rights or obligation;-
"No rule of construction is more firmly established than this; that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only."
19. The word 'fairly' used in the aforesaid quotation is important and relevant, but for application of another rule of interpretation. G.P. Singh in "Principles of Statutory Interpretation", 13th Edition, 2012 at page 538 under the sub-heading "Recent statements of the rule against Retrospectivity" has greatly emphasized the principle of fairness and observed that classification of statute either substantive or procedural does not necessarily determine whether the enactment or amendment has retrospective operation, e.g., law of limitation is procedural but its application to past cause of action may result of reviving or extinguishing a right, and such operation cannot be said to be procedural. Similarly, when requisites of an action under the new statute, draws from a time incident to its passing, rule against retrospectivity may not be applicable.
20. In the said text, reference has been made to formulation by Dixon, C.J. in Maxwell versus Murphy, (1957) 96 CLR 261 holding:-
"The general rule of the common law is that a statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a way as to confer or impose or otherwise affect the rights or liabilities which the law had defined be reference to the past events. But given the rights and liabilities fixed by reference to the past facts, matters or events, the law appointing or regulating the manner in which they are to be enforced or their enjoyment is to be secured by judicial remedy is not within the application of such a presumption".
21. Identically, in Secretary of State for Social Security versus Tunnicliffe, (1991) 2 All ER 712, Staughton, L.J. has expressed the said principle in the following words:-
"The true principle is that Parliament is presumed not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events and transactions in a manner which is unfair to those concerned in them unless a contrary intention appears. It is not simply a question of classifying an enactment as retrospective or not retrospective. Rather it may well be a matter of degree- the greater the unfairness, the more it is to be expected that Parliament will make it clear if that is intended".
22. House of Lords in L' office Cherifien des Phosphates versus Yamashita Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd., (1994) 1 All ER 20 has said the question of fairness has to be answered by taking into account various factors, viz., value of the rights which the statute affects; extent to which that value is diminished or extinguished by the suggested retrospective effect of the statute; unfairness of adversely affecting the rights; clarity of the language used by Parliament and the circumstances in which the legislation was created. These factors have to be weighed together to provide an answer whether the consequences of reading the statute with suggested degree of retrospectivity is unfair; that the words used by the Parliament could not have been intended to mean what they might appear to say. This principle was applied while interpreting a new provision in Arbitration Act in this case observing that the delay attributable to the claimant in pursuing a claim before enactment of the new provision, could be taken into consideration for dismissal.
23. Principle of "fairness" has not left us untouched and was applied by the Supreme Court inVijay versus State of Maharashtra, (2006) 6 SCC 289 in the following words:-
"…The negotiation is not a rigid rule and varies with the intention and purport of the legislation, but to apply it in such a case is a doctrine of fairness. When a new law is enacted for the benefit of the community as a whole, even in absence of a provision the statute may be held to be retrospective in nature."
24. In Allied Motors (P) Limited versus Commissioner of Income Tax, 1997 (224) ITR 677= (2002-TIOL-588-SC-IT), it was held that the new proviso to Section 43B should be given retrospective effect from the inception on the ground that the proviso was added to remedy unintended consequences and supply an obvious omission. The proviso ensured reasonable interpretation and retrospective effect would serve the object behind the enactment.
25. In State through CBI, Delhi versus Gian Singh and Another, AIR 1999 SC 3450 extreme penalty of death was diluted to alternative option of imprisonment for life recording that the legislative benevolence could be extended to an accused, who awaits judicial verdicts against his sentence. Earlier in Ratan Lal versus State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444 reference was made to Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and it was observed that if the Act was not given retrospective operation, it would lead to anomalies and thus could not be the intention of the Legislature.
26. Principle of matching which is disturbed by Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, may not materially be of consequence to the Revenue when the tax rates are stable and uniform or in cases of big assessees having substantial turnover and equally huge expenses as they have necessary cushion to absorb the effect. However, marginal and medium taxpayers, who work at low G.P. rate and when expenditure which becomes subject matter of an order under Section 40(a)(ia) is substantial, can suffer severe adverse consequences as is apparent from the case of Naresh Kumar. Transferring or shifting expenses to a subsequent year, in such cases, will not wipe off the adverse effect and the financial stress. Nevertheless the Section 40(a)(ia) has to be given full play keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the section. At the same time, the provision can be and should be interpreted liberally and equitable so that an assessee should not suffer unintended and deleterious consequences beyond what the object and purpose of the provision mandates. Case of Naresh Kumar is not one of rare cases, but one of several cases as we find that Section 40(a)(ia) is invoked in large number of cases.
27. One important consideration in construing a machinery section is that it must be so construed so as to effectuate the liability imposed by the charging section and to make the machinery workable. However, when the machinery section results in unintended or harsh consequences which were not intended, the remedial or correction action taken is not to be disregarded but given due regard.
28. It is, in this context, that we had in Rajinder Kumar's case (supra) observed as under:
"22. Now, we refer to the amendments which have been made by the Finance Act, 2010 and the effect thereof. We have already quoted the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Virgin Creations (supra). The said decision refers to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Allied Motors (P) Limited (supra) and Commissioner of Income Tax versus Alom Extrusions Limited, (2009) 319 ITR 306 (SC) = (2009-TIOL-125-SC-IT). In the case of Allied Motors (P) Limited (supra), the Supreme Court was examining the first proviso to Section 43B and whether it was retrospective. Section 43B was inserted in the Act with effect from 1st April 1984 for curbing claims of taxpayers who did not discharge or pay statutory liabilities but claimed deductions on the ground that the statutory liability had accrued. Section 43B states that the statutory liability would be allowed as a deduction or as an expense in the year in which the payment was made and would not be allowed, even in cases of mercantile system of accountancy, in the year of accrual. It was noticed that in some cases hardship would be caused to assessees, who paid the statutory dues within the prescribed period though the payments so made would not fall within the relevant previous year. Accordingly, a proviso was added by Finance Act, 1987 applicable with effect from 1st April, 1988. The proviso stipulated that when statutory dues covered by Section 43B were paid on or before the due date for furnishing of the return under Section 139(1), the deduction/expense, equal to the amount paid would be allowed. The Supreme Court noticed the purpose behind the proviso and the remedial nature of the insertion made. Of course, the Supreme Court also referred to Explanation 2 which was inserted by Finance Act, 1989 which was made retrospective and was to take effect from 1st April, 1984. Highlighting the object behind Section 43B, it was observed that the proviso makes the provision workable, gives it a reasonable interpretation. It was elucidated:"12. In the case of Goodyear India Ltd. V. State of Haryana this Court said that the rule of reasonable construction must be applied while construing a statute. Literal construction should be avoided if it defeats the manifest object and purpose of the Act.13. Therefore, in the well-known words of Judge Learned Hand, one cannot make a fortress out of the dictionary; and should remember that statutes have some purpose and object to accomplish whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. In the case of R.B. Judha Mal Kuthiala v. CIT, this Court said that one should apply the rule of reasonable interpretation. A proviso which is inserted to remedy unintended consequences and to make the provision workable, a proviso which supplies an obvious omission in the section and is required to be read into the section to give the section a reasonable interpretation, requires to be treated as retrospective in operation so that a reasonable interpretation can be given to the section as a whole.14. This view has been accepted by a number of High Courts. In the case of CIT v. Chandulal Venichand, the Gujarat High Court has held that the first proviso to Section 43-B is retrospective and sales tax for the last quarter paid before the filing of the return for the assessment year is deductible. This decision deals with Assessment Year 1985-85. The Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Sri Jagannath Steel Corpn. has taken a similar view holding that the statutory liability for sales tax actually discharged after the expiry of the accounting year in compliance with the relevant statute is entitled to deduction under Section 43-B. The High Court has held the amendment to be clarificatory and, therefore, retrospective. The Gujarat High court in the above case held the amendment to be curative and explanatory and hence retrospective. The Patna High court has also held the amendment inserting the first proviso to be explanatory in the case of Jamshedpur Motor Accessories Stores v. Union of India. The special leave petition from this decision of the Patna High Court was dismissed. The view of the Delhi High Court, therefore, that the first proviso to Section 43-B will be available only prospectively does not appear to be correct. As observed by G.P. Singh in his Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 4th Edn. At p. 291: "It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended." In fact the amendment would not serve its object in such a situation unless it is construed as retrospective. The view, therefore, taken by the Delhi High Court cannot be sustained."23. Section 43B deals with statutory dues and stipulates that the year in which the payment is made the same would be allowed as a deduction even if the assessee is following the mercantile system of accountancy. The proviso, however, stipulates that deduction would be allowed where the statutory dues covered by Section 43B stand paid on or before the due date of filing of return of income. Section 40(a)(ia) is applicable to cases where an assessee is required to deduct tax at source and fails to deduct or does not make payment of the TDS before the due date, in such cases, notwithstanding Sections 30 to 38 of the Act, deduction is to be allowed as an expenditure in the year of payment unless a case is covered under the exceptions carved out. The amended proviso as inserted by Finance Act, 2010 states where an assessee has made payment of the TDS on or before the due date of filing of the return under Section 139(1), the sum shall be allowed as an expense in computing the income of the previous year. The two provisions are akin and the provisos to Sections 40(a)(ia) and 43B are to the same effect and for the same purpose.24. In Podar Cement Private Limited (supra), the Supreme Court considered whether term 'owner' would include unregistered owners who had paid sale consideration and were covered by Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the assessees was that the amendments made to the definition of term 'owner' by Finance Bill, 1987 should be given retrospective effect. It was held that the amendments were retrospective in nature as they rationalise and clear the existing ambiguities and doubts. Reference was made to Crawford: 'Statutory Construction' and 'the principle of Declaratory Statutes', Francis Bennion: 'Statutory Interpretation', Justice G.P. Singh's 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation', it was observed that sometimes amendments are made to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous provision. The issue was accordingly decided holding that in such cases the amendments were retrospective though it was noticed that as per Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act, etc. a legal owner must have a registered document.25. In view of the aforesaid discussion in paras 18,19 and 20, it is apparent that the respondent assesse did not violate the unamended section 40(a)(ia) of the act. We have noted the ambiguity and referred their contention of Revenue and rejected the interpretation placed by them. The amended provisions are clear and free from any ambiguity and doubt. They will help curtail litigation. The amended provision clearly support view taken in paragraphs 17 - 20 that the expression "said due date" used in clause A of proviso to unamended section refers to time specified in Section 139(1) of the Act. The amended section 40(a)(ia) expands and further liberalises the statue when it stipulates that deductions made in the first eleven months of the previous year but paid before the due date of filing of the return, will constitute sufficient compliance."
29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any merit in the present appeals filed by the Revenue and they are dismissed.
| Execution of irrevocable power of attorney of a property in favour of land developers deemed as 'transfer' | ||
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IT : No penalty could be levied under section 271(1)(c) where filing of erroneous claim by assessee was found to be bona fide mistake and entire exercise resulted into tax neutrality
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[2013] 36 taxmann.com 533 (Gujarat)
HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Commissioner of Income-tax-I
v.
Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd.*
M.R. SHAH AND MS. SONIA GOKANI, JJ.
TAX APPEAL NO. 127 OF 2013†
JUNE 25, 2013
Section 271(1)(c), read with section 115JB, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Penalty - For concealment of income [Wrong claim, effect of] - Assessee's claim with respect to depreciation and capital loss was found erroneous - When said fact was brought to assessee's notice, it offered amount of difference for taxation - Assessing Officer, however, levied penalty under section 271(1)(c) - Commissioner (Appeals) deleted penalty holding that it was bona fide inadvertent mistake - Admittedly, even after making some disallowance on both counts, tax required to be paid as per section 115JB remained same - Whether in absence of any material to hold that assessee had either concealed particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars, penalty under section 271(1)(c) was rightly cancelled - Held, yes [Paras 4,5 & 6] [In favour of assessee]
CASES REFERRED TO
CIT v. Vijay Mistry Construction & Rajakamal Builders (P.) Ltd. [Tax Appeal No. 2224 of 2009, dated 29-3-2011] (para 3) and CIT v. Nalwa Sons Investments Ltd. [2010] 327 ITR 543/194 Taxman 387 (Delhi) (para 5).
K.M. Parikh for the Appellant. Manish J. Shah for the Respondent.
ORDER
Ms. Sonia Gokani, J. - Aggrieved by the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') dated July 13, 2012, the present Tax Appeal is preferred by the Revenue under Section 260A of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), proposing the following substantial question of law for our consideration :
"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in deleting the penalty of Rs. 2,82,50,000/- levied u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act by holding that even after the disallowances, tax finality required to be paid as per section 115JB of the Act, remains the same, and that the claim made was admitted by the assessee as a bona fide mistake, disregarding the fact that the mistake was admitted only on pointing out the same during the assessment proceedings and also disregarding the notional tax effect involved in the case ?"
2. A short substantial question raised in the present Tax Appeal pertains to levying of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act by the Assessing Officer and deletion of the same by both, the CIT (Appeals) and the Tribunal.
3. We have heard the learned counsel Shri K.M. Parikh for the Revenue and Shri Manish Shah for the respondent-assessee. The respondent has pressed into service the decision of this Court rendered on March 29, 2011, in the case of CIT v. Vijay Mistry Construction & Rajakamal Builders (P.) Ltd., while dealing with Tax Appeal No. 2224 of 2009. In identical set of facts when the penalty was levied, the, Tribunal had reversed the order of CIT (Appeals) and cancelled the amount of penalty. When challenged before this Court, it held thus :
"2. Issue pertains to penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer as well as CIT (Appeals) held that respondent-assessee was liable to pay penalty for certain concealment of income. The assessee carried the issue in appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by impugned judgment, deleted the penalty for three reasons. Firstly, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was no concealment or supplying of inaccurate particulars by the assessee. It was observed that all facts were on record and omission to disallow certain sum while computing income as per the profit and loss account, all were brought on record. Second ground adopted by the Tribunal was that even after disallowing certain sum while computing income as per the profit and loss account, the same had no impact on the tax liability of the assessee. It was held that even after such disallowance, tax finally required to be paid, as per Section 115 JB of the Act, would remain the same. The Tribunal, therefore, held that it cannot be stated that the assessee evaded tax. The third ground on which the Tribunal deleted the penalty was that in response to the notice issued, the assessee had tendered his explanation to the Assessing Officer, which was not found to be false. There was nothing to show that such explanation was not bona fide and that all facts relating to computational income were not discussed by the assessee. The Tribunal observed that no such case is made out by the Assessing Officer or by the CIT(Appeals). When in facts Tribunal found that the assessee, at the outset, had disclosed all facts, and that its explanation to the Assessing Officer was otherwise also found acceptable and bona fide and that in any case even after the deletions ordered, there was no impact on the tax liability of the assessee under Section 115JB of the Act, we do not find any error in the Tribunal's order. Resultantly, we do not find any substantial question of law is arising. Tax Appeal is, therefore, dismissed."
4. The Tribunal, in the instant case, relied upon the said decision of this Court rendered in the case of Vijay Mistry Construction & Rajakamal Builders (P.) Ltd. (supra) for basing its reasonings. In the present case, the assessee did not deny that the claim of depreciation was erroneous. When the said fact was brought to its notice, it offered difference for taxation. The CIT (Appeals) was of the opinion that every case of addition would not attract the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Only where no explanation is rendered or explanation is found to be false, that such penalty proceedings may be attracted. It appears that with respect to depreciation as well as the capital loss, the reason for making the claims has been plausibly explained by the assessee, which was held by the CIT (Appeals) as "bona fide inadvertent mistake, pure and simple". It also further held that more than one legal view is possible with regard to the tax treatment and, therefore, it was of the view that it was neither the case of concealment nor of non-furnishing of material particulars of income.
5. The Tribunal adopted these findings and moreover, relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Vijay Mistry Construction (supra) andRajakamal Builders (P.) Ltd. (supra), it further held that the assessed income of the assessee under regular provision was nil even after making additions on both the counts i.e. in respect of depreciation as well as the capital loss. The Tribunal, therefore, was of the opinion that even after making some disallowance, the tax required to be paid as per Section 115JB remained the same and, therefore, it was not possible to hold that, the assessee evaded the tax. Thus, on the ground of tax neutrality, relying also on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Nalwa Sons Investments Ltd. [2010] 327 ITR 543/194 Taxman 387 (Delhi), it held in favour of the assessee-respondent.
6. The Division Bench of this Court which has already decided the issue on identical grounds and the Tribunal having relied upon such judgment has found that the entire exercise results into tax neutrality and moreover, when more than one view was possible on both the claims made by the assessee, in absence of any material to hold that the assessee had either concealed particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars, penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act was rightly cancelled by both the authorities. No interference is necessary as no substantial question of law arises.
7. Resultantly, the Tax Appeal merits no consideration and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
Notification for Extension of date for receipt of ITR-Vs in CPC, Bengaluru, for the cases of AY 2012-13 and 2011-12 received in e-filed in FY 2012-13.
There are many taxpayers who have uploaded their Income Tax Returnselectronically (without digital signature Certificate) for A.Y. 2011-12 [filed during F.Y. 2012-13] and for ITRs ofA.Y. 2012-13 [filed on or after1.4.2012], but have either not filed the corresponding ITR-V or have filed it with the local Income-tax office. ITR-V is accepted only at the Centralized Processing Center (CPC) of the Income-tax Department at Bengaluru by ordinary or speed post. Therefore, a final opportunity is being given to such taxpayers to regularize their Income-tax returns.
All such taxpayers may mail the ITR-V, by 31st October, 2013, by ordinary post or speed post at Post Bag No. 1, Electronic City Post Office, Bengaluru -560100 (Karnataka). Taxpayers who have filed their ITR-V with the local Income-tax office may again mail their ITR-V to the CPC by 31stOctober, 2013. Those taxpayers who have earlier mailed their ITR-V, but have not received theacknowledgement e-mail from the CPC, may mail their ITR-V to the CPC again.
The ITR-V form should be mailed to the CPC only at the above address by ordinary post or speed post. Taxpayers may note that no other place or form of delivery will be accepted.
Taxpayers may also note that without acknowledgement of the ITR-V from the CPC it would not be possible for the Income-tax Department to process the Income-tax returns or issue any refundstherefrom, as these would be treated as not having been filed with the Department
IT: Where assessee held more than 10 per cent shares of a company 'B' and he on basis of an agreement received a sum of Rs. one crore from 'B' in advance against transaction of sale of his cold storage, amount received was on account of commercial transaction and section 2(22)(e) was not applicable to said transaction
IT: Where assessee had taken interest bearing loan on which he paid interest and further he had given loan to family members without charging interest, since assessee was having sufficient own capital as against interest free loan given to family members, no disallowance of interest paid by assessee could be made under section 36(1)(iii)
IT: Where there was forfeited liability of Rs. 10 lakhs and assessee had credited said amount to capital account, said amount was rightly added to income of assessee by invoking provisions of section 28(iv)
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[2013] 36 taxmann.com 507 (Agra - Trib.)
IN THE ITAT AGRA BENCH
Krishan Murari Lal Agarwal
v.
Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle -4(1)*
BHAVNESH SAINI, JUDICIAL MEMBER
AND A.L. GEHLOT, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
AND A.L. GEHLOT, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
IT APPEAL NO. 295 (AGRA) OF 2012
[ASSESSMENT YEAR 2008-09]
[ASSESSMENT YEAR 2008-09]
JULY 5, 2013
I. Section 2(22), read with section 56, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Deemed dividend [Loans or advances] - Assessment year 2008-09 - Assessee held more than 10 per cent shares of a company 'B', where public was not substantially interested - He was having a cold storage - He claimed that during previous year he received a sum of Rs. one crore from 'B' in advance against transaction of sale of cold storage and amount received was on account of commercial transaction and, therefore, provisions of section 2(22)(e) were not applicable to said transaction - In this regard, he stated that (i) under an agreement dated 7-1-2008 cold storage was agreed to be sold to 'B' for an amount of Rs. 2 crores and half of said sum, i.e., Rs. one crore was given in advance to him with clear understanding that rest of sum of Rs. one crore shall be received by assessee on making sale deed, and (ii) due to some dispute said agreement was cancelled and a settlement deed was executed, whereby he was required to refund said amount of Rs. one crore to 'B' including interest - Assessing Officer held that transaction between assessee and 'B' was covered within meaning of section 2(22)(e) - He, therefore, added amount of Rs. one crore plus interest thereon to income of assessee - Assessee furnished before Assessing Officer copy of agreement dated 7-1-2008 - He also furnished copy of board meeting of company 'B', wherein a director of company was authorized to purchase cold storage of assessee up to maximum amount of Rs. 2 crores - Whether assessee had prima facie discharged burden in establishing that amount received by him was on account of commercial transaction - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, provisions of section 2(22)(e) were not applicable to transaction in question - Held, yes [Paras 19 to 21] [In favour of assessee]
II. Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Interest on borrowed capital - [Interest free loans to family members] - Assessment year 2008-09 - During year assessee had taken interest bearing loan on which he paid interest and claimed deduction of same - Assessing Officer having noticed that assessee had given loan to family members without charging interest disallowed interest claim of assessee under section 36(1)(iii) - Assessee was having sufficient own capital as against interest free loan given to family members - Whether since assessee was having sufficient own capital, no disallowance of interest paid by assessee could be made under section 36(1)(iii) - Held, yes [Para 24] [In favour of assessee]
III. Section 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Business income - Value of any benefit or perquisite, arising from business or exercise of profession [Forfeited liability] - Assessment year 2008-09 - There was forfeited liability of Rs. 10 lakhs and assessee had credited said amount to capital amount - Assessing Officer added said amount to income of assessee by invoking provisions of section 28(iv) - Whether Assessing Officer had rightly made impugned addition by invoking section 28(iv) - Held, yes [Para 26] [In favour of revenue]
Words and Phrases : 'Advance' occurring in section 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
FACTS - I
| ■ | The assessee held more than 10 per cent shares of a company 'B', where public was not substantially interested. He was having a cold storage. He claimed that (i) during the previous year he received a sum of Rs. one crore from 'B' in advance against transaction of sale of cold storage, (ii) the said amount was given by 'B' for business consideration, and (iii) therefore, provisions of section 2(22)(e) were not applicable to said transaction. In this regard, he stated that under an agreement dated 7-1-2008 entered into by him with 'B' the cold storage was agreed to be sold to 'B' for an amount of Rs. 2 crores and half of the said sum, i.e., Rs. one crore was given in advance to him with the clear understanding that rest of the sum of Rs. one crore shall be received by the assessee on making sale deed and on failure to do so 'B' shall be entitled to take back the said sum of Rs. one crore from the assessee after charging the interest. He further stated that thereafter due to some dispute between him and 'B' the said agreement was cancelled and a settlement deed [MOU] was executed between him and 'B' to the effect that the advance money of Rs. one crore given by 'B' to him shall be refunded by him to 'B' including interest. In the said settlement deed, it was specifically mentioned that the agreement dated 7-1-2008 be treated as cancelled. | |
| ■ | The Assessing Officer held that the transaction between assessee and 'B' was covered within the meaning of section 2(22)(e). He, therefore, added the amount of Rs. one crore plus interest thereon to the income of the assessee under section 56 read with section 2(22)(e). | |
| ■ | On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer observing that the assessee had miserably failed to prove that the money was advanced by 'B' for any business consideration. The plea taken by the assessee that the advance was given by 'B' for purchase of cold storage building remained totally unsubstantiated. He agreed with the view of the Assessing Officer that provisions of section 2(22)(e) were squarely applicable in the assessee's case and his case was not covered by the exceptions as provided in section 2(22)(e). | |
| ■ | On second appeal: |
HELD - I
| ■ | Sub-clause (e) of section 2(22) lays down that dividend includes any payment by a closely held company of any sum by way of advance or loan to a shareholder who comes in the category described in that sub-clause or to a concern in which such shareholder has a substantial interest. Dividend under the sub-clause also includes any payment by such company on behalf, or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder. Deemed dividend under this sub-clause would be to the extent to which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits. The shareholder referred to here should be beneficial owner of shares holding not less than 10 per cent of the voting power but those shares should not be shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend with or without a right to participate in profits. [Para 10] | |
| ■ | Object of sub-clause (e) of section 2(22) is that a company in which public are not substantially interested may not declare dividends or adequate dividends and may not merely give loans to shareholders and such loans not being dividends under the general law, would not be taxable as income in the hands of shareholders. As the public would not have substantial interest in such company, those substantially interested in the company may not recover the loans or allow them to be barred by time. The result would be that amounts which were ostensibly received as loans or advances become the income of shareholders and yet they would not be required to pay any tax on said income under the law. It is to avoid the evil of this nature that sub-clause (e) of section 2(22) has been enacted. This sub-clause created a fiction that the amount in question was dividend. [Para 11] | |
| ■ | The expression used in first part of section 2(22)(e) is advance or loan. The word advance has not been defined. It ordinarily means payment of cash or transfer of goods for which accounting must be rendered by the recipient at some later date. The transaction of loan involves lending and delivery by one party and receipt by another party of money upon express or implied agreement to repay it with or without interest. The phrase 'by way of advance or loan' appearing in section 2(22)(e) be construed to mean those advances or loans which a shareholder enjoys for simply on account of being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares, but if such loan or advance is given to such shareholder as a consequence of any further consideration which is beneficial to the company received from a shareholder, in such case, such advance or loan cannot be said to be deemed dividend within the meaning of the Act. Thus gratuitous loan or advance given by a company to those classes of shareholders would come within the purview of section 2(22), but not the cases where the loan or advance is given in return to an advantage confirmed upon by company by such shareholder. [Para 12] | |
| ■ | The assessee has furnished the copy of agreement dated 7-1-2008. He has also furnished the copy of board meeting of company 'B' dated 5-1-2008, wherein a director of the company was authorised to purchase the cold storage of the assessee up to maximum amount of Rs. 2 crores. [Para 17] | |
| ■ | However, the matter could not be materialized and MOU was executed on 28-3-2008 cancelling the said transaction. [Para 18] | |
| ■ | Considering the facts of the case and material on record, it is apparent that the assessee has prima facie discharged the burden in establishing that the amount received was on account of commercial transaction. [Para 19] | |
| ■ | The contention of the revenue is that the assessee has shown the amount of Rs. one crore as unsecured loan in the books of account. In this regard, it is relevant to state that for the purpose of income-tax matter the entries in the books of account cannot be said to be a final entry or transaction. For the purpose of income-tax, one is to examine the nature of transaction in accordance with law. In the instant case, the assessee has demonstrated that the amount was received for the purpose of commercial transaction. The second objection of the revenue is that the agreement and MOU are after thought. These documents are already on record and the revenue did not point out any contrary material to these documents. [Para 20] | |
| ■ | In view of the aforesaid, the amount of Rs. one crore received by the assessee was on account of commercial transaction. Therefore, section 2(22)(e) was not applicable. Therefore, the impugned addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the Commissioner (Appeals) was liable to be deleted. [Para 22] |
CASE REVIEW-III
CIT v. Aries Advertising (P.) Ltd. [2002] 255 ITR 510/125 Taxman 969 (Mad.); CIT v. T.V. Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Ltd. [1996] 222 ITR 344/88 Taxman 429 (SC) and CIT v. Rajasthan Golden Transport Co. (P.) Ltd. [2001] 249 ITR 723/116 Taxman 60 (Delhi) (para 27) followed.
CASES REFERRED TO
CIT v. Creative Dyeing & Printing (P.) Ltd. [2009] 318 ITR 476/184 Taxman 483 (Delhi) (para 13), CIT v. Raj Kumar [2009] 318 ITR 462/181 Taxman 155 (Delhi) (para 13), CIT v. Ambassador Travels (P.) Ltd. [2009] 318 ITR 376/[2008] 173 Taxman 407 (Delhi) (para 16), Pradip Kumar Malhotra v. CIT [2011] 338 ITR 538/203 Taxman 110/15 taxmann.com 66 (Cal.) (para 16), CIT v. Aries Advertising (P.) Ltd. [2002] 255 ITR 510/125 Taxman 969 (Mad.) (para 27), CIT v. T.V. Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Ltd. [1996] 222 ITR 344/88 Taxman 429 (SC) (para 27) and CITv. Rajasthan Golden Transport Co. (P.) Ltd.[2001] 249 ITR 723/116 Taxman 60 (Delhi) (para 27).
Rajendra Sharma for the Appellant. Waseem Arshand for the Respondent.
ORDER
A.L. Gehlot, Accountant Member - This appeal has been filed by the assessee against the order dated 15.03.2012 passed by the learned CIT(A)-II, Agra for A.Y. 2008-09.
2. The grounds raised in this appeal is reproduced as below:-
| "(1) | On the facts and circumstances of the case the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-II, Agra has erred on facts as well as in law while sustaining the addition of Rs.1,01,20,910/- made by the Assessing Officer u/s 56 read with section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 which is sustained, without taking into consideration the material facts and case laws brought on record by the appellant. After taking into consideration the above, no addition is liable to be sustained, same is liable to be deleted. | |
| (2) | That while sustaining the addition at Rs.1,01,20,910/- the authorities below have not rejected nor rebutted the submissions made before them in support of their contention. After taking into consideration all these documents no addition is liable to be sustained, same is liable to be deleted. | |
| (3) | The learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-II, Agra has erred both in law and on facts in confirming the addition of Rs.1,34,794/- made by the Assessing Officer u/s 36(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 completely ignoring the case laws and other material facts brought on record by the Appellant during the course of appellate proceedings. | |
| (4) | On the facts and circumstances of the case the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-II, Agra has erred both on law and on facts in confirming the addition of Rs.10,00,000/- made u/s 28(iv) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 completely ignoring the material facts and pronouncements relied upon by the appellant during the course of appellate proceedings." |
3. The brief facts of first and second grounds of the appeal are that during the assessment proceedings, the A.O. noticed that the assessee has made transactions with M/s Bhole Baba Buildcon P. Ltd. as under:—
| Date | Particulars | Debit | Credit |
| 01.04.2007 | Opening balance | 2,50,55,357 | |
| 10.07.2007 | TDS A/c Being the amount of TDS charged on interest paid by Bhole Baba Buildcon P. Ltd. | 1,06,880 | |
| Interest received a/c Being the amount of interest charged on loan | 10,37,670 | ||
| 27.07.2007 | State Bank of India (SIB Br.) Ch. No.798176 received from Bhole Baba Buildcon P. Ltd. | 2,59,86,147 | |
| 10.01.2008 | State Bank of India (SIB Br.) Ch. No.798200 received from Bhole Baba Buildcon ltd. | 1,00,00,000 | |
| 31.03.2008 | Interest paid Being amount of intt. pid to Bhole Baba BNuildcon P Ltd. | 1,34,794 | |
Payable TDS Being the amount of TDS deducted on interest paid on Rs.1,00,00,000/- @ 10.3%. | 13,884 |
4. The A.O. noticed that the assessee has shareholder of more than 10%. The company has sufficient reserves and surplus. The company is one where public is not substantially interested. The A.O. after considering assessee submission found that the amount of Rs.1,01,20,910/- is hit by the Section 2(22)(e) of the Act. The A.O. after examining the accumulate profit and other condition for Section 2(22)(e) of the Act made addition of Rs.1,01,20,910/-.
5. The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the A.O. observing that the assessee has miserably failed to prove that the money was advanced by M/s. Bhole Baba Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. for any business consideration. The plea taken by the assessee that the advance was given by M/s Bhole Baba Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. for purchase of cold storage building remains totally unsubstantiated. The CIT(A) agreed with the view of the AO that provisions of sec. 2(22)(e) are squarely applicable in the assessee's case and his case is not covered by the exceptions as provided in sec.2(22)(e). Also, as on the date of giving the loan the company had sufficient accumulated profits. The order passed by the AO does not call for any interference, therefore, the addition of Rs.1,01,20,910/- was sustained and ground was dismissed.
6. The ld. Authorized Representative submitted that the A.O. is highly unjustified and legally in incorrect in holding that the transaction between assessee and M/s Bhole Baba Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. is covered within the meaning of section 2(22)(e) of the I.T. Act, 1961 and, hence the same is added in the hands of the assessee u/s 56 of the Act i.e. income from other sources read with Section 2(22)(e) of the Act. The ld. Authorized Representative submitted that the observation of the assessee are without any basis and are based upon misinterpretation of the provisions of Section 2(22)(e) of the Act. The ld. Authorized Representative further submitted that during the course of assessment proceedings it was clarified to the assessing officer through written submission that the assessee had taken loan of Rs.1 crore from M/s Bhole Baba Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., on the basis of an Ikrarnama executed on non judicial stamp paper of Rs.100/- wherein, it is clearly stated on a piece of land (Khasra no.91, Area 4-17-0 bigha situated at Mauza Baroli Aheer, Shamshadbad Road, Agra, a cold storage is built up known as Bhole Baba Ice Factory and Cold Storage. On the basis of the aforesaid Ikrarnama it has been agreed between the Director, Shri Hari Shankar Agarwal of Bhole Baba Buildcon (P) Ltd. the owner of the said piece of land, Bhole Baba Ice Factory & Cold Storage, Shri Krishan Murari Agarwal the assessee, that the said piece of land was agreed to be sold for an amount of Rs.2 crore and half of the said sum i.e. Rs.1 crore was given as an advance to the assessee with the clear understanding that rest of the sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/-shall be received by the assessee on making a sale deed before the Sub Registrar, Agra and failure to do so the first party i.e. the Director of M/s Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., shall be entitled to take back the said sum of Rs.1 crore from the assessee after charging the interest as stipulated in the said Ikrarnama. The ld. Authorized Representative Submitted that these transactions were recorded in the books of account which were produced before the Assessing Officer.
7. The ld. Authorized Representative Submitted that thereafter, due to some dispute between the assessee and M/s Baba Dairy Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., the said Ikrarnama was cancelled and a settlement deed was executed between the assessee and M/s Bhole Baba Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., through its Director Shri Hari Shankar Agarwal that the advance money of Rs.1 crore given by M/s Bhole Baba Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., to the assessee shall be refunded by the assessee to M/s Bhole Baba Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., till March, 2009 including interest @ 6% per annum. It was further stipulated in the said settlement deed that if said repayment of Rs.1 crore is not paid till 31st March, 2009 by the assessee then the rate of interest shall be increased to 18% per annum. In the said settlement deed, it was specifically mentioned that the Ikrarnama dated 07.01.2008 be treated as cancelled.
8. The ld. D.R. on the other hand, relied upon the order of CIT(A) and submitted that it is a case of advance or loan in accordance with Section 2(22)(e) of the Act. The ld. D.R. submitted that this fact supported by audited balance sheet wherein the auditor has shown this amount as unsecured loan. Therefore, the said loan cannot said to be a loan for business purposes. As regards the agreement and MOU, the ld. D.R. submitted that it is after thought.
9. We have heard ld. Representatives of the parties and records perused. The issue under consideration is pertaining to Section 2(22)(e) of the Act. To appreciate the issue. we would like to reproduce the said Section 2(22)(e) of the Act as under:—
| '(e) | any payment by a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, of any sum (whether as representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise) made after the 31st day of May, 1987, by way of advance or loan to a shareholder, being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits) holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power, or to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest (hereafter in this clause referred to as the said concern) or any payment by any such company on behalf, or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder, to the extent to which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits; |
but "dividend" does not include—
| (i) | a distribution made in accordance with sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) in respect of any share issued for full cash consideration, where the holder of the share is not entitled in the event of liquidation to participate in the surplus assets ; | |
| (ia) | a distribution made in accordance with sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) in so far as such distribution is attributable to the capitalised profits of the company representing bonus shares allotted to its equity shareholders after the 31st day of March, 1964, and before the 1st day of April, 1965 ; | |
| (ii) | any advance or loan made to a shareholder or the said concern by a company in the ordinary course of its business, where the lending of money is a substantial part of the business of the company ; | |
| (iii) | any dividend paid by a company which is set off by the company against the whole or any part of any sum previously paid by it and treated as a dividend within the meaning of sub-clause (e), to the extent to which it is so set off; | |
| (iv) | any payment made by a company on purchase of its own shares from a shareholder in accordance with the provisions of section 77A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956); | |
| (v) | any distribution of shares pursuant to a demerger by the resulting company to the shareholders of the demerged company (whether or not there is a reduction of capital in the demerged company). |
Explanation 1.— The expression "accumulated profits", wherever it occurs in this clause, shall not include capital gains arising before the 1st day of April, 1946, or after the 31st day of March, 1948, and before the 1st day of April, 1956.
Explanation 2.-The expression "accumulated profits" in sub-clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e), shall include all profits of the company up to the date of distribution or payment referred to in those sub-clauses, and in sub-clause (c) shall include all profits of the company up to the date of liquidation, but shall not, where the liquidation is consequent on the compulsory acquisition of its undertaking by the Government or a corporation owned or controlled by the Government under any law for the time being in force, include any profits of the company prior to three successive previous years immediately preceding the previous year in which such acquisition took place.
Explanation 3.— For the purposes of this clause,—
| (a) | "concern" means a Hindu undivided family, or a firm or an association of persons or a body of individuals or a company ; | |
| (b) | a person shall be deemed to have a substantial interest in a concern, other than a company, if he is, at any time during the previous year, beneficially entitled to not less than twenty per cent of the income of such concern ;' |
10. On plain reading of aforesaid section we find that sub-clause (e) of Section 2(22) lays down that dividend includes any payment by a closely held company of any sum by way of advance or loan to a shareholder who comes in the category described in that sub-clause or to a concern in which such shareholder has a substantial interest. Dividend under the sub-clause also includes any payment by such company on behalf or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder. Deemed dividend under this sub-clause would be to the extent to the company in either case possesses accumulated profits. The shareholder referred to here should be beneficial owner of shares holding not less than 10% of the voting power but those shares should not be shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend with or without a right to participate in profits.
11. Object of this sub clause is that a company in which public are not substantially interested may not declare dividends or adequate dividends and may not merely give loans to shareholders and such loans not being dividends under the general law, would not be taxable as income in the hands of shareholders. As the public would not have substantial interest in such company, those substantially interested in the company may not recover the loans or allow them to be barred by time. The result would be that amounts which were ostensibly received as loans or advances become in the income of shareholders and yet they would not be required to pay any tax on said income under the law. It is to avoid the evil of this nature that sub-cl.(e) of section 2(22) has been enacted. This sub-clause created a fiction that the amount in question was dividend. Normally legal fictions are created for a definite purpose and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond their legitimate filed. However, legal fictions ought to be carried to its logical conclusion within the framework of the purpose for which it was created.
12. The expression used in first part of section 2(22)(e) is advance or loan. The word advance has not been defined. It ordinarily means payment of cash or transfer of goods for which accounting must be rendered by the recipient at some later date. The transaction of loan involves lending and delivery by one party and receipt by another party of sum money upon express or implied agreement to repay it with or without interest. The phrase "by way of advance or loan" appearing in Section 2(22)(e) of the Act be construed to mean those advances or loans which a share holder enjoys for simply on account of being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares, but if such loan or advance is given to such shareholder as a consequence of any further consideration which is beneficial to the company received from a shareholder, in such case, such advance or loan cannot be said to a deemed dividend within the meaning of the Act. Thus, gratuitous loan or advance given by a company to those classes of shareholders would come within the purview of Section 2(22) of the Act but not the cases where the loan or advance is given in return to an advantage confirmed upon the company by such shareholder.
13. Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Creative Dyeing & Printing (P.) Ltd. [2009] 318 ITR 476/184 Taxman 483 wherein it has been held that the amount advanced to the assessee company by another company having common Directors not being a loan to advance for business transaction which is to be adjusted against the moneys payable by the latter to the assessee company in the subsequent years, same did not fall within the definition of deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) of the Act.
14. Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Raj Kumar [2009] 318 ITR 462/181 Taxman 155 wherein it has been held that trade advance which is in the nature of money transacted to give effect to commercial transaction does not fall within the ambit of provisions of Section 2(22)(e) of the Act.
15. Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Ambassador Travels (P.) Ltd. [2009] 318 ITR 376/[2008] 173 Taxman 407 wherein it has been held that in case of normal course of business transactions it should not be treated as deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e) of the Act.
16. Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Pradip Kumar Malhotra v. CIT [2011] 338 ITR 538/203 Taxman 110/15 taxmann.com 66 wherein it has been held that loan advanced by company to shareholder in compensation of shareholder mortgaging his immovable property for enabling company to secure bank loan cannot be treated as deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e) of the Act.
17. In the light of the above discussions, if we consider the facts of the case under consideration, we notice that the assessee was having running account with the company having opening debit balance of Rs.2,50,55,357/-as on 01.04.2007. Rs.2,59,86,147/- received from the company, Bhole Baba Buildcon (P) Ltd. on 27.07.2007. Similarly on 10.01.2008, a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- received from Bhole Baba Buildcon P. Ltd. The contention of the assessee was that the business transaction was done with the assessee in this account and a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- was received to the assessee against transaction of sale of cold storage of the assessee. The assessee was having cold storage at 91, Mauza Baroli Aheer, Shamsabad Road, Agra known as Bhole Baba Ice Factory & Cold Storage. The assessee has furnished the agreement dated 07.01.2008 between the Director of the said cold storage and Director, Bhole Baba Buildcon (P) Ltd. Copy of the said agreement has been placed at Page Nos. 2 & 3 of the assessee's paper book. The assessee has also furnished the copy of resolution of board meeting dated 05.01.2008. The abstract of the board resolution is reproduced as below:-
"RESOLVED THAT, board of directors be and is hereby authorized to purchases the Cold Storage Property situated at Khasra No. 91, Mauza Baroli Aheer, Shamsabad Road, Agra from Shri Kirshna Murari Lal Agarwal for the purpose of business activities of the company up to maximum amount of Rs.2.00 crore.
FURTHER RESOLVED THAT, SHRI HARI SHANKAR AGARWAL, DIRECTOR, be and is hereby authorized by and on behalf of the board to give effect to the above resolution and also to do all such acts, deeds and things as may be deemed necessary in relation to the purchase above property."
18. However, the matter could not be materialized and MOU was executed on 28.03.2008 cancelling the said transaction, a copy of MOU has been placed at Page Nos. 4 & 5 of the assessee's paper book.
19. Considering the facts of the case and material on record, we notice that the assessee has prima facie discharged the burden in establishing that the amount received was a commercial transaction, therefore, the transaction is not covered by Section 222(e) of the Act.
20. As regards, the contention of the ld. D.R. that the assessee has shown this amount as unsecured loan in the books of account, in this regard, it is relevant to state that for the purpose of Income-tax matter the entries in the books of account cannot be said to be a final entry or transaction. For the purpose of Income-tax, one is to examine the nature of transaction in accordance with law. In the light of the facts, the same is to be decided in accordance with law. In the case under consideration as stated above, the assessee has demonstrated that the amount was received for the purpose of commercial transaction. As regards, the second objection, which is agreement and MOU as after thought, in this regard, we are of the view that these documents are already on record and the Revenue did not point out any contrary material to these documents. Therefore, merely by stating that this is after thought, such argument of the revenue without supporting material/evidence is not sustainable, therefore, the same is rejected.
21. In the light of above discussions, we find that the amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/- received to the assessee is on account of commercial transaction, therefore, the Section 2(22)(e) is not applicable. We, therefore, delete the addition of Rs.1,01,20,910/- made by the A.O. and sustained by the CIT(A).
22. The third ground is in respect of addition of Rs.1,34,794/- by disallowing interest under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. During the assessment proceedings, the A.O. noticed that the assessee has taken interest bearing loan on which interest has been paid. The A.O. further noticed that total amount of Rs.1,73,38,986/- was given to family members by the assessee without charging interest. The A.O. held that the assessee has diverted interest bearing fund to interest free fund to his family members. The A.O. disallowed the interest claim of the assessee Rs.1,34,794/-disallowing interest under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the A.O.
23. The ld. Authorized Representative submitted that the assessee was having sufficient capital to cover the interest free fund given by the assessee. The assessee was having own capital Rs.1,78,85,290/- whereas advance to family members was Rs.1,73,38,986/-. The. ld. Authorized Representative relied upon the order of the ITAT, Agra Bench in ITA No. 44/Agra/2012 vide order dated 20th July, 2012, ITA No. 142/Agra/2011 order dated 22.06.2012 and ITA No. 58/Agra/2012 order dated 20.07.2012.
24. We have heard ld. Representatives of the parties and records perused. We noticed that on identical set of facts, the ITAT, Agra Bench has adopted a formula following certain orders of other Benches of ITAT that to the extent of the own fund if the assessee diverted the interest-free fund, to that extent no disallowance of interest can be made under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. In the case under consideration, the assessee has demonstrated that the assessee was having sufficient own capital Rs.1,78,85,290/- as against interest-free loan given Rs.1,73,38,986/-. To maintain consistency we follow the said order of the ITAT (Supra). In view of that, we set aside the order of the Revenue Authorities and deleted the addition of Rs.1,34,794/-
25. The fourth ground is in respect of addition of Rs.10,00,000/-. The A.O. made addition of Rs.10,00,000/- on the ground that assessee has shown Rs.10,00,000/- as liability forgone. The said amount has been credited to capital account. The addition made by the A.O. has been confirmed by the CIT(A) observing that the A.O. has rightly made addition invoking Section 28(iv) of the Act.
26. We have heard ld. Representatives of the parties and records perused. The admitted facts of the case are that there is forfeited liability and the assessee has credited the amount to the capital account. Section 28(iv) of the Act is clearly applicable to the case under consideration. The contention of the ld. Authorized Representative was that the amount was not arising from business or profession. This contention of the ld. Authorized Representative is not acceptable as evident from the facts that this amount has been credited to capital account on account of liability forgone in his Balance Sheet of business transaction. The assessee failed to furnish any contrary evidence. When this was not related to business, why this amount has been credited to capital account. The assessee was having no such explanation to this question.
27. In the light of various judgments including the judgment of the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. Aries Advertising (P.) Ltd. [2002] 255 ITR 510/125 Taxman 969, judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. T.V. Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Ltd. [1996] 222 ITR 344/88 Taxman 429 (SC) and the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Rajasthan Golden Transport Co. (P.) Ltd. [2001] 249 ITR 723/116 Taxman 60, this amount is liable to tax. We, therefore, find that the CIT(A) has rightly confirmed the addition of Rs.10,00,000/-. The order of the CIT(A) is confirmed on the issue.
28. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.
SKJ IT: Where assessee took over a part of business undertaking of MSSL as a going concern on slump sale basis which was registered as 100 per cent EOU, it could not be concluded that assessee's business was set up by splitting up or reconstruction of existing business of MSSL and, thus, denial of assessee's claim under section 10B on aforesaid ground was not justified
IT: Mere fact that some part of sale was effected in domestic area would not disentitle assessee from claiming exemption under section 10B unless undertaking was deleted from category of 100 per cent EOU by concerned Department
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[2013] 36 taxmann.com 534 (Delhi - Trib.)
IN THE ITAT DELHI BENCH 'H'
Woco Motherson Elastomer Ltd.
v.
Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle -18 (1)*
R.P. TOLANI, JUDICIAL MEMBER
AND T.S. KAPOOR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
AND T.S. KAPOOR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
IT APPEAL NOS. 234, 235, 5233 & 6056 (DELHI) OF 2011
STAY APPLICATION NO. 70 (DELHI) OF 2013
[ASSESSMENT YEARS 2005-06 TO 2008-09]
STAY APPLICATION NO. 70 (DELHI) OF 2013
[ASSESSMENT YEARS 2005-06 TO 2008-09]
MAY 17, 2013
Section 10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Export oriented undertaking [Splitting up or reconstruction] - Assessment years 2005-06 to 2008-09 - A part of business of MSSL comprising of an undertaking which was engaged in manufacturing metal and plastic from rubber was split from rest of business of MSSL and was sold to assessee - Assessee-company took over business of said undertaking on slump sale basis - Said undertaking was already registered as 100 per cent Export Oriented Unit (EOU) and was eligible for benefit under section 10B - Assessee while filing returns of income for years under consideration, continued to claim benefit of section 10B - Assessing Officer rejected assessee's claim on three grounds, firstly, business of assessee was set up by splitting existing business of MSSL, secondly, assessee company derived domestic turnover from articles or things produced by the undertaking and, therefore, it was not a 100 per cent EOU and, thirdly, pre-used machinery received by assessee from MSSL far exceeded allowable limit of 20 per cent of total value of plant and machinery used in business of undertaking - It was noticed from records that whole undertaking consisting of all assets and liabilities as a going concern was acquired by assessee-company and, thus, it could not be concluded that undertaking had been formed by re-construction of business already in existence or assessee-company carried on business with transferred machinery or plant previously used by another person - Whether in view of above, first and third objections raised by Assessing Officer were not sustainable - Held, yes - Whether as regards second objection, mere fact that some part of sale was effected in domestic area would not disentitle assessee from claiming exemption under section 10B unless undertaking was deleted from category of 100 per cent EOU by concerned Department - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, impugned order passed by Assessing Officer was to be set aside and assessee's claim for deduction was to be allowed - Held, yes [Paras 8 & 12] [In favour of assessee]
FACTS
| ■ | A part of the business of MSSL comprising of an undertaking which was engaged in manufacturing metal and plastic from rubber was split from the rest of the business of MSSL and was sold to assessee. | |
| ■ | The assessee-company took over the business sold by MSSL on slump sale basis. The said undertaking was already registered as 100 per cent Export Oriented Unit and was eligible for benefit under section 10B. | |
| ■ | The assessee while filing the returns of income for the years under consideration continued to claim benefit of section 10B. | |
| ■ | The Assessing Officer, however, held that deduction under section 10B(1) was allowable only to a newly established 100 per cent EOU whereas in assessee's case the business was set up by splitting the existing business of MSSL. | |
| ■ | The Assessing Officer further opined that the assessee had made domestic sales of articles or things and, therefore, it was not 100 per cent EOU. | |
| ■ | It was also held that plant and machinery being used by the assessee consisted mainly of plant and machinery transferred from the original company, i.e., MSSL and therefore, the pre-used machinery transferred to the assessee company far exceeded the allowable limit of 20 per cent of total value of plant and machinery used in the business of undertaking. | |
| ■ | The Assessing Officer thus rejected assessee's claim. | |
| ■ | The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of Assessing Officer. | |
| ■ | On second appeal: |
HELD
| ■ | The main objection of the Assessing Officer is regarding splitting up of the business. The Assessing Officer held that assessee-company has been formed and has taken over the assets of the existing business by splitting the business of MSSL. While holding such a finding, the Assessing Officer has ignored the fact that it was not a case where a part of plant and machinery or other assets belonging to an undertaking were transferred. The whole undertaking consisting of all assets and liabilities as a going concern was acquired by the assessee-company and, thus, it cannot be said that the undertaking has been formed by reconstruction of business already in existence. | |
| ■ | Rather it was an undertaking already in existence on which the deduction under section 10B was claimed and was allowed also. Since it is a case of transfer of whole undertaking, it cannot be said that the assessee-company carried the business with transferred machinery or plant previously used by another person. [Para 8] | |
| ■ | In the present case, the undertaking existed in the same place, form and substance and did carry on the same business before and after the change in the legal character and form of the organization. Formerly, it was a part of MSSL and presently it is an independent assessee. However, with the above change in organizational status, the same unit continued to function. [Para 11] | |
| ■ | As regards objection of the Assessing Officer that the unit had not exported 100 per cent of its turnover, it is observed that clause (iv) ofExplanation 2 to section 10B defines the expression 100 per cent EOU so as to mean an undertaking which has been approved as 100 per cent export oriented unit by the board appointed in this behalf by the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred under section 14 of the Development Regulation Act, 1951 and rules made under said Act | |
| ■ | In the present case the representation was made to the authorities and after verifying the documents and after being satisfied a certificate was granted of being 100 per cent EOU to the undertaking under the name and style of MSSL and, subsequently, when the unit was transferred to assessee, the same was transferred in the name of the assessee. | |
| ■ | Therefore, the objection of the Assessing Officer that some part of sale was effected in domestic area does not disentitle the assessee for claiming deduction under section 10B unless the undertaking is deleted from the category of 100 per cent EOU by the concerned department. [Para 12] | |
| ■ | As regards objection of Assessing Officer regarding transfer of assets which exceeded 20 per cent of total value of plant and machinery, as already held that part assets were not transferred but the whole undertaking was transferred and, thus, there is no question of comparison of assets transferred with the total transfer of the assessee as it is a case of transfer of whole undertaking. [Para 13] | |
| ■ | In view of above, it is held that assessee was entitled to the benefit of section 10B for the years under consideration provided these years fall within 10 years from the date of availment of first deduction under section 10B. [Para 14] | |
| ■ | In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed. [Para 16] |
CASES REFERRED TO
Sumsung India Software (P.) Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [IT Appeal No. 399 (Bang.) of 2012, dated 13-4-2012] (para 6), CIT v. Hindustan General Industries Ltd. [1982] 137 ITR 851/[1981] 6 Taxman 360 (Delhi) (para 7), Kanhiyalal Rameshwar Das v. CIT [1985] 156 ITR 463/22 Taxman 455 (Raj.) (para 7), Phagoo Mal Sant Ram v. CIT [1969] 74 ITR 734 (Punj & Har) (para 7) and ITO v. Heartland Delhi Transcription Services (P.) Ltd. [2011] 45 SOT 89 (Delhi) (para 8).
Pawan Kumar and Ashwani Taneja for the Appellant. A.K. Mishra for the Respondent.
ORDER
T.S. Kapoor, Accountant Member - The above said appeals were heard together. Therefore, for the sake of convenience a common order is being passed. These are appeals filed by the assessee against the order of Ld CIT(A) / DRP (Dispute Resolution Panel) dated 30.11.2010 and 6.12.2010 respectively in respect of assessment year 2005-06 & 2006-07. The assessee has taken number of grounds in all these appeals. However, the crux of grounds of appeal is regarding grievance due to rejection of claim of deduction u/s 10B of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
2. The brief facts of the case are that assessee company has purchased an existing unit being run by M/s Motherson Sumy Systems Limited (for short MSSL). A part of the business of M/s MSSL comprising of an undertaking which was engaged in manufacturing metal and plastic from rubber was split from the rest of the business of M/s MSSL and was sold to a newly incorporated company by the name of M/s Woco Motherson Elastomer Limited (for short WMEL) which is assessee in the present case. The new company i.e. the assessee was incorporated on 16.3.2004 and was given a certificate of commencement of business by Registrar of Companies w.e.f. 30.4.2004. The assessee company took over the business of said undertaking sold by M/s MSSL on slump sale basis. The said undertaking was already registered as 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) was eligible for benefit u/s 10B of the Act and even was availing benefit of deduction u/s 10B of the Act. The assessee while filing the returns of income for the years under consideration continued to claim benefit of section 10B as in its opinion the assessee was eligible for benefit u/s 10B of the Act as the whole undertaking which was eligible for such benefit was taken over.
3. The Assessing Officer, however, held that deduction u/s 10B(1) was allowable only to a newly established 100% EOU whereas in his opinion the business was set up by splitting the existing business of MSSL. Moreover, the Assessing Officer held that the assessee had made domestic sales of articles or things and therefore it was not 100% EOU. The Assessing Officer also held that plant and machinery being used by the assessee consisted mainly of plant machinery transferred from the original company i.e. M/s MSSL and therefore the pre-used machinery transferred to the assessee company far exceeded the allowable limit of 20% of total value of plant & machinery used in the business of undertaking. In nutshell, the Assessing Officer disallowed on account of the following:—
| "(i) | That the assessee company comprising the undertaking had been formed by splitting up of an existing business being run by M/s Motherson Sumy Systems Ltd. in violation of the provisions of section 10B(2)(ii). | |
| (ii) | The assessee company derived domestic turnover from articles or things produced by the undertaking and therefore it is not a 100% EOU despite having been registered as such in violation of the provisions of section 10B(1). | |
| (iii) | The business of the assessee is an entirely new business and the pre-used machinery received by the assessee from M/s Motherson Sumy Systems Ltd. far exceeds the allowable limit of 20% of the total value of the plant and machinery used in the business of undertaking in violation of the provisions of section 10B(2)(iii)." |
4. Dissatisfied with the order, the assessee carried the matter in respect of assessment year 2005-06 and 2006-07 before Ld CIT(A) but was not successful. However, in respect of assessment year 2007-08 and 2008-09 the appeals were not routed through CIT(A) as the assessment was done u/s 143(3) read with 144C.
5. Aggrieved with the order of Ld CIT(A) in respect of assessment year 2005-06 & 2006-07 and with order of Assessing Officer passed u/s 143(3) read with 144C in respect of assessment year 2007-08 & 2008-09 the assessee filed appeal before this Tribunal.
6. At the outset, the Ld AR submitted that assessee acquired 100% EOU which was part of the existing company and the unit purchased by the assessee was enjoying benefit u/s 10B of the Act. He further argued that it was not splitting of business rather the whole undertaking eligible for benefit u/s 10B was taken over by the assessee. Continuing his arguments, the Ld AR submitted that there is a Board Circular No.178/84 of 2012 dated 17.1.2013 in which para 2(iv) clarifies that tax benefit u/s 10B would continue to be available in case of slump sale of a unit/undertaking. Our attention was invited to pages 17 to 20 of paper book wherein at page 19 in para (iv) such directions were mentioned. It was also submitted that assessee was not a software unit but was eligible for deduction u/s 10B of the Act. Continuing his arguments the Ld AR submitted that other than change in ownership, there was no change in the structure of the undertaking. He invited our attention to sub section (9) of section 10B which provided that where during any previous year the ownership or beneficial interest in the undertaking is transferred by any means, the deduction under sub section (1) shall not be allowed to the assessee for the assessment year relevant to such previous year and the subsequent year. Highlighting the above said section, the Ld AR submitted that before 1.4.2004 such provision was applicable which has been omitted by Finance Act, 2003 w.e.f. 1-4-2004. Therefore, in view of the fact that before 1-4-2004, there was a special sub section (9) which disentitled the deduction u/s 10B of the Act in case of transfer of beneficial ownership, the Ld AR argued that legislature intention was made clear with the omission of sub section that after 1-4-2004 no such deduction will be disallowed even in the case of change of ownership of the undertaking. Reliance in this respect was placed on the case law of Sumsung India Software (P.) Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT, Bangalore decided by ITAT 'A' Bench Bangalore in I.T.A./ No.399/Bang./2012, dated 13-4-2012. Our attention was also invited to para 14 of the said order placed at paper book page 35. In view of findings of Hon'ble ITAT it was argued that the facts of the case of the assessee are similar to the above said case and therefore, the assessee was eligible for deduction u/s 10B of the Act. Our attention was also invited to the case of Heartland Delhi Transcription & Services Pvt. Ltd. This case was decided by the ITAT Delhi Bench 'C' in I.T.A. Nos. 1551 to 1553/Del/2008. Our attention was also invited to page 24 of the paper book wherein the findings of the Hon'ble Tribunal were placed in this respect.
7. The Ld DR, on the other hand, submitted that it was a pure case of splitting of business and assessee had taken over plant & machinery from old company and the whole business had not devolved on to the assessee. Therefore, the Assessing Officer had rightly made the addition and was rightly upheld by Ld CIT(A). Reliance in this respect was placed on the following case laws:-
| 1. | CIT v. Hindustan General Industries Ltd. [1982] 137 ITR 851/[1981] 6 Taxman 360 (Delhi). | |
| 2. | Kanhiyalal Rameshwar Das v. CIT [1985] 156 ITR 463/22 Taxman 455 (Raj.). | |
| 3. | Phagoo Mal Sant Ram v. CIT [1969] 74 ITR 734 (Punj & Har). |
8. We have heard the rival submissions of both the parties and have gone through the material available on record. We find that the main objection of the Assessing Officer is regarding splitting of the business. The Assessing Officer held that assessee company has been formed and has taken over the assets of the existing business by splitting the business of M/s MSSL. While holding such a finding, the Assessing Officer has ignored the fact that it was not a case where a part of plant & machinery or other assets belonging to an undertaking were transferred. The whole undertaking consisting of all assets and liabilities as a going concern was acquired by the assessee company. It cannot be said that the undertaking has been formed by splitting or re-construction of business already in existence. Rather it was an undertaking already in existence on which the deduction u/s 10B of the Act was claimed and was allowed also. Since it is a case of transfer of whole undertaking, therefore, it cannot be said that the assessee company carried the business with transferred machinery or plant previously used by another person. It is pertinent to mention here that in view of the eligibility of the undertaking as a 100% EOU M/s MSSL claimed deduction on the profit earned by the same in the assessment year 2004-05 which was assessed u/s 143(3) vide order 22-12-2006 and a copy of which is placed at pages 105 to 111 of paper book dated 10-3-2011. Under similar circumstances, the ITAT Delhi Bench in the case of ITO v. Heartland Delhi Transcription Services (P.) Ltd.[2011] 45 SOT 89 (Delhi) had dealt with the same situation. In that case the dispute were for assessment year 2002-03 to 2004-05. The Hon'ble Tribunal relying upon the provisions of sub section (9) which existed up to 31-3-2004 did not allow the claim of assessee u/s 10B whereas for assessment year 2004-05, it allowed the same as sub clause (9) was deleted w.e.f. 1.4.2004. The findings of the Tribunal are summarized below:—
"We have considered the facts of the case and submissions made before us. The facts are that the STPI set up an undertaking on the basis of the letter of intent issued by STPI in financial year 1998-99. The business of the undertaking is to digitize medical prescription and export it. This business has been transferred to the assessee in financial year 2000-01. The HICS set up the business with new machinery and it fulfilled all the conditions mentioned in sub section (2) of sec.10B. The case of the assessee is that deduction u/s 10B(1) is granted to an undertaking and if the ownership of the undertaking changes for reason whatsoever, the benefit continues to be given to the undertaking for the unexpired period and the new owner continues to get this deduction from its total income for such unexpired period. On the other hand, the case of the revenue is that the benefit is given to an assessee as the deduction is made from its gross total income. Therefore, if there is change in ownership the benefit is not available to the new owner. In the alternative, the argument is that such deduction is not available with the assessee for assessment year 2002-03 and 2003-04 in view of the provisions contained in sub sec. (9) of sec. 10B.
On prima facie perusal of these provisions, it is seen that the profits and gains derived by a 100 per cent export oriented undertaking from inter alia export of computer software for a period of 10 years shall be allowed as deduction from the total income of the assessee. Therefore, in the first instance, the profits derived by the undertaking from the export of software are to be computed and thereafter such profits are to be deducted from the total income of the assessee. The emphasis is on the undertaking, whose profits are to be computed which thereafter have to be deducted from the total income of the assessee. The words "the assessee" means any assessee as the article "the" is an indefinite article. The deduction is admissible in respect of profits and gains of an undertaking which inter alia satisfies the condition that it is not formed by the transfer to a new business of machinery or plant previously used for any purpose. This provision also uses the words "any undertaking" and not "the assessee". Therefore, this provision also lays emphasis on the undertaking and not the assessee. The words 'new business' also imply that the emphasis is on the business and not the assessee. Sub Sec. (9) deals with a situation where ownership or the beneficial interest in the undertaking is transferred by any means. The words "any means" are of wide import and take within their ambit the transfer of the undertaking either by sale of individual assets or as a going concern by way of slump sale. This provision is attracted to the facts of this case for assessment year 2002-03 and 2003-04."
9. In the same order while deciding the same issue for assessment year 2004-05, the Hon'ble Tribunal held as under:—
"Coming to the facts of this case, there is no impediment in giving the finding that for assessment year 2004-05, the assessee is entitled to deduct the profits and gains of the undertaking from its total income. The decision in the case of Heartland KG Information Ltd. (supra) supports the case of the assessee. This decision pertain to assessment year 2004-05 for which the provision contained in sec. 10B(9) does not exist on the statute book. Therefore, following this decision, it is held that the assessee is entitled to the deduction u/s 10B for this year."
10. Similarly, in the case of Samsung Software India (P.) Ltd. (supra) the issue was decided by 'A' Bench of the Bangalore Bench in I.T.A. No.399/Bang/2012 wherein the Hon'ble Tribunal held as under:—
"We have considered the submissions of both the parties and carefully gone through the material available on record. It is noticed that a similar issue having identical facts has been decided by the ITAT Bench 'B' Bangalore in ITA No.623 & 847/Bang/2010 for the ssessment years 2004-05 & 2005-06 respectively in the case of DCIT v. M/s. LG Soft India Pvt. Ltd., order dated 19.05.2010 wherein vide para 10 it has been held as under:-We have considered the rival contentions and the facts of the case reflected in the orders passed by the lower authorities. As rightly pointed out by the CIT(A), the assessee's undertaking existed in the same place, form and substance and did carry on the same business before and after the change in the legal character of the form of organization. Formerly, it was a branch establishment of non-resident company/foreign company but later on, it was converted into a subsidiary company. But for the above change of the organizational status, the same unit continued to function throughout the time. Therefore, it is quite fruitless to argue that the organizational change has caused conversion of the existing unit to a new unit. There is no such splitting up or reconstruction of an existing business in the case of a branch establishment becoming a subsidiary establishment. The assessee's unit satisfied all the conditions stipulated in the Act and was entitled for the benefit. Therefore, as rightly held by the CIT(A), a mere organizational change is not a ground to hold that the assessee has violated the conditions stated in 10A(2)(ii). It is a case of only change in the name and style. It is clearly possible to state that there was no violation of the conditions laid down in sec. 10A(2)(iii) as well."
11. In the present case also, the undertaking existed in the same place, form and substance and did carry on the same business before and after the change in the legal character and form of the organization. Formerly, it was a part of MSSL and presently it is an independent assessee. However, with the above change in organizational status, the same unit continued to function.
12. As regards objection of the Assessing Officer that the unit had not exported 100% of its turnover, It is observed that clause (iv) of Explanation 2 to section 10B defines the expression 100% EOU so as to mean an undertaking which has been approved as 100% export oriented unit by the Board appointed in this behalf by the Central Govt. in exercise of the power conferred under section 14 of the Development Regulation Act, 1951 and rules made under that Act and in the present case the representation was made to the authorities and after verifying the documents and after being satisfied a certificate was granted of being 100% EOU to the undertaking under the name & style of M/s MSSL and subsequently when the unit was transferred to assessee the same was transferred in the name of the assessee. The relevant documents are placed at paper book dated 10-3-2011 at pages 27 & 28. Therefore, the objection of the Assessing Officer that some part of sale was affected in domestic area does not disentitle the assessee for claiming deduction u/s 10B of the Act unless the undertaking is deleted from the category of 100% EOU by the said Department.
13. As regards objection of Assessing Officer regarding transfer of assets which exceeded 20% of total value of plant & machinery, we have already held that part assets were not transferred but the whole undertaking was transferred and there is no question of comparison of assets transferred with the total transfer of the assessee as it is a case of transfer of whole undertaking.
14. As regards the case law relied upon by the Ld DR we have observed that all the case laws relate to transfer of assets to an assessee and these cases do not relate to transfer of an undertaking in full. Therefore, the facts and circumstances of the case laws relied upon by the Ld Dr are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, we are in agreement with the arguments of Ld AR that assessee was entitled to the benefit of section u/s 10B for the years under consideration provided these years fall within 10 years from the date of availment of first deduction u/s 10B of the Act.
15. As regards the stay application, in view of the disposal of appeals, the said stay application has become infructuous and hence it is dismissed.
16. In the result, all the appeals of the assessee are allowed.
ST - Appellant collects maintenance fees from flat buyers to discharge payments towards local taxes & water charges - appellant was acting as pure agent - demand of ST not sustainable - Stay granted: CESTAT
By TIOL News Service
MUMBAI, SEPT 13, 2013: THE appellant shared common expenditure such as, staff expenses, space used, computer software and maintenance charges, electricity charges, repairs and maintenance expenses, printing and stationery and vehicle expenses with their group companies during the period 2003-04 to 2005-06.
On the said expenses which was recovered from their group companies, the department was of the view that service tax is payable under the category of 'Business Auxiliary Service. The service tax demand in this regard is Rs.45,04,294/-.
The appellant is also engaged in construction of residential flats on which they discharged service tax liability. However, they collected maintenance charges/deposits from the flat buyers which are used for payment of property tax, electricity charges, water charges, security charges and other maintenance expenses till such time the flats are actually handed over to the Housing Co-operative Society found by the buyers of the flats. The department was of the view that such charges/deposits recovered from the flat buyers are taxable under the category of 'Management, Maintenance or Repair Service' and accordingly, demanded service tax amounting to Rs.1,21,54,570/- during the period 16/06/2005 to 30/09/2007.
The appellant was also running a health club at Marve and they collected charges from the users of this club for use of the club facilities such as Gym, swimming pool, etc. A service tax demand of Rs.1,31,824/- was made under the Health and Fitness Services during the period October 2002 to March 2007.
Another demand of Rs.1,23,78,690/- was made in respect of 'Management, Maintenance or Repair Service' for the period 01/10/2007 to 30/09/2008 apart from a demand of Rs.56,881/- towards Health and Fitness Club during the period 01/10/2007 to 31/03/2008.
All these demands were confirmed by the CCE, Mumbai-V along with interest thereon and also by imposing penalties.
Hence the appellant is before the CESTAT & submits -
+ As regards the first activity undertaken by them, they have been discharging service tax liability w.e.f. 01/05/2006 under the category of 'Business Support Service' and the department has accepted the same & so the demand of Rs.45,04,294/- under BAS for the period 2003-04 to 2005-06 does not survive.+ As regards demand under 'Management, Maintenance or Repair Service' the deposits have been collected from the flat owners as per the provisions of Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963, which provides that the promoter shall, while he is in possession, shall pay all outgoings (including ground rent, municipal or other local tax, tax on income, water charges, electricity charges, revenue assessments, etc.) until he has transferred the property to the person taking over the flats or to the organization of any such person. Accordingly, they have collected deposits/maintenance deposits from the flat purchasers and kept them in a separate account and the said sum was used for making payment towards municipal and property taxes, electricity charges, water charges and other maintenance charges. The said amount has not been utilised for any other purpose except for the above and wherever there is any surplus, the same is handed over to the housing co-operative society of the flat owners when the flats are actually handed over. In other words, they are acting as a pure agent of the flat owner while collecting these charges and making payments and therefore, question of levy of service tax on such charges under the category of 'Management, Maintenance or Repair Service' does not arise.+ As regards the demand for service tax under 'Health and Fitness Club Service' they have discharged the service tax liability.
In view of the above,they pray for grant of stay.
The Bench inter alia observed -
+ As regards the demand for service tax on commonly shared expenses under the category of 'Business Auxiliary Service', we find that the transaction does not involve any of the categories mentioned in BAS….In any case, the appellant has been discharging service tax on the said activity under Business Support Services effective from 01/05/2006 and the department has been accepting such payment. In view of the above, prima facie, we are of the view that the services rendered by the appellant does not come under the category of 'Business Auxiliary Service' at all.+ As regards the demand of service tax under 'Management, Maintenance or Repair Service', it is seen that the appellant is collecting security/maintenance deposits from the flat owners….Since the amount is collected for discharging statutory obligations and amount is utilised for incurring those statutory obligations, it cannot be said that the appellant was rendering management, maintenance or repair service to the flat owners….Thus the appellant was acting as a pure agent and was performing custodial functions. Therefore, the demand of service tax under 'Management, Maintenance or Repair service' does not appear to be sustainable in law.
Holding that the appellant has made out a strong case in their favour, the Bench granted unconditional waiver from pre-deposit of the adjudged dues and stayed the recovery.
In passing: Also see K.Raheja Real Estate Service Pvt. Ltd. - (2013-TIOL-535-CESTAT-MUM) & Hiranandani Constructions - (2013-TIOL-1051-CESTAT-MUM).
ST - Appellant collects maintenance fees from flat buyers to discharge payments towards local taxes & water charges - appellant was acting as pure agent - demand of ST not sustainable - Stay granted: CESTAT
By TIOL News Service
MUMBAI, SEPT 13, 2013: THE appellant shared common expenditure such as, staff expenses, space used, computer software and maintenance charges, electricity charges, repairs and maintenance expenses, printing and stationery and vehicle expenses with their group companies during the period 2003-04 to 2005-06.
On the said expenses which was recovered from their group companies, the department was of the view that service tax is payable under the category of 'Business Auxiliary Service. The service tax demand in this regard is Rs.45,04,294/-.
The appellant is also engaged in construction of residential flats on which they discharged service tax liability. However, they collected maintenance charges/deposits from the flat buyers which are used for payment of property tax, electricity charges, water charges, security charges and other maintenance expenses till such time the flats are actually handed over to the Housing Co-operative Society found by the buyers of the flats. The department was of the view that such charges/deposits recovered from the flat buyers are taxable under the category of 'Management, Maintenance or Repair Service' and accordingly, demanded service tax amounting to Rs.1,21,54,570/- during the period 16/06/2005 to 30/09/2007.
The appellant was also running a health club at Marve and they collected charges from the users of this club for use of the club facilities such as Gym, swimming pool, etc. A service tax demand of Rs.1,31,824/- was made under the Health and Fitness Services during the period October 2002 to March 2007.
Another demand of Rs.1,23,78,690/- was made in respect of 'Management, Maintenance or Repair Service' for the period 01/10/2007 to 30/09/2008 apart from a demand of Rs.56,881/- towards Health and Fitness Club during the period 01/10/2007 to 31/03/2008.
All these demands were confirmed by the CCE, Mumbai-V along with interest thereon and also by imposing penalties.
Hence the appellant is before the CESTAT & submits -
+ As regards the first activity undertaken by them, they have been discharging service tax liability w.e.f. 01/05/2006 under the category of 'Business Support Service' and the department has accepted the same & so the demand of Rs.45,04,294/- under BAS for the period 2003-04 to 2005-06 does not survive.+ As regards demand under 'Management, Maintenance or Repair Service' the deposits have been collected from the flat owners as per the provisions of Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963, which provides that the promoter shall, while he is in possession, shall pay all outgoings (including ground rent, municipal or other local tax, tax on income, water charges, electricity charges, revenue assessments, etc.) until he has transferred the property to the person taking over the flats or to the organization of any such person. Accordingly, they have collected deposits/maintenance deposits from the flat purchasers and kept them in a separate account and the said sum was used for making payment towards municipal and property taxes, electricity charges, water charges and other maintenance charges. The said amount has not been utilised for any other purpose except for the above and wherever there is any surplus, the same is handed over to the housing co-operative society of the flat owners when the flats are actually handed over. In other words, they are acting as a pure agent of the flat owner while collecting these charges and making payments and therefore, question of levy of service tax on such charges under the category of 'Management, Maintenance or Repair Service' does not arise.+ As regards the demand for service tax under 'Health and Fitness Club Service' they have discharged the service tax liability.
In view of the above,they pray for grant of stay.
The Bench inter alia observed -
+ As regards the demand for service tax on commonly shared expenses under the category of 'Business Auxiliary Service', we find that the transaction does not involve any of the categories mentioned in BAS….In any case, the appellant has been discharging service tax on the said activity under Business Support Services effective from 01/05/2006 and the department has been accepting such payment. In view of the above, prima facie, we are of the view that the services rendered by the appellant does not come under the category of 'Business Auxiliary Service' at all.+ As regards the demand of service tax under 'Management, Maintenance or Repair Service', it is seen that the appellant is collecting security/maintenance deposits from the flat owners….Since the amount is collected for discharging statutory obligations and amount is utilised for incurring those statutory obligations, it cannot be said that the appellant was rendering management, maintenance or repair service to the flat owners….Thus the appellant was acting as a pure agent and was performing custodial functions. Therefore, the demand of service tax under 'Management, Maintenance or Repair service' does not appear to be sustainable in law.
Holding that the appellant has made out a strong case in their favour, the Bench granted unconditional waiver from pre-deposit of the adjudged dues and stayed the recovery.
In passing: Also see K.Raheja Real Estate Service Pvt. Ltd. - (2013-TIOL-535-CESTAT-MUM) & Hiranandani Constructions - (2013-TIOL-1051-CESTAT-MUM).
2013-TIOL-787-ITAT-AHM
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
BENCH 'A' AHMEDABAD
BENCH 'A' AHMEDABAD
ITA No.1068/Ahd/2012
Assessment Year: 2006-07
Assessment Year: 2006-07
THE INCOME TAX OFFICER
WARD-8(1), ROOM NO 415,
4TH FLOOR, AAYAKAR BHAVAN,
MAJURA GATE, SURAT
WARD-8(1), ROOM NO 415,
4TH FLOOR, AAYAKAR BHAVAN,
MAJURA GATE, SURAT
Vs
M/s ASHWIN DIAMOND
57/67, 2ND FLOOR, BAMBAWADI
NR GODHANI CIRCLE, KATARGAM ROAD
SURAT 395004
PAN NO:AALFA5403A
57/67, 2ND FLOOR, BAMBAWADI
NR GODHANI CIRCLE, KATARGAM ROAD
SURAT 395004
PAN NO:AALFA5403A
D K Tyagi, JM And A Mohan Alankamony, AM
Dated: July 10, 2013
Appellant Rep by: Shri Rahul Kumar, Sr. (DR)
Respondent Rep by: None
Respondent Rep by: None
Income Tax - Sections 145(3), 271(1)(c ) - Whether penalty u/s 271(1)(c) can be levied when addition was made on estimate basis and the only dispute was with respect of quantum of allowable expenditure.
The assessee is a Partnership Firm engaged in the business of diamond cutting and polishing on job work basis. The assessee had claimed labour expenses, salary wages and miscellaneous expenses of Rs.1,37,46,363/. The AO disallowed 20% of Rs.1,37,46,363/- and levied penalty of Rs.8,24,787/- u/s 271 (1) (c ), for the reason that the assessee had not produced original register. The AO was of the view that the assessee had not maintained day to day stock register and therefore, he rejected the books of account of the assessee u/s 145(3). However the AO accepted fact that without labour expenses one cannot complete job work and allowed 80% of the expense claimed. The CIT(A) deleted the penalty by observing that penalty is not required to be levied when addition is made on estimate basis.
Having heard the parties, the Tribunal held that,
++ the only dispute was with respect of quantum of allowable expenditure since the assessee had not produced all the relevant vouchers. Moreover the AO did not bring any materials on record that the assessee has claimed excess expenditure. The estimated addition does not necessarily indicate that there is concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income on the part of the assessee. Therefore this case is not a fit case for levy of penalty.
Revenue's appeal dismissed
ORDER
Per: A Mohan Alankamony:
This This appeal of the Revenue is directed against the order of the learned CIT (A)-V, Surat in Appeal No. CAS-V/25/11-12 dated 14-02-2012, for the assessment year 2006-07, passed u/s 250 read with section 271(1) ( c) of the Income Tax Act.
2. The revenue has raised four grounds wherein grounds No. 2, 3 and 4 are general in nature and do not survive for adjudication. The sole surviving ground No.1 is reproduced herein under:-
"1 On the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the penalty levied u/s. 271 (1) ( c ) of the Act of Rs.8,24,787/- by the A. O. for concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income, without appreciating the facts of the case."
3. The facts of the case are that the assessee is a Partnership Firm engaged in the business of diamond cutting and polishing on job work basis. The assessee had claimed labour expenses, salary wages and miscellaneous expenses of Rs.1,37,46,363/. The learned AO disallowed 20% of Rs.1,37,46,363/- and made addition of Rs.27,49,273/- and levied penalty of Rs.8,24,787/- u/s 271 (1) (c ) of the Act, for the reason that the assessee had not produced original register of Karigar Majoori and salary, and vouchers for expenses incurred, though the assessee had produced zerox copies of all registers and vouchers. The learned AO was of the view that the assessee had not maintained day to day stock register and therefore, he rejected the books of account of the assessee u/s 145(3) of the Act. However the learned AO accepted fact that without labour expenses one cannot complete job work and allowed 80% of the expense claimed.
3.1 Before the learned CIT(A), the assessee furnished the following written submission:-
5. ……The notice u/s. 271 (1) (c) of the Act was not served on the appellant as no such notice was received by the appellant. The notice might have been served on a stranger but not on the assessee. In the absence of Notice, the assessee could not submit the explanation before the Assessing Officer.1. The only ground involved in the case the levy of penalty u/s. 271 (1) (c) of the Act on following additions made in order passed u/s 143(3) of the Act on 26.12.2008.2. The Assessing Officer made disallowance of 20% of Rs.1,37,46,363/- claimed by the assessee for various expenses as under:
1. Karigar Majoori expenses Rs.1,32,48,0512. Legal charges Rs. 17,0503. Salary & wages Expenses Rs. 3,95,5004. Miscellaneous expenses Rs. 85,762Total Rs. 137463633. The Hon'ble CIT(A) had confirmed the addition of Rs.27,49,273/- on the ground that the books of accounts were rejected and that despite ample opportunities given to the assessee to produce the workers the appellant simply produced the registers of wages, vouchers, salary registers and various bills of expenses. The appellant had also not maintained day to day production registers for job work of diamonds.4. The complete details of the persons to whom labour payments were made were available before the Assessing Officer. The appellant submits that the reasons given by the Assessing Officer are not correct since:-i. The assessee had maintained and produced for verification before the Assessing Officer, all wage registers showing the name of worker, number of pieces of diamonds cut and polished by each worker, stages of work such as Taliya, Mahala, Ghat, Pahel etc.ii. The process wise labourers are mentioned in the wage Registers produced before the Assessing Officer. The copy of one wage Register of Feb. 2006b is enclosed for evidence before your honour that assessee maintained work wise Register for different stages of diamond cutting and polishing work.iii. The Assessing Officer at page 6 on top of the Assessment Order admitted that appellant had submitted labour bills of income whereas in Para "d" stated that no such details were furnished which is factually not correct. The copy of one labour bill is enclosed.iv. The workers having left the premises due to closure of business on account of recent heavy lay off in diamond business and therefore, they cannot be produced.v. The Assessing Officer admitted to have received copies of wage registers which were submitted after verification of original register by Assessing Officer. The Registers reveal the piece wise records of work done.vi. In para "h" the Assessing Officer accepted to have verify labour Registers and piece wise production details.vii. The postal addresses of workers are not maintained by appellant as most of the workers come from the nearby villages of partners of appellant firm i.e. from Saurastra Region.viii. Since, the premises are rented the Electricity bills are not in the name of assessee.ix. Machineries are very old.x. The Jangads are returned along with the polished diamonds when manufacturing labour bill is prepared and diamond are sent to principal. Therefore, Jangads are not available with assessee after completion of work.5. Even if there are some defects in wages registers and vouchers produced before the Assessing Officer only Net Profit can be estimated. As submitted in the statement of facts The Net Profit of assessee is 3.27%. The Hon'ble ITAT Rajkot Bench has estimated Net Profit in diamond labour business in following cases as under:-
Name of job worker of Bhavani Gems ITA No. Final Gross Profit accepted by ITAT Rajkot BenchDulabhai Mavjibhai Sankar IT(AA)/A/15/RJT/2004 1.5% Jivarajbhai D. Patel IT/137/RJT/2001 1% Dhirajbhai D. Patel IT/138/RJT/2001 1.2% Therefore, Net Profit of assessee being correct, true and fair, the labour expenses, salary expenses, legal fees and Miscellaneous Expenses cannot be disallowed. The disallowance made by Assessing Officer is excessive, unreasonable and on the basis of presumption only.6. The Gross Profit of assessee is 9.02%. In most of the case of diamonds in Range-8 and Rnge-9 Gross Profit of 6% is estimated in diamond business. The copy of Order of NBA Diamonds Mfg. Co. is enclosed in which Gross Profit of 6% was estimated and your honour had confirmed the same.7. In the case of Vanmalibhai Bhagwanbhai Patel V/s. ITO the Hon'ble ITAT Ahmedabad Bench deleted the addition of 10% of labour expenses disallowed by Assessing Officer. The copy of order of ITAT is enclosed.8. The details of Miscellaneous Expenses submitted to Assessing Officer during assessment proceedings are as under:-
Head of Account AmountBank charges 14120Factory Expenses 53545Office Expenses 6525Stationary & Printing 3444Miscellaneous Expenses 8128 Total Rs. 85672The copies of accounts of all above expenses submitted to Assessing Officer are enclosed.9. The following evidences submitted to Assessing Officer during assessment proceedings are enclosed.i. Copy of Reply dtd. 14.10.2008ii. Copy of Reply dtd. 16.12.2008iii. Copy of Notice dtd. 08.12.2008Thus, the lump-sum disallowance of 20% is very high in view of Gross Profit of 9.02% and Net Profit of 3.27% of assessee being higher than Gross Profit of 6% in diamond job business, the Assessing Officer was not justified in levying the penalty.10. In the case of ITAT Ahmedabad Bench "B" in the case of Anish B. Shah (HUF) bearing ITA No.2223/Ahd/2004 for A. Y. 2001/02 dated 06.01.2005, wherein an observation was made that when the assessee has furnished the details of the labourers and the services rendered, merely because the assessee was unable to produce the labourers could not be said to be that no services were rendered by such labourers. It was also a case of processing of diamond and the assessee was asked to produce 20 labourers. In that case, it was explained that the assessee has failed to produce those labourers who had come from outside and did not have a permanent address at Surat. But the plea was that the assessee had given the details of the work done by the labourers. By accepting that plea, finally the matter had gone in favour of the assessee.11. On the disallowance of expenses penalty u/s. 271 (1) ( c) of the Act cannot be levied as it does not result into any concealment of Income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The Assessing Officer has accepted the facts of diamond job work.12. The assessee cannot be said to have concealed the particulars of Income or guilty of fraud or gross or willful neglect merely because the books of accounts were rejected and the Assessing Officer estimated higher income. I the following cases it has been held that even if the bills, vouchers are not produced or in cases where the same are produced are defective, the penalty cannot be levied in cases where the element of exact profit is not certain.i. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT vs. K. C. Builders reported at 265 ITR 562 = (2004-TIOL-13-SC-IT).ii. The decision of ITAT in CIT vs. Sahyog Sahakari Samvida Samity reported at 111 TTJ 540.iii. The decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in CIT vs. Raj Bans Singh reported at 276 ITR 351iv. The decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in CIT vs. Harman Singh reported at 106 ITR 532."
3.2 The learned CIT(A) after taking into consideration of the above submissions of the assessee deleted the penalty of Rs.8,24,787/- levied by the learned AO vide his order dated 29-03-2011 by observing that penalty is not required to be levied when addition is made on estimate basis. Aggrieved by this order of the learned CIT(A), the revenue is now in appeal before us.
4. During the course of hearing before us, the learned DR relied on the order of the learned AO. However, none appeared on behalf of the assessee.
5. We have heard the learned DR and perused the materials on record. We find from the facts of this case that the learned AO had levied penalty due to the additions made on estimate basis not relying on the Xerox copies of the vouchers and registers produced. Further it is evident from the submissions of the assessee that the assessee had produced substantial document to prove the genuineness of the transactions. The learned assessing officer was also convinced that the assessee had incurred expenditure considering the nature of business. The only dispute was with respect of quantum of allowable expenditure since the assessee had not produced all the relevant vouchers. Moreover the learned AO did not bring any materials on record that the assessee has claimed excess expenditure. In such circumstances the estimated addition does not necessarily indicate that there is concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income on the part of the assessee. Therefore we are of the considered view that this case is not a fit case for levy of penalty and, therefore, we delete the same.
6. In the result, the revenue's appeal is dismissed.
(Order pronounced in the open Court on 10.07.2013)
2013-TIOL-790-ITAT-MUM
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
BENCH 'F' MUMBAI
BENCH 'F' MUMBAI
ITA No.4679/Mum/2012
Assessment Year: 2009-2010
Assessment Year: 2009-2010
M/s DABUR INIDA LTD
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS FEM CARE PHARMA LTD)
43, NAGINDAS MASTER ROAD, BALASARA HOUSE,
FORT, MUMBAI-400001
PAN NO: AAACF0515A
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS FEM CARE PHARMA LTD)
43, NAGINDAS MASTER ROAD, BALASARA HOUSE,
FORT, MUMBAI-400001
PAN NO: AAACF0515A
Vs
THE ASSTT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
CIRCLE 5(1), MUMBAI
CIRCLE 5(1), MUMBAI
R S Syal, AM And Sanjay Garg, JM
Dated: August 23, 2013
Appellant Rep by: Shri Subhash Shetty
Respondent Rep by: Shri R R Prasad
Respondent Rep by: Shri R R Prasad
Income Tax Act, 1961 - Sections 10(33), 10(38), 14A, 32, 32(1), 115JB & 115JB(2), Rule 8D - tenancy rights - intangible assets - exempt income - relatable to.
Whether tenancy rights can be construed as "intangible" assets falling within the meaning of explanation 3 to section 32(1) - whether the computation of amount disallowable under section 14A is covered under clause (f) of explanation (1) to section 115JB(2)
The assessee had claimed depreciation on tenancy rights and he had also earned certain exempt income.
The AO made an addition on account of tenancy rights and also made an addition to the book profit under section 115JB by computing disallowance under section 14A in regard to the exempt income.
The CIT(A) upheld the AO's order.
On appeal of the assessee, the ITAT held that,
++ considering the definition of the term "intangible" asset as given in Explanation (3) to section 32(1) on which depreciation is available, it makes it vivid that the intangible assets so classified are know-how, patents, copyrights, trade marks, licences, franchises or any other business or commercial rights of similar nature;
++ following the rule of nosticur a sociis which simply means that the general words associated with the specific words draw their meaning from the company they keep and going by this rule, the expression "any other business or commercial rights" as employed in the definition of "intangible" assets must mean only the intangible assets similar to those which precede it, that is, "know-how, patents, copyrights, trade marks, licences, franchises";
++ the former category of intangible assets includes such assets with which the business is directly carried and which directly facilitate the profit earning activity. On the other hand, the tenancy rights have no significance whatsoever either with a right to manufacture or actual manufacture of the products or their sale carrying brand name or logo etc;
++ Tenancy rights simply provide a place at which manufacturing or administrative activity is persued. A businessman can carry on manufacturing at any place but the business cannot be carried on without licence, or without specific know-how, copy right, or trade mark etc;
++ the legislature has made its intention crystal clear by the use of words "of similar nature" immediately after the words "any other business or commercial rights". This makes the position beyond any pale of doubt that "any other business or commercial rights" would only be such which are of the nature of know-how, patents, copyrights, trade marks, licences, franchises etc;
++ we are of the considered opinion that tenancy rights cannot be construed as "intangible" assets falling within the meaning of Explanation 3 to section 32(1).
++ 'Book-profit' u/s 115JB is computed as per Explanation (1) to sub-section (2) of section 115JB. A bare perusal of clause (f) of Explanation (1) makes it abundantly clear that the amount of expenditure "relatable to" any exempt income, other than section 10(38), is liable to be added back to the amount of net profit as shown in the profit and loss account. Section 14A disallowes any expenditure incurred 'in relation to' income not includible in the total income;
++ the expression "in relation to" used for making disallowance u/s 14A has been employed in Explanation (1) to section 115JB(2) as expenditure "relatable to", in more or less the same form. It is manifest that the amount of dividend is exempt u/s 10(33) [not section 10(38)]. Thus any expenditure 'relatable to' the exempt dividend income would fall under clause (f);
++ the amount disallowable under section 14A is always part of the expenses specifically debited to the profit and loss account. It is axiomatic that unless any expenditure is incurred and claimed as deduction, there can be no question of any hypothetical disallowance under section 14A. It, therefore, follows that the amount disallowable under section 14A is covered under clause (f) of Explanation (1) to section 115JB(2);
++ Our view is fortified by the decisions of the Mumbai bench of the tribunal eciding the issue against the assessee vide its order dated 24.07.2013. As the assessment year under consideration is 2008-2009 in which disallowance u/s 14A is required to be computed as per Rule 8D and further it is in this fashion that the amount has been disallowed and also added to the amount of net profit for computing 'book-profit' u/s 115JB, we see no reason to disturb the impugned order on this issue.
Assessee's appeal dismissed
Cases followed:
M/s.RBK Share Broking Pvt.Ltd. v. ITO in ITA No.6678/Mum/2011
Esquire P. Ltd, Mumbai (ITA No. 5688/Mum/2011)
CIT VS. Venketaswara Hatcheries (1999) 237 ITR 174 (SC)
Stonecraft Enterprises VS. CIT (1999) 237 ITR 131 (SC)
Aravinda Paramilla Works VS. CIT (1999) 237 ITR 284 (SC).
Case Distinguished
Techno Share and Stocks Ltd. & Ors. v. CIT (2010-TIOL-67-SC-IT)
ORDER
Per: R S Syal:
This appeal by the assessee is directed against the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) on 18.05.2012 in relation to the assessment year 2009-2010.
2. The first ground is against the denial of depreciation on tenancy rights amounting to Rs. 2,90,948. Briefly stated the facts of this ground are that the assessee claimed depreciation on tenancy rights. The Assessing Officer rejected such claim following the view taken by him for the assessment years 2003-2004 to 2007-2008. The learned CIT(A) upheld the assessment order on this issue.
3. After considering the rival submissions and perusing the relevant material on record, we find that the earlier years came up for consideration before the Tribunal in ITA No.6050/Mum/2007 etc. Vide order dated 09.04.2010, the Tribunal has upheld the view of the authorities below by relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT v. Techno Shares & Stocks Limited (2010) 323 ITR 69 (Bom.) = (2009-TIOL-495-HC-MUM-IT). The learned Counsel for the assessee contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has overruled this judgment in Techno Share and Stocks Ltd. & Ors. v. CIT (2010) 327 ITR 323 (SC) = (2010-TIOL-67-SC-IT) and the effect of such reversal is that the depreciation should now be allowed. In canvassing such a view for the grant of depreciation, he referred to the provisions of section 32(1)(ii) for bringing home the point that the tenancy rights fall within the ambit of the expression "any other business or commercial rights of similar nature" as employed in defining "intangible" assets. Au contraire, the ld. DR relied on the impugned order.
4. We are not convinced with the contention advanced on behalf of the assessee. The manifest reason is the following definition of the term "intangible" asset given in Explanation (3) to section 32(1) :-
"(b) intangible assets, being know-how, patents, copyrights, trade marks, licences, franchises or any other business or commercial rights of similar nature".
5. A bare perusal of the definition of intangible assets on which depreciation is available u/s 32 makes it vivid that the intangible assets so classified are know-how, patents, copyrights, trade marks, licences, franchises or any other business or commercial rights of similar nature. We are reminded of the rule of nosticur a sociis which simply means that the general words associated with the specific words draw their meaning from the company they keep. This rule has been quoted with approval by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in several judgments including CIT VS. Venketaswara Hatcheries (1999) 237 ITR 174 (SC), Stonecraft Enterprises VS. CIT (1999) 237 ITR 131 (SC) and Aravinda Paramilla Works VS. CIT (1999) 237 ITR 284 (SC).Going by this rule, the expression "any other business or commercial rights" as employed in the definition of "intangible" assets as per the above Explanation, must mean only the intangible assets similar to those which precede it, that is, "know-how, patents, copyrights, trade marks, licences, franchises". The former category of intangible assets includes such assets with which the business is directly carried on. In other words, these are intangible assets by which either the permission to carry on the business or manufacture is received or are used for the manufacture or the sale of the products manufactured. Such intangible assets directly facilitate the profit earning activity. On the other hand, the tenancy rights have no significance whatsoever either with a right to manufacture or actual manufacture of the products or their sale carrying brand name or logo etc. Tenancy rights simply provide a place at which manufacturing or administrative activity is persued. A businessman can carry on manufacturing at any place but the business cannot be carried on without licence, or without specific know-how, copy right, or trade mark etc. Reverting to the extant case, only an intangible asset of the nature of know-how, patents, copyrights, trademarks, licences, franchises etc. can be brought within the ambit of "any other business or commercial right". The legislature has made its intention crystal clear by the use of words "of similar nature" immediately after the words "any other business or commercial rights". This makes the position beyond any pale of doubt that "any other business or commercial rights" would only be such which are of the nature of know-how, patents, copyrights, trade marks, licences, franchises etc. As noticed supra, there is a vast difference between know-how, patents, copyrights, trade marks, licences, franchises etc. on one hand and tenancy rights on the other, we are of the considered opinion that tenancy rights cannot be construed as "intangible" assets falling within the meaning of Explanation 3 to section 32(1). The reliance of the ld. DR on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Techno Shares (supra) is of no consequence. In that case the question was whether depreciation can be granted on the Bombay Stock Exchange Membership card. As the ownership of such Membership Card is sine qua non to conduct the business on the floor of stock exchange, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held it to be an intangible asset eligible for depreciation. Such Membership card is a permission to do the business as share broker akin to 'licence' and not a place for carrying on such business akin to 'tenancy right'. In our considered opinion, this judgment does not advance the case of the assessee any further. To sum up, we hold that since the tenancy right cannot be treated as an intangible asset, there is no question of allowing depreciation on it. We, therefore, approve the view taken by the authorities below on this issue. This ground fails.
6. Second ground of the appeal is against the confirmation of addition to the book profit u/s 115JB by disallowance u/s 14A amounting to Rs. 4,15,062. The assessee earned exempt income of Rs. 8.78 lakh but did not offer any disallowance u/s 14A. The Assessing Officer computed disallowance u/s 14A by applying rule 8D at Rs. 4.15 lakh. While computing book-profit u/s 115JB, the A.O. added this disallowance of Rs. 4.15 lakh as per clause (f) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB. The learned CIT(A) upheld the assessment order on this point.
7. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the relevant material on record. 'Book-profit' u/s 115JB is computed as per Explanation (1) to sub-section (2) of section 115JB. This Explanation provides that "book profit" means net profit as shown in the profit and loss account for the relevant previous year prepared under subsection (2) as increased by certain amounts specified under clauses (a) to (i) if debited to the profit and loss account and clause (j) if not credited to the profit and loss account. The amount so determined is further adjusted by reducing the amounts specified in clauses (i) to (vii). The amount which eventually results is the amount of 'book profit' on which tax liability is determined u/s 115JB. Clause (f) to the Explanation (1) provides that the net profit shown in the profit and loss account shall be increased by : "(f) the amount or amounts of expenditure relatable to any income to which section 10 (other than the provisions contained in clause 38 thereof) or section 11 or section 12 apply;". A bare perusal of clause (f) of Explanation (1) makes it abundantly clear that the amount of expenditure "relatable to" any exempt income, other than section 10(38), is liable to be added back to the amount of net profit as shown in the profit and loss account. When we turn to the language of section 14A, it transpires that it talks of disallowing any expenditure incurred 'in relation to' income not includible in the total income. Sub-section (1) of this provision provides that : "For the purposes of computing the total income under this Chapter, no deduction shall be allowed in respect of expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under this Act." The expression "in relation to" used for making disallowance u/s 14A has been employed in Explanation (1) to section 115JB(2) as expenditure "relatable to", in more or less the same form. It is manifest that the amount of dividend is exempt u/s 10(33) [not section 10(38)] of the Act. Thus any expenditure 'relatable to' the exempt dividend income would fall under clause (f). The ld. AR argued that unless an amount is specifically debited to the Profit and loss account in respect of an exempt income, the same cannot be brought within the purview of clause (f) of the Explanation 1 to section 115JB(2). He stated that since the disallowance u/s 14A is computed as per rule 8D, the origin of the expenses disallowed cannot be traced to the profit and loss account and hence it cannot be covered within the mischief of clause (f) of the Explanation. We fail to find any logic in this submission because of the clear language of the Explanation 1, which provides in unequivocal terms that the amount of expenditure 'relatable to' the exempt income shall be added back. Neither the language of clause (f) expressly refers to the amount specifically debited to the profit and loss account nor there can be an implication in this regard. What has been contemplated by the provision is the amount of the expenditure 'relatable to' the exempt income. Further, the amount disallowable u/s 14A is always part of the expenses specifically debited to the profit and loss account. It is axiomatic that unless any expenditure is incurred and claimed as deduction, there can be no question of any hypothetical disallowance u/s 14A. It, therefore, follows that the amount disallowable u/s 14A is covered under clause (f) of Explanation (1) to section 115JB(2). Our view is fortified by the decision of the Mumbai bench of the tribunal in M/s.RBK Share Broking Pvt.Ltd. v. ITO in ITA No.6678/Mum/2011 and another earlier order dated 29 August, 2012 passed by the Mumbai Bench of the tribunal in the case of Esquire P. Ltd, Mumbai (ITA No. 5688/Mum/2011) deciding the issue against the assessee vide its order dated 24.07.2013. As the assessment year under consideration is 2008-2009 in which disallowance u/s 14A is required to be computed as per Rule 8D and further it is in this fashion that the amount has been disallowed and also added to the amount of net profit for computing 'book-profit' u/s 115JB, we see no reason to disturb the impugned order on this issue. This ground is not allowed.
8. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
(Order pronounced on 23.8.2013)
[2009] 180 TAXMAN 584 (PUNJ. & HAR.)
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Commissioner of Income-tax, Jalandhar-I
v.
Ramco International*
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND L.N. MITTAL, JJ.
IT APPEAL NO. 417 OF 2008†
DECEMBER 8, 2008
Section 80-IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Deductions - Profits and gains from industrial undertakings other than infrastructure development undertakings - Assessment year 2003-04 - Assessee had claimed deduction under section 80-IB and though Form 10CCB and other requisite documents had been furnished along with return, Assessing Officer made assessment without referring to said documents - On appeal, claim of assessee was upheld - On appeal before Tribunal, revenue contended that assessee made claim by way of an application without filing a revised return and, therefore, deduction could not be allowed - Tribunal, however, upheld order of Commissioner (Appeals) holding that as assessee was not making any fresh claim and it had duly furnished requisite documents for claim under said section, there was no requirement for filing any revised return and claim of assessee was admissible - Held, yes - Whether Tribunal had taken correct decision - Held, yes
CASE REVIEW
Vivek Sethi for the Appellant.
JUDGMENT
Adarsh Kumar Goel, J. - The revenue has preferred this appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short, "the Act") against the order of Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, Amritsar dated 12-10-2007, passed in ITA No. 213(ASR)/2007 for the assessment year 2003-04, proposing to raise following substantial questions of law :—
"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ITAT was right in law in allowing assessee's claim for deduction under section 80-IB, which the assessee had neither claimed in the return of income nor through a revised return of income?
2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the decision of ITAT is not contrary to the law as spell out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Goetze (India) Limited v. CIT 284 ITR 323 (SC) and Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Gurjargravures (P.) Ltd. 111 ITR 1 (SC)?"
2. The assessee claimed deduction under section 80-IB of the Act and though Form 10CCB and other requisite documents were furnished, the Assessing Officer without referring to the said documents made assessment. On appeal, the appellate authority upheld the claim of the assessee. The Tribunal has upheld the said view.
3. Learned counsel for the revenue submits that the assessee made claim by way of an application without filing a revised return and in such a situation, judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Goetze (India) Ltd. v. CIT [2006] 284 ITR 323 1 was applicable and deduction could not be allowed.
4. We are unable to accept the submission. The Tribunal has considered this issue and found that as per Form 10CCB filed during assessment proceedings, the claim of the assessee was admissible. Finding of the Tribunal is as under :—
"19. In view of the above, we find no error in the order of the learned CIT(A). It has correctly been held by the first appellate authority, inter alia that as per Form No. 10CCB filed during the assessment proceedings, the claim made by the assessee was admissible and the same remained to be allowed. The order of the learned CIT(A) is hereby upheld in view of the above discussion. The grievance of the department stands rejected."
5. In view of the finding that the assessee was not making any fresh claim and had duly furnished the documents and submitted Form for claim under section 80-IB, there was no requirement for filing any revised return. The judgment relied upon was not applicable.
6. Accordingly, we are unable to hold that any substantial question of law arises.
7. The appeal is dismissed.
CENVAT Credit on capital goods - Amendment vide Notification No 25/1996 is only clarificatory and has retrospective application - CESTAT order denying credit on goods falling under CETH 84.74 is set aside: Madras HC
By TIOL News Service
CHENNAI, SEPT 13, 2013: THE issue involved in the appeal is admissibility of MODVAT credit on goods falling under CETH 84.74 for the period from 23.7.1996 to 31.8.1996. For the period prior to 23.7.1996, there is no dispute on admissibility. However, with effect from 23.7.1996, after the insertion of new definition of capital goods under Rule 57Q, goods falling under CETH 84.74 were specifically excluded from the eligibility in sub-clause (a) of Rule 57Q(1). Also with effect from 31.8.1996, vide Notification No 25/1996 CE (NT), the definition of capital goods was amended again and goods falling under CETH 84.74 became eligible for credit. So this dispute is limited to the period from 23.07.1996 to 31.8.1996.
Aggrieved by denial of credit by the lower authorities, the assessee went on appeal before CESTAT, where the assessee took the contention that as Notification No.25/96- CE( NT) dated 31.8.1996 was clarificatory in nature, retrospective effect had to be given to the said amendment. Further, considering the fact that prior to 23.7.1996, the assessee had availed the benefit of modvat credit on components, spare parts and accessories thereof, that benefit should have been taken as available to the assessee in respect of those goods received during the disputed period, when Notification No.14/96-CE dated 23.7.1996 was in vogue. The claim of the assessee was however rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that Notification No.25/96-CE (NT) dated 31.8.1996 could not be taken as clarificatory in order to read retrospective effect to it to cover the period from 23.7.1996 to 31.8.1996 to grant the benefit of MODVAT credit in respect of those specified items, which were excluded from the list of eligible capital goods under Notification No.14/96-CE dated 23.7.1996. Aggrieved by this, the present appeal has been filed by the assessee.
After hearing both sides, the High Court held:
The dispute herein related to goods falling under Chapter Heading 84.74. As is evident from the reading of the amended Rule 57Q( 1)(d) under Notification No.14/96-CE dated 23.7.1996, the provision reads as follows:
"(d) components, spares and accessories of the goods specified against items (a) to (c) above."
Going by the liberal meaning given to Clause (d) in Rule 57Q that the position prior to 23.07.1996 when credit was available for components, spares and accessories irrespective of the classification of specified capital goods, we have no hesitation in accepting the case of the assessee. Quite apart, even going by the circular, we agree with the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the assessee that the amendment under Notification No.25/96 dated 31.8.1996 has to be read only as clarificatory and retrospective effect has to be given for availing modvat credit. In view of this reasoning, we find that capital goods itself were eligible for modvat credit under Rule 57Q.
In the light of the decision of this court following the Apex court decision and in the background of the circular issued by the Government of India dated 2.12.1996 that the benefit of modvat credit under Rule 57Q would be applicable to all components, spares and accessories of the specified goods, irrespective of their classification under any chapter heading, we have no hesitation in granting the relief in favour of the assessee, thereby the order of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal is set aside.
(See 2013-TIOL-690-HC-MAD-CX)
2013-TIOL-689-HC-ALL-IT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Income Tax Appeal No. 348 of 2008
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
Vs
MUZAFAR NAGAR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Sunil Ambwani And Surya Prakash Kesarwani JJ,
Dated: August 5, 2013
Appellant Rep by: A N Mahajan
Respondent Rep by: Shubham Agarwal
Respondent Rep by: Shubham Agarwal
Income tax - Section 12AA - Whether when CIT has not disposed off the application of the assessee under section 12AA within a period of six months, the registration would be deemed as granted to the trust.
Assessee was created by an enactment of UP urban planning and development Act. for the objects of planning, Development and Improvement of cities, towns and villages for general public utility. Assessee applied for registration u/s 12A but the same was not disposed of within the time prescribed under Section 12AA(2). Assessee claimed exemption u/s 11 & 12 and exercised the option under clause (2) of Explanation to section 22(1) for the receipts / income remained unutilized during the previous year. Return was filed under the status of Local authority declaring nil income. Assessment was completed in the status of "Artificial Juridical Person". AO denied benefits of registration. CIT (A) confirmed the order of AO. Assessee contended before ITAT that when CIT had not passed an order granting or refusing the registration u/s 12AA(2) within six months from the end of the month in which the application for registration u/s 12A was filed, the registration would be deemed to have been granted to the trust or institution automatically on the expiry of period specified in Section 12AA(2). ITAT allowed the appeal and directed AO to assess the assessee as having been registered u/s 12A of the Act in the light of the Special Bench judgment in the case of Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memoral Shri Parmarth Dham Trust Vs. CIT Dehradun and allow the claims / benefits of Sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Act, subject to satisfaction of other conditions laid down in these section.
Revenue contended that Section 12AA(2) of the Act merely provides that order granting or refusing to registration shall be passed before the expiry of six month from the end of the month in which the application was received but it does not mean that if the order granting or refusing to grant registration could not be passed then the registration shall be deemed to have been granted. The question of deemed grant of registration under Section 12AA(2) of the Act after expiry of the period of six months of filing of the application, requires reconsideration.
Assessee contended that the question of deemed grant of registration after expiry of the period provided in sub-section 2 of Section 12AA of the Act is concluded by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment, which should be followed.
After hearing both the parties, the High Court held that,
++ there is nothing in Section 12AA(2) of the Act which provides for deemed grant of registration, if the application for registration is not decided within six months. This sub-Section provides that every order granting or refusing registration shall be passed before expiry of six months from the end of the month in which the application was received. Thus, this provision prescribes the period of six months to pass an order either granting or refusing registration. Therefore, if an order is not passed within the period of six months, the grant cannot be deemed leaving the words 'refusing registration'. One of the most important condition for availing the exemption under section 11 and 12 of the Act is the grant of registration under Section 12AA of the Act and as such an order is necessarily required to be passed by the Commissioner either granting or refusing the registration. In case after considering the facts and circumstances the C.I.T. Comes to the conclusion that the person applying for registration is not entitled to registration under Section 12A of the Act then he may refuse registration and the consequence would be that such a person shall not be entitled to the benefits provided in Section 11 and 12 of the Act. Thus no presumption of grant of registration can be inferred from the plain words of Section 12AA (2) of the Act which requires the order to be passed in writing by the competent authority either granting or refusing the registration. Construing Section 12AA(2) of the Act to mean deemed grant of registration on the expiry of period of six months would attribute redundancy to the words "refusing registration" and therefore such a construction can not be accepted as per settled principle of law. The expiry of the period without more confers no right unless the statute by legal fixation or otherwise confers a right. There is nothing in Section 12AA(2) of the Act which provides that the authority concerned shall have no power to pass order either granting or refusing registration after expiry of six months. Thus, when the legislature itself has not provided so and the authority concerned has not been made functus officio on expiry of the prescribed period then it is not within the powers of the Court to legislate and provide for deemed grant of registration;
++ matter is referred to Larger Bench for opinion on whether non disposal of application for registration by granting or refusing registration before the expiry of six months as provided under Section 12AA(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 would result in deemed grant of registration. Whether the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment holding that the effect of non consideration of the application for registration within the time fixed by Section 12AA(2) would be deemed grant of registration, is legally correct.
Assessee was created by an enactment of UP urban planning and development Act. for the objects of planning, Development and Improvement of cities, towns and villages for general public utility. Assessee applied for registration u/s 12A but the same was not disposed of within the time prescribed under Section 12AA(2). Assessee claimed exemption u/s 11 & 12 and exercised the option under clause (2) of Explanation to section 22(1) for the receipts / income remained unutilized during the previous year. Return was filed under the status of Local authority declaring nil income. Assessment was completed in the status of "Artificial Juridical Person". AO denied benefits of registration. CIT (A) confirmed the order of AO. Assessee contended before ITAT that when CIT had not passed an order granting or refusing the registration u/s 12AA(2) within six months from the end of the month in which the application for registration u/s 12A was filed, the registration would be deemed to have been granted to the trust or institution automatically on the expiry of period specified in Section 12AA(2). ITAT allowed the appeal and directed AO to assess the assessee as having been registered u/s 12A of the Act in the light of the Special Bench judgment in the case of Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memoral Shri Parmarth Dham Trust Vs. CIT Dehradun and allow the claims / benefits of Sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Act, subject to satisfaction of other conditions laid down in these section.
Revenue contended that Section 12AA(2) of the Act merely provides that order granting or refusing to registration shall be passed before the expiry of six month from the end of the month in which the application was received but it does not mean that if the order granting or refusing to grant registration could not be passed then the registration shall be deemed to have been granted. The question of deemed grant of registration under Section 12AA(2) of the Act after expiry of the period of six months of filing of the application, requires reconsideration.
Assessee contended that the question of deemed grant of registration after expiry of the period provided in sub-section 2 of Section 12AA of the Act is concluded by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment, which should be followed.
After hearing both the parties, the High Court held that,
++ there is nothing in Section 12AA(2) of the Act which provides for deemed grant of registration, if the application for registration is not decided within six months. This sub-Section provides that every order granting or refusing registration shall be passed before expiry of six months from the end of the month in which the application was received. Thus, this provision prescribes the period of six months to pass an order either granting or refusing registration. Therefore, if an order is not passed within the period of six months, the grant cannot be deemed leaving the words 'refusing registration'. One of the most important condition for availing the exemption under section 11 and 12 of the Act is the grant of registration under Section 12AA of the Act and as such an order is necessarily required to be passed by the Commissioner either granting or refusing the registration. In case after considering the facts and circumstances the C.I.T. Comes to the conclusion that the person applying for registration is not entitled to registration under Section 12A of the Act then he may refuse registration and the consequence would be that such a person shall not be entitled to the benefits provided in Section 11 and 12 of the Act. Thus no presumption of grant of registration can be inferred from the plain words of Section 12AA (2) of the Act which requires the order to be passed in writing by the competent authority either granting or refusing the registration. Construing Section 12AA(2) of the Act to mean deemed grant of registration on the expiry of period of six months would attribute redundancy to the words "refusing registration" and therefore such a construction can not be accepted as per settled principle of law. The expiry of the period without more confers no right unless the statute by legal fixation or otherwise confers a right. There is nothing in Section 12AA(2) of the Act which provides that the authority concerned shall have no power to pass order either granting or refusing registration after expiry of six months. Thus, when the legislature itself has not provided so and the authority concerned has not been made functus officio on expiry of the prescribed period then it is not within the powers of the Court to legislate and provide for deemed grant of registration;
++ matter is referred to Larger Bench for opinion on whether non disposal of application for registration by granting or refusing registration before the expiry of six months as provided under Section 12AA(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 would result in deemed grant of registration. Whether the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment holding that the effect of non consideration of the application for registration within the time fixed by Section 12AA(2) would be deemed grant of registration, is legally correct.
Matter referred to Larger Bench
Cases followed:
Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Salem Vs. Sheela Christian Charitable Trust (2013-TIOL-200-HC-MAD-IT)
Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Salem Vs. Sheela Christian Charitable Trust (2013-TIOL-200-HC-MAD-IT)
Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Karimangalam Onriya Pengal Semipu Amaipu Ltd. (2013-TIOL-282-HC-MAD-IT)
Director of Income Tax (Exemption), Chennai Vs. Anjuman-e-Khyrkhah-e-Aam (2011-TIOL-09-HC-MAD-IT)
JUDGEMENT
Per: Surya Prakash Kesarwani:
1. In this appeal the following substantial question of law has been made in the memorandum of appeal: -
1. In this appeal the following substantial question of law has been made in the memorandum of appeal: -
"(1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is justified in law in directing the Assessing Authority to assess the assessee Development Authority as having been registered u/s 12-A of the Act in light of the judgement of the Special Bench of the I.T.A.T., Delhi in the case of Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial Sh. Hari Parmarth Dham Trust Vs. C.I.T. Dehradun reported in (2007) 17 SOT 281 (Del) (SB) = (2007-TIOL-468-ITAT-DEL-SB)?(2) Whether any exemption could be allowed to the assessee u/s 11, 12 and 13 of the Act in view of the omission of Section 10(20-A) of the Act w.e.f. 01-04-03 from the statute by the Finance Act, 2002?(3) Whether the Assessing Authority was justified in assessing the assessee Development Authority as Artificial Juridical Person instead of a Local Authority ? "
2. Briefly stated the facts of the present case are that the assessee, Muzaffarnagar Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'MDA') was created by an enactment of Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 vide notification (G.O.) No. 4521/9 Awas-5-96-1-Gathan-96, dated 21.11.1996 for the objects of planning, Development and Improvement of cities, towns and villages for general public utility. The assessee had applied for registration under Section 12A(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on 31.3.2003 but the same has not been disposed of within the time prescribed under Section 12AA(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The assessee claimed exemption under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act and exercised the option available under clause (2) of the Explanation to Section 11(1) of the Act for the receipts / income remained unutilized during the previous year relevant to the Assessment Year 2004-05. The assessee filed the return of income in the status of "Local Authority" on 30.10.2004 declaring the total income of Rs. Nil. The assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act was completed assessing income of Rs.27,78,060/- in the status of "Artificial Juridical Person". In the process, the assessing authority denied all the benefits of Registration. The assessee being aggrieved with the assessment order and the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals) on the issue of CIT's failure to dispose of the application of the assessee under section 12A(A) preferred the I.T.A. No. 981/Del.2007 before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench "I", New Delhi. Before the I.T.A.T. The counsel for the assessee submitted that when the Commissioner has not passed an order granting or refusing the registration under Section 12AA(2) within six months from the end of the month in which the application for registration under Section 12A was filed, the registration would be deemed to have been granted to the trust or institution automatically on the expiry of period specified in Section 12AA(2) of the Act. He relied on the special appeal decision in the case of Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memoral Shri Parmarth Dham Trust Vs. CIT Dehradun (2007) 17 SOT 281 (Delhi) (SB) = (2007-TIOL-468-ITAT-DEL-SB). The I.T.A.T. Considered the submissions of the parties and directed the assessing officer to assess the assessee as having been registered under Section 12A of the Act in the light of said Special Bench judgment and allow the claims / benefits of Sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Act, subject to satisfaction of other conditions laid down in these section. Aggrieved with the aforesaid decision of the ITAT dated 19.2.2008 the Revenue has preferred the present appeal.
3. We have heard Sri Dhanajnay Awasthi, learned Standing Counsel for the Income Tax Department and Sri Subham Agarwal, Advocate appearing for the Respondent-Assessee.
Submission on behalf of Appellant Income Tax Department
4. Sri Sri Dhanajnay Awasthi, learned counsel for the appellant submits that Section 12AA of the Act provides for procedure for registration so as to avail the benefits of exemption under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act. Section 12A of the Act provides the condition for applicability of Sections 11 and 12 of the Act. Section 12A provides that the person in receipt of income has to make an application for registration in the prescribed form and manner to the Commissioner. He submits that Section 12AA(2) of the Act merely provides that order granting or refusing to registration shall be passed before the expiry of six month from the end of the month in which the application was received but it does not mean that if the order granting or refusing to grant registration could not be passed then the registration shall be deemed to have been granted. He submits that the aforesaid Special Bench judment as well as the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central, Kanpur (2008) 171 Taxman 113 (All.) = (2008-TIOL-231-HC-ALL-IT) does not lay down the correct law. He submits that such provision are directory and not passing the order within the time specified shall not result in deemed grant of registration. He submits that there is nothing in Section 12AA(2) of the Act which provides for deemed grant of registration and as such the aforesaid two judgments holding that when an order under Section 12AA is not passed within the period specified under sub-section (2), then the registration shall be deemed to have been granted, would amount to legislation by the Court which power is not conferred on the Court. He submits that this question of deemed grant of registration under Section 12AA(2) of the Act after expiry of the period of six months of filing of the application, requires reconsideration. Sri Dhanajnay Awasthi has also submitted that the Hon'ble Madras High Court has held that non disposal of application within the time prescribed under Section 12AA(2) of the Act would not result in deemed grant of registration. He relied on the following judgment :-
(i) 32 Taxman, 2013, 242 = (2013-TIOL-200-HC-MAD-IT) (Commissioner of Income Tax-1, Salem Vs. Sheela Christian Charitable Trust.(ii) 32 Taxman, 2013, 292 = (2013-TIOL-282-HC-MAD-IT) (Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Karimangalam Onriya Pengal Semipu Amaipur Ltd.).(iii) 11 Taxman, 2011, 354 = (2011-TIOL-09-HC-MAD-IT) (Director of Income Tax (Exemption), Chennai Vs. Anjuman-e-Khyrkhah-e-Aam).(iv) (2003) 2 SCC 455 paras 11 to 14 (Unique Butyle Tube Industries(P) Ltd. Vs. U.P. Financial Corporation and Others)(v) AIR 2002 SC 1334 paras 8-A and 14 (Padmasundara Rao Vs. State of T.N.).(vi) AIR 1992 SC 96 para 14 (Union of India and another Vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal).(vii) AIR 2003 SC 2917 paras 18, 19, 20 and 23 (Union of India Vs. Rajiv Kumar).(viii) AIR 1981 SC 653 para 6 (Chet Ram Vashist Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another).(ix) AIR 1975 SC 1012 para 9 (Dhoom Singh Vs. Prakash Chandra Sethi and others).(x) AIR 1961 SC 609 paras 5 and 6 (C.A. Abraham Vs. Income Tax Officer, Kottayam and another).(xi) AIR 1993 SC 1048 para 66(Hotel Balaji and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others)(xii) (2003) 5 SCC 531 para 16 (Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd. Vs. Jayesh H. Pandya and another).(xiii) AIR 1967 SC 135 para 18(Yashwant Rao Ghorpade Vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax Bangalore).(xiv) AIR 1975 SC 1871 para 26 (State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M.K. Kandaswami).(xv) (1998) 3 SCC 234 para 4(State of Gujarat and others VS. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and another).
Submission on behalf of Respondent
5. Sri Subham Agarwal, learned counsel for the Respondent-Assessee submits that the question of deemed grant of registration after expiry of the period provided in sub-section 2 of Section 12AA of the Act is concluded by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment (supra). He referred to paragraph Nos. 9, 10, 13 and 18 of this judgment. He further submits that in these circumstances the substantial question of law as framed in the memorandum of appeal is squarely covered by aforesaid Division Bench judgment of this Court and therefore this question deserves to be answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
Discussion
6. We have considered the submission of learned counsel for the department and the assessee. Presently we confine ourselves to the question no. 1 as quoted above. The relevant provisions to consider this question are the provisions of Section 12A and 12AA of the Act which are reproduced below : -
Section 12A:- The provisions of section 11 and Section 12 shall not apply in relation to the income of any trust or institution unless the following conditions are fulfilled, namely: -(a) the person in receipt of the income has made an application for registration of the trust or institution in the prescribed form and in the prescribed manner to the Commissioner before the 1st day of July, 1973 or before the expiry of a period of one year from the date of the creation of the trust or the establishment of the institution [whichever is later and such trust or institution is registered under Section 12AA]:[Provided that where an application for registration of the trust or institution is made after the expiry of the period aforesaid, the provisions of sections 11 and 12 shall apply in relation to the income of such trust or institution, -(i) from the date of the creation of the trust or the establishment of the institution if the Commissioner is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, satisfied that the person in receipt of the income was prevented from making the application before the expiry of the period aforesaid for sufficient reasons ;(ii) from the 1st day of the financial year in which the application is made, if the Commissioner is not so satisfied:][Provided further that the provisions of this clause shall not apply in relation to any application made on or after the 1st day of June, 2007;][(aa) the person in receipt of the income has made an application for registration of the trust or institution on or after the 1st day of June, 2007 in the prescribed form and manner to the Commissioner and such trust or institution is registered under Section 12AA;](b) where the total income of the trust or institution as computed under this Act without giving effect to [the provisions of section 11 and section 12 exceeds the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income tax in pay previous year], the accounts of the trust or institution for that year have been audited by an accountant as defined in the Explanation below sub-section (2) of section 288 and the person in receipt of the income furnishes alongwith the return of income for the relevant assessment year the report of such audit in the prescribed form duly signed and verified by such accountant and setting forth such particulars as may be prescribed.](c) [.....][(2) Where an application has been made on or after the 1st day of June, 2007, the provisions of sections 11 and 12 shall apply in relation to the income of such trust or institution from the assessment year immediately following the financial year in which such application is made.].Section 12AA:- (1) The Commissioner, on receipt of an application for registration of a trust or institution made under clause (a) [or clause (aa) of sub-Section (1)] of section 12A, shall-(a) call for such documents or information from the trust or institution as he thinks necessary in order to satisfy himself about the genuineness of activities of the trust or institution and may also make such inquires as he may deem necessary in this behalf ; and(b) after satisfying himself about the objects of the trust or institution and the genuineness of its activities, he-(i) shall pass an order in writing registering the trust or institution;(ii) shall, if he is not so satisfied, pass an order in writing refusing to register the trust or institution, and a copy of such order shall be sent to the applicant;Provided that no order under sub-clause (ii) shall be passed unless the applicant has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.[(1A) All applications, pending before the Chief Commissioner on which no order has been passed under clause (b) of sub-section (1) before the 1st day of June, 1999, shall stand transferred on that day to the Commissioner and the Commissioner may proceed with such applications under that sub-section from the stage at which they ere on that day.](2) Every order granting or refusing registration under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be passed before the expiry of six months from the end of the month in which the application was received under clause (a) [or clause (aa) of sub-section (1) of section 12A.][(3) where a trust or an institution has been granted registration under clause (b) of sub-section (1) [or has obtained registration at any time under section 12A [as it stood before its amendment by the Finance (No.2) Act, 1996 (33 of 1996]] and subsequently the Commissioner is satisfied that the activities of such trust or institution are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or institution, as the case may be, he shall pass an order in writing cancelling the registration of such trust or institution:Provided that no order under this sub-section shall be passed unless such trust or institution has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.]
7. We find that prima facie the question no. 1 i.e. deemed grant of registration is covered by the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment (supra). We find that applying the principles of purposive construction this Court has held in paragraph 18 as under : -
"Considering the pros and cons of the two views, we are of the opinion that by far the better interpretation would be to hold that the effect of non-consideration of the application for registration within the time fixed by section 12AA(2) would be a deemed grant of registration. We do not find any good reason to make the assessee suffer merely because the Income Tax Department is not able to keep its officers under check and control, so as to take timely decisions in such simple matters such as consideration of applications for registration even within the large six month period provided by section 12AA(2) of the Act."
8. Respectfully we do not agree with the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment (supra) for the following reasons: -
(i) There is nothing in Section 12AA(2) of the Act which provides for deemed grant of registration, if the application for registration is not decided within six months.(ii)This sub-Section provides that every order granting or refusing registration shall be passed before expiry of six months from the end of the month in which the application was received. Thus, this provision prescribes the period of six months to pass an order either granting or refusing registration. Therefore, if an order is not passed within the period of six months, the grant cannot be deemed leaving the words 'refusing registration'.(iii) One of the most important condition for availing the exemption under section 11 and 12 of the Act is the grant of registration under Section 12AA of the Act and as such an order is necessarily required to be passed by the Commissioner either granting or refusing the registration. In case after considering the facts and circumstances the C.I.T. Comes to the conclusion that the person applying for registration is not entitled to registration under Section 12A of the Act then he may refuse registration and the consequence would be that such a person shall not be entitled to the benefits provided in Section 11 and 12 of the Act. Thus no presumption of grant of registration can be inferred from the plain words of Section 12AA (2) of the Act which requires the order to be passed in writing by the competent authority either granting or refusing the registration.(iv) Construing Section 12AA(2) of the Act to mean deemed grant of registration on the expiry of period of six months would attribute redundancy to the words "refusing registration" and therefore such a construction can not be accepted as per settled principle of law.(v) The principles of purposive construction or mischief rule cannot be applied so as to re-write the language in a way different from that in which it is framed. When the public officer is directed by statute to perform duty within a specified time, the provision as to time are directory as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.T. Rajan Vs. T.P.M. Sahir and others (2003) 8 SCC 498 para 48 to 50.(vi) The principles of law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment (supra) appears to be in conflict with the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Others [2004(54) ALR 39]. The relevant paragraph nos. 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 of the judmgnet in the case of Sanjay Kumar (supra) are reproduced below: -"10. It is settled legal proposition of law that unless that statute provides for a deeming clause, the Court should be very slow in accepting such a contention, as laid down by a Constitution Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Rana Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. The Court held that had the intention fiction/ deeming sanction/ refusal, specific in the Act or the Rules. In absence of any statutory provision/ rule, it should not be construed as to provide for a fiction in such an eventuality.11. Moreso, creating a fiction by judicial interpretation may amount to legislation, a field exclusively within the domain of the legislature. (Vide State of Jammu & Kashmir Vs. Triloki Nath Khosa and Ajaib Singh V. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-processing Service Society Ltd.13. Even if the statute provides for a legal fiction / deeming provision, it must be limited to the purposes indicted by the context and can not be given a larger effect. (Vide Radhakissen Chamria and others V. Durga Prasad Chamria and another, State of Travencore-Cochin V. S.V. Cashewnut factory Quilon, and Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. V. State of Bihar and others. In Modi Cement Ltd. V. Kuchil Kumar Nandi, the Hon'ble Apex Court explained the distinction between the deeming provisions, and presumption and held that the distinction was well discernible.14. Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Kerala and others Vs. Dr. S.G. Sarvothama Prabhu, Commissioner of Income Tax V. Mysodet (P) Ltd. and Garden Silk Mills Ltd. and another V. Union of India and others.15. Rule 165 of the Explosive Rules, 1983, provide that if an application for renewal has been filed within time and it is not being disposed of by the licensing authority, the licence shall be deemed to be in force until such date as the licensing authority renews the licence or until an intimation that the renewal of the licence is refused and is communicated to the applicant. The rules provide for a fiction only for the transitory period, but neither the Explosive Act nor the rules framed thereunder envisage deemed renewal of a licence, thus the authorities have been passing the order without complying the requirement of the statutory provisions which cannot be held to be a sign of good governance."(vii) In the case of Rana Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Others (1996) Supp. AWC 92) a Full Bench of this Court, while considering the provision of Section 13 and 14 of the Arms Act regarding grant of Arms Licence has held in paragraph 34 as under : -"34. A reading of the relevant statutory provisions of the Arms Act would show that no time limit has been prescribed therein for the consideration of an application for the grant of an arms licence, nor is there any provision to the effect that if the application is not finally decided within a particular time frame, the licensing authority shall be bound to grant the licence, or that the licence shall be deemed to have been granted. We, therefore, cannot but concur with the view of Vijay Bahuguna, J that had the intention of the Legislature been such, specific provisions would undoubtedly have been made for it in the Act. On the face of it, therefore, the provisions of the Arms Act cannot be so construed as to provide for a deeming provisions for the grant of a licence merely on the expiry of a particular period of time. There can, of course, be no manner of doubt that where undue delay takes place in the licensing authority considering and deciding an application for an arms licence the Court is competent and empowered to direct that the consideration may be completed within the time to be stipulated by it. In dealing with this matter, it is not to be forgotten that there can be many reasons and circumstances to account for an application for an arms licence not having been decided within a particular period. No hard and fast rule can, therefore, be laid down. What be an appropriate order to be passed, with regard to an application for the grant of an arms licence, would clearly depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case."(viii) The provision fixing a time in which a public officer or authority has to act in performance of a duty considers it reasonable for the officer or the authority to act within the said period. The expiry of the period without more confers no right unless the statute by legal fixation or otherwise confers a right. Thus Section 12AA(2) of the Act providing for grant or refusing registration within a period of six months does not mean that the application must have been granted after expiry of the said period, unless there is a provision to the said effect made in the Act itself. The above points supported by the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chet Ram Vashist Versus Municipal Corporation of Delhi an other (1980) 4 SCC 647 Paras 6, 7, 8 and 9.(ix) The performance of duty required to be done by the competent authority under Section 12AA (2) of the Act within the period specified therein and related to a right which may accrue to a person on grant of registration, the provision of time will be directory and not passing the order within the period specified shall not automatically result in deemed grant of registration.(x) In the case of Nassurddin another Vs. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577 paras 37 and 38) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law that "it is a well settled principle that if an act is required to be performed by a private person within the specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but when the public functionary is required to perform the public function within time frame, the same shall be held directory unless consequence therefor are specified." Similar view has been taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh and others Vs. Anand Kumamr Sharma and others (2003) 3 SCC 433 para 7.(xi)There is nothing in Section 12AA(2) of the Act which provides that the authority concerned shall have no power to pass order either granting or refusing registration after expiry of six months. Thus, when the legislature itself has not provided so and the authority concerned has not been made functus officio on expiry of the prescribed period then it is not within the powers of the Court to legislate and provide for deemed grant of registration. In the case of Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and others (2003) 2 SCC 111 para 42, 43, 44 and 45 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :-"42. We are not oblivious of the law that when a public functionary is required to do a certain thing within a specified time, the same is ordinarily directory but it is equally well settled that when consequence for inaction on the part of the Statutory authorities within such specified time is expressly provided, it must be held to be imperative.43. In Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd edition, Vol.3 at p.102 the law is stated as follows :-".......unless the nature of the act to be performed, or the phraseology of the statute is such that the designation of time must be considered a limitation of the power of the Officer."At p.107 it is pointed out that a statutory direction to private individuals should generally be considered as mandatory and that the rule is just the opposite to that which obtains with respect to public officers. Again, at p. 109, it is pointed out that often the question as to whether a mandatory or directory construction should be given to a statutory provision may be determined by an expression in the statute itself of the result that shall follow non-compliance with the provision. At p.111 it is stated as follows:"As a corollary of the rule outlined above, the fact that no consequences of non-compliance are stated in the statute, has been considered as a factor tending towards a directory construction. But this is only an element to be considered, and is by no means conclusive."44.In Dattatrays v. State of Bombay [AIR 1952 SC 181], it was held as under :-"Generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice of the courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done."45. In Craies on Statute Law VIII Edn. at page 262, it is stated thus :-"It is the duty of courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed That is each case you must look to the subject-matter, consider the importance of the provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory."
9. In the following three judgments in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Salem Vs. Sheela Christian Charitable Trust (2013) 214 Taxman 551 = (2013-TIOL-200-HC-MAD-IT),Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Karimangalam Onriya Pengal Semipu Amaipu Ltd. (2013) 214 Taxman 666 = (2013-TIOL-282-HC-MAD-IT) and Director of Income Tax (Exemption), Chennai Vs. Anjuman-e-Khyrkhah-e-Aam (2011) 200 Taxman 27 (Mad.) = (2011-TIOL-09-HC-MAD-IT) the Madras High Court has held that non disposal of application for registration within the time prescribed under Section 12AA(2) of the Act would not automatically result in granting registration to the trust and such a provision is directory.
10. In view of the discussion made above we refer the following questions for opinion of the Larger Bench: -
(i) whether non disposal of application for registration by granting or refusing registration before the expiry of six months as provided under Section 12AA(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 would result in deemed grant of registration.(ii) Whether the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment (supra) holding that the effect of non consideration of the application for registration within the time fixed by Section 12AA(2) would be deemed grant of registration, is legally correct.
11. Let the record of this appeal be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Larger Bench for authoritative pronouncement on the above referred two questions.
CL : Flat owner can sell, let or mortgage his flat for loan without permission of the builder or Society
• It is too late in the day to contend that flat owners cannot sell, let, hypothecate or mortgage their flat for availing of loan without permission of the builder, Society or the Company.
• So far as a builder is concerned, the flat owner should pay the price of the flat. So far as the Society or Company in which the flat owner is a member, he is bound by the laws or Articles of Association of the Company, but the species of his right over the flat is exclusively that of his. That right is always transferable and heritable. Of course, they will have charge over the flat if any amount is due to them upon the flat.
• Neither the Companies Act nor any other statute make any provision prohibiting the transfer of species of interest to third parties or to avail of loan for the flat owners' benefit. A legal bar on the saleability or transferability of such a species of interest, in our view, will create chaos and confusion. The right or interest to occupy any such flat is a species of property and hence has a stamp of transferability
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[2013] 37 taxmann.com 150 (SC)
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Hill Properties Ltd.
v.
Union Bank of India
K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND A.K. SIKRI, JJ.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7939 OF 2013
SEPTEMBER 11, 2013
JUDGMENT
K.S. Radhakrishnan, J - Leave granted.
2. We are in this case concerned with the saleability of Flat No.23, Building No.2, Hill Park Estate, A.G. Bell Road, Malabar Hill, Mumbai – 400 006, which is under attachment in the execution proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Mumbai.
3. Union Bank of India, Respondent No.1 herein, had advanced some financial assistance to the second respondent sometimes in the year 1992. Respondent Nos.3 and 4 stood as personal guarantors for repayment of the dues of Respondent No.2. Respondent No.5, being an associate company of Respondent No.2, mortgaged the aforementioned flat in favour of the Union Bank of India to secure repayment of the dues of Respondent No.2. For realization of the payment of the amount, proceedings were initiated under the Securitization Act before the DRT, Mumbai, and the flat in question was attached under the warrant of attachment on 23rd August, 2005.
4. The Hill Properties Ltd., Appellant herein, preferred Suit No.1627 of 2007 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Ordinary Original Jurisdiction), to release the flat in question from attachment. Notice of Motion was taken out for injunction restraining the Bank and others from taking any steps in furtherance of warrant of attachment or transferring the suit property to third parties. Learned Single Judge rejected the Appellant's Notice of Motion seeking to release the flat from attachment by its order dated 25th January, 2012, giving liberty to the Appellant to make its offer to purchase the suit flat at a price determined by the Valuer or the price determined by the Auditor of the Company, whichever is higher. Aggrieved by the order, the Appellant preferred Appeal (L) No.185 of 2012 before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court contending that Respondent No.5, being only a shareholder of the Company, has only a right to occupy the flat and has no right to mortgage the same to the Bank without permission of the Company. Further, it was pointed out that Respondent No.5 is only holding "A" equity share (bearing Share Certificate No.45) in the Appellant Company. By virtue of Articles of Association of the Company, Respondent No.5 was only permitted to use and occupy the flat owned by the Appellant Company and, therefore, the same is not liable to be attached and sold.
5. The Application was resisted by Respondent No.9 contending that the right to occupy the suit flat is the valuable right and value in the share of the Company is nothing but the value of the flat and the same could be transferred for consideration. The flat was, therefore, rightly mortgaged to the Bank and the learned Single Judge was justified in rejecting the claim of the Appellant.
6. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court found no illegality in the order passed by the learned Single Judge and dismissed the Appeal, so also the Notice of Motion. Various safeguards incorporated by the learned Single Judge were reiterated. Aggrieved of the said order, this appeal has been preferred.
7. Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel appearing for the Appellant, submitted that Respondent No.5 is only a shareholder of the Appellant Company and hence only permitted to use and occupy one of the flats owned by the Company and all the rights, title and interest in respect of the flat in question exclusively vest in the Company. Learned senior counsel submitted that Respondent No.5 could not have mortgaged the suit flat without the permission of the Company which is in violation of the provisions of the Articles of Association of the Company. Learned senior counsel referred to the Articles of Association of the Company and submitted that Respondent No.5 being a shareholder, is bound by the provisions of Articles of Association of the Company. Learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in Bacha F. Guzdar, Bombay v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, [1955] 1 SCR 876, and Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India & Anr., [2012] 6 SCC 613, Learned senior counsel also submitted that the ratio laid down by this Court in RameshHimatlal Shah v. Harsukh Jadhavji Joshi, [1975] 2 SCC 105, is not applicable to the case on hand, since in that case this Court was dealing with the interest of a member in an immovable property of a Cooperative Society governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, which is inapplicable in the case of right of a shareholder in a limited liability company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956.
8. Shri U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the principle laid down in Ramesh Himatlal Shah's case (supra), will clearly apply to the facts of this case. Learned senior counsel submitted that the question as to whether the flat belongs to a member of a Cooperative Society or a shareholder of a Company makes no difference, since the right, title and interest and the right to occupy is the species of property, which has the stamp of transferability. Learned senior counsel submitted that in the absence of any clear and unambiguous legal provisions to the contrary, such species of rights can always be transferred and there is no illegality in mortgaging the property to the Bank, as security for the loan transaction. Learned senior counsel submitted that the High Court has rightly rejected the suit as well as the Notice of Motion and the same calls for no interference by this Court.
DISCUSSION
9. The Appellant claims to be the owner of the property known as Flat No.23, Building No.2, Hill Park Estate, A.G. Bell Road, Malabar Hill, Mumbai – 400 006. Respondent No.5 is the shareholder of the Appellant Company holding one "A" equity share. Flat No.23 was allotted to Respondent No.5 who was holding the Share Certificate No.45. Respondent No.5 created an equitable mortgage to secure dues of Respondent No.2 to the Union Bank of India by depositing Share Certificate No.45. Union Bank of India filed Suit No.1079 of 1993 for recovery of the dues and also for enforcement of the security. The suit was later transferred to the DRT, Mumbai, and was numbered as OA No.245 of 2001. The DRT, Mumbai, later passed an order of attachment in respect of the flat in question. The question arose as to whether the property which was mortgaged to the Bank and the right of Respondent No.5 upon it could be attached and sold in execution of a decree.
10. We are of the view that the right, title, interest over a flat conveyed is a species of property, whether that right has been accrued under the provisions of the Articles of Association of a Company or through the bye-laws of a Cooperative Society. The people in this country, especially in urban cities and towns are now accustomed to flat culture, especially due to paucity of land. Multi-storeyed flats are being constructed and sold by Companies registered under the Companies Act as well as the Cooperative Societies registered under the Registration of Cooperative Societies Act, etc. Flats are being purchased by people by either becoming members of the Cooperative Society or shareholders of the Company and the flat owners have an independent right as well as the collective right over the flat complex. Flat owners' right to dispose of its flat is also well recognized, and one can sell, donate, leave by will or let out or hypothecate his right. These rights are even statutorily recognized by many State Legislatures by enacting Apartment Ownership Acts. Such a legislation exists in the State of Maharashtra as well.
11. Most of the flat owners purchase the flat by availing of loan from various banking institutions by mortgaging their rights over the purchased flat. By purchasing the flat, the purchaser, over and above his species of right over the flat, will also have undivided interest in the common areas and facilities, in the percentage as prescribed. Flat owners will also have the right to use the common areas and facilities in accordance with the purpose for which they are intended. It is too late in the day to contend that flat owners cannot sell, let, hypothecate or mortgage their flat for availing of loan without permission of the builder, Society or the Company. So far as a builder is concerned, the flat owner should pay the price of the flat. So far as the Society or Company in which the flat owner is a member, he is bound by the laws or Articles of Association of the Company, but the species of his right over the flat is exclusively that of his. That right is always transferable and heritable. Of course, they will have charge over the flat if any amount is due to them upon the flat.
12. In Ramesh Himatlal Shah's case (supra), this Court has clearly delineated the legal principle which is as follows :-
"20. Multi-storeyed ownership flats on cooperative basis in cities and big towns have come to stay because of dire necessity and are in the process of rapid expansion for manifold reasons. Some of these are: ever growing needs of an urban community necessitating its accommodation in proximity to cities and towns, lack of availability of land in urban areas, rise in price of building material, restrictions under various rent legislations, disincentive generated by tax laws and other laws for embarking upon housing construction on individual basis, security of possession depending upon fulfilment of the conditions of membership of a society which are none too irksome. In absence of clear and unambiguous legal provisions to the contrary, it will not be in public interest nor in the interest of commerce to impose a ban on saleability of these flats by a tortuous process of reasoning. The prohibition, if intended by the legislature, must be in express terms. We have failed to find one."
13. Reference may also be made to another judgment of this Court in DLF Qutub Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana, [2003] 5 SCC 622, wherein this Court held that the right of transfer of land indisputably is incidental to the right of ownership and such a right can be curtailed or taken away only by reason of a Statute. In our view, the Articles of Association of a Company have no force of a Statute and that the right of Respondent No.5 to mortgage could not have been restricted by the Articles of Association.
14. We find that neither the Companies Act nor any other statute make any provision prohibiting the transfer of species of interest to third parties or to avail of loan for the flat owners' benefit. A legal bar on the saleability or transferability of such a species of interest, in our view, will create chaos and confusion. The right or interest to occupy any such flat is a species of property and hence has a stamp of transferability and consequently we find no error with the warrant of attachment issued by the DRT on the flat in question.
15. We may reiterate that the appellant will certainly have the right of pre-emption, but not at any value lesser than the market value of the suit flat at the time of the sale. Various directions already given by the High Court, therefore, will stand.
16. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the amount, if any, deposited by the Appellant be refunded to him. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
ST : Department cannot seek condonation of delay in filing appeal merely by stating that delay was caused due to time consumed in administrative procedures, which is too general and unsatisfactory explanation
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[2013] 37 taxmann.com 39 (Gujarat)
HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
State of Gujarat
v.
Atul Products Ltd.*
M.R. SHAH AND MS. SONIA GOKANI, JJ.
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 334 OF 2013
STAMP NO. 1345 OF 2013
STAMP NO. 1345 OF 2013
JUNE 14, 2013
Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 read with section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - Application of certain provisions of Excise Act - Appeal to High Court - Department sought condonation of 1371 days in filing appeal citing administrative procedures as reason of delay arguing that there was no intention to flout any legal provision or Act - It was also argued that meritorious case would seriously get prejudiced and public interest would be at jeopardy, if delay was not condoned and assessee would not loose anything as due opportunity will be given to both sides - HELD : Ordinarily Courts liberally condone delay and are also expected to adopt "justice oriented approach" rather than giving any undue importance to technicalities and further, delay is not to be explained by litigant on literal sense on day-to-day basis - However, when there is no justification for delay, substantial law of limitation cannot be marred advancing cause of liberal approach - Test for a sufficient cause is whether party, by exercise of due care and attention, could have avoided delay; sufficient cause would mean presence of legal and adequate reasons - In absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, Court cannot condone delay mechanically only because litigant is a Government Wing - In this case, Department's plea of time consumed in administrative procedures was in general terms; therefore, in absence of any specific details and explanation, it was unsatisfactory - Only because applicant is Government, it cannot be absolved of its responsibility to fulfill mandate of law - Moreover, issue involved was neither going to have any far reaching ramification on exchequer, nor would it result into denying an opportunity in respect of substantial question of law - Hence, appeal was dismissed as time-barred [Paras 5 to 9] [In favour of assessee]
Words and Phrases : 'Sufficient cause' as appearing in section 35G of Central Excise Act, 1944
CASE REVIEW
Lanka D. Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P. AIR 2011 SC 1199 (para 6.1), Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh AIR 2010 SCW 4848 (para 6.1) andOffice of the Chief Post MasterGeneral. v. Living Media India Ltd. [2012] 348 ITR 7/207 Taxman 163/20 taxmann.com 347 (SC) (para 6.3)relied on.
CASES REFERRED TO
G. Ramegowda v. Major Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1988 SC 897 (para 3), N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy AIR 1998 SC 3222 (para 3.1), State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [1996] 3 SCC 132 (para 3.2), Lanka D. Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P. AIR 2011 SC 1199 (para 6.1) Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh AIR 2010 SCW 4848 (para 6.1) and Office of the Chief Post MasterGeneral. v. Living Media India Ltd. [2012] 348 ITR 7/207 Taxman 163/20 taxmann.com 347 (SC) (para 6.3)
Ms. Shruti Pathak for the Appellant.
ORDER
Ms. Sonia Gokani, J - This is an application preferred for condonation of delay of 1371 days in filing the present Tax Appeal challenging the order dated 6th May, 2009, in Revision Application No. 129 of 2001 passed by the Gujarat Value Added Tax Tribunal, Ahmedabad ("Tribunal" for short)
2. It is pleaded in the application by the applicant-State, thus :
"The applicant further submits that, to file Tax Appeal before this Court the applicant has to undergo certain administrative procedures mentioned below :-
After receiving the judgment/order from the Tribunal, it is required to study the judgment and then opinions of several officers are sought as whether to file the Tax Appeal. Thereafter, the department sends a proposal to the Finance Department to get the approval of the Government to file the Tax Appeal. After receiving the approval from the Finance Department, all the papers alongwith the judgment/order are to be submitted to the G.P Office to file Tax Appeal. And thereafter, the G.P Office after receiving the papers prepares, gets approved and then files Tax Appeal before this Hon'ble Court.
The applicant further says that, in the present case, the Tribunal passed the Order on 6-05-2009 in Revision Application No. 129 of 2001. The applicant states that, the order dated 6-05-2009 was communicated to the applicant on 30-05-2009. Thereafter, on 15-12-2012, the proposal to file the tax appeal was sent to the Finance Department and on 2-2-2013, Finance Department approved the proposal. After receiving the proposal from the Finance Department on 20-02-2013, relevant papers alongwith judment/order were haned over to the office of the Government Pleader, High Court to file the Tax Appeal. The applicant says that, the tax appeal was required to be filed on or before 3-08-2009. However, the same was filed on 6/5/2013 and thus, there is delay of 1371 days in preferring the Tax Appeal.
The applicant further says that due to Government administrative mechanism, every work passes and comes back to source point, through a route system, hence the tax appeal could not be filed within the statutory time limit. Due to administrative procedures, time was consumed and hence the delay was caused."
2.1 It is further averred by the applicant that meritorious case would seriously get prejudiced, if delay is not condoned and opponent is not to loose anything as due opportunity is likely to be given to both the sides. It is also averred that it is the public interest which is at jeopardy in a case where the Government is the petitioner.
3. Learned AGP appearing for the applicant-State has fervently urged to condone delay as reasonable explanation is already embodied, according to her, in the petition and this must be construed as a sufficient cause. She has sought to rely upon the decision of the Apex Court rendered in case of G. Ramegowda Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1988 SC 897 wherein the Apex Court has held thus -
"In litigation which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which perhaps cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of the Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient cause' for the purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that, those who bear responsibility of Government must have a 'little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on Government functioning - of course, within a reasonable limit is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process.."
3.1 Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Apex Court rendered in case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy AIR 1998 SC 3222. It is held therein by the Apex Court that the rules of limitation are not to jeopardize the right and interest of the parties. Court is to ensure of course that no dilatory tactics are adopted and if the large amount of tax revenue is at stake, the Court should be slow in dismissing such plea of condonation of delay..
3.2 Judgment rendered in case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [1996] 3 SCC 132 is pressed into service, wherein, the Apex Court has reiterated liberal approach in condoning the delay.
3.3 In short, the submission that has been emphasized is to the effect that in absence of any intention to flout any legal provision or Act, the attempt to deliberately jeopardize the interest of the otherside, an explanation of delay as put forth should be accepted and this being the administrative cause involving revenue for the State, the Court may approach this request with a liberty attitude.
4. On thus having heard the learned AGP and on having consciously considered the materials on record, this application is not being entertained for the reasons to follow hereinafter.
5. We are conscious that ordinarily the Courts have liberally condoned the delay and are also expected to adopt "justice oriented approach" rather than giving any undue importance to the technicalities. We are also not oblivious of the fact that the delay is not to be explained by the litigant on literal sense on day-to-day basis. However, we cannot disregard the vital requirement of law that when there is no justification for delay, the substantial law of limitation cannot be marred advancing the cause of liberal approach."
6. It will not be out of place to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in case of Lanka D. Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P. AIR 2011 SC 1199 wherein the delay was caused and there was insufficient explanation. The Apex Court set-aside the order of the High Court in condoning the delay, by holding that the concept of liberal approach and justice oriented approach cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. In the words of the Apex Court —
'26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.'
6.1 The Apex Court in a decision, rendered in case of Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh AIR 2010 SCW 4848 has given the test for a sufficient cause and what is to be seen is as to whether the party by the exercise of due care and attention could have avoided the delay. It reiterated that sufficient powers and discretion is available with the Courts for applying this law in a meaningful manner but sufficient cause would mean presence of legal and adequate reasons.
6.2 It would be profitable to reproduce the relevant observations of the Apex Court in this case :
"14. In the case of Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd., [1988 (38) Excise Law Times 739 (SC)], this Court while granting some latitude to the Government in relation to condonation of delay, still held that there must be some way or attempt to explain the cause for such delay and as there was no whisper to explain what legal problems occurred in filing the Special Leave Petition, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed. Similarly, in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. A.MD. Bilal and Co., [1999 (108) Excise Law Times 331 (SC)] / (1999 AIR SCW 4740), the Supreme Court declined to condone the delay of 502 days in filing the appeal because there was no satisfactory or reasonable explanation rendered for condonation of delay. The provisions of Order 22, Rule 9, CPC has been the subject-matter of judicial scrutiny for considerable time now. Sometimes the Courts have taken a view that delay should be condoned with a liberal attitude, while on certain occasions the Courts have taken a stricter view and wherever the explanation was not satisfactory, have dismissed the application for condonation of delay. Thus, it is evident that it is difficult to state any straight-jacket formula which can uniformly be applied to all cases without reference to the peculiar facts and circumstances of a given case. It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the Legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly. Furthermore, it is also a well-settled canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an interpretation to provisions which would render the provision ineffective or odious. Once the Legislature has enacted the provisions of Order 22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applied to the entertainment of such an application, all these provisions have to be given their true and correct meaning and must be applied wherever called for. If we accept the contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order 22, Rule 9 of the CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law. Liberal construction of the expression 'sufficient cause' is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the Court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the Court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect 'sufficient cause' as understood in law. [Advanced Law Lexicon,P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, 1997] The expression 'sufficient cause' implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word 'sufficient' means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plenitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these classes of cases. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]."
6.3 In yet another recent decision of the Apex Court rendered in case of Office of the Chief Post Master General. v. Living Media India Ltd.[2012] 348 ITR 7/207 Taxman 163/20 taxmann.com 347 (SC), in absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, the Court refused to condone the delay mechanically only because it was a Government Wing, by observing thus —
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with Court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us."
7. From the explanation rendered by the applicant, it can be noted that the same is if general terms. The Department appears to have sent a proposal to the Finance Department, which had approved it on 2nd February, 2013 and after the same was received back alongwith necessary papers and orders permitting the Office of the Government Pleader to file Tax Appeal, it appears that the Tax Appeal which was to be filed on or before 3rd August, 2009, came to be filed after huge delay of 1371 days.. What is stated for explaining such delay is that due to Government administrative mechanism, within the statutory time period, tax appeal could not be filed. In absence of any specific details and explanation, this explanation in general terms does not satisfy us. There can be no straight-jacket formula adopted which can be applied uniformly in all matters, without considering the facts and circumstances of the case. In absence of any satisfactory explanation coming forth for condonation of delay, we are of the opinion that no liberal attitude requires to be adopted; particularly considering the inordinate delay in preferring this Application. Only because the applicant is the State, it cannot be absolved of its responsibility to fulfil the mandate of law. Even if day today explanation is not desired, for a long period after the sanction of Finance department also, nothing emerges on record to indicate due care or diligence to satisfy the requirement of explaining sufficiency of cause.
8. As a parting note, we would like to specifically mention that dismissal of the appeal preferred by the applicant consequent to rejection of this application for condonation of delay is neither going to have any far reaching ramification on the exchequer, nor would it result into denying an opportunity in respect of the substantial question of law, which may jeopardize the State's interest in the assessment year in question or beyond the same.
9. Resultantly, this application for condonation of delay fails and consequently, Tax Appeal {Stamp} No. 1345
Regards,
Pawan Singla
BA (Hon's), LLB
Audit Officer
__._,_.___
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