Saturday, September 7, 2013

[aaykarbhavan] Judgments and Information






DEAR SIR,
1)  Members must prepare 3CA/3CB-3CD on the latest available utility e-PR8 released in the last week.
2)
You can email problems other than
48 & 16 
problems covered in our and ICAI's FAQs 
respectively. 
3
)
      Kindly email to moreassociate@gmail.com along with screen shot of problem, if any.
3)      It generally takes 2-3 days to provide the solution.
4)      Our expert panel will try to provide solution.
5)      Those who want to be member of our expert panel can contact, ca nitesh more in his mobile 9883157484

48 TAX AUDIT PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
BY CA NITESH MORE, KOLKATA
 
INDEX
 
TECHNICAL ISSUES
OTHER ISSUES
1.       Steps for Filling Online Tax Audit Report
2.       Software Requirements
3.       Problem in Slowdown of System
4.       Problem of Negative Figures
5.       Problem of Providing Quantitative Details
6.       Problem in Entry of Large No. Of Fixed Assets
7.       Problem in Viewing Stock Figures
8.       Problem of Depreciation in Webtel Software
9.       Problem of No Space for Commodity
10.   Problem in Calculation of NP Ratio
11.   Problem of Blank Fields in Saved Draft Xml File
12.   Problem of Viewing Data of Xml before Uploading
13.   Problem of Printing/Saving Uploaded Xml File
14.   Problem of Fakepath
15.   Problem in Viewing Xml File from Client's Login
16.   How to Print Uploaded Xml Files
17.   Problem in Getting Activation Link/SMS for Completing Registration
18.   Unable to See Xml in Assessee's Login
19.   Non Acceptance of Negative Figures in Form 29B
20.   Use of Special Characters
21.   Problem of Non Generation of XML
22.   Problem of Swapping Of Due Date and Actual Date
23.   TAR Rejected By Assessee If Uploaded Again
1.       No. of Tax Audit a CA can Sign? Issue of section 44AD
2.       Online Filling, Date of Signing and Date of Filling
3.       Can a Partner Sign On Behalf Of Other Partners?
4.       Can Return Be Filed After Due Date
5.       ITR 7 to Be Filed Online?
6.       Mandatory E-Filling of Trust, Society
7.       Responsibility of Tax Auditor for Delay in Uploading
8.       Penalty for Non Furnishing of Report
9.       Waiver of Penalty for Non Furnishing
10.   Format of Maintenance of Records of Tax Audit
11.   Communication with Previous Auditor
12.   Should CA Accept Tax Audit If Undisputed Fees of Previous Auditor Not Paid
13.   Tar of Pvt Ltd Company
14.   Address for NRI Director in ITR
15.   Pan of Relative for Unsecured Loan
16.   Return Can Be Uploaded Before TAR
17.   Problem of Three Tax Auditors of Same Assessee
18.   Problem of Different Methods of Valuation of Stock in Two Firms
19.   Approval of Tar by Assessee Is Mandatory
20.   How to Show Additional Depreciation
21.   Date Of TAR Vs Date Of Furnishing TAR
22.   Format For Tax Audit U/S 44AD
 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON E-FILLING OF TAX AUDIT REPORTS - TECHNICAL ISSUES
 
1. STEPS FOR FILLING ONLINE TAX AUDIT REPORT
Q1. What are the steps to be followed for E-filling of Tax Audit Report?
Ans. Step 1- One Time Registration of Chartered Accountant at E-filling website
Step 2 – Login to Assessee account at e-filling website and Add CA
Step 3 – Downloading, Preparing Tax Audit Report Utility & Generating XML file.
Step 4 – Uploading XML file at E-filling website from CA's Login Id
Step 5 – Approval of form uploaded by CA at E-filling website from Assessee's Login Id
Step 6 – Do not forget to file Income Tax Return in Relevant ITR separately
 
2. SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS
Q2. What are operating system and runtime environment requirement for E-filling of Tax Audit Report?
Ans. Operating System – Windows XP with Service Pack 3/ Windows 7/ Windows 8.
Runtime Environment – JRE 1.7 Update 6 and above, 32 Bit is required to run applets for offline forms to work.
 
3. PROBLEM IN SLOWDOWN OF SYSTEM
Q3. Our system becomes very slow during working on e-utility. What should we do?
Ans. Remove all old versions of Java to improve performance. Better use Google chrome. Can also use Mozilla Firefox.
 
4. PROBLEM OF NEGATIVE FIGURES
Q4. System is not accepting negative figures in brackets i.e. "()". What should we do?
Ans. Use negative sign. i.e. minus "-"
 
5. PROBLEM OF PROVIDING QUANTITATIVE DETAILS
Q5. Due to nature and complexity of the business of the assessee, we do not have quantitative information about the stock. The software is not accepting any comment and it is accepting only numeric value. What should we do?
Ans. Kindly note that Quantitative details of only principle items is to be given. However, in my opinion, if details are not available, 
a) Write nil in online form 3CD &
b) Report why quantitative details is not provided in the following two places:
i) In paper form 3CD &
ii) Notes to accounts
c) The Following Statement Should Be Written In Paper Form 3CD As Well As Notes: "Due To Nature & Complexity of Business of Assessee, It Is Not Possible To Provide Quantitative Details"
 
6. PROBLEM IN ENTRY OF LARGE NO. OF FIXED ASSETS
Q6. An assessee had purchased, say 5000 assets. His details of purchase are there in schedule. Online form 3CD again requires filling each purchase. It is a huge task resulting duplicity of work.
Ans. In view of our time constraint, such fixed assets may be grouped into different blocks of assets and each of these groups can be further divided into 2 parts.
i. Assets put to use on or before 2nd October: For ease of entry in online form 3CD, we will argue that all assets were put to use on 2nd October, wherever possible.
ii. Assets put to use after 2nd October (eligible for half of depreciation): For ease of entry in online form 3CD, we will argue that all assets were put to use on 31st March, wherever possible.
It is also advised to attach the working of calculation of depreciation under the Income Tax act, 1961 as a schedule so that breakup of each group is easily visible to the IT department.
 
The above can be summarized in the following steps:
Step 1 - All fixed assets may be grouped into different blocks of assets.
Step 2 - Each of these groups can be further divided into 2 parts. (i) Assets put to use on or before 2nd October (ii) assets put to use after 2nd October (eligible for half of depreciation)
Step 3 - For assets brought on or before 2nd October, we can argue that those assets were put to use on 2nd October and accordingly relevant entries can be made in the online form 3CD.
Step 4 - For assets brought after 2nd October, we can argue that those assets were put to use on 31st March and accordingly relevant entries can be made in the online form 3CD.
Step 5 – Sale of assets for each of group should be entered in a separate row while filling online form 3CD.
Step 6 - It is also advised to attach the working of calculation of depreciation under the Income Tax act, 1961, as a schedule, so that breakup of each group is easily visible to the IT department.
 
7. PROBLEM IN VIEWING STOCK FIGURES
Q7. I filled stock details in point 28A. When after validating and saving, I reopen the form; only one stock figure is displayed.
Ans. It is the inherent problem of the software but your xml file contains the correct data. Open the xml file in Internet Explorer and check it. You can edit xml file, however you have to adopt unceremonious way to edit the xml file for the necessary correction for the item in subsequent rows of point 28A. Therefore it is advised to fill up point 28A before filling any other point from point 7 onwards.
 
8. PROBLEM OF DEPRECIATION IN WEBTEL SOFTWARE
Q8.  We have received demand relating to AY 2012-13, for almost for all companies for which income tax return were filled using Webtel software. The demand pertains to non-deduction of deprecation u/s32 in the return processed u/s 143(1) by CPC Bangalore, as claim by us in ITR 6. I just want to know if any other user of Webtel are also facing same problem.
Ans: The Problem Was Faced Many CA Using Webtel Software Due To Non Updation. I Suggest Submitting Revised Return or Making Rectification U/S 154.
 
9. PROBLEM OF NO SPACE FOR COMMODITY
Q9. In online Form 3CD, nature of business is to be mentioned i.e. Trading/Manufacturing & Retailer/ Wholesaler, but there is no space given for a particular commodity, say, cloth/ medicine/ cement. What should we do?
Ans. You can select, say, retailers & thereafter choose others (i.e. 104, 204, etc as applicable).
10. PROBLEM IN CALCULATION OF NP RATIO
Q10. If any businessman having a cloth business & also keeps photocopy machine/ agent of LIC, the income from photocopy machine / commission received from LIC is used for calculating the NP ratio. If so, then in this case GP ratio is less then NP ratio. So what to do about it?
Ans. You have to calculate NP ratio as a whole of the business for which tax audit was conducted.
 
11. PROBLEM OF BLANK FIELDS IN SAVED DRAFT XML FILE
Q11. When we reopen draft saved xml file, many fields which we had already entered is showing blank.
Ans. The software has some inherent errors as a result when we reopen draft saved xml file, it shows blank i.e. we have to re-enter the fields again. These fields are 7(B), 8(B), 9(A), 10, 11(D), 12(B), 21(Notes), 22(A), 22 AND 23.
 
12. PROBLEM OF VIEWING DATA OF XML BEFORE UPLOADING
Q12. How we can view data of XML before uploading?
Ans. You can view the xml file of tax audit report prepared in e utility of department. CA P.K. Agarwalla has prepared the screen shots of the process to view the same. The process is as follows:
Go to Programme à Microsoft Office àMicrosoft Office Access 2003/2007 à New blank data base àClick blank data base à A window with file name database1.accdb will appear on the right hand side pane. à Click on create. Your new date base is saved by default in my Documents. (You may save the same to your choice folder)
A new data base is opened. Go to and click External data à Click XML file>Browse the xml file for which you want to create/view or save the data àClick OKàImport XMLàClick OKàCheck the box "Save import steps"à Close.
Your data base is ready, on the left hand side pane the indexes for "All Tables" do appear. By clicking any Table/ any point you can easily view and save its contents presently appearing in the XML file. Once the xml file is saved and the data base is reopened it will show the updated entries lying in the XML file. If some member finds any error in the tables he can easily make corrections opening the utility.
 
13. PROBLEM OF PRINTING/SAVING UPLOADED XML FILE
Q13. There is no provision for saving or printing downloaded Forms 3CB-3CD, or XML file.
Ans.  U can save the work in middle by using "Save Draft" Button. To view the print option opens the xml file in Microsoft Access 2007 using new projects. U can find the Data in tabular form.
 
14. PROBLEM OF FAKEPATH
Q14. When we are uploading the 3CA and 3CD online one error is coming cannot read fake path file. I have placed the XML file in c drive fakepath folder and using Google chrome for that. Please help on the issue.
Ans. Kindly check the name of folder is "fakepath" and not as fake path, in C drive.
 
15. PROBLEM IN VIEWING XML FILE FROM CLIENT'S LOGIN
Q15. We uploaded form 3CD of a client. When it is viewed from the client's login (i.e. for approving or rejecting), the dates in point no. 16(b) of form 3CD is getting interchanged (i.e. in the due dates column actual dates are seen and vice versa). But there is no mistake at our end. We have filled in the data in the income tax offline utility correctly and generated xml.
Ans. Your XML File contains the right data. Do not worry, upload it.
 
16. HOW TO PRINT UPLOADED XML FILES
Q16. CA has no option to print uploaded xml files. How to print?
Ans. CA has no option to print uploaded xml files. However, it can be printed from assessee's login id, even before approval by assessee as the said xml file can be downloaded, from assessee's login id, in the pdf format by default.
 
17. PROBLEM IN GETTING ACTIVATION LINK/SMS FOR COMPLETING REGISTRATION
Q17. A Chartered Accountant in practice registered himself with his DSC in the e-filing website. But he neither received any sms nor any activation link in his e-mail. When he tried again to register himself, the message was that he is already registered. But when he tried to log in, it was informed that the link is not activated. What should he do now?
Ans. Go to login page and enter your User ID i.e.  ARCA(Mem. No.) e.g. ARCA300700 and enter your Password as given then click on "Resend Activation Link". You will get a mail from the site. If it does not work then reset your Password by sending mail at validate@incometaxindia.gov.in.
 
18. UNABLE TO SEE XML IN ASSESSEE'S LOGIN
18. I had uploaded one Form 3CD, 10 days back and same was reflecting in my log in and I also received message for uploading. Now when I go to assessee log, same form is not available for validation. When I try to re-file from my log in I am getting massage that you are already submitted and assessee has not rejected/accepted.
Ans. Kindly Go to Work lists and approve it.
 
19. NON ACCEPTANCE OF NEGATIVE FIGURES IN FORM 29B
Q19. In the department utility, the point no.9 of Annexure A of Form 29B is not accepting negative figures.
Ans. Kindly Type 0, Until Such Inherent Error in Software Is Rectified By Department
 
20. USE OF SPECIAL CHARACTERS
Q20. Can we use special characters while typing address in different places of online form 3CD?
Ans. No, special characters are not allowed while typing address.
 
21. PROBLEM OF NON GENERATION OF XML
Q21. The department utility is opening the saved data and saving draft successfully but it does not generate XML file when we click generate XML file
Ans. First validate it and generate
 
22. PROBLEM OF SWAPPING OF DUE DATE AND ACTUAL DATE
Q22. I have noticed that under the Clause No. 16(b) there is an error in the utility. The columns of due date and actual date for payments as show in the utility have been reversed against the actual data being generated in the XML file. The column headers should be swapped. The same is also evident from the form being generated at the time of approval.
Ans. This is the inherent problem. Kindly do not swap the dates at the time of data entry. IT department had been communicated with such problems.
 
23. TAR REJECTED BY ASSESSEE IF UPLOADED AGAIN
Q23. If a TAR is rejected by assessee and uploaded again, then an error message comes.
Ans. This is the inherent problem. Kindly download and fill up fresh form.
 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON E-FILLING OF TAX AUDIT REPORTS – OTHER ISSUES
 
1. NO. OF TAX AUDIT
Q1. Whether Tax Audit Report u/s 44AD etc will be counted in the specified limits of 45 Tax Audits?
Ans. As per Council Guidelines No.1-CA(7)/02/2008, dated 8th August,2008, these will not be included and you can file unlimited such Tax Audit Reports
 
Q2. What are the limits on signing of Tax Audit Report?
Ans. As per Council Guidelines No.1-CA(7)/02/2008, dated 8th August,2008,
a) A CA can sign up to 45 Tax Audit.
b) In case of Partnership Firm, limit will be 45 / Partner.
c) Audit U/S 44AD, 44AE, 44AF will not be included in the limit. (FROM FY 2012-13, SEC 44AF ISNOT APPLICABLE)
 
2. ONLINE FILLING, DATE OF SIGNING AND DATE OF FILLING
Q3. What are the Tax Audit Reports which are to be compulsorily filed online?
Ans. As per Notification No. 34/2013 dated 01/05/2013, & Notification No. 42/2013 dated 11/06/2013, Audit reports under Sections 10 (23C) (iv), (v), (vi) or (via), 10A, 12A (1)(b), 44AB, 80-IA, 80-IB, 80-IC, 80-ID, 80JJAA, 80LA, 92E or 115JB are to be filed electronically. (It covers audit report u/s 44AD, 44AE, 44AF also) (FROM FY 2012-13, SEC 44AF is not applicable)
 
Q4. Should we sign Tax Audit Report on 30th September?
Ans. As the word "before" has been used in sec. 44AB, we should not sign Tax Audit Report on 30th September. You should sign Tax Audit Report before 30th September, since the assessee is required to "obtain" Tax Audit Report before the due date i.e. 30th September.
 
Q5. Where audit is to be conducted u/s 92E, what is the last date of filling online Tax Audit Report?
Ans.  Normally, Tax Audit Report is to be submitted by 30th September. However, for these assesses Report u/s 92E as well as Tax Audit Report can be filled by 30th November.
 
3. CAN A PARTNER SIGN ON BEFALF OF OTHER PARTNERS
Q6. Please advice in case of partnership firm can only one partner sign all the reports?
Ans.
a) Clause 12 Of Part I of Schedule I of Chartered Accountants Act allow a partner to sign on behalf of (i) Other Partner (ii) Firm
b) Sign can be either digital or physical
c) In my view, one partner can sign form 3CD etc. keeping in view the limit of 45 audits per partner.
 
[Clause 12 of Part I of Schedule I of Chartered Accountants Act states that "A CA in practice will be guilty if he allows a person not being a member of the institute in practice, or a member not being his partner to sign on his behalf or on behalf of his firm, any balance-sheet, P&L a/c, report or financial statements"]
 
4. CAN RETURN BE FILED AFTER DUE DATE
Q7. Can Income tax Return be e-filed after 30th September? However we will file Tax Audit Report within 30th September?
Ans. Yes, Online Tax Audit Report is to be filed by 30th September to avoid penalty of Rs. 1.5 Lakhs or ½% of Turnover, whichever is lower. However, return may be filed later. However, such return will be treated as belated return.
 
5. ITR 7 TO BE FILED ONLINE?
Q8. Whether e-Filing of ITR 7 For AY 2013 - 14 mandatory or can we file paper returns also?
Ans.  It Is Mandatory To Submit Online
 
6. MANDATORY E-FILLING OF TRUST, SOCIETY
Q9. Are All Charitable Trust and Cooperative Society's Income Tax Return Are to E-File?
Ans: The Charitable Trusts etc. are Required To File Return Online Also.
 
7. RESPONSIBILITY OF TAX AUDITOR FOR DELAY IN UPLOADING
Q10. Is tax auditor responsible for delay in uploading of Tax Audit Report?
Ans.  Guidance Note on Tax Audit states that normally, it is the professional duty of the CA to ensure that the audit accepted by him is completed before the due date. Hence, yes, if delay is attributable to his part.
 
8. PENALTY FOR NON FURNISHING OF REPORT
Q11. What are the penalties for non furnishing a Tax Audit Report?
Ans. Sec 271B states that, if any person fails to get his accounts audited in respect of any previous year or years relevant to an assessment year or furnish a report of such audit as required under section 44AB, the Assessing Officer may direct that such person shall pay, by way of penalty, a sum equal to one-half per cent of the total sales, turnover or gross receipts, as the case may be, in business, or of the gross receipts in profession, in such previous year or years or a sum of one hundred fifty thousand rupees, whichever is less.
 
9. WAIVER OF PENALTY FOR NON FURNISHING
Q12. What are the circumstances under which penalty cannot be imposed for non furnishing of Tax Audit Report?
Ans. As per section 273B, no penalty is imposable under section 271B on the assessee for the above failure if he proves that there was reasonable cause for the said failure. The onus of proving reasonable cause is on the assessee. Some of the instances where Tribunals/Courts have accepted as "reasonable cause" are as follows:
(a) Resignation of the tax auditor and consequent delay;
(b) Bona fide interpretation of the term `turnover' based on expert advice;
(c) Death or physical inability of the partner in charge of the accounts;
(d) Labour problems such as strike, lock out for a long period, etc.;
(e) Loss of accounts because of fire, theft, etc. beyond the control of the assessee;
(f) Non-availability of accounts on account of seizure;
(g) Natural calamities, commotion, etc.
 
10. FORMAT OF MAINTAINANCE OF RECORDS OF TAX AUDIT
Q13. What is the format for maintaining records of Tax Audit Assignments?
Ans. Record of Tax Audit Assignments
1. Name of the Member accepting the assignment
2. Membership No.
3. Financial year of audit acceptance
4. Name and Registration No. of the firm/ firms of which the member is a proprietor or partner.
 
Sl. No.
Name of the Auditee
AY of the Auditee
Date of Appointment
Date of acceptance
Name of the firm on whose behalf the member has accepted the assignment
Date of communication with the previous auditor (applicable)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. COMMUNICATION WITH PREVIOUS AUDITOR
Q14. Is communication with the previous tax auditor necessary?
Ans. Yes
 
12. SHOULD CA ACEEPT TAX AUDIT IF UNDISPUTED FEES OF PREVIOUS AUDITOR NOT PAID
Q15. Should a CA accept Tax audit where undisputed fees of previous auditor have not been paid?
Ans. As per Council Guidelines No.1-CA(7)/02/2008, dated 8th August,2008, "a member of the Institute in practice shall not accept the appointment as auditor of an entity in case the undisputed audit fee of another CA for carrying out the statutory audit under the Companies Act, 1956 or various other statutes has not been paid"
 
13. TAR OF PVT LTD COMPANY
Q16. Whether Form 3CA or Form 3CB to use for Tax Audit Report purpose of a Pvt. Ltd. Co. having statutory Audit done by the same CA.
Ans. Form No 3CA-3CD
 
14. ADDRESS FOR NRI DIRECTOR IN ITR
Q17. While filling Director Details in ITR 6, only Indian Address is accepted in the form. However, one of the directors is an NRI and having foreign address. Should we fill in a local address of the Director and proceed or there is some other way out?
Ans. ITR-6 Required Residential Address. If Indian Address Available Then Give.
Particulars of MD, Directors, Secretary and Principal officer(s) 
who have held the office during the previous year
Name
Designation
Residential
Address
PAN
S.No.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. PAN OF RELATIVE FOR UNSECURED LOAN
Q18. Whether it is mandatory to mention Pan No of Party Related with Unsecured Loan in online 3CD Form
Ans. EFiling software is not accepting it without PAN. Hope error will be rectified soon.
 
16. RETURN CAN BE UPLOADED BEFORE TAR
Q19. Is there any problem in uploading Income Tax Return before filing/approval of Tax Audit forms?
Ans. Date of furnishing TAR to department is to be mentioned in ITR. So TAR is to be filed first.
 
17. PROBLEM OF THREE TAX AUDITORS OF SAME ASSESSEE
Q20. An Individual Has Three Businesses Audited By Same/Different Tax Auditors. How To Submit Tax Audit Report?
Ans. In my view, you can follow the below mentioned steps.
a) Combine data of all B/S, P/l, tax audit report and submit as one
b) If tax audit conducted by different CAs, any CA can submit.
c) It is advised to attach physical copies of all Tax Audit Reports too, for disclosure of the fact that (i) different CAs have done Tax audit and (ii) that CA who is filling had relied on the work of all other Cas. (iii) There are three different Tax audit report whose data has been combined while submitting online TAR.
 
18. PROBLEM OF DIFFERENT METHODS OF VALUATION OF STOCK IN TWO FIRMS
Q21. An Individual Have 2 Firms. In One Firm, Method Of Valuation Of Closing Stock Is Cost Or Market Price Whichever Is Less. However, In Other Firm, Stock Is Valued At Market Price. How To Show It In Online Form 3cd?
Ans. It is better to mention the facts in separate sheet and attach with the online audit report.
 
19. APPROVAL OF TAR BY ASSESSEE IS MANDATORY
Q22. What If The Assessee Does Not Approve The Audit Report Submitted Before The Due Date
Ans. It may be presumed that no tar has been submitted by assessee
 
20. HOW TO SHOW ADDITIONAL DEPRECIATION
Q23. How To Show Additional Depreciation in the Online Form 3CD.
Ans. Add It with Normal Depreciation
 
21. DATE OF TAX AUDIT REPORT VS DATE OF FURNISHING TAX AUDIT REPORT
Q24. What is the difference between date of TAR and date of furnishing of TAR?
Ans. Date of TAR is the date of signing by the auditor and date of furnishing TAR is the date on which assessee approves the audit report uploaded by CA.
 
22. FORMAT FOR TAX AUDIT U/S 44AD
Q25. What is the format for Tax Audit u/s 44AD?
Ans. The Tax Audit under the provisions of section 44AD are to be conducted u/s 44AB. Hence, the format prescribed for Tax Audit u/s 44AD is 3CB & 3CD.
 
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IT : Section 10(23C) benefit can't be granted to maternity hospital as child birth is a natural process of God which in no way could be said to be any illness as contemplated under section 10(23C)(iiiae)
• In the instant case the assessee was running a maternity hospital in which services were provided to patients on nominal charges. In the cross objections it made a claim for deduction under section 10(23C)(iiiae). Thus, the moot question that arosed before the ITAT was as under:
• Whether assessee was eligible to claim deduction under section 10(23C)(iiiae) and whether services provided by assessee in relation to maternity hospital could be termed as services provided for illness or disease as envisaged under section 10(23C)(iiiae)?
The Tribunal held as under:
(1)  The child birth is the natural process of God and it certainly is the God's grace which is extended to sustain us through it. It is the act of God who designs a child conceived in the womb to be born into this world;
(2)  In olden days deliveries of children were perfectly conducted by midwives at home, but in the modern age, it is only because the anxiety of people that they would not be able to manage the discomfort or pain during labour, they choose to take better facilities in the hospitals in presence of Doctors for this purpose;
(3)  Thus, the assessee's maternity hospital had been facilitating the deliveries, i.e., a natural process of God, which in no way could be said to be any illness to be treated in the hospital as envisaged under section 10(23C)(iiiae);
(4)  The CIT(A) rightly disallowed the claim of assessee as the ingredients of section 10(23C)(iiiae) were not fulfilled. Thus, the cross objections of the assessee had no merit and were accordingly, to be dismissed.
■■■
[2013] 37 taxmann.com 1 (Agra - Trib.)
IN THE ITAT AGRA BENCH
Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle -1, Aligarh
v.
Nehru Prasutika Asptal Samiti
BHAVNESH SAINI, JUDICIAL MEMBER 
AND A.L. GEHLOT, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
IT APPEAL NO. 218 (AGRA) OF 2013 
C.O. NO. 18 (AGRA) OF 2013
[ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009-10]
AUGUST  14, 2013 
K.K. Mishra for the Appellant. Nikhil Kumar for the Respondent.
ORDER
 
Bhavnesh Saini, Judicial Member - The departmental appeal and the cross objection by the assessee are directed against the order of ld. CIT(A), Ghaziabad dated 15.03.2013 for the assessment year 2009-10.
2. We have heard the ld. representatives of both the parties, perused the findings of the authorities below and considered the material available on record.
Departmental Appeal :
3. The Revenue challenged the order of the ld. CIT(A) in holding that investment of surplus fund in FDRs to earn interest income on idle funds is directly incidental activity. Hence, such interest income of Rs.11,32,800/- is eligible for exemption u/s. 11 of the IT Act. It is also stated that earning of interest on surplus funds cannot be treated as either educational or charitable activities.
4. The assessee filed return of income at nil income accompanied by auditors report. The assessee society is running a maternity hospital at Aligarh. All services pertaining to maternity, i.e., consultation, delivery and related operations etc. are provided to the patients at nominal charges. The assessee society is registered u/s. 12AA of the IT Act. The AO asked the assessee as to why interest income from FDR be not taxed. The AO found that as per submissions, the interest income as per FDR exceeds 15% of receipts allowed to be treated as charitable activity and balance was to be disallowed. The interest income was found to be taxable income. The assessee challenged the addition before the ld. CIT(A) and also claimed that its income is exempt u/s. 10(23C)(iiiae) of the Income-tax Act. It was submitted that the assessee is a charitable trust running a maternity hospital and large number of deliveries and related operations are conducted in the hospital. Therefore, the assessee is entitled for exemption u/s. 11 as well as u/s. 10(23C)(iiiae) of the IT Act and the receipts do not exceed Rs.1 crore. The investment made in the FDRs with the bank is permissible mode u/s. 11(5) of the IT Act. The AO disallowed 15% of the income. Therefore, remaining should have been considered as the income applied to the charitable objects. The assessee relied upon the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of DIT(Exemption) v. Dalmiya Shiksha Pratishthan, 305 ITR 327, in which it was held that merely because the assessee earns interest as a result of its investment would not mean that the assessee ceased to exist solely for educational purposes. The assessee also relied upon the decision of ITAT, Delhi Bench in the case of ITO v. Jesuit Conference of India, 47 SOT 29, in which it was held -
"Assessee trust would not lose exemption under s. 11 merely because of investing surplus money in mutual fund units and entering frequent transactions related to purchase/switchover from one such mutual fund scheme to another as the same is not a business activity; even otherwise, there was due compliance of the provisions of s. 11(4A) by the assessee."
The ld. CIT(A) found the claim of the assessee to be correct because the interest earned on surplus/corpus fund was directly incidental to the main activities of the trust and the assessee's claim is allowable by the above decision. The AO was therefore, directed to allow deduction u/s. 11 of the IT Act.
5. On consideration of the rival submissions, we are of the view that the departmental appeal has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. The decision in the case of Dalmiya Shiksha Pratishthan (supra) and ITO v. Jesuit Conference of India (supra) squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. The assessee has invested its funds in FDRs on which the assessee earned interest, which is applied towards the objects of the assessee society. The funds invested in FDR have been shown in the balance sheet and is the property of the assessee-society. Merely because the assessee earns interest on its surplus/corpus funds would not lead to the fact that the assessee exists for profit purpose. The claim of the assessee has been correctly allowed by the ld. CIT(A). The departmental appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.
Cross Objection:
6. The assessee in the cross objection made a claim of deduction u/s. 10(23C)(iiiae) of the IT Act. The ld. CIT(A) held that the assessee is a general hospital pertaining to maternity while the hospital/Institution as envisaged in section 10(23C)(iiiae) is in respect of mental disease or illness or rehabilitation existing solely for philanthropic purposes. The assessee has, however, not satisfied these conditions. Therefore, the claim of assessee was denied. Section 10(23C)(iiiae) of the IT Act reads as under :
"Any hospital or other institution for the reception and treatment of persons suffering from illness or mental defectiveness or for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation, existing solely for philanthropic purposes and not for purposes of profit, if the aggregate annual receipts of such hospital or institution do not exceed the amount of annual receipts as may be prescribed."
7. The AO noted in the assessment order that the assessee society is running maternity hospital and all services pertaining to maternity only. Maternity is a natural process and could not be termed as illness or disease. Giving birth and at that time hospital providing services for delivery could not be said to be providing any treatment for illness or mental defectiveness. Further in absence of any details or evidences available on record, we do not find it to be a fit case for interference and the ld. CIT(A) was therefore justified in holding that the ingredients of above section are not fulfilled in the case of assessee. The ld. counsel for the assessee pointed out from the paper book, the application of income and details of deliveries and operations conducted in this regard, which is not sufficient to grant relief under the above provisions to the assessee. It is worthwhile pointing out that the child birth is the natural process of God and it is certainly the God's grace which is extended to sustain us through it. It is the act of God who designs a child conceived in the womb to be born into this world. In olden days deliveries of children were perfectly conducted by midwives at home, but in the modern age, it is only because the anxiety of people that they would not be able to manage the discomfort or pains during labor, they choose to take better facilities in the hospitals in presence of Doctors for this purpose. Thus, it may be said that the assessee's maternity hospital in the instant case would have been facilitating the deliveries, i.e., a natural process of God. It, therefore, can in no way be said to be any illness to be treated in the assessee's hospital as envisaged u/s. 10(23C)(iiiae). Therefore, the ingredients of section 10(23C)(iiiae) being not fulfilled, the ld. CIT(A) has rightly disallowed the claim of assessee. As a result, the cross objection of the assessee has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.
8. In the result, the departmental appeal as well as the cross objection of the assessee are dismissed.

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IT: Where in appellate proceedings, Tribunal took a view that order passed by Commissioner (appeals) being administrative in nature, assessee's appeal against said order was not maintainable, subsequently in rectification proceedings Tribunal could not remand matter back with a direction to Commissioner (Appeals) to pass a fresh order on assessee's application
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[2013] 36 taxmann.com 307 (Gujarat)
HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Commissioner of Income-tax
v.
Patel Maheshbhai Dahyabhai*
AKIL KURESHI AND MS. SONIA GOKANI, JJ.
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8003 OF 2013
MAY  2, 2013 
Section 254, read with section 119, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Appellate Tribunal - Powers of [Scope of] - Assessment year 2000-01 - For relevant assessment year, assessee filed his return after expiry of prescribed time period claiming refund of tax deducted at source - Since return was filed belatedly, assessee moved Commissioner for regularization of such return in terms of section 119(2)(b) - Commissioner rejected assessee's application - Tribunal recorded a finding that appeal which was filed against order under section 119(2)(b) was not maintainable since such order was an administrative order and, therefore, not appealable before Tribunal - Assessee sought rectification of said order - In rectification proceedings, Tribunal remanded matter back to Commissioner for consideration of assessee's application afresh - Commissioner filed instant petition challenging aforesaid direction of Tribunal - Whether since in original order, Tribunal took a view that order passed by Commissioner (Appeals) was not appealable, in exercise of rectification powers, it could not have given directions to Commissioner to pass fresh order on assessee's application - Held, yes - Whether, however, in view of peculiar facts of case that assessee, who was a labourer and retired more than 10 years back and did not have any taxable income, impugned order passed by Tribunal in rectification proceedings was to be upheld - Held, yes [Paras 7 and 8] [In favour of assessee]
Km Parikh for the Petitioner.
ORDER
 
Akil Kureshi, J.- This petition is filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax-II, Baroda, in somewhat peculiar circumstances.
2. Respondent, one Maheshbhai Dahyabhai Patel, had filed a return of income for the assessment year 2000-01. Such return was filed after the due date prescribed under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). He, therefore, had moved the petitioner herein for regularisation of such return in terms of Section 119(2)(b) of the Act. His main plank was that he is a retired labourer and was totally ignorant about the Income-tax laws and other technical requirements. On the basis of such return, he had claimed a refund of Rs.33,949/-. In his application dated June 10, 2003 for above purpose, he stated that his normal salary was below the taxable limit and no Income-tax return, therefore, was filed. Under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, however, he received a compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- during the financial year under consideration and the tax of Rs.33,949/- was deducted at source by the employer company. For the purpose of getting his refund, he had filed the return. The same was, however, beyond the prescribed limit. He, therefore, requested the petitioner to exercise powers under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act.
3. Such application was rejected by an order dated January 22, 2008. In such order, the Commissioner recorded that the return was due on July 31, 2000. The same was filed only on June 30, 2003 i.e. nearly three years from the last date for filing the return. He rejected the petitioner's ground of ignorance of law for delay in filing the return.
4. Such order of the petitioner was challenged by the respondent before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in a Tax Appeal. Such Tax Appeal came to be dismissed by an order dated April 04, 2012. The Tribunal recorded that the appeal which was filed against the order under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act was not maintainable since such order was an administrative order and, therefore, not appellable before the Tribunal.
5. The respondent filed a Miscellaneous Application for rectification of such order of the Tribunal. In such rectification proceedings, the Tribunal passed the impugned order dated October 19, 2012. During the course of hearing of such application, it was pointed out to the Tribunal that the petitioner had rejected the application under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act, on the premise that the return was filed late by about three years. June, 2003, however, was the date of filing of the application under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act. The return was delayed by only about one year and three months. On such premise, the Tribunal passed the following order.
"4. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material on record. From the order dated 22-1-2009 passed u/s.119(2)(b), we find that the application of the assessee was rejected for the reason that the return was filed almost 3 years from the due date. The assessee's submission is that the delay was not of 3 years but of 1 year and 3 months. It was further the submission of the Ld. A.R. that the delay be directed to be condoned in view of the fact that the assessee is a retired labourer who is ignorant about the Income-tax laws. The Ld. D.R. has not brought any contrary facts to contradict the submissions of the Ld. A.R.
5. We find that the assessee is a retired labourer. Considering the totality of facts and in the interest of justice we are of the view that considering the peculiar circumstances of the case the Commissioner of Income-tax may consider the case afresh including the issue of condonation of delay and after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the assessee pass the necessary orders."
6. It is this order that the Revenue has challenged before us. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the Tribunal committed serious error in entertaining and allowing the rectification application of the respondent. He submitted that the order of the Commissioner was not appellable before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, therefore, had no jurisdiction to pass any order in favour of the respondent.
7. We have no hesitation in holding that the Tribunal's order on rectification application suffered from serious legal defect. If in the original order, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the order passed by the petitioner was not appellable, in exercise of rectification powers the Tribunal simply could not have given directions to the Commissioner to pass fresh order on the respondent's application. In essence, the Tribunal nullified the original order of the Commissioner and directed him to pass a fresh order after hearing the respondent. The Tribunal could have done this if the appeal was maintainable. When the Tribunal was of the opinion that the appeal was not maintainable, there was no question of giving such a direction, particularly in the order on application for rectification, the Tribunal did not come to any different conclusion. In other words, without holding that the appeal was maintainable, the order under challenge could not have been interfered with.
8. This petition, however, involves peculiar facts. The respondent-assessee, who was a labourer and retired more than 10 years back, did not have any taxable income under normal circumstances. He had perhaps in his entire life never filed any return of income. As a part of golden hand shake, he received a lump sum amount of Rs.1,30,000/-. The employer deducted a hefty tax at source of Rs.33,949/-. It appears that he was entitled to refund of such tax deducted at source. Under such circumstances, he filed his return for the assessment year 2000-01. Such return was delayed. Such return is ignored on the ground that no valid return is filed. His refund of Rs.33,949/- is withheld for the last about 10 years. It is for this purpose he prayed to the Commissioner that such delay be condoned. For the present, we are not commenting on the Commissioner's approach while deciding such application. All that the Tribunal has in the impugned order done is to require the Commissioner to pass a fresh order. This the Tribunal was persuaded to do because in the order passed by the Commissioner under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act, he was influenced substantially by the fact that according to him, the return was belated by three years. The respondent pointed out to the Tribunal that such delay was of about one year and three months. The Commissioner had mistakenly taken into account the date of filing of the application under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act.
9. Only to correct the Tribunal's order, we are simply not prepared to call the respondent before us. The man has retired in the year 2000 as a labourer. He is seeking refund of small sum of Rs.33,949/- which for him is very substantial. Only to correct an apparent error committed by the Tribunal, we would not drag him before High Court. Even if we had issued notice and called him before us, we would have been persuaded to replace the Tribunal's order by our order and same direction would have followed. Only to bring about some result in a correct manner, we would be wholly unjustified in asking a man of advanced age and of poor means before us. Response to a High Court notice comes at a considerable cost. In exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction, we refuse to entertain this petition. This is the beauty of the writ jurisdiction and we would be failing in our duty, if we entertained the petition.
10. In the result, the petition is dismissed.

CX - Modvat - Bought out items exported as such along with machinery for setting up a plant in Vietnam - No Credit: Supreme Court 

By TIOL News Service
NEW DELHI SEPT 05 2013: THE appellant-assessee entered into a contract with M/s Vina Sugars Vietnam for supply and installation of a sugar plant at Vietnam with a capacity of 1250 TCD (Tons crushed per day). For the said purpose the appellant had manufactured certain machines in its own factory which were to form part of the sugar plant and certain machinery including electric cables etc. which were necessary for the plant were purchased by the appellant from other dealers-manufacturers and the said machines- equipments - cables etc. which had been purchased from others along with appellant's manufactured items had been put in a container and the containers were transported to Vietnam so that the different parts of the machinery can be assembled and the plant can be set up at Vietnam.
In the course of its business the appellant had availed the MODVAT credit on certain goods under the provisions of Rule 57 Q of the Central Excise Rules 1944 declaring them as 'capital goods' which had been purchased by the appellant from other manufacturers-dealers in the country and had sent to Vietnam along with other parts of machinery manufactured by the appellant.
The respondent-department was of the view that the MODVAT credit availed by the appellant on goods parts of machinery & cables etc. purchased by it from local market and transported in a container along with other parts of machinery manufactured by it was not justified for the reason that the appellant had wrongly described such parts- equipments - cables etc. as 'capital goods' though the said goods were not covered under the definition of 'capital goods' under the provisions of Rule 57 Q of the Rules. The department was of the view that none of such purchased items had been used by the appellant in its factory premises in relation to manufacture of the final product manufactured by the appellant.
For the afore-stated reasons show cause notices dated 29.03.1996 and 03.03.1997 were issued to the appellant which had been dropped on considering the reply of the appellant. Upon review of the orders whereby the show cause notices had been dropped the Central Board of Excise and Customs directed the Commissioner to file an appeal before the CEGAT and therefore the Commissioner filed the appeals.
It was mainly submitted in the appeals on behalf of the department that the goods in respect of which the MODVAT credit was availed by the appellant were not capital goods as per the provisions of Rule 57Q of the Rules. It was also submitted that such goods were not used in the factory premises of the appellant in any manufacturing process and therefore the said goods were not capital goods as claimed by the appellant. It was also the case of the department that the said goods had been exported by the appellant along with parts of machinery manufactured by the appellant in a container and the said parts i.e. the parts purchased by the appellant had been exported in the same condition i.e. even without opening the packages or testing them. Thus the role of the appellant was merely like a trader who had purchased certain goods including parts of machinery cables etc. from dealers in our country and thereafter exported the same in the exact condition in special containers along with the machinery manufactured by it.
The department was also of the view that the parts of machinery which had been exported by the appellant could not have been said to be in Completely Knocked Down condition because the parts manufactured by the appellant and the parts purchased by the appellant from other dealers in the country had never been assembled in the appellant's factory and they were exported in the same condition as stated hereinabove and it was also pertinent to note that the parts so purchased were packed in such a way so as to keep the parts in good condition even after it is transported from India to Vietnam by sea.
The department was also of the view that the parts so purchased by the appellant could not have been treated even as 'inputs' as the said parts had not been used by the appellant in the process of manufacturing the machinery. The appeals were heard by the CEGAT and ultimately the CEGAT allowed the appeals by remanding the cases to the original authority for computing and confirming the amount of the MODVAT credit irregularly availed by the appellant and also for imposition of appropriate penalty after affording effective opportunity of hearing to the appellant in accordance with law.
Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the CEGAT the present appeals have been filed by the appellant before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court observed
It is pertinent to note that the most important object concerning grant of the MODVAT credit is to see that cascading effect of the duty imposed on the final product cleared at the time of sale is removed. If some duty is levied on the inputs raw materials etc. and if the final product is also dutiable then the duty levied on inputs i.e. raw materials is to be reduced from the duty ascertained on the final product. Thus there are two conditions for getting the MODVAT credit benefit:
i) On the raw materials i.e. on the inputs the manufacturer must have paid duty and such raw material must have been used in the process of manufacturing the final product in his factory or premises.
ii) Excise duty must have been levied on the final product. If there is no duty levied on the final product there would not be any question of grant of any relief because in that case there would not be any cascading effect on the duty imposed.
Looking at the above stated clear legal position one may see here that no duty was paid by the appellant on the final product i.e. on the sugar plant which had been set up in Vietnam. For time being let us forget the fact whether the plant is movable or immovable the fact remains that no duty was paid on the said plant and therefore there would not be any question with regard to getting credit on the duty paid on the inputs especially when the appellant had not used the machinery manufactured by other manufacturers in its factory premises while manufacturing machinery which had been transported along with machinery manufactured by the appellant in a common container which had been sent to Vietnam by sea.
In our opinion the above stated reason is quite sufficient for denying any MODVAT credit to the appellant. While dealing with a similar issue this Court had observed in para no.15 of the judgment delivered in the case of Madras Cements Ltd. v. CCE - 2010-TIOL-40-SC-CX as under:
"In order to avail of MODVAT / CENVAT credit an assessee has to satisfy the assessing authorities that the capital goods in the form of components spares and accessories had been utilized during the process of manufacture of the finished product. Admittedly in this case the appellant was not able to identify the machinery for which the goods in question had been used. In the absence of such identification it was not possible for the assessing authorities to come to a decision as to whether MODVAT credit would be given in respect of the goods in question."
Looking to the above legal position in our view the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal cannot be said to be incorrect.
It is also not in dispute that the appellant had purchased some machinery from others and such machinery had not even been unpacked by it and in the exact condition it had been transported along with the machinery manufactured by it to Vietnam. Thus the appellant did not use the purchased machinery in its premises or in its factory and therefore necessary condition incorporated in the Rules for availing credit of the MODVAT had not been complied with. To avail the MODVAT credit the input on which excise duty is paid must be used in the manufacture of the final product in the factory of the assessee. The machinery purchased by the appellant had not even been tested or was not even unwrapped in the factory of the appellant. In case of such an admitted fact it cannot be said that the machinery so purchased from others was used by the appellant in the manufacture of the sugar plant.
In the instant case the appellant had only acted as a trader or as an exporter in relation to the machinery purchased by it which had been exported and used for setting up a sugar plant in a foreign country. In any case it cannot be said to have manufactured that plant in its factory.
Moreover it is also clear that the appellant-assessee did not pay any excise duty on the sugar plant set up by it in Vietnam and therefore there cannot be any question of availing any MODVAT credit."
The Supreme Court was of the view that the Tribunal had come to a correct conclusion and the conclusion so arrived at by the Tribunal does not require any interference. The party' s appeal is dismissed.

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Tax Audit issues Raised by ICAI & Reply by IT Department

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS(FAQs) ON e-FILING OF TAX
AUDIT REPORT
(Developed by Direct Taxes Committee of ICAI in consultation with the Officials of Directorate
of Income-Tax (Systems)
Note: This document deals with those FAQ's which are not covered in the e-filing portal. The members may visit thewww.incometaxindiaefiling.gov.infor other FAQ's.
[Go to home page of www. incometaxindiaefiling.gov. in, click on 'Help' menu at right topmost corner of the page, then click on the link as may be considered necessary]
1. What is the complete procedure to upload tax audit reports by Tax Professionals?
The procedure of e- filing is explained at the following path of e-filing website:
https://incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in/e-Filing/Portal/StaticPDF/Registration Services.pdf?0.223 1070064008236
However, the procedure in brief is mentioned below:
CA Reg 1
Step- I
Registration on e-filingportal
Action by Chartered Accountant
b)   Click on 'Register Yourself' tab and select the user type under Tax Professional as 'CharteredAccountant'
c) Enter Basic details:
Step- II
Add Chartered Accountant
Action by Assessee
a)      Assessee is required to login into his/her account by entering user id and password atwww.incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in
b)      Go to 'My Account' tab and select 'Add CA'
c)      Enter MRN of the CA. After entering correct 6 digits MRN of CA, the name of CA will automatically get prefilled.
d)     Select the Form no. for which CA is supposed to be added.
e)      Select Assessment Year
f)       Enter the image of the captcha code
g) Click 'Submit'
After successful submission of above, a message will be displayed notifying the addition of CA in assessee's profile.
Step- III
Submit Tax Audit report
Action by Chartered Accountant
CA Reg 2
After successful uploading of tax audit report, the said form will go to assessee for approval.
Step- IV
Approval or Rejection of uploaded tax audit report
Action by Assessee
a)                  Login the account and navigate to 'Work list' tab (Assessee will be able to view list of forms submitted by Chartered Accountant along with attachment)
b)                  Click on 'View Form'
c)                  Assessee can verify the form and approve/reject the form (other than ITR).
d)                 The acceptance of the form (other than ITR) by the assessee is to be made under his/her Digital Signature.
e)          If assessee is rejecting the form, reason for such rejection has to be provided.
An email will be sent to the registered e-mail id after successful submission of the form along with the acknowledgement number.
2. Whether Schedules and Notes to Accounts are also required to be uploaded with Balance Sheet and P&L?
Form No. 3CA requires the tax auditor to annex a copy of the Statutory Audit Report along with the copy of audited Profit and Loss Account/ Income & Expenditure Account, audited Balance Sheetand documents declared by the said Act to be a part of / or annexed to the Balance Sheet and Profit and loss Account/ Income & Expenditure Account. Accordingly, the same are required to be uploaded.
With regard to Form No.3CB, the tax auditor is required to annex the audited Balance Sheet, Profit and loss account /Income & Expenditure Account along with notes to accounts and schedules, if any, forming part of Balance Sheet, Profit and loss account /Income & Expenditure Account.
3. Whether it is mandatory to upload a scanned copy of signed Balance Sheet, P&L andother documents?
Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss Account in Word, Excel Format, etc signed as "sd/-" can be converted in to '.pdf' file and uploaded on the portal. However, the auditor should maintain the physically signed Audited Report in his records and ensure from that there is no difference between physical report and PDF file uploaded.
4.           Whether Name / Date of Birth (DOB) of the Chartered Accountant given in PANdatabase (as per ITD e-filing website) is to be matched with the ICAI database for successful registration in the e-filing portal?E-filing portal verifies the Name of Member and Date of Birth entered in Registration Form from ICAI Database and also PAN Database. In case there is difference / mismatch of details between the two Databases the portal will not allow registration. In case any member is facing such difficulty, please refer to procedure given in the following linkhttp://220.227.161 .86/30652dtc20622.pdf
5. Whether audit conducted under section 44AD, 44BB, 44BBB & 44AE is required to befiled electronically?
Sections 44AD, 44BB, 44BBB & 44AE provide that in specified cases the assessee is required to get his accounts audited and furnish the report of such audit as required under section 44AB. Therefore, e-filing is applicable to such audits also.
6. Where the Firm Registration No. (FRN) should be mentioned in the e-forms?The presentE-filing portal does not provide field to mention FRN, however, the department is in the process of enabling this facility. Till the utility is configured to allow entering of FRN, members need not mention their FRN.
7.       Where should the comments/observations in respect of a particular clause of FormNo.3CD is to be mentioned in the e-form?Comments / observations, if any relating to the clauses may be given in Form 3CA/3CB subject to space provided therein. Alternatively, they can be uploaded as PDF file in the field 'Upload other report' of the portal.
8.           In case tax audit is conducted by joint auditors, what is the procedure to upload tax audit report electronically?The e-filing portal allows the report to be uploaded by a single auditor. Therefore, the joint auditors may mutually agree and decide the auditor who shall upload the report. However, all the joint auditors should sign the hard copies.As per the ICAI's "Guidance Note on Tax Audit u/s 44AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961", it is possible for the assessee to appoint two or more chartered accountants as joint auditors for carrying out the tax audit, in which case, theaudit report will have to signed by all the chartered accountants. As per Standards on Auditing 299 (Responsibility of Joint Auditors) issued by ICAI, normally, the joint auditors are able to arrive at an agreed report. In such case, the physical copy should be signed by all the auditors. Thereafter, any one of them may upload the report.However, where the joint auditors are in disagreement with regard to any matters to be covered by the report, each one of them should express his own opinion through a separate report. A joint auditor is not bound by the views of the majority of the joint auditors regarding matters to be covered in the report and is required to express his opinion in a separate report in case of a disagreement. Such separate reports are also to be uploaded on the portal.
9. What is the procedure to furnish revised audit report electronically?In case of revision, theaudit report should be given in the manner suggested by the Institute in SA-560 (Revised) "Subsequent Events". It may be pointed out that report under section 44AB should not normally berevised. However, sometimes a member may be required to revise his tax audit report on grounds such as:
(i)                    revision of accounts of a company after its adoption in annual general meeting.
(ii)                  change of law e.g., retrospective amendment.
(iii)                change in interpretation, e.g. CBDT's circular, judgments, etc.
(iv)                Any other reason like system/software error requiring change in report already
uploaded.
In case, where a member is called upon to report on the revised accounts, then he must mention in the revised report that the said report is a revised report and a reference should be made to the earlier report also. In the revised report, reasons for revising the report should also be mentioned.
The e-filing portal allows uploading such Revised Audit Report by the CA for the same PAN and Assessment Year.
10.  Is there any upper limit on the no. of audit reports which can be uploaded by a Chartered Accountant on e-filing portal?
As per ICAI Council Guidelines No.1-CA(7)/02/2008, dated 8th August,2008, a member of the Institute in practice shall not accept, in a financial year, more than the 45 tax audit assignmentsunder Section 44AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. However, audits conducted under sections 44AD and 44AE shall not be included in this limit.
Since, the Income-tax Act,1961 does not provide any limit on number of tax audits assignments which can be undertaken by a Chartered Accountant the e-filing portal does not provide any restriction. However, members are required to comply with the prescribed ceiling limits.
11.       If there are 10 partners in a firm of Chartered Accountants, then how many tax audits reports can each partner sign in a financial year?As per Chapter VI of Council General Guidelines, 2008 (Tax Audit Assignments under Section 44AB of the Income Tax Act, 1961), a member of the Institute in practice shall not accept, in a financial year, more than the specified number of tax audit assignments as prescribed under Section 44AB of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The specified number of tax audit assignments under Section 44AB of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is 45.
It is further provided in Chapter VI of Council General Guidelines, 2008 that in case of firm of Chartered Accountants in practice, specified number of tax audit assignments means 45 tax audit assignments per partner of the firm, in a financial year.
Therefore, if there are 10 partners in a firm of Chartered Accountants in practice, then all the partners of the firm can collectively sign 450 tax audit reports. This maximum limit of 450 tax audit assignments may be distributed between the partners in any manner whatsoever. For instance, 1 partner can individually sign 450 tax audit reports in case remaining 9 partners are not signing any tax audit report.
It is needless to say that the tax audit assignment should be in accordance with the Standard on Quality Control (SQC) 1: Quality Control for Firms that Perform Audits and Reviews of Historical Financial Information, and Other Assurance and Related Services Engagements
12.       What is recommended system requirements for facilitating e-filing?To increase the computer processing speed all the previous versions of java be removed from the computer. To use the e-forms utility install Java Runtime Environment Version 7 update 13 (jre 1.7 is also known as jre version 7) or https://incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in
13.       If tax audit report is issued and the ITR is filed prior to issuance of the Notification No. 34/2013, dated 01-05-2013 which mandates e-filing of audit reports. In such cases whether e-filing of audit reports is required?CBDT Notification No. 3 4/2013 dated 1 -05-2013provides that the rules prescribed therein shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from the 1st day of April, 2013. Accordingly, even if ITR has been filed prior to issuance of said Notification, Tax Audit report is required to be e-filed separately.
14.       In case of e-filing of audit reports what is the date of audit report? Date on which the report is physically signed by the Auditor shall be the date of audit report.15. Is it possible to e-file the ITR first and then e-file the audit report?
e-filing of ITR and Tax Audit report are independent actions. However, it is advisable to first upload tax audit report and then file IT return.
16. Even after filling complete details in the first page of ITR-7, one is not allowed to proceed to second page. What should be done in such a case?
The trust should first fill the status and then PAN.
Some More General issues Raised by ICAI during Presentation on e-Filing of Audit Reports – Webcast to ICAI Members 29th August , 2013 and there resolution as suggested by Income Tax Department :- 
Issue - Date of Receipt of Audit Report (Whether Date of filing by CA or date of Acceptance by  Assessee)
Resolution - While Audit Report will become valid on acceptance by Assessee, Date of upload would be treated as date of filing
Issue -  Mismatch between PAN date of Birth and Date of Birth in ICAI database
Resolution – PAN Correction is the correct resolution
Issue -  DSC May be dispensed with
Resolution - Not acceptable.
Issue -  As per ICAI's Council Guidelines the Firm Registration Number (FRN) and the name of the firm with which he/she is associated, has to be mentioned in all audits. However, there is no such requirement in Form No. 3CA/3CB & 3CD
Resolution - The field for Capturing FRN will be added in the verification for the CA. In Reports filed so far where the FRN was not captured procedure shall be intimated
Issue -   Guidance Note on tax audit u/s 44AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961" requires the tax auditor to mention his observations/reservations, if any, in respect of various clauses of Form No.3CD in Form No.3CD itself for the ease of the AOs
Resolution -  ICAI had suggested that separate column may be created with the clause itself; this would require a change in the form by TPL. More space is being created. A sub Committee of ICAI and ITD examining the additional space in Para 3 of Form No. 3CA/ Para 3(a) of Form No.3CB,
Issue -   Word limit has been fixed for reporting in the e-filing schema like under each clause of Form no. 3CD limit is set at 100, for observations and comments the limit is fixed at 1000/2000, for ratios and computation thereof the limit is 30
Resolution - More space is being created. A sub Committee of ICAI and ITD examining the additional space requirements
Issue -  Capturing Signatures of More than one CA in the instance of joint Audits.
Resolution - ICAI  pointed out that only in the case of disagreement would two separate reports be required to be filed. Thus more than audit report under DSC of different CAs are enabled
Issue -   Revised Audit Reports to be enabled
Resolution - Revised Reports can be filed
Issue -   ICAI wanted validations to be built in into various fields such as limits under Chapter VI A or where certain deductions can be claimed by Assessees of certain status.
Resolution - While the general feeling is that the CA's should themselves exercise caution, certain validations are being developed based on the recommendations of the sub-committee
Issue -  In the Java format of e-filing tax audit reports, it is observed that the user is not able to take print out of the filled in forms before or after uploading the same in the e-filing portal
Resolution While print option available post upload/approval of Forms. The XML can be imported into the Forms to check the correctness of the particulars keyed in before upload. The suggestion is being examined
Issue -   The facility of import of data form multiple formats (Excel etc) should be created to prevent tedious data entry/ dta entry errors especially with regards to depreciation schedule and other large schedules
Resolution For ITD to Provide import facility for multiple formats may not be viable. ICAI/ ERIs can consider working on such Utilities. However a standard CSV format for Depreciation schedule shall be made available to permit import
Issue -   CA s could not  view clients
Resolution - Have been resolved
Issue -  There were issues with regards to upload of 20MB/ 50 MB
Resolution - Have been resolved
Issue -  Erasure of certain clauses particularly, the data entered in clauses 7(b), 8(b), 9(a) & 10  after saving
Resolution - Have been resolved
Issue - Special characters disabling
Resolution - Have been resolved
Issue - Companies prior to 1913
Resolution - Have been resolved
Issue -   In case of partnership firm, the total of profit sharing ratio of all partners is equal to 100%. The user should not be allowed to fill in further information if the total of profit sharing ratio is less than 100%
Resolution -  Consciously a decision has been taken not to put any validation in the Audit Report as it is not being processed.
Issue -   17- Separate disclosure for different nature of disallowance is not possible. Under this clause only single amount of disallowance can be specified in sub-clauses 17(a)/ (b)/ (c)/ (d)/ (e)/ (f).
Resolution While a change in the form is being suggested to TPL. Increasing space for remarks at the end of the form is being worked out subject to overall limit of 50MB
Issue -  PAN to not be a mandatory field in the 206A cases
Resolution - Have been resolved
Issue -   No order number in case of brought forward loss reference order
Resolution - Have been resolved
Issue -   Difficulty in uploading scanned P&L accounts and balance sheets
Resolution - PDF documents/ Text or Excel documents can be uploaded. Working on convergence with MCA

IT : 1st proviso to section 206C(6A) introduced by Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 1-7-2012 has retrospective effect
• Applicability of section 206C is not restricted to sale of scrap generated from manufacturing business undertaken by assessee himself but covers sale of scrap in the business of trading in scrap also.
• A "seller" of scrap is neither required to be the manufacturer himself nor the scope of "scrap" as defined in Explanation(b) restricted to scrap generated from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials undertaken by the seller himself.
• The 1st proviso to section 206C(6A) introduced by Finance Act, 2012 w.e..f. 1-7-2012 relieves assessee from consequences of assessee in default for non-collection of TCS based on proof of "no loss to Revenue" in the form of a CA certificate certifying specified matters.
• As the said proviso seeks to rationalize TCS provisions and is also beneficial in nature in the sense that it seeks to provide relief to collectors of tax from consequences of not/short collecting TCS after ensuring Revenue interest is well-protected, said proviso shall apply retrospectively even to pending matters also though it is expressed to be applicable w.e.f. 1-7-2012.
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[2013] 37 taxmann.com 37 (Rajkot - Trib.) (SB)
IN THE ITAT RAJKOT BENCH (SPECIAL BENCH)
Bharti Auto Products
v.
Commissioner of Income-tax -II, Rajkot
G.C. GUPTA, VICE PRESIDENT 
D.K. SRIVASTAVA AND A. MOHAN ALANKAMONY, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
IT APPEAL NOS. 391 & 392 (RJT.) OF 2011
[ASSESSMENT YEARS 2009-10 & 2010-11]
SEPTEMBER  6, 2013 
D.M. RindaniP.M. Maharshi and B.R. Popat for the Appellant. Rajiv Ranade for the Respondent.
ORDER
 
D.M. Srivastava, Accountant Member - In exercise of powers conferred by section 255 of the Income-tax Act, the Hon'ble President has constituted this Special Bench to hear and dispose of both the aforesaid appeals. The ld. Commissioner (Appeals) has passed a common order to dispose of the appeals for both the assessment years. Besides, facts as well as issues involved in both the appeals are common. It is therefore convenient to dispose of both the appeals by a consolidated order.
2. In ITA No.391/Rjt/2011 relating to assessment year 2009-10, the assessee has taken the following grounds of appeal:-
"1.  The learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) - II, Rajkot erred in confirming the order of ITO(TDS) - 3, Jamnagar holding the appellant liable for default of TCS of Rs.2,61,225/- and interest amounting to Rs.28,723/-.
2.  The learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) - II, Rajkot erred in interpreting the definition of "Scrap" U/s.206(C)(1).
3.  The learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) - II, Rajkot failed to appreciate that since the appellant held a bonafide belief regarding interpretation of definition of scrap u/s.206, it could not have been treated as an assessee deemed to be in default.

 The appellant craves leave to add, amend, alter, withdraw any ground of appeal anytime upto the hearing of this appeal."
3. In ITA No.392/Rjt/2011 relating to assessment year 2010-11, the assessee has taken the following grounds of appeal:-
"1.  The learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) - II, Rajkot erred in confirming the order of ITO(TDS) - 3, Jamnagar holding the appellant liable for default of TCS of Rs.6,28,614/- and interest amounting to Rs.10,519/-.
2.  The learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) - II, Rajkot erred in interpreting the definition of "Scrap" U/s.206(C)(1).
3.  The learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) - II, Rajkot failed to appreciate that since the appellant held a bonafide belief regarding interpretation of definition of scrap u/s.206, it could not have been treated as an assessee deemed to be in default.
The appellant craves leave to add, amend, alter, withdraw any ground of appeal anytime upto the hearing of this appeal."
4. In both the aforesaid appeals, the assessee has prayed for admission of the following additional grounds of appeal:- Additional ground No.1.
"The Income-tax Officer (TDS-3), Jamnagar erred in not discharging the onus of showing as to how the material imported by the appellant fell within the definition of "Scrap" as given in section 206C of the Act and the Learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) further erred in confirming the order of the Income-tax Officer (TDS-3), Jamnagar."
Additional ground No. 2
"The Income-tax Officer (TDS-3), Jamnagar failed to appreciate that section 206C strictly did not apply to the facts of the appellant in as much as the sale of materials made by the appellant was not of the nature and kind covered within the definition of a "buyer" as given in section 206C of the Act."
Additional ground No.3
"The I.T.O. and the learned C.I.T.(Appeals) failed to appreciate that where the assessee stated that buyers were assessed to tax, there would be no double recovery of tax on the same sum and thus the I.T.O. erred in treating the assessee as deemed to be in default without first ascertaining this fact from the buyers."
5. It was prayed that all the aforesaid three grounds of appeal should be admitted as they were legal in nature and, after admission, they should be restored to the file of the CIT(A) in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble MP High Court in CIT v. Tollaram Hassomal, 153 Taxman 532 (MP). We have considered the submissions of both the parties. Additional grounds of appeal raised by the assessee are not independent grounds of appeal but are elaborations of the main grounds of appeal. The aforesaid additional grounds of appeal are inextricably linked with the issues raised in the main grounds of appeal. Apart from being integral part of the main grounds of appeal, they are predominantly of legal nature and therefore no useful purpose would be served by restoring the matter to the file of the CIT(A). In this view of the matter, all the aforesaid three grounds of appeal are admitted for adjudication together with main grounds of appeal.
6. The assessee is an individual. He is an importer, trader and seller of brass scrap. Survey u/s 133A of the Income-tax Act was carried out at his business premises on 21-01-2010. It was noticed that the assessee had imported and sold brass scrap amounting to Rs.2,61,22,573/- in assessment year 2009-10 and Rs.6,28,61,420/- in assessment year 2010-11 without collecting tax at source as required by section 206C(1) of the Income-tax Act. The Assessing Officer therefore issued a show cause notice on 01.02.2010 calling upon the assessee to show cause as to why he should not be treated as assessee in default for non-collection of tax at source @ 1% of sales of brass scrap made by him in both the assessment years under appeal. In reply, the assessee, vide his letter dated 12.02.2010, submitted before the AO that he was a mere trader of imported brass scrap. It was also submitted that the brass scrap sold by him was not generated from the manufacture or mechanical working of material and therefore the brass scrap sold by him was not "scrap" within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 206C of the Income-tax Act". The Assessing Officer considered the submissions made by the assessee. He however rejected them for the detailed reasons given in the order passed by him u/s 206C of the Income-tax Act on 09.03.2010. It has been held by him that the assessee has failed to collect the tax at source as required by section 206C(6) of the Income-tax Act on the sale of scrap made by him to various dealers in both the years under appeal and therefore he is liable to pay a sum of Rs.2,61,225/- u/s 206C(6) and further sum of Rs.28,723/- being interest thereon u/s.206C(7) for assessment year 2009-10 and further sum of Rs.6,28,614/- u/s 206C(6) and interest thereon amounting to Rs.10,519/- u/s.206C(7) of the Income-tax Act for assessment year 2010-11. Aggrieved by the order passed by the AO, the assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A). The ld. CIT(A) has dismissed both the appeals with the following observations:-
"8. I am not in agreement with the above contentions of the appellant. It is rightly liable for collecting the sums at 1% from the buyers of the imported brass scrap u/s.206C. My reasons for reaching this conclusion are as below:-
(a)  Firstly, one has to find out whether the appellant should be a manufacturer, thus becoming liable for TCS u/s.206C of the Act or not? I am afraid, it is not. Even a trader can be very well brought under the purview of Section 206C. The reasons are explained in the following lines:-

 The title of Section 206C reads as "Profits and gains from the business of trading in alcoholic liquor, forest produce, scrap etc." This clearly indicates that an assessee, who has been trading in scrap, falls within the purview of Section 206C. It is not necessary to find out whether the appellant sells the scrap originated from its manufacturing activity, if any, or scrap is procured from outside source and sold thereafter. Whatever the origin of the scrap, as the appellant is trading in scrap, this activity is squarely covered u/s. 206C of the Act.

 Section 206C stipulates that every person being a seller, at the time of selling of any of the goods of the nature specified in that section will collect sum at a certain percentage. The definition of 'seller' under explanation (c) of section 206C(11) also does not stipulate that the seller should be a manufacturer only. It talks only about the status.

 'Buyer' is also defined in explanation (a) of section 206C(11) as a person who obtains goods on sale by certain specified modes. Buyer may be a manufacturer or a trader. The explanation does not differentiate even this aspect as well.

 The appellant tries to draw support for his contention that only a manufacturer is subject to rigors of section 206C by picking a specific word from the definition of 'scrap' given in the explanation. But the appellant forgets that the substantive portion, i.e. the Title of Section clearly stipulates "profits from the business of trading in scrap". The substantive part weights more than the definition given in the explanation.
(b)  Secondly, the appellant's argument that it is not a manufacturer and thus it is not in a position to generate waste/scrap is not acceptable as the definition of 'scrap' reads as under:- "

 [(b) "scrap" means waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials which is definitely not usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear and other reasons."[Explanation (b) of Sec.206C(11)]

 It has two distinct limbs. Even if one of the limbs is applicable, an assessee can be treated as if he deals in scrap, not usable as such -
(i)  "scrap' means waste; and
(ii)  "scrap' generated from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials.

  The above indicates that only 'waste' materials may partake the character of 'scrap'. This first limb of the definition definitely applies to the appellant's case because it imports brass scraps. This further conveys that there is no need to apply the second limb to the appellant (i.e. scrap need not to have arisen from any manufacturing or mechanical activity if the first limb is applicable and applied. In the 'Sales contract' on high seas sale basis, the nature of the material sold is to be invariably mentioned and in the appellant's case, it is admittedly 'brass scraps'. Even bills of entry for home consumption issued by Customs Authorities, bills issued by supplier, bills raised by the appellant on other parties and bills of landing indicate very clearly what the appellant sold is only scrap. It is also understood that the customs duty was paid by the appellant by claiming the goods imported as 'scrap' at a particular rate.

 In nutshell, in the appellant's case, scrap means waste which is definitely not usable as it is. Scrap might have been bought and sold. Scrap might have arisen due to manufacturing activity which is sold. Whatever may it be, it is a fact that the appellant had the 'scrap' for sale.
(c)  The appellant has not furnished any evidence of its claim regarding disclosure of such purchases by its buyers and consequent payment of tax in any of the case. Hence, this argument also does not survive. Further, here this contention is not relevant as the issue under consideration is that of TCS default.

 9. In the end result, I fully endorse the views taken by the A.O. in invoking section 206C(1) of the Act in the appellant's case. Consequently, the appeals of the assessee for both the assessment years, i.e., AYs 2009-10 & 2010-11 are dismissed."
7. Aggrieved by the order passed by the CIT(A), the assessee is now in appeal before this Tribunal. At the time of hearing, the assessee prayed for admission of the following documents placed at pp 6-29 of paper-book (Volume-II) filed by the assessee on 12.06.2013 as additional evidence under Rule 29 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules:-
a.  Copy of letter from M/s. AL-NAWAZ METAL TR. LLC (foreign supplier) regarding nature and origin of material, with sample invoices and import documents.
b.  Copy of letter from M/s. DIETIKER AG FUR ROHMENTALLE (foreign supplier) regarding nature and origin of material, with sample invoices and import documents.
c.  Copy of letter from M/s. OVERSEAS METAL TRADING (foreign supplier) regarding nature and origin of material, with sample invoices and import documents.
8. The aforesaid documents are stated to be relevant for disposal of appeal. It is the case of the assessee that he could not file them before the AO/CIT(A) as they were not available with him at that time. The ld. Departmental Representative did not object to the admission of the aforesaid documents as additional evidence. They are therefore being admitted to avoid any prejudice that may be caused to the assessee due to non-admission of the aforesaid documents as additional evidence.
9. In support of both the appeals, S/Shri Rindani, Maharshi and Popat, Chartered Accountants, duly authorized by the assessee u/s 288 of the Income-tax Act have entered appearance on behalf of the assessee before this Tribunal. They have filed written submissions and paper-books.
10. Shri Rindani has filed written submissions running into 6 pages under the signature of the assessee and also made oral submissions at the time of hearing. His submissions, in brief, are as under:
(i)  The AO has straightway concluded that the assessee was liable to collect tax at source without explicitly showing as to how the materials dealt with by the assessee and noticed by the Department during survey fell within the definition of scrap. According to him, the AO failed to discharge the aforesaid onus and hence his action of treating the assessee as assessee in default was not sustainable in law in view of the decisions in TEJ Quebecor Printing Ltd. v. JCIT, 84 ITD 684; SOL Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. ITO, 83 ITD 72; and Senior Accounts Officer v. CIT, 34 DTR 69 (MP).
(ii)  The material traded by the assessee was not "scrap" within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 296C notwithstanding the fact that it was imported and declared as scrap before the Customs authorities. According to him, the assessee himself was neither a manufacturer nor had he carried out any mechanical working on the materials imported by him. It was submitted that the definition of "scrap" as given in Explanation (b) to section 206C should be restricted to mean and include the scrap generated from the manufacture or mechanical working by the assessee himself on sale of which alone liability u/s 206C could be fastened.
(iii)  The material imported and traded by the assessee has not arisen from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials undertaken by the assessee as the brass scrap imported by the assessee comprised of loose and collected items made of brass such as utensils, water taps, hardware items, brass stove, brass show pieces, household items of brass, etc. According to him, the items imported and sold by the assessee were discarded items and not scrap arising from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials. Relying upon the judgment in Vijay Ship Breaking Corporation v. CIT, 314 ITR 309 (SC), he submitted that the word "manufacture" used in Explanation (b) to section 206C was narrower in meaning than the word "production" and therefore discarded items traded by the assessee, which were of personal use by someone at some point of time in the past, would not qualify to be called "scrap" in terms of Explanation (b).
(iv)  Relying upon the decisions of this Tribunal in Nathulal P Lavti v. ITO, ITA Nos.1167 & 1168/Rjt./2010; and Navine Fluorine International Ltd. v. ACIT, 45 SOT 86, he submitted that both the words "waste" and "scrap" in Explanation (b) were one word and therefore both of them are qualified by the words following them, namely, "from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials which is definitely not usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear and other reasons". According to him, "waste" as well as "scrap" must arise from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials undertaken by the assessee himself in order to constitute "scrap" within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 206C.
(v)  Every kind of scrap under the sun cannot be said to be covered under the definition of "scrap" as given in Explanation (b) as such an interpretation would render the later part of the definition, i.e., "from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials which is definitely not usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear and other reasons" otiose. He contended that any interpretation which rendered later part of the definition of "scrap" otiose should be avoided. According to him, it can be avoided only if (i) both the words, namely, "waste" as well as "scrap" are held to be one word; and (ii) both the aforesaid words are held to be qualified by the words following them. If so interpreted, the items traded by the assessee would not fall under the definition of "scrap" as they have not been generated by the assessee from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials undertaken by him.
(vi)  Referring to Circular No.528 dated 16.12.1998 issued by the CBDT, he submitted that the aforesaid Circular simply explains the intention behind inserting section 206C in the Income-tax Act. It does not explain the meaning or scope of the term "scrap" used in Explanation (b) to section 206C and therefore is of no use in interpreting the said term. Referring to Circular No.525 dated 24.11.1988 issued by the CBDT, he submitted that the provisions of section 206C were intended to be used in those cases where persons engaged in certain trades/businesses were untraceable and not in those cases where they were traceable as in the case of the assessee.
(vii)  Inviting our attention to the first proviso inserted in sub-section (6A) of section 206C with effect from 1.7.2012, he submitted that the provisions of section 206C would not apply to a case where it is shown that the buyer has furnished his return of income and satisfied all other conditions stipulated by the said proviso. In this connection, he referred to the judgments in Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage (P) Ltd. v. CIT, 293 ITR 226 andSree manjunatha Wines v. CIT, 202 Taxman 620 (Karn.).
11. Elaborating his arguments further regarding the applicability of first Proviso to sub-section (6A) of section 206, Shri Rindani submitted that a person, other than a person, referred to in sub-section (1D) responsible for collecting tax, who fails to collect the whole or any part of the tax on the amount received from a buyer or licensee or lessee or on the amount debited to the account of the buyer or licenses or lessee shall not be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax if such buyer or licensee or lessee has fulfilled the conditions laid down in the said Proviso. He submitted that this aspect of the matter has not been examined by the AO and therefore the matter should be restored to the file of the Assessing Officer.
12. Appearing for the assessee, Shri Maharishi made similar submissions as those made by Shri Rindani. He submitted 5 unsigned loose sheets titled "Written submission on the definition of scrap contained in Explanation (b) to section 206C" in which extracts explaining the meaning of "scrap" as downloaded from various sources available on internet have been reproduced. These sources are Mariam Webster Dictionary, www.Ask.com and Wikipedia. According to him, Mariam Webster Dictionary defines scrap as "fragments of stock removed in manufacturing" and "manufactured articles or parts rejected or discarded and useful only as material for reprocessing; especially waste and discarded metals". He further submitted that the term "waste" as defined in the said Dictionary would mean "damaged, defective, or superfluous materials produced by a manufacturing process, as (1) materials rejected during a textile manufacturing process and used usually for wiping away dirt and oil <cotton waste> (2) scrap; (3) and unwanted bye-product of a manufacturing process, chemical laboratory or nuclear reactor <toxic waste> <hazardous waste> <nuclear waste>." Relying upon the website www.ask.com, he submitted that the difference between scrap and waste is that "scrap" is a loss connected with the output mostly an unforeseen loss of raw materials in production process while "waste" is a foreseen and calculated percentage of loss of raw materials or an output that does not have any sales or use. According to him, Wikipedia defines material as anything made of matter, constituted of one or more substances. Based on the aforesaid sources, he submitted that both scrap and waste must arise from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials in order to constitute "scrap" within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 206C. He also referred to the definition of "waste and scrap" as given in Note 8(a) of Section XV of First Schedule of the Central Excise Tariff Act 1985 and also to the judgments in M/s Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No.7453 of 2008; Collector of Customs v. IM Kemex India Ltd., 1996 (86) ELT 95 (Tribunal); and Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. CCE, 2002 (144) ELT 339 (Tribunal) rendered in the context of the definition of "waste and scrap" as given in Note 8(a) of Section XV of First Schedule of the Central Excise Tariff Act.
13. Supporting the decisions cited by Shri Rindani, Shri Maharshi also submitted that both the words, namely "waste" and "scrap", used in Explanation (b) to section 206C of the Income-tax Act were one phrase. He emphasized that no material would be "scrap" within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 206C of the Income-tax Act unless it was generated from manufacture or mechanical working of materials. According to him, the process of manufacture or mechanical working can be carried out only on materials and therefore only those items could be treated as "scrap", which were generated from the manufacture or mechanical working of "materials". He contended that if the items of scrap were not generated in the course of manufacture or mechanical working of "materials", such items would not be "scrap" as defined in Explanation (b). In this connection, he cited the example of sale of old newspapers. He submitted that old newspapers are not generated from manufacture or mechanical working of "materials" and therefore they would not be "scrap" within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 206C of the Income-tax Act. On this analogy, he sought to emphasize that discarded items as sold by the assessee would not be "scrap" within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 206C. It was submitted by him that the aforesaid proposition would clearly emerge if the definition of scrap as given in Explanation (b) to section 206C of the Income-tax Act is considered in its entirety. He contended that the scrap should not only be generated from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials but also such scrap should not definitely be usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear and other reasons. Having thus explained the meaning of "scrap" as used in Explanation (b) to section 206C, he submitted that discarded materials generated on dismantling of building, as in the matter under appeal, would not qualify to be called "scrap" within the meaning of section 206C.
14. Shri Popat has also filed unsigned written submissions running into 7 sheets, which incorporate synopsis of his submissions. According to him, the provisions of section 206C would be attracted only when "scrap" was sold to a "buyer". He submitted that the sale of scrap to a person other than a buyer would not attract the provisions of section 206C. He invited our attention to the term "buyer" used in Explanation (aa) to section 206C of the Income-tax Act and submitted that the buyer is a person who obtains specified goods in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode or the right to receive any such goods. He submitted that a person would not be a buyer unless he obtains specified goods in any sale by way of auction, tender or any other like mode. He contended that the phrase "any other mode" is preceded by "auction, tender" and therefore sale "by any other mode" must by analogous to auction or tender. In this connection, he referred to the principle of Noscitur a Sociis according to which the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it and also to the principle of ejusdem generis. He submitted that sale of goods by an assessee to a buyer in retail sale of such goods cannot therefore be construed as sale to a buyer as such sale was not by way of auction or tender or any other like mode and therefore such transactions in retail sale between the assessee and his buyer would clearly be outside the scope of section 206C. In this connection, he compared the provisions of sub-clause (ii) with those of sub-clause (i) of clause (aa) of Explanation to 206C of the Income-tax Act. He submitted that sub-clause (i) defines a buyer as a person who obtains specified goods in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode while sub-clause (ii) defines a buyer for the purpose of sub-section (1D) as a person who obtains specified goods in any sale. Based on the aforesaid comparison, he submitted that the legislative intent was quite clear that the buyer, except for the purposes of sub section (1D) of Section 206C, would be a person who obtains specified goods in any sale which must necessarily be by way of auction, tender or any other mode analogous to auction or tender and not by way of retail sale as in sub-clause (ii) of clause (aa) of Explanation 206C. Turning to the facts of the case, he submitted that the Revenue has brought no material on record to show that the assessee has sold brass scrap to a "buyer" by way of auction, tender or any similar mode. According to him, the assessee has sold brass scrap in retail sale and not by way of auction, tender or similar mode and therefore the goods sold by him cannot be said to have been sold to a "buyer" for the purposes of sub-section (6) of section 206C.
15. In reply, the ld. Departmental Representative relied upon the orders passed by the Assessing Officer and the ld. Commissioner (Appeals). He has filed a paper-book, which contains, inter-alia, his written submissions in 14 pages. His submissions, in brief, are as under:
(i)  Section 206C has been inserted in the Income-tax Act to ensure collection of taxes at source from persons carrying on particular trades in view of peculiar difficulties experienced by the Revenue in the past in collecting taxes from them. Section 206C thus seeks prevention of evasion of taxes. In interpreting the aforesaid provisions, which are intended to plug leakage of revenue and prevent tax evasion, a construction which would defeat its purpose should be eschewed and a construction which preserves its workability and efficacy should be preferred.
(ii)  Provisions of section 206C are applicable to traders as well as manufacturers as there is no requirement in section 206C that the seller should be a manufacturer also. In this connection, he referred to the head-note of section 206C and other relevant provisions of the said section in this behalf.
(iii)  "Waste" and "scrap" as mentioned in the definition of scrap in section 206C are different and distinct items and not the same. Materials not arising from manufacture or mechanical working of materials are also covered by the definition of "scrap" as given in section 206C. Discarded materials or materials which are no longer useful also fall under the definition of scrap.
(iv)  The definition of "scrap" in Explanation (b) is quite comprehensive in its ambit and scope in the sense that it covers both, namely, waste as well as scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials which is definitely not usable as such …" The use of the words "which is" in the phrase "scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials which is not definitely usable as such…" in Explanation (b) also supports the aforesaid view that anything which is unusable as such is scrap.
(v)  The definition of "scrap" as given in Explanation (b) is wide enough to include "waste and scrap" as defined in Note 8(a) of Section XV of Schedule I of the Customs Tariff Act and Central Excise Tariff Act and therefore any material which is declared as waste and scrap for the purposes of the Customs Tariff Act or Central Excise Tariff Act Note 8 would be covered by the definition of "scrap" in section 206C.
(vi)  Relying upon letter F.No.275/86/2011-IT(B) dated 18th May 2012, circulated by the CBDT to all the Commissioners/Directors of Income-tax (TDS), he submitted that (1) the term "scrap" is clearly defined in the Explanation to section 206C and there is no requirement that the goods to be eligible for scrap should be produced/manufactured by the seller itself; (2) the term "buyer" is also defined in the same Explanation according to which a buyer is a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode, goods of the specified nature and thus a "buyer" in terms of the said Explanation is not restricted to a person who buys the specified goods in an auction or tender alone but covers a buyer in the retail sale of specified goods as well; and (3) all the sellers of scrap including those trading in scrap are liable to collect tax at source from the buyers of such scrap.
16. It was further submitted by the ld. Departmental Representative that the assessee himself has shown and declared the goods sold by him as "scrap" before the Customs authorities and paid customs duty accordingly and therefore there was no dispute that what was imported and subsequently sold by the assessee was scrap and nothing else.
17. We have heard both the parties and carefully considered their submissions including the authorities referred to by them at the time of hearing and also in the written submissions filed by them. The facts, as found by the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A), are that the assessee is an individual. He is an importer. It has been found by the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) that he has imported brass scrap and sold the same to various parties in both the years under appeal. It has also been found by them that bills of entry issued by the Customs authorities, bills issued by the supplier, bills raised by the assessee and bills of landing, etc., also indicate that the assessee has imported "scrap" and sold the same as such. It is also stated in the appellate order passed by the CIT(A) that the assessee has declared imported goods as "scrap" for payment of customs duty and accordingly paid the customs duty as per the rates prescribed for scrap. It has also been found by both the AO and the CIT(A) that the assessee has not collected the tax at source from the buyers in conformity with the provisions of section 206C of the Income-tax Act and therefore the assessee, according to them, was liable to be treated as "assessee in default" u/s 206C(6) and (7) of the Income-tax Act.
18. Before taking up the grounds of appeal as also the aforesaid issues for consideration and adjudication, it is necessary to reproduce section 206C of the Income-tax Act in so far as it is relevant for disposal of the issues under appeal. Relevant portions of section 206C read as under:-
"BB.-Collection at source
Profits and gains from the business of trading in alcoholic liquor, forest produce, scrap, etc.
206C. (1) Every person, being a seller shall, at the time of debiting of the amount payable by the buyer to the account of the buyer or at the time of receipt of such amount from the said buyer in cash or by the issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, collect from the buyer of any goods of the nature specified in column (2) of the Table below, a sum equal to the percentage, specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) of the said Table, of such amount as income-tax:
TABLE
  Sl. No.Nature of goods Percentage
 (1) (2)(3)
  (vi)Scrap One per cent
Provided that …..
 ** ****
(6) Any person responsible for collecting the tax who fails to collect the tax in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall, notwithstanding such failure, be liable to pay the tax to the credit of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3).
(6A) If any person responsible for collecting tax in accordance with the provisions of this section does not collect the whole or any part of the tax or after collecting, fails to pay the tax as required by or under this Act, he shall, without prejudice to any other consequences which he may incur, be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of the tax:
Provided that any person, other than a person referred to in sub section (1D), responsible for collecting tax in accordance with the provisions of this section, who fails to collect the whole or any part of the tax on the amount received from a buyer or licensee or lessee or on the amount debited to the account of the buyer or licensee or lessee shall not be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax if such buyer or licensee or lessee -
(i)  has furnished his return of income under section 139;
(ii)   has taken into account such amount for computing income in such return of income; and
(iii)  has paid the tax due on the income declared by him in such return of income
and the person furnishes a certificate to this effect from an accountant in such form as may be prescribed:
Provided further ….
(7) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (6), if the person responsible for collecting tax does not collect the tax or after collecting the tax fails to pay it as required under this section, he shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of one per cent per month or part thereof on the amount of such tax from the date on which such tax was collectible to the date on which the tax was actually paid and such interest shall be paid before furnishing the quarterly statement for each quarter in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3):
Provided that ……
Explanation - For the purposes of this section,-
(a) "accountant" shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Explanation to sub-section (2) of section 288;
(aa) "buyer" with respect to—
(i) sub-section (1) means a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode, goods of the nature specified in the Table in sub-section (1) or the right to receive any such goods but does not include, -
(A) a public sector company, the Central Government, a State Government, and an embassy, a High Commission, legation, commission, consulate and the trade representation, of a foreign State and a club; or
(B) a buyer in the retail sale of such goods purchased by him for personal consumption;
(ii) sub-section (1D) means a person who obtains in any sale, goods of the nature specified in the said sub-section;
 (ab)** ****
(b) "scrap" means waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials which is definitely not usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear and other reasons;
(c) "seller" means the Central Government, a State Government or any local authority or corporation or authority established by or under a Central, State or Provincial Act, or any company or firm or co-operative society and also includes an individual or a Hindu undivided family whose total sales, gross receipts or turnover from the business or profession carried on by him exceed the monetary limits specified under clause (a) or clause (b) of section 44AB during the financial year immediately preceding the financial year in which the goods of the nature specified in the Table in sub-section (1) or sub-section (1D) are sold.
19. Section 206C as originally enacted did not provide for collection of tax at source on sale of scrap. By the Finance Act 2003, "scrap" has been included and placed in the Table in sub-section (1) of section 206C as a result of which every seller {as defined in Explanation (c) to section 206C} of scrap is required to collect tax @ 1% at the time of debiting the amount payable by the buyer to the account of the buyer or at the time of receipt of such amount from the said buyer in cash or by the issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier. The liability of a seller to collect tax at source in terms of section 206C is absolute unless requisite declaration from the buyer is obtained and a copy thereof is delivered to the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner in terms of the provisions of sub-section (1A) and (1B) of section 206C.
20. Reasons for inserting section 206C in the Income-tax Act have been explained in Circular No.525 dated 24.11.1988 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes as under:
"1. Considerable difficulty has been felt in the past in assessing income of persons who take contracts for sale of liquor, forest produce, etc. It has been the Department's experience that for taking such contracts, firms or associations of persons are specifically constituted and very often no trace is left of them or their members after the contract has been executed. Persons have also been found to have taken contracts in 'benami' names by floating undertakings or associations for short periods. Since tax is payable in the assessment years on the incomes of the previous years, the time by which the incomes from such sources become assessable, such persons become untraceable. Moreover, at the time of assessment years in these cases, either the accounts are not available or they are mostly incorrect or incomplete. Thus, even if assessments could be made on ex parte basis, it becomes almost impossible to collect the tax found due, either because it becomes difficult to establish the identity of the persons and trace them or because of the fact the persons in whose names contracts were taken are men of no means. With a view to combating large scale tax evasion by persons deriving incomes from such business, the Finance Act, 1988 has inserted a new section 44AC to provide for determination of income in such cases. Further, with a view to facilitating collection of taxes from such assessees, the Finance Act, 1988 has inserted a new section 206C to provide for collection of such tax at source."
21. It is quite obvious that the provisions of section 206C have been enacted to ensure collection of taxes from persons carrying on particular trades in view of peculiar difficulties experienced by the Revenue in the past in collecting taxes from them. Section 206C thus seeks to prevent evasion of taxes. It therefore needs to be construed strictly and in a manner that seeks to achieve the purpose for which it has been enacted.
22. As rightly submitted by both the parties that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. The courts, in the interpretation of statutes, always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which contributes redundancy to the legislature should not be accepted, except for compelling reasons.
23. The issues under appeal have been clarified by the Central Board of Direct Taxes in its letter No.275/86/2011-IT(B) dated 18th may 2012 addressed to all the Commissioners/Directors of Income-tax (TDS) as under:
"Subject: Liability of Old Iron (Scrap) Dealers cum traders under section 206C of the Income Tax Act 1961 - regarding
Representations were received from certain Associations of Old Iron Scrap Dealers cum Traders alleging wrong interpretation of law regarding applicability of provisions of Section 206 C of the Income Tax Act 1961 in their case.
The Income Tax Act, 1961 as per Section 206C requires a seller of goods of specified nature (defined in the Act and includes scrap) to collect Tax at source at specified percentage of the receipt from the buyer and deposit the same in the Government account. The term scrap is clearly defined in the explanation to this section and there is no requirement that the goods to be eligible for scrap should be produced/manufactured by the seller itself. Further the term buyer is also defined in the same Explanation and means a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode, goods of the specified nature. Thus a buyer is not restricted to a person who buys the specified goods in an auction or tender and thus includes a buyer in the retail sale of specified goods as well. As per Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act 2003, w.e.f. 08-09-2003, if a buyer in the retail sale of such goods buys it for personal consumption and furnishes before the seller such declaration in prescribed Form 27C, then the Seller is not liable to collect tax on the same.
Thus all Sellers of Scrap, within the meaning of Section 206C, including those trading in scrap are liable to collect tax at source from the buyers of such scrap. However if the buyer declares by furnishing Form 27C before the seller its purpose for obtaining such goods being manufacturing/processing/producing articles and not trading purpose then the seller is exempted from collecting such tax from such buyer.
If it may be added that Sellers as defined in the explanation to Section 206C only are liable to collect tax at source. It may further be added the Act as per section 206C (9) allows any buyer to approach the Assessing Officer for obtaining a certificate of lower rate of collection of TCS".
24. Explanation (b) to section 206C defines "scrap" as "waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials which is definitely not usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear and other reasons". It is evident that the word "scrap" occurs twice in the said definition. It is first used as a term which is sought to be defined and which includes "waste" also and thereafter the word "scrap" is used again in the expression "scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials". The said definition is in two parts. Its first part, i.e., "waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials", refers to what would constitute "scrap" while its second part, namely, "which is definitely not usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear and other reasons" refers to the characteristics which a material has to possess in order to fall in the category of "scrap". The second part of definition, being integral part of the definition, also throws light on the scope and ambit of the term "scrap" and therefore needs to be taken into consideration while interpreting the first part of the definition of "scrap".
25. We shall first take up the first part of the definition, namely, "waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials". The first part of the definition seeks to cover both "waste" as well as "scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials". In the absence of any definition of the term "waste" in the Income-tax Act, we have to turn to its meaning as it is understood in common parlance. In common parlance, "waste" is understood as something unusable or unwanted material. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, "waste" is something which has been "eliminated or discarded as no longer useful or required". "Scrap", on the other hand, represents something which is left over after the greater part has been used or consumed. "Scrap" thus refers to the incidental residue derived from certain types of manufacture, which is recoverable without further processing. It is in this context that the words "from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials" qualify the preceding word "scrap" and not "waste". The definition of "scrap" as given in Explanation (b) is not limited to scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials alone but extends to cover "waste" also. Therefore the scope of the term "scrap" as defined in Explanation (b) cannot be interpreted so as to restrict its application to scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials alone. While "waste" covers everything that is unusable or has been discarded as no longer useful as such, "scrap" covers everything that arises from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials. By its very nature, "waste" is a term of wider import while "scrap" is narrower in its scope.
26. The first part of the definition of "scrap" in Explanation (b) refers not only to scrap from the "manufacture" but also to "mechanical working of materials". Both the phrases, namely, manufacture and mechanical working of materials differ in their meaning and content. In Black's Law Dictionary, the meaning of the term "Manufacture" has been explained thus: "Manufacture. v.From Latin words manus and factura, literally put together by hand. Now it means the process of making products by hand, machinery or other automated means…" The term "Manufacture" as a noun is also defined in the same Dictionary as follows: "Manufacture. The process or operation of making goods or any material produced by hand, by machinery, or by other agency; anything made from raw materials by the hand, by machinery, or by art…." "Mechanical working of materials" refers to physical operations on materials. It signifies physical operations to bring about physical change to which the material is subjected in order to change its shape, properties or structure. In order to fall in the definition of "scrap", it is not necessary that the same should occur in the course of manufacture; it can also occur in the course of mechanical working of materials, i.e., in the course of physical operations on materials. Thus, both the operations/processes, namely, the manufacture and mechanical working of materials, can give rise to scrap. Any article or thing arising from the physical operations on materials which is not usable as such would therefore fall in the category of "scrap". As stated earlier, the second part of the definition, i.e., "which is definitely not usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear and other reasons" also throws light on the scope of the term "scrap" in as much as it seeks to define the characteristics of scrap. In order to constitute "scrap", the article or thing must not be usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear and other reasons. The use of the words "other reasons" in the second part of the definition of "scrap" is significant. In order to constitute "scrap", what is contemplated by Explanation (b) is the non-usability of materials as such, which could even be for a reason other than breakage, cutting up and wear. The phraseology employed in Explanation (b) shows that the term "scrap" has been defined in wide terms so as to include both (i) waste, and (ii) scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials. However both of them have been used as one phrase, i.e., as "waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials", for the second part of the definition and therefore both of them should definitely be not usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear or other reasons.
27. At the time of hearing, it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that the use of the word "and" in the expression "waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials" suggests that both of them, namely, waste and scrap, must arise from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials and that waste per se cannot be scrap unless it, like scrap, also arises from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials. We do agree with the submission that the word 'and" in the said expression joins both the words, namely, (i) waste; and (ii) scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials and to that extent they constitute one phrase, i.e., "waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials" and that is why the words "which is" have been used as link between the first part and second part of the definition. However, the word "and" in the said phrase has been used to enlarge the scope of "scrap", which is sought to be defined by Explanation (b) to section 206C, so as to cover both, i.e., waste as well as scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials. If the legislative intent was to exclude waste from the definition of "scrap", it could have easily done so by not including the "waste" in the definition of "scrap".
28. It is the case of the Revenue that the items imported and subsequently sold by the assessee as "brass scrap" fall under the Revised Indian Trade Classification Code (RITC) 74040022 as declared by the assessee himself before the Customs authorities. In this connection, the ld. Departmental Representative referred to the definition of "waste and scrap" as given in Note 8(a) to Schedule I (Import Tariff) of the Customs Tariff Act and submitted that the goods imported by the assessee were known as metal scrap in trade circles, both in India and abroad. In this connection, he referred to the Harmonized Commodity and Coding Systems, which are popularly known as HSN or HS, developed by the World Customs Organization and followed by over 200 countries including India to facilitate easy identification of merchandise in international trade. According to him, the goods imported and sold by the assessee being brass scrap fall under the classification of waste and scrap under the said Coding System. In support of his submissions, he relied upon three judgments of the Hon'ble Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal/Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, namely, Sujana Steels Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2000 ECR 776 Tri Chennai; Quick Car Wash Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs,2007-TIOL-CESTAT-DEL; Collector of Customs v. Shankar Metal Trading Co., 1991 ECR 309 Tri Delhi.
29. We have perused the definition of "waste and scrap" as given in Note 8(a) of Section XV of Schedule I (Import Tariff) of the Customs Tariff Act, which reads as under:
"8. In this Section, the following expressions have the meanings assigned to them:
(a) waste and scrap:
Metal waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of metals, and metal goods definitely not usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear or other reasons."
30. The assessee has declared the goods imported by him under the Revised Indian Trade Classification Code (RITC) 74040022, which includes within itself brass scrap of various descriptions. The goods imported by the assessee are categorized as "copper waste and scrap" (including brass scrap) under the Harmonized Commodity and Coding Systems. In trade circles also, the goods imported by the assessee are categorized as metal waste and scrap. In Quick Car Wash Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (supra), Hot/Cold Rolled Sheets of defective quality and in rusted condition were imported and therefore were not usable as such. On the aforesaid facts, it was held that the authorities were not justified in treating the said materials as not of metal waste. Relevant observations made by the Hon'ble Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal in this behalf read as under:
"8. Upon perusing the record and considering the submissions of both the sides, we find in favour of the appellant. It is to be noted that the consignment is of mixed dimensions, 50% of it has been found to be rusted. It has also been noted that the material is secondary/defective. Materials of this description is clearly not capable of being sold as ferrous products. Therefore, we feel that the authorities were not justified in treating the consignments as not of metal waste. The HSN note relied upon by the learned SDR also does not seem to support a contrary view. There is also a mention that waste and scrap of iron and steel of a miscellaneous nature would not be usable as such. In the present case, there is no evidence that the goods in the consignments could be sold as ferrous products or \used as such. It is difficult to plead that rusted iron is capable of use as iron sheets, particularly when the consignment has been found by the expert to be of 50% rusted."
31. Metal waste and metal goods, which are not usable as such, are categorized as waste and scrap under the Customs Tariff Act. The crux of the matter is non-usability of the material as such. If the material is not usable as such, it has to necessarily fall in the category of waste and scrap. The definition of "scrap" as given in Explanation (b) to section 206C of the Income-tax Act covers all kinds of waste including metal waste and metal goods which are not usable as such and therefore is significantly wider in its scope than the definition of "waste and scrap" as given in Note 8(a) of Section XV of Schedule I of the Customs Tariff Act. In this view of the matter, the definition of "scrap" as given in Explanation (b) to section 206C includes not only "waste and scrap" of metal as contemplated by Note 8(a) of Section XV of Schedule I of the Customs Tariff Act but also all kinds of waste and scrap including those arising from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials provided such "waste and scrap" is not usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear and other reasons.
32. It was strenuously argued on behalf of the assessee that the Courts and Tribunal have consistently taken the view, in the context of the levy of Central Excise duty under the Central Excise Act read with Central Excise Tariff Act, that used, worn-out, obsolete and scrap items of brass as items of collection were not liable to excise duty as they do not arise as part of manufacture of prime product. In this connection, three judgments have been cited, namely, M/s Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, which is a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.7453 of 2008; and two judgments of the Hon'ble CEGAT in Collector of Customsv. IM Kemex Ltd., 1996 (86) ELT 95 and Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2002 (144) ELT 339. We have perused them.
33. Section 3 of the Central Excise Act mandates levy of duty on all excisable goods (excluding goods produced or manufactured in special economic zones) which are produced or manufactured in India as, and at the rates, set forth in the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. It therefore follows that the Central excise duty cannot be levied on the goods including scrap which are not manufactured or produced in India. It is in the context of the aforesaid provision that the courts and tribunal have held, in the context of levy of excise duty, that the waste and scrap not generated from the manufacture of the prime product cannot be subjected to levy of central excise duty in the hands of non-manufacturers. This context is completely absent in the Income-tax Act and therefore the requirement that the waste and scrap must be generated by the assessee himself from the manufacture of the prime product as required by the Central Excise legislations cannot be read into the Income-tax Act. Section 206C of the Income-tax Act, on the other hand, fastens liability on a seller of scrap for collection of tax at source. There is no requirement that such a seller should himself generate scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials undertaken by him.
34. It was vehemently contended on behalf of the assessee that section 206C applies to sale of scrap which is generated by the assessee himself from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials. We are unable to accept the aforesaid submission for several reasons. One, the head note of section 206C shows that the provisions of section 206C are applicable to business of trading, inter-alia, in scrap. The use of the words "business of trading" in the said head note makes it clear that the applicability of section 206C is not restricted to sale of scrap generated from the business of manufacturing undertaken by the assessee himself but covers sale of scrap in the business of trading in scrap also. Two, sub-section (1) of section 206C requires the "seller" to collect tax at source. The term "seller" is defined in Explanation (c) to section 206C according to which the term "seller" means "the Central Government, a State Government or any local authority or corporation or authority established by or under a Central, State or Provincial Act, or any company or firm or co-operative society and also includes an individual or a Hindu undivided family whose total sales, gross receipts or turnover from the business or profession carried on by him" exceed the monetary limit as specified therein. Explanation (c) to section 206C does not require that a seller of scrap must himself generate scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials. Therefore such a requirement cannot be read in section 206C for its applicability to sale of scrap. Three, the subject matter of sale on which tax is required to be collected at source from the buyer is, inert-alia, scrap, which is defined in Explanation (b) to section 206C to mean waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials. It does not further require that the scrap, in order to be covered by Explanation (b) to section 206C, should also be generated by the assessee from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials undertaken by the assessee himself. "Scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials" may arise as a result of manufacturing activity undertaken by the assessee himself or by anyone else. Similarly, scrap may also arise from the mechanical working of materials, which is different from manufacture. For the aforesaid reasons, it is held that tax is required to be collected at source from the buyer, in terms of section 206C, on sale of, inter-alia, scrap being waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials undertaken by the assessee himself or by anyone else. A seller of scrap is neither required to be a manufacturer himself nor the scope of "scrap", as defined in Explanation (b), is restricted to scrap generated from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials undertaken by the seller himself. It is sufficient for the applicability of section 206C if the person sought to be fastened with liability u/s 206C is a seller of scrap being waste as well as scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials provided all other conditions for the applicability of section 206C are also satisfied.
35. In the matter under appeal before us, the assessee himself has declared the goods imported by him as brass scrap before the Customs authorities. He is therefore bound by that declaration. Once it is declared as waste and scrap under the Customs Tariff Act, it necessarily follows that it is in the nature of waste and scrap, which is definitely not usable as such. Be that as it may, the definition of "scrap" under Explanation (b) is wider in scope than the definition of "scrap" as given in the Customs Tariff Act. In this view of the matter, materials recovered on demolition of buildings, old machines/fixtures/fittings sold as scrap, discarded packing materials, etc., would also fall in the category of "scrap" as defined in Explanation (b) as all of them are items, which are no longer useful as such, and therefore fall in the category of waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials, which is definitely not usable as such. Resultantly, ground nos. 1 and 2 taken by the assessee in both the assessment years under appeal are dismissed.
36. Apropos ground no. 3, it was submitted that the assessee was under a bona-fide belief that what was imported and sold by him was not "scrap"" within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 206C. We are unable to accept the aforesaid submission for two principal reasons. One, the assessee has placed no material either before the AO or before the CIT(A) or before us to establish his bona-fide in the matter. It is not his case that he was advised by any competent professional that the scrap sold by him would not attract the provisions of section 206C. Two, the provisions of section 206C are not subject to reasonable cause or bona-fide belief like provisions relating to levy of penalty. In this view of the matter, ground no. 3 in both the appeals is dismissed.
37. Apropos additional ground no. 1, it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that the Assessing Officer has fastened the liability on the assessee u/s 206C without bringing any material on record to show that the assessee has sold scrap within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 206C. We are unable to accept the aforesaid submission for two principal reasons. One, it is the assessee himself who had declared that the materials sold by him was imported by him as scrap. The AO is not required to prove facts admitted by the assessee himself. Once the assessee makes a declaration to that effect before the Government and the Government also acts upon that declaration, he is precluded from pleading otherwise before the Government. Section 115 of the Evidence Act is quite apposite. Both the authorities, namely, the AO and the CIT(A), have taken cognizance of the aforesaid declaration made by the assessee before the Customs authorities before fixing the liability on the assessee. It cannot therefore be said that the AO has not brought out any material on record to show that the material imported and subsequently sold by the assessee was "scrap". Two, we have also taken the view that the material imported and subsequently sold by the assessee was "scrap" within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 206C. In this view of the matter, additional ground no.1 taken by the assessee in both the assessment years under appeal is dismissed.
38. Apropos additional ground no. 2, it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that the provisions of section 206C require a seller to collect the tax at source from the buyer (and from none else) on sale, inter-alia, of scrap. Our attention was drawn to the definition of "buyer" as given in sub-clause (i) of clause (aa) of Explanation to section 206C, which defines a "buyer" as "a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender, or any other mode, goods of the nature specified in the Table in sub-section (1) ……" It was submitted that the buyer from whom tax is required to be collected at source should be one who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode, goods of the specified nature. Placing reliance on the interpretative tools of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, it was submitted that the phrase "any other mode" in the expression "a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode ….." in Explanation (aa)(i) would get its meaning from the words preceding it, namely, "by way of auction, tender" and therefore the said phrase, namely, "any other mode" would have to be construed narrowly and in the same sense as something akin to auction or tender. It was further submitted that sale of scrap in retail sale/trade could not be construed as sale by way of auction, tender or any other similar mode and therefore such a purchaser of scrap in retail sale could not be treated as buyer within the meaning of Explanation (aa)(i) to section 206C. Several judgments, i.e., Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers v. Administrative Officer, AIR 2004 SC 1426; Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd.v. Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1991 SC 754; Siddheswari Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 1019; Housing Board of Havana v. Havana Housing Board Employees, AIR 1996 SC 434; Amar Chandra Chakroborty v. Collector of Excise, AIR 1972 SC 1863; M/s Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, judgment dated 4th April 2002 of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1951 of 1998; Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 1080; Thakur Amarsinghji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 504; Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shankarprasad, judgment dated 19.7.1999 of the Supreme Court; Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, AIR 1990 SC 1747; Ghanshyam Das v. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, AIR 1964 SC 766; Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, AIR 1992 SC 96, were cited by him in which both the aforesaid principles have been explained. It was contended that the assessee has sold the scrap in retail trade and not by way of auction or tender or any similar mode or mode akin to auction or tender and therefore it was not required to collect tax at source from them u/s 206C as such purchasers in retail trade were not buyers within the meaning of Explanation (aa)(i) to section 206C.
39. The principle underlying the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis" is that he who cannot be known from himself may be known from his associates. Under the said doctrine, the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it: Black's Law Dictionary. Under "ejusdem generis" canon of statutory construction, where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of the same general class as those enumerated. The aforesaid principle however does not necessarily require that the general provision be limited in its scope to the identical things specially named. Nor does it apply when the context manifests a contrary intention. Ejusdem Generis rule is explained in HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND thus: 'As a rule, where in a statute there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified, although this, as a rule of construction, must be applied with caution, and subject to the primary rule that statutes are to be construed in accordance with the intention of Parliament. For the Ejusdem Generis rule to apply, the specific words must constitute a category, class or genus, then only things which belong to that category, class or genus fall within the general words'.
40. The Ejusdem Generis rule is not a rule of law but is merely a rule of construction to aid the courts to find out the true intention of the legislature. Like all other linguistic canons of construction, the ejusdem generis principle applies only when a contrary intention does not appear or meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute is required to be ascertained. If a given provision is plain and unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear, there is no occasion to call in aid that rule. Similarly, a phrase cannot be construed ejusdem generis unless it is susceptible of meaning analogous to the preceding words. The aforesaid propositions are well supported not only by the judgments cited on behalf of the assessee but also by several other judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, e.g., U.P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shanker Jain, AIR 1980 SC 65;Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 521; Amar Chand Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise, AIR 1972 SC 1863; Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v. Satchikitsa PrasarakMandal, Civil Appeal No. 2050 of 2010.
41. As already stated earlier, section 206C seeks to prevent mischief, i.e., evasion of taxes in certain types of businesses. The words defining a buyer as "a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode ….." in Explanation (aa)(i) are plain and simple in their meaning and content. The buyer is one who obtains specified goods "in any sale" which could be by way of auction, tender "or any other mode". The use of the word "or" in the aforesaid expression shows that all the three phrases (namely, auction, tender or any other mode) are intended to carry independent meaning without being controlled by each other. The use of the words "any other mode" in the said expression further shows that the mode of sale need not be by way of auction or tender alone but could be by any other mode. The words "any other mode" are words of wide amplitude and therefore cover all possible modes of sales in addition to specific modes of sales by way of auction or tender. Hence they cannot be construed ejusdem generis or as referring to similar sales as those by way of auction or tender. The Legislature has been cautious and thorough-going enough to bar all avenues of escape by using the words "or any other mode". These words (i.e., "any other mode") are not words of limitation but of extension so as to cover all possible ways in which a person (i.e., a buyer) could obtain specified goods in sale. The words "or any other mode" in Explanation (aa)(i) in section 206C are intended to cover all other modes of sales which may not come within the meaning of the preceding words, namely, auction or tender. Hence, far from using those words (i.e., "any other mode") ejusdem generis with the preceding words of the Explanation (aa)(i), the legislature has used those words in an all inclusive sense. No decided case of any court holding that the words "or any other mode" have ever been used in the sense contended on behalf of the assessee has been brought to our notice. In our considered opinion, in the context of the object sought to be achieved, mischief sought to be avoided, the language used in Explanation (aa)(i) of section 206C, and the clarity with which the legislative intent has been expressed, there is no room to construe the words "or any other mode" ejusdem generis the preceding words in Explanation (aa)(i). We therefore hold that a person who obtains specified goods in retail sale or by any other mode of sale would also be a buyer within the meaning of Explanation (aa)(i) as such sale would fall in the category of sale by "any other mode". In this view of the matter, all the submissions made in this behalf by the assessee are rejected. Resultantly, additional ground no. 2 is dismissed.
42. We shall now turn to additional ground no. 3. At the time of hearing, our attention was also drawn to the first proviso inserted in sub-section (6A) of section 206C with effect from 1.7.2012 according to which any person, other than a person referred to in sub-section (1D) of section 206C, responsible for collecting tax in accordance with the provisions of this section, who fails to collect the whole or any part of the tax on the amount received from a buyer or licensee or lessee or on the amount debited to the account of the buyer or licensee or lessee shall not be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax if such buyer or licensee or lessee (i) has furnished his return of income under section 139; (ii) has taken into account such amount for computing income in such return of income; and (iii) has paid the tax due on the income declared by him in such return of income, and the person responsible for collecting tax at source furnishes a certificate to this effect from an accountant in such form as may be prescribed, which, according to Rule 37J of the Income-tax rules, shall be furnished in Form No. 27BA. The aforesaid proviso relaxes the rigours of consequences flowing from non-collection of tax at source if the conditions stipulated by the said proviso are fulfilled.
43. There is no dispute that the said proviso has been inserted in sub-section (6A) of section 206C with effect from 1.7.2012. Amendments on exactly similar lines have been carried out in section 201 of the Income-tax Act by inserting a proviso to sub-section (1) thereof with effect from 1.7.2012. The need for such amendment has been explained in the Explanatory Notes to the Finance Bill 2012 as under:
"E. RATIONALIZATION OF TAX DEDUCTION AT SOURCE (TDS) AND TAX COLLECTION AT SOURCE (TCS) PROVISIONS
In order to provide clarity regarding discharge of tax liability by the resident payee on payment of any sum received by him without deduction of tax, it is proposed to amend section 201 to provide that the payer who fails to deduct the whole or any part of the tax on the payment made to a resident payee shall not be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax if such resident payee -
(i)  has furnished his return of income under section 139;
(ii)   has taken into account such sum for computing income in such return of income; and
(iii)  has paid the tax due on the income declared by him in such return of income,
and the payer furnishes a certificate to this effect from an accountant in such form as may be prescribed.
The date of payment of taxes by the resident payee shall be deemed to be the date on which return has been furnished by the payee.
It is also proposed to provide that where the payer fails to deduct the whole or any part of the tax on the payment made to a resident and is not deemed to be an assessee in default under section 201(1) on account of payment of taxes by the such resident, the interest under section 201(1A)(i) shall be payable from the date on which such tax was deductible to the date of furnishing of return of income by such resident payee.
Amendments on similar lines are also proposed to be made in the provisions of section 206C relating to TCS for clarifying the deemed date of discharge of tax liability by the buyer or licensee or lessee.
These amendments will take effect from 1st July, 2012."
44. First Proviso inserted in sub-section (6A) of section 206C seeks to achieve three-fold objectives. One, it seeks to (1) ensure that there is no loss to the Revenue, i.e., (i) the buyer has furnished his return of income u/s 139, (ii) the buyer has taken into account such sum on which tax was required to be collected at source u/s 206C for computing income in such return of income, (iii) the buyer has paid the tax due on the income declared by him in such return of income, (iv) the payer, i.e., the person responsible for collecting the tax at source u/s 206C, has furnished a certificate in Form No. 27BA confirming the aforesaid; (2) rationalize the provisions relating to collection of tax at source; (3) provide relief to the collector of tax at source from the consequences of non/short deduction collection of tax at source and to that extent it is a beneficial provision. In the aforesaid background, the issue that arises for consideration is whether the first proviso to section 206C(6A) is applicable to pending matters also notwithstanding the fact that it has been made effective from 1.7.2012.
45. In CIT v. Chandulal Venichand, 209 ITR 7 (Guj.), the issue before the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court was whether the first proviso inserted in section 43B with effect from 1.4.1988, which was intended to be a beneficial provision, would apply retrospectively. The Hon'ble High Court has held: "Once it is held that the proviso is inserted as a remedial and curative measure for removing the difficulties faced by the taxpayers because of inadvertent mistake or omission which has crept in in drafting section 43B, it would be just and proper to hold that it would relate back to the date when section 43B was introduced." The aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court has been approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Allied Motors (P.) Ltd. v. CIT, 224 ITR 677 (SC). Keeping in view the fact that the first proviso to sub-section (6A) of section 206C not only seeks to rationalize the provisions relating to collection of tax at source but is also beneficial in nature in that it seeks to provide relief to the collectors of tax at source from the consequences flowing from non/short collection of tax at source after ensuring that the interest of the Revenue is well protected, we have no hesitation to hold that the said proviso would apply retrospectively and therefore to both the assessment years under appeal. We therefore direct the assessee to appear before the Assessing Officer along with relevant documents as stipulated by the first proviso to sub-section (6A) of section 206C within two months of the date on which this order is pronounced upon which the AO shall examine the claim of the assessee in the light of the said provisions and pass appropriate order accordingly in conformity with law after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. Thus the issue raised in additional ground no. 3 stands restored to the file of the AO with the aforesaid observations.
46. In view of the foregoing, both the appeals filed by the assessee are partly allowed.


IT: Where a claim is held by High Court to give rise to a substantial question of law, then there cannot be an allegation of furnishing of inaccurate particulars or concealment of particulars of income in relation to such a claim so as to attract levy of penalty under section 271(1)(c)
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[2013] 36 taxmann.com 361 (Delhi - Trib.)
IN THE ITAT DELHI BENCH 'G'
Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax
v.
Srei Infrastructure Finance Ltd.*
A.N. PAHUJA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER 
AND C.M. GARG, JUDICIAL MEMBER
IT APPEAL NOS. 1908 & 1909 (DELHI) OF 2012
[ASSESSMENT YEARS 2006-07 & 2007-08]
DECEMBER  14, 2012 
Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Penalty - For concealment of income [Wrong claim, effect of] - Assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08 - Whether where a claim is held by High Court to give rise to a substantial question of law, then there cannot be an allegation of furnishing of inaccurate particulars or concealment of particulars of income in relation to such a claim so as to attract levy of penalty under section 271(1)(c) - Held, yes Whether where Tribunal in quantum proceedings, set aside impugned additions and remanded matter back for disposal afresh, since very basis on which penalty had been imposed did not exist, penalty order passed by Assessing Officer under section 271(1)(c) was to be set aside - Held, yes [In favour of assessee]
FACTS
 
 The assessee filed its return declaring certain income under the normal provisions of the Act. It also disclosed certain book profits in terms of provisions of section 115JB.
 During assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer made addition on account of excess depreciation claimed on vehicles given on lease and interest on loans given to subsidiaries while computing income under the normal provisions of the Act.
 Similarly, while computing book profits under section 115JB, addition was made in respect of transfer to special reserve and transfer to debenture redemption reserve.
 The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed said additions in quantum appeal.
 Thereupon, the Assessing Officer passed a penalty order under section 271(1)(c) in respect of aforesaid additions.
 The Commissioner (Appeals), however, taking a view that the assessee was not guilty of concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income, set aside penalty order.
 On revenue's appeal:
HELD
 
 It was noticed from records that even though the disallowances under the normal provisions were upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals), the Tribunal had restored the issues to the file of the Assessing Officer. [Para 8.2]
 Since the very basis upon which the penalty has been imposed on the amount disallowed on account of excess claim of depreciation and interest on loan to subsidiaries, does not exist in view of the order of the Tribunal in quantum appeal, it is opined that penalty levied in relation to the said amount does not survive. [Para 8.2.1]
 As regards additions in terms of provisions of section 115JB, the issues in quantum appeal have been admitted for adjudication by the High Court. [Para 9]
 It is well settled that when the dispute between the revenue and the assessee is on a legal issue and question of law is admitted by the High Court, then there cannot be an allegation of furnishing of inaccurate particulars and concealment and therefore, normally in such cases penalty cannot be justified.
 A plea or claim which is held by the High Court to give rise to a substantial question of law, cannot be treated to be frivolous or mala fideso as to attract levy of penalty under section 271(1)(c). [Para 9.1]
 In view of aforesaid, impugned order of the Commissioner (Appeals) deleting penalty was to be upheld.
CASES REFERRED TO
 
CIT v. Nalwa Sons Investments Ltd[2010] 327 ITR 543/194 Taxman 387 (Delhi) (para 6), Trinity Touch (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [2011] 132 ITD 88/11 taxmann.com 434 (Delhi) (para 6), Chadha Sugars (P.) Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2012] 135 ITD 42/18 taxmann.com 244 (Delhi) (para 6), CITv. Zoom Communication (P.) Ltd[2010] 191 Taxman 179 (Delhi) (para 6), CIT v. Alkesh K. Patel [2010] 195 Taxman 338 (Bom.) (para 6),Asstt. CIT v. Surinder Lal Chopra [2010] 2 ITR (T)790 (Delhi) (para 6), CIT v. Harparshad & Co. Ltd[2010] 328 ITR 53 (Delhi) (para 6),Asstt. CIT v. Dinesh Goel [2011] 16 taxmann.com 11/52 SOT 132 (Delhi)(URO) (para 6), CIT v. Liquid Investment & Trading Co. IT Appeal No. 240 of 2009 (Delhi) (para 7), Roger Enterprises (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal Nos. 567, 568 & 569 (Delhi) of 2006] (para 7), Hero Honda Motors Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2011] 63 DTR 53 (Delhi)(Trib) (para 7), Nayan Builders & Developers (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [IT Appeal No. 2379 (Mum.) of 2009, dated 18-3-2011] (para 7), Rupam Mercantiles Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Dy. CIT [2004] 91 ITD 237 (Ahd.)(TM) (para 7), Asstt. CIT v. Vijay Kumar Jindal [IT Appeal No. 4237 (Delhi) of 2009] (para 7), Jt. CIT v. Ghaziabad Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 3992 (Delhi) of 2011] (para 7), CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts (P.) Ltd. [2010] 322 ITR 158/189 Taxman 322 (SC) (para 7), CIT v.Mahanager Telephones [2011] 63 DTR 87 (Delhi) (para 7), CIT v. Shyam Tex International Ltd[2011] 198 Taxman 200 (Mag.)/9 taxmann.com 268 (Delhi) (para 7), CIT v. Dharam Pal Prem Chand Ltd[2010] 329 ITR 572/[2011] 202 Taxman 94/11 taxmann.com 437 (Delhi) (para 7), CIT v. Haryana Warehousing Corpn[2009] 314 ITR 215/182 Taxman 107 (Punj & Har.) (para 7), Union of India v.Rajasthan Spg. & Wvg. Mills [2009] 180 Taxman 609 (SC) (para 8), Dilip N. Shroff v. Jt. CIT [2007] 291 ITR 519/161 Taxman 218 (SC)(para 8), CIT v. Sidhartha Enterprises [2010] 322 ITR 80/[2009] 184 Taxman 460 (Punj & Har.) (para 8), Gitanjali Ghate v. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal No. 6560 (Mum.) of 2010] (para 8), Dy. CIT v. T.P. Roychowdhary & Co. (P.) Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 729 (Kol.) of 2010] (para 8), K.C. Builders v. Asstt. CIT [2004] 265 ITR 562/135 Taxman 461 (SC) (para 8.2), CIT v. R. Dalmia [ITR No. 184 of 1977, dated 20-2-1991] (Delhi) (para 8.2), Addl. CIT v. Badri Kashi Prasad [1993] 200 ITR 206 (All.) (para 8.2), Prabhat Oil Traders v. ITO (No. 3) [IT Appeal No. 4711 (Ahd.) of 1989, dated 21-9-1995] (para 8.2), City Dry Fish Co. v. CIT [1999] 238 ITR 63 (AP) (para 8.2), CIT v. Mohd. Bux Sokat Ali [2004] 265 ITR 326/[2003] 131 Taxman 238 (Raj.) (para 8.2), Asstt. CIT v. VIP Industries [2009] 30 SOT 254 (Mum.) (para 8.2), Jt. CIT v.Ghaziabad Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 3992 (Delhi) of 2011] (para 8.2), Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. ITO [1978] 112 ITR 592 (Cal.) (para 10), CIT v. P.K. Narayanan [1999] 238 ITR 905/106 Taxman 567 (Ker.) (para 10) and CITv. HMA Udyog (P.) Ltd[2007] 159 Taxman 394 (Delhi) (para 10).
Ramesh Chander for the Appellant. Soumen Adak and Mrs. Alka Arren for the Respondent.
ORDER
 
A.N Pahuja, Accountant Member - These two appeals filed on 25th April, 2012 by the Revenue against two separate orders dt. 30th Jan., 2012 and 29th Feb., 2012 of the learned CIT(A)-XII, New Delhi, raise the following grounds :
"1.  The learned CIT(A) erred in law and facts of the case, in cancelling the penalty of Rs. 4,43,56,450 in the asst. yr. 2006-07 and Rs. 8,99,30,100 in the asst. yr. 2007-08 imposed by the AO under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act.
2.  The appellant craves to amend, modify, alter, add or forego any ground of appeal at any time before or during the hearing of this appeal."
2. Facts, in brief, as per relevant orders for the asst. yr. 2006-07 are that e-return declaring income of Rs. 2,03,13,738 under the normal provisions of the IT Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and book profits of Rs. 38,9504,834 in terms of provisions under s. 115JB of the Act, filed on 27th Nov., 2006 by the assessee, a non-banking finance company in the business of leasing commercial vehicles, infrastructure construction machinery and financing infrastructural projects, was revised on 7th Nov., 2007, 19th March, 2008 and finally on 31st March, 2008, reflecting income of Rs. 1,25,92,360 under the normal provisions of the Act while book profits remain unchanged. After processing, the return was selected for scrutiny with the service of a notice under s. 143(2) of the Act. The assessment was completed on an income of Rs. 16,17,08,631 under the normal provisions with the addition of Rs. 9,77,07,271 on account of excess claim of depreciation on vehicles given on lease; Rs. 14,04,000 on account of interest on loan to subsidiaries beside disallowance of Rs. 5,00,05,000 under s. 14A of the Act. The book profits were determined at Rs. 67,92,04,834 with the addition on account of provision for deferred tax-Rs. 16,65,00,000, corporate dividend tax-Rs. 2,52,00,000 and transfer to special reserve-Rs. 9,80,00,000. Thus, total income was determined on the book profit of Rs. 67,92,04,834.Inter alia, penalty proceedings under s. 271(l)(c) of the Act were initiated for each of the aforesaid additions/disallowances.
2.1 Likewise, in the asst. yr. 2007-08 e-return declaring loss of Rs. 3TT94,15,570 under the normal provisions and book profits of Rs. 47,54,42,043 in terms of provisions of s. 115JB of the Act was filed on 29th Oct., 2007. After processing, the assessment was completed under s. 143(3) of the Act, determining loss of Rs. 13,58,44,884 under the normal provisions of the Act with the disallowance of excess claim of depreciation of Rs. 14,91,54,686 on account of vehicles given on lease; interest on loans given to subsidiaries-Rs. 24,84,000 beside disallowance of Rs. 9,19,32,000 in terms of provisions of s. 14A of the Act while book profits were determined at Rs. 84,05,42,043 with the addition of Rs. 1,85,00,000 on account of corporate dividend tax, Rs. 16,00,00,000 on account of transfer to special reserve and Rs. 18,66,00,000 on account of transfer to debenture redemption reserve. Thus, total income was determined on the book profit of Rs. 84,05,42,043 and penalty proceedings under s. 271(l)(c) of the Act were also initiated for each of the aforesaid additions/disallowances.
3. On appeal, the learned CIT(A) upheld the aforesaid additions/ disallowances in these two assessment years. After the receipt of order of the learned CIT(A), in response to a show-cause notice issued before levy of penalty under s. 271(l)(c) of the Act, the assessee replied that they have neither concealed any income nor furnished any inaccurate particulars thereof. Inter alia, the assessee relied on a number of decisions. However, the AO did not accept the submissions of the assessee and levied a penalty of Rs. 4,43,56,450 for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income in the asst. yr. 2006-07 @ 100 per cent of the tax sought to be evaded on the income of Rs. 19,71,11,271 comprising as under :
(i) Claim of excess depreciation on vehicles given on leaseRs. 9,77,07,271
(ii) Interest on loans given to subsidiariesRs. 14,04,000
(iii) Transfer to special reserve while computing the book profits under s. 115JB of the Act. Rs. 9,80,00,000
3.1 Similarly, in the asst. yr. 2007-08, the AO imposed a penalty of Rs. 8199,30,100 for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income @ 100 per cent of the tax sought to be evaded on the income of Rs. 49,82,36,686 comprising as under :
(i) Claim of excess depreciation on vehicles given on leaseRs. 14,91,54,686
(ii) Interest on loans given to subsidiariesRs. 24,84,000
(iii) Transfer to special reserve while computing the book profits under s. 115JB of the ActRs. 16,00,00,000
(iv) Transfer to debenture redemption reserve while computing the book profits under s. 115JB of the Act Rs. 18,66,00,000
4. On appeal, the learned CIT(A) cancelled the penalty in the asst. yr. 2006-07 on each of the aforesaid additions/disallowances, holding as under:
"(i) Levy of penalty in relation to disallowance of depreciation :
7.2 I have carefully gone through the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and gone through the relevant judicial pronouncements cited by the Authorised Representative of the appellant. On perusal of the judicial pronouncements and the facts as enumerated by the Authorised Representative of the appellant the following conclusions can be drawn :
(a)  There is no deliberate attempt on the part of the appellant to conceal the particulars of income. The claim of higher rate of depreciation on motor vehicles given on lease was clearly evident from the tax audit report filed during the course of the assessment proceedings.
(b)  The claim of higher depreciation made by the assessee was based on various judicial pronouncements and the explanation offered by the appellant was bona fide with respect to claim of depreciation which was neither found to be false nor untrue. The claim of the appellant is bona fide and nothing adverse has been found against the claim as such in the course of the assessment proceedings.
Assessee's case is also covered by Delhi High Court in IT Appeal No. 1582 of 2010 in the case of CIT v. Brahmaputra Consortium Ltd., dt. 3rd Aug., 2011. After hearing both the parties, the high Court held that:
' ... there cannot be dispute about allowing depreciation @ 25 per cent en excavators. However, the circumstances under which the claim was made at 40 per cent, show that it was a genuine and bona fide. The assessee had acquired new excavators and tippers for a total sum of Rs. 1,78,75,260 and Rs. 6,36,88,865 respectively. All block of assets were termed as 'earth moving equipments' and taken in the P&L a/c under the aforesaid head. Since, the entire block consisting of excavators and tippers was taken under the head 'Earth moving equipments' the explanation given by the assessee was that inadvertently, in respect to excavators the depreciation was claimed at 40 per cent instead of 25 per cent. This explanation has been accepted as genuine and bona fide by the Tribunal which is the final fact finding authority. Deletion of penalty on the ground of inadvertent error is a finding of fact. AO did not even contradict the plea of the assessee.
Further, by making claim of depreciation at higher rate, where the IT return was at loss, the assessee did not gain any mileage. On the contrary, it was better for him to claim depreciation @ 25 per cent in this year resulting into higher WDV in the next year for claim of depreciation [of a higher amount on higher WDV thereby reducing the tax liability. Thus, the AO was not correct in holding that submitting inaccurate claim would amount to giving inaccurate particulars. Thus, no substantial question of law arises in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.'
The claim of the higher depreciation by the appellant is squarely covered in the appellant's own case for asst. yrs. 1995-96, 2000-01 and 2001-02. The Hon'ble jurisdictional Tribunal has decided the similar issue in favour of the appellant. Thus, the same was claimed based on the earlier year's precedent.
(ii) Levy of penalty in relation to disallowance of notional interest:
8.3 I have carefully gone through the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and gone through the relevant judicial pronouncements cited by the Authorised Representative of the appellant. On perusal of the judicial pronouncements and the facts as enumerated by the Authorised Representative of the appellant the following conclusions can be drawn :
(a)  The appellant had owned funds of Rs. 41,052 lacs as at 31st March, 2006 and during the year, profit of Rs. 4,842 lacs (PAT) has been earned which is sufficient to finance interest-free loan of Rs. 117 lacs advanced to the sister concerns. The same is clearly evident from the audited accounts for the year ended financial year 2005-06.
(b)  The claim of the appellant was bona fide based on various juridical pronouncements available at the time of filing of return. Further, it is a debatable issue as contrary judgments are available and does not call for imposition of penalty.
(c)  The above facts as narrated by the Authorised Representative of the appellant are clearly .visible from the balance sheet and the audited accounts of the company which leave beyond doubt the fact that the appellant had sufficient own funds for advancing such funds to its subsidiary company.
(d)  Since all the facts relating to the said issue were already disclosed and the appellant had an adequate basis, thus there was no concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars in the return of income.
8.4 Further, similar issue has been decided in favour of the appellant in asst. yr. 2008-09 in Appeal No. 11/2010-11 by me.
Thus, keeping in mind that, all the facts relating to the issue were disclosed before AO, there was no concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the appellant. The decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts (P.) Ltd.(2010) 230 CTR 320/36 DTR 449/322 ITR 158 (SC) is applicable in the present case. Since there was neither any concealment of income nor any inaccurate particulars have been furnished by the appellant, the basic conditions for levy of penalty are not satisfied. The penalty imposed is thus cancelled.
(iii) Levy of penalty in relation to addition of special reserve while computing book profits :
9.2 I have carefully gone through the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and gone through the relevant judicial pronouncements cited by the Authorised Representative of the appellant. On perusal of the judicial pronouncements and the facts as enumerated by the Authorised Representative of the appellant the following conclusions can be drawn :
(a)  During the year under consideration, the appellant has transferred a sum of Rs. 9,80,00,000 to 'special reserve' as per the provisions of s. 45-IC of the RBI Act being 20 per cent of the profits. The said transfer was made as per the guidelines laid down by RBI and was statutory in nature.
(b)  The appellant was under a bona fide relief that the amount transferred to special reserve as per RBI Act is not to be added back to the books profit under s. 115JB and thus the same was not added back. Thus, there has been neither concealment of income nor furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. The appellant had made complete disclosure of the said fact in the course of the assessment proceedings under s. 143(3) of the Act. Further, the aforesaid fact was clearly evident from audited accounts.
9.3 Further, similar issue has been decided in favour of the appellant in asst. yr. 2008-09 in Appeal No. 11/2010-11 by me. Thus, keeping in mind that, all the facts relating to the issue were disclosed before AO, there was no concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the appellant. The decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts (P.) Ltd. (supra) is applicable in the present case. Since there was neither any concealment of income nor any inaccurate particulars have been furnished by the appellant, the basic conditions for levy of penalty are not satisfied. The penalty imposed is thus cancelled.
(iv) Levy of penalty due to determination of income under s. 115JB of the Act:
10. As regard ground No. 8, the question as to whether penalty can be imposed in respect of the assessment of total income under the normal provisions of the Act when ultimately the total income is determined under s. 115JB of the Act. Reliance was placed on the decision of Hon'ble Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Ruchi Strips & Alloys Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (ITA. No. 6940/Mum/2008) wherein it was held that the concealment of income had its repercussions only when the assessment was done under the normal procedure. If the assessment as per the normal procedure was not acted upon and it was the deemed income assessed under s. 115JB which became the basis of assessment, the concealment had no role to play and was totally irrelevant. Similar view has been taken in the cases of Dy. CIT v. Ushdev International Ltd. (2011) 51 DTR (Mumbai) 283 and Paramount Minerals & Chemicals Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (ITA No. 4714/Mum/2009).
10.1 In the present case the appellant had to pay tax under the provisions of s. 115JB of the Act. However, the AO has levied penalty amounting to Rs. 4,43,56,450 on additions and/or disallowances made under the normal provisions of the Act as well as under s. 115JB of the Act. Further, penalty under s. 271(l)(c) to the tune of Rs. 3,33,60853 was levied on disallowance made under the normal provisions of the Act, however there was no change in tax liability on account of the aforesaid disallowance as the disallowance was made in normal computation of income. Since, there was no impact on tax liability on account of disallowances under the normal provisions of the Act, no tax is sought to be evaded.
The assessee has also relied on CIT v. Nalwa Sons Investments Ltd(2010) 235 CTR 209/45 DTR 345/194 Taxman 387 (Del):
' ... Sec. 271(l)(c) r/w s. 115JB of the IT Act, 1961-Penalty-For concealment of income-Asst. yr. 2001-02-Assessee filed its return of income declaring certain loss-While making assessment, AO made disallowances on account of PF contribution made belatedly, deduction claimed under s. 80HHC and depreciation claimed on machinery purchased on last day of year. However, as income so computed under normal procedure was less than income determined under s. 115JB, assessee was assessed under s. 115JB-Thereafter, assessing authority imposed penalty under s. 271(l)(c) in respect of aforesaid three additions holding that assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of income- Whether, though there was concealment, yet that would have repercussions only when assessment would have been done under normal procedure-Held, yes-Whether when assessment was made on income computed under s. 115JB and tax had been paid on income so computed, aforesaid concealment did not lead to tax evasion and, therefore, no penalty could have been imposed on assessee-Held, yes.
Finding
10.2 In the light of aforesaid discussion, I find that the issue is covered by the aforesaid decision. Since, there was no change in the tax liability on account of the disallowance made under normal provisions of the Act, the penalty, even otherwise ought not to have been imposed on the disallowances made under the normal provisions of the Act. However, since the individual grounds are allowed above, no further relief is granted in respect of this ground."
5. Similarly, in the asst. yr. 2007-08, the learned CIT(A) cancelled the penalty on each of the aforesaid additions/disallowances, holding as under :
"(i) Levy of penalty in relation to disallowance of depreciation :
7.2. I have carefully gone through the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and gone through the relevant judicial pronouncements cited by the Authorised Representative of the appellant. On perusal of the judicial pronouncements and the facts as enumerated by the Authorised Representative of the appellant the following conclusions can be drawn :
(a)  There is no deliberate attempt on the part of the appellant to conceal the particulars of income. The claim of higher rate of depreciation on motor vehicles given on lease was clearly evident from the tax audit report filed during the course of the assessment proceedings.
(b)  The claim of higher depreciation made by the assessee was based on various judicial pronouncements and the explanation offered by the appellant was bona fide with respect to claim of depreciation which was neither found to be false nor untrue. The claim of the appellant is bona fide and nothing adverse has been found against the claim as such in the course of the assessment proceedings.
Assessee's case is also covered by Delhi High Court in IT Appeal No. 1582 of 2010 in the case of CIT v. Brahmaputra Consortium Ltd., dt. 3rd Aug., 2011. After hearing both the parties, the High Court held that:
' ... there cannot be dispute about allowing depreciation @ 25 per cent on excavators. However, the circumstances under which the claim was made at 40 per cent, show that it was a genuine and bona fide. The assessee had acquired new excavators and tippers for a total sum of Rs. 1,78,75,260 and Rs. 6,36,88,865 respectively. All block of assets were termed as 'earth moving equipments' and taken in the P&L a/c under the aforesaid head. Since, the entire block consisting of excavators and tippers was taken under the head 'earth moving equipments' the explanation given by the assessee was that inadvertently, in respect to excavators the depreciation was claimed at 40 per cent instead of 25 per cent. This explanation has been accepted as genuine and bona fide by the Tribunal which is the final fact-finding authority. Deletion of penalty on the ground of inadvertent error is a finding of fact. AO did not even contradict the plea of the assessee.
Further, by making claim of depreciation at higher rate, where the IT return was at loss, the assessee did not gain any mileage. On the contrary, it was better for him to claim depreciation @ 25 per cent in this year resulting into higher WDV in the next year for claim of depreciation of a higher amount on higher WDV thereby reducing the tax liability. Thus, the AO was not correct in holding that submitting inaccurate claim would amount to giving inaccurate particulars. Thus, no substantial question of law arises in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.'
7.3 Thus, keeping in mind that, all the facts relating to the issue were disclosed before AO, there was no concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the appellant. The decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts (P.) Ltd. (supra) is applicable in the present case. Since there was neither any concealment of income nor any inaccurate particulars have been furnished by the appellant, the basic conditions for levy of penalty are not satisfied. The penalty imposed is thus cancelled.
(ii) Levy of penalty in relation to disallowance of interest:
8.3 I have carefully gone through the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and gone through the relevant judicial pronouncements cited by the Authorised Representative of the appellant. On perusal- of the judicial pronouncements and the facts as enumerated by the Authorised Representative of the appellant the following conclusions can be drawn :
(a)  The appellant had owned funds of Rs. 47,703 lacs as at 31st March, 2007 and during the year, profit of Rs. 7,925 lacs (PAT) has been earned which is sufficient to finance interest-free loan of Rs. 207 lacs advanced to the sister concerns. The same is clearly evident from the audited accounts for the year ended financial year 2006-07.
(b)  The claim of the appellant was bona fide based on various juridical pronouncements available at the time of filing of return.
(c)  The above facts as narrated by the Authorised Representative of the appellant are clearly visible from the balance sheet and the audited accounts of the company which leave beyond doubt the fact that the appellant had sufficient own funds for advancing such funds to its subsidiary company.
(d)  Since all the facts relating to the said issue were already disclosed and the appellant had an adequate basis, thus there was no concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars in the return of income.
8.4 Further, similar issue has been decided in favour of the appellant in asst. yr. 2008-09 in Appeal No. 11/2010-11 by me. Thus, keeping in mind that all the facts relating to the issue were disclosed before AO. there was no concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the appellant. The decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts (P.) Ltd. (supra) is applicable in the present case. Since there was neither any concealment of income nor any inaccurate particulars have been furnished by the appellant, the basic conditions for levy of penalty are not satisfied. The penalty imposed is thus cancelled.
(iii) Levy of penalty in relation to addition of special reserve while computing book profits :
9.2 I have carefully gone through the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and gone through the relevant judicial pronouncements cited by the Authorised Representative of the appellant. On perusal of the judicial pronouncements and the facts as enumerated by the Authorised Representative of the appellant the following conclusions can be drawn :
(a)  During the year under consideration, the appellant has transferred a sum of Rs. 16,00,00,000 to 'Special reserve' as per the provisions of s. 45-IC of the RBI Act being 20 per cent of the profits. The said transfer was made as per the guidelines laid down by RBI and was statutory in nature.
(b)  The appellant was under a bona fide relief that the amount transferred to special reserve as per RBI Act is not to be added back to the books profit under s. 115JB and thus the same was not added back. Thus, there has been neither concealment of income nor furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. The appellant had made complete disclosure of the said fact in the course of the assessment proceedings under s. 143(3) of the Act. Further, the aforesaid fact was clearly evident from audited accounts.
9.3 Further, similar issue has been decided in favour of the appellant in asst. yr. 2008-09 in Appeal No. 11/2010-11 by me. Thus, keeping in mind that all the facts relating to the issue were disclosed before AO, there was no concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the appellant. The decision of Hon'ble apex Court in the case of CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts (P.) Ltd. (supra) is applicable in the present case. Since there was neither any concealment of income nor any inaccurate particulars have been furnished by the appellant, the basic conditions for levy of penalty are not satisfied. The penalty imposed is thus cancelled.
(iv) Levy of penalty in relation to addition of debenture redemption reserve while computing book profits :
10.2 I have carefully gone through the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and gone through the relevant judicial pronouncements cited by the Authorised Representative of the appellant. On perusal of the judicial pronouncements and the facts as enumerated by the Authorised Representative of the appellant the following conclusions can be drawn :
(a)  During the year under consideration, the appellant has transferred a sum of Rs. 18,66,00,000 to 'debenture redemption reserve' and contended that the same is neither a reserve nor a provision for unascertained liability so as to attract the cl. (b) or (c) of Expln. 1 to s. 115JB(2).
(b)  Any amount transferred to any reserve cannot be treated as a reserve particularly when the amount transferred is not in excess of amount which had to be paid for the special purpose. The above view has also been held by the decision of Hon'ble apex Court in the case of National Rayon Corporation Ltd. (supra).
(c)  On perusal of the meaning of the terms 'provision' and 'reserve' as defined in cl. 7(1) of Part III, Sch. VI to the Companies Act, 1956, it can be said that the said transfer can be termed as a provision and not a reserve, even though it is reflected in the audited accounts as 'debenture redemption reserve'. Thus, the same is not covered by the provisions of cl. (b) of Expln. 1 to s. 115JB.
10.3 As all the disclosures relating to the amount so transferred to the reserves have already been made in the audited accounts itself and the appellant has made a claim on the bona fide belief that the same is allowable, thus, keeping in mind that all the facts relating to the issue were disclosed before AO, there was no concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the appellant. The decision of Hon'ble apex Court in the case of CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts (P) Ltd. (supra) is applicable in the present case. Since there was neither any concealment of income nor any inaccurate particulars have been furnished by the appellant, the basic conditions for levy of penalty are not satisfied. The penalty imposed is thus cancelled.
(v) Levy of penalty due to determination of income under s. 115JB of the Act:
11.1 In the present case the appellant had to pay tax under the provisions of s. 115JB of the Act. However, the AO has levied penalty amounting to Rs. 8,99,30,100 on additions and/or disallowances made under the normal provisions of the Act as well as under s. 115JB of the Act. Further, penalty under s. 271(l)(c) to the tune of Rs. 5,10,41,580 was levied on disallowance made under the normal provisions of the Act, however there was no change in tax liability on account of the aforesaid disallowance as the disallowance was made in normal computation of income. Since, there was no impact on tax liability on account of disallowances under the normal provisions of the Act, no tax is sought to be evaded.
The assessee is also covered by CIT v. Nalwa Sons Investments Ltd(2010) 235 CTR 209/45 DTR 345/194 Taxman 387 (Del):
... Sec. 271(l)(c) r/w s. 115JB of the IT Act, 1961-Penalty-For concealment of income-Asst. yr. 2001-02-Assessee filed its return of income declaring certain loss-While making assessment, AO made disallowances on account of PF contribution made belatedly, deduction claimed under s. 80HHC and depreciation claimed on machinery purchased on last day of year-However, as income so computed under normal procedure was less than income determined under s. 115JB, assessee was assessed under s. 115JB-Thereafter, AO imposed penalty under s. 271(l)(c) in respect of aforesaid three additions holding that assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of income-Whether, though there was concealment, yet that would have repercussions only when assessment would have been done under normal procedure-Held, yes-Whether when assessment was made on income computed under s. 115JB and tax had been paid on income so computed, aforesaid concealment did not lead to tax evasion and, therefore, no penalty could have been imposed on assessee-Held, yes.'
11.2 Thus, in the light of aforesaid discussion, I find that the issue is covered by the aforesaid decision. Since, there was no change in the tax liability on account of the disallowance made under normal provisions of the Act, the penalty, even otherwise ought not to have been imposed on the disallowances made under the normal provisions of the Act. However, since the individual grounds are allowed above, no further relief is granted in respect of this ground."
6. The Revenue is now in appeal before us against the aforesaid findings of the learned CIT(A). The learned Departmental Representative supported the order of the AO, levying penalty, contending, inter alia, that provisions of s. 115JB of the Act are a self-contained code and the assessee having not offered to tax the amount transferred to special reserve or debenture redemption reserve in the computation of book profits, furnished inaccurate particulars of income, especially when the assessee itself had been adding back the amount transferred to special reserve in computing the book profits in the earlier years. As regards reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in CIT v. Nalwa Sons Investments Ltd[2010] 327 ITR 543/194 Taxman 387 the learned Departmental Representative in his written submissions pleaded that the IT Act nowhere provided that if provisions under s. 115JB are resorted to, mandatory provisions of the Chapter IV will get suspended. Even when tax is computed under s. 115JB, AO has to compute income under normal provisions of Chapter IV also which is a must only because it is here that the AO has to give effect to various other claims for deductions/exemptions of the assessee e.g. set off of brought forward losses, deductions under Chapter VI-A etc. Had the High Court been explained the correct machinery scheme of the IT Act, that even after computation under s. 115JB, AO is duty-bound to compute income or loss under the normal provisions of the Act, its decision would have been different. Besides deeming fiction of the provisions of s. 115JB could not extend beyond calculation of tax payable by the assessee. Accordingly, the learned Departmental Representative submitted that penalty proceedings being independent of the assessment proceedings, provisions of s. 115JB which were on computation of tax could not be extended to these proceedings. Besides, extending scope of application of 115JB to penalty proceedings would make provisions of cl. (a) of the Expln. 4 to s. 271(l)(c) of the Act otiose/redundant. The provisions of s. 115JB are only for calculating income-tax and not for calculating penalty. There is no doubt that even if there is no positive income, penalty can still be calculated by deeming the addition or disallowance itself to be the income. Explanation 4 does not even impliedly provide for attracting the deeming fiction of the provisions of s. 115JB. Accordingly, the learned Departmental Representative prayed to allow the appeal of the Revenue. While referring to decisions in Trinity Touch (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [2011] 132 ITD 88/11 taxmann.com 434 (Delhi) and Chadha Sugars (P.) Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2012] 135 ITD 42/18 taxmann.com 244 (Delhi), the learned Departmental Representative argued that claim being not bona fide levy of penalty was justified. Inter alia, the learned Departmental Representative relied upon decisions in CIT v. Zoom Communication (P.) Ltd[2011] 191 Taxman 179 (Delhi)CIT v. Alkesh K. Patel [2010] 195 Taxman 338 (Bom.)Asstt. CIT v. Surinder Lal Chopra [2010] 2 ITR (T)790 (Delhi); CIT v. Harparshad & Co. Ltd[2010] 328 ITR 53 (Delhi)Chadha Sugars (P.) Ltd. (supra) and Asstt. CIT v. Dinesh Goel [2011] 16 taxmann.com 11/52 SOT 132 (Delhi)(URO).
7. On the other hand, the learned Authorised Representative on behalf of "the assessee supported the findings of the learned CIT(A) while contending that penalty is not leviable on additions made to book profits when appeal is admitted by the Hon'ble High Court in their case on the issue of additions on account of transfer to special reserve and debenture redemption reserve in IT Appeal Nos. 371 and 372 of 2012 vide order dt. 29th Aug., 2012 read with order dt. 6th Nov., 2012. In this connection, the learned Authorised Representative referred to decisions in CIT v.Liquid Investment & Trading Co. IT Appeal No. 240 of 2009 (Delhi); Roger Enterprises (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal Nos. 567, 568 & 569 (Delhi) of 2006]; Hero Honda Motors Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2011] 63 DTR 53 (Delhi)(Trib); Nayan Builders & Developers (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [IT Appeal No. 2379 (Mum.) of 2009, dated 18-3-2011]; Rupam Mercantiles Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Dy. CIT [2004] 91 ITD 237 (Ahd)(TM) andAsstt. CIT v. Vijay Kumar Jindal [IT Appeal No. 4237 (Delhi) of 2009]. The learned Authorised Representative further submitted that since the assessee neither concealed any particulars of income nor furnished inaccurate particulars thereof while quantum additions in determining income under the normal provisions of the Act have been restored back to the file of AO by the Tribunal vide their order dt. 23rd Feb., 2012 in ITA Nos. 617 and 618/Del/2010, no penalty could be imposed in relation to the said disallowances. In this connection, the learned Authorised Representative referred to decision in Jt. CIT v. Ghaziabad Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 3992 (Delhi) of 2011] since the claims made by the assessee were bona fide, relying upon decisions in CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts (P.) Ltd. [2010] 322 ITR 158/189 Taxman 322 (SC)CIT v. Mahanager Telephones [2011] 63 DTR 87 (Delhi); CIT v. Shyam Tex International Ltd[2011] 198 Taxman 200 (Delhi) (Mag.)/9 taxmann.com 268 (Delhi) and CIT v. Dharam Pal Prem Chand Ltd[2010] 329 ITR 572/[2011] 202 Taxman 94 (Mag.)/11 taxman.com 437 (Delhi), the learned Authorised Representative argued that penalty could not be imposed. The learned Authorised Representative also pleaded that decision in Union of India v. Dharmendra Textile Processors [2008] 306 ITR 277/174 Taxman 571 (SC) is not applicable in view of decisions in CIT v. Haryana Warehousing Corpn[2009] 314 ITR 215/182 Taxman 107 (Punj & Har.) and Union of India v. Rajasthan Spg. & Wvg. Mills [2009] 180 Taxman 609 (SC). The ratio of the judgment in Dharmendra Textiles (supra) has been explained by the Hon'ble apex Court in Reliance Petroproducts (supra) by observing that the said decision is an authority only for the proposition that element of mens rea stands excluded from the scope of the provisions of s. 271(l)(c) and it is only to this extent the decision in the case of Dilip N. Shroff v. Jt. CIT [2007] 291 ITR 519/161 Taxman 218 (SC) stood overruled. Further, in the case of CIT v. Sidhartha Enterprises [2010] 322 ITR 80/[2009] 184 Taxman 460 (Punj & Har.) it was held that the decision of the Supreme Court in Dharmendra Textile '(supra) cannot be read as laying down that in every case where particulars of income are inaccurate, penalty must follow. The learned Authorised Representative contended that issue is squarely covered by decision in CIT v. Nalwa Sons Investments Ltd. (supra) and SLP against the said decision has been dismissed by the Apex Court. The learned Authorised Representative added that when facts are disclosed in the /balance sheet, no penalty could be levied as held in Gitanjali Ghate v. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal No. 6560 (Mum.) of 2010] and Dy. CIT v. T.P. Roychowdhary & Co. (P.) Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 729 (Kol.) of 2010].
8. We have heard both the parties and gone through the facts of the case as also the decisions referred to by both the sides. As is apparent from the aforesaid facts, the assessments for the asst. yrs. 2006-07 and 2007-08 in this case were completed under the normal provisions of the Act, with the following disallowances :
S.No.Nature of disallowance Asst. yr. 2006-07Asst. yr. 2007-08
1.Excess claim of depreciation on vehicles9,77,072 14,91,54,686
2.Interest on loans to subsidiaries 14,04,00014,84,000
3.Disallowance under s. 14A of the Act 5,00,05.0009,19,32,000
8.1 Book profits were determined under s. 115JB of the Act with the following additions :
S.No.Nature of disallowance Asst. yr. 2006-07Asst. yr. 2007-08
1.Provision of deferred tax16,65,00,000 Nil
2.Corporate dividend tax 2,52,00,0001,85,00,000
3.Amount transferred to special reserve9,80,00,000 Nil
4.Amount transferred to debenture redemption reserve Nil8,66,00,000
8.2 Though the aforesaid disallowances under the normal provisions were upheld by the learned CIT(A), Tribunal vide their order dt. 23rd Fe., 2012 restored the issues to the file of the AO. The additions made in terms of provisions of s. 115JB of the Act were upheld by the learned CIT(A) and the Tribunal. On receipt of order of the learned CIT(A), the AO levied penalty under s. 271(l)(c) of the Act in respect of disallowance on account of excess claim of depreciation on vehicles and interest on loans to subsidiaries while determining income under the normal provisions. As already stated, though the learned CIT(A) upheld these disallowances, the Tribunal restored the issues in relation to these disallowances to the file of the AO vide order dt. 23rd Feb., 2012 in ITA Nos. 617 and 618/Del/2010. Since the disallowances, forming the basis for levy of penalty, itself have been set aside, penalty imposed under s. 271(l)(c) of the Act does not survive. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.C. Builders v. Asstt. CIT [2004] 265 ITR 562/135 Taxman 461 held that ordinarily, penalty cannot stand if the assessment itself is set aside. Where an order of assessment or reassessment on the basis of which penalty has been levied on the assessee, has itself been finally set aside or cancelled by the Tribunal or otherwise, the penalty cannot stand by itself and the same is liable to be cancelled. Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. R. Dalmia [ITR No. 184 of 1977, dated 20-2-1991], held that ho penalty survives after deletion of additions, forming the basis for the levy of penalty. Similar view was taken in Addl. CIT v. Badri Kashi Prasad [1993] 200 ITR 206 (All.), Prabhat Oil Traders v. ITO [IT Appeal No. 4711 (Ahd.) of 1989, dated 21-9-1995], City Dry Fish Co. v. CIT [1999] 238 ITR 63 (AP)CIT v. Mohd. Bux Sokat Ali [2004] 265 ITR 326/[2003] 131 Taxman 238 (Raj.)Asstt. CIT v. VIP Industries [2009] 30 SOT 254 (Mum.), as also in Jt. CIT v.Ghaziabad Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 3992 (Delhi) of 2011].
8.2.1 Since the very basis upon which the penalty has been imposed on the amount disallowed on account of excess claim of depreciation and interest on loan to subsidiaries, does not exist in view of the aforesaid order dt. 23rd Feb., 2012 of the Tribunal in quantum appeal, we are of the opinion that penalty levied in relation to the said amount does not survive. The other arguments made by the learned Authorised Representative on the issue of levy of penalty in relation to these disallowances, consequently become redundant and infructuous.
9. As regards additions in terms of provisions of s. 115JB of the Act, the Issues in quantum, appeal have been admitted for adjudication by the Hon'ble High Court vide their order dt. 29th Aug., 2012 r/w order dt. 6th Nov., 2012 in ITA Nos. 371 and 372/2012 for the asst. yrs. 2007-08 and 2006-07 respectively. In this connection, the learned Authorised Representative relied upon decision dt. 5th Oct., 2010 of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT v. Liquid Investment & Trading Co. (supra) wherein it was concluded as under :
"Both the CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal have set aside the penalty imposed by the AO under s. 271(l)(c) of the IT Act, 1961 on the ground that the issue of deduction under s. 14A of the Act was a debatable issue. We may also note that against the quantum assessment whereunder deduction under s. 14A of the Act was prescribed to the assessee, the assessee has preferred an appeal in this Court under s. 260A of the Act which has also been admitted and substantial question of law framed. This itself shows that the issue is debatable. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that no question of law arises in the present case.
This appeal is accordingly dismissed."
9.1 Similar view has been taken in the decisions of the Tribunal, Delhi Bench in the case of Hero Honda Motors Ltd. (supra); Chennai 'A' Bench in the case of Sundaram Non Conventional Energy Systems Ltd. in ITA Nos. 1706 and 1707/Mad/2011 Mumbai 'B' Bench in the case of Nayan Builders & Developers (P.) Ltd. (supra) a Third Member Decision of Ahmedabad Bench in the case of Rupam Mercantile (supra) .It has been laid down in these decisions that when the dispute between the Revenue and the assessee is on a legal issue and question of law is admitted by the Hon'ble High Courts, then there cannot be an allegation of furnishing of inaccurate particulars and concealment and, therefore, normally in such cases penalty cannot be justified. A plea or claim which is held by the Hon'ble High Court to give rise to a substantial question of law, cannot be treated to be frivolous or mala fide so as to attract levy of penalty under s. 271(l)(c) of the IT Act, as held by the Third Member in the aforesaid decision in Rupam Mercantile (supra). In the light of view taken in these decisions, especially when the Revenue have not brought to our notice any contrary decision, we are of the opinion that penalty levied in relation to additions in terms of provisions of s. 115JB of the Act, does not survive.
10. Even otherwise Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. ReliancePetroproducts(P.) Ltd. (supra) held that where no information given in the return is found to be incorrect and where an assessee has made only incorrect claim, it does not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars. We are of the opinion that a mere rejection of a legal claim does not give rise to concealment of income.- Burmah Shell Oil Storage & DistributingCo. of India Ltd. v. ITO [1978] 112 ITR 592 (Cal.). A mere rejection of the claim of the assessee by relying on different interpretations does not amount to concealment of the particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars thereof by the assessee. When two views are possible, no penalty can be imposed is a principle that has been enunciated in the decision in the cases of CIT v. P.K. Narayanan[1999] 238 ITR 905/106 Taxman 567 (Ker.) and CIT v. HMA Udyog (P.) Ltd[2009] 159 Taxman 394 (Delhi).
11. Moreover, in these two assessment years, book profits alone have been assessed as income. Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the case ofNalwa Sons Investments Ltd. (supra) has held that if tax is paid on the income assessed under s. 115JB of the Act, concealment of income had no role to play and is totally irrelevant. SLP against this decision has been dismissed on 4th May, 2012 by Hon'ble apex Court in Nalwa Sons Investments Ltd. (supra).
12. In view of the foregoing, especially when the Revenue have not placed before us any material, controverting the aforesaid conclusion of the learned CIT(A) in these appeals, so as to enable us to take a different view in the matter, we are not inclined to interfere. Therefore, ground No. 1 in these two appeals is dismissed.
13. No additional ground having been raised before us in term of residuary ground No. 2 in these appeals, accordingly, this ground is dismissed.
14. No other plea or arguments have been raised before us.
In the result, both these appeals are dismissed.

--
Regards,

Pawan Singla
BA (Hon's), LLB
Audit Officer


IT : Where book profits as declared were in conformity and as per provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI of Companies Act, 1956, adjustment of prior period expenses in book profits under section 115JB would be a debatable issue; AO was not justified in invoking section 154
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[2012] 23 taxmann.com 434 (Delhi)
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Commissioner of Income-tax
v.
R.T.C.L. Ltd.*
SANJIV KHANNA AND R.V. EASWAR, JJ.
IT APPEAL NO. 612 OF 2009 
MARCH 28, 2012
Section 115JB, read with section 154, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Minimum alternate-tax - Assessment year 2002-03 - During relevant year, assessee changed method of computing depreciation from straight line method to written down value method - Difference due to said change was shown in profit and loss account - Assessing Officer passed assessment order under section 143(3) - Subsequently, notice under section 154 was issued and a rectification order was passed recording that while computing book profit under section 115JB prior period expenses could not be adjusted - On further appeal, Tribunal held that action of Assessing Officer under section 154 was not warranted - It held that net profit as shown in accounts of assessee after writing off arrears of depreciation of earlier years would alone represent book profits of assessee and it was not for Assessing Officer to substitute his own figures in its place and make any book adjustment - In instant appeal assessee contended that book profits as declared were in conformity and as per provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI of Companies Act, 1956 and Assessing Officer and Commissioner (Appeals) had not adversely commented or stated that entry was contrary to Parts II and III of said Schedule - Whether issues and contentions being debatable and in realm of uncertainty, Assessing Officer was not right in invoking section 154 - Held, yes [In favour of assessee]
FACTS
The assessee was following the straight-line method of depreciation under the Companies Act, 1956, prior to the assessment year 2002-03. However, in the year in question, it changed the method to written down value method and difference due to said change was shown in the profit and loss account under the head 'Expenditure - Depreciation'. The Assessing officer assessed the total income of the assessee as 'Nil' under section 143(3). Subsequently, notice under section 154 was issued and a rectification order was passed recording that while computing book profit under section 115JB the assessee had claimed prior period adjustment which was inadmissible in nature. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer. On further appeal, the Tribunal held that the action of the Assessing Officer under section 154 was not warranted. It held that the net profit as shown in the accounts of the assessee after writing off arrears of depreciation of the earlier years would alone represent the book profits of the assessee and it was not for the Assessing Officer to substitute his own figures in its place.
On revenue's appeal:
HELD
There are two aspects of the matter. First aspect relates to whether or not adjustment is permissible and should be taken into consideration while computing book profits under section 115JB. [Para 5]
The jurisdiction under section 154 is confined and restricted to rectification of errors and mistakes which are apparent from the record. The Assessing Officer cannot go into a debatable issue on which two or more views are possible and pass an order on merits. The orders passed by the Assessing Officer as well as Commissioner (Appeals) have not indicated or specifically stated how and why the issue was clear and that no debate or two views were possible. The contention of the assessee, which has been referred to by the Tribunal in the impugned order, shows that there was considerable controversy on the said aspect. [Para 6]
It was the contention of the assessee that the book profits as declared were in conformity and as per provisions of parts II and III of the Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956 it is stated by the assessee that the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) have not adversely commented or stated that the entry was contrary to parts-II and III of the said Schedule. The first proviso to section 115JB(2) has not been specifically referred to and applied by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals). They have not stated as to why and how the book profits were not computed in consonance with provisions of parts II and III of the Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. The issues and contentions being debatable and in the realm of uncertainty, the Assessing Officer was not right in invoking section 154. The Tribunal was right in observing that the action of the Assessing Officer under section 154 was not warranted. [Para 7]
Ms. Rashmi Chopra for the Appellant. Dr. Rakesh Gupta and Ms. Poonam Ahuja for the Respondent.
ORDER
Sanjiv Khanna, J. - This appeal filed by the Revenue under Section 260 A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ('Act', for short) impugns order dated 29.8.2008 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ('Tribunal' for short) in the case of R.T.C.L. Ltd. and relates to assessment year 2002-03. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we feel no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal.
2. The Assessing Officer vide order dated 15.3.2005 had assessed total income of the assessee at Nil under Section 143(3) of the Act. Subsequently, notice under section 154 of the Act was issued and a rectification order dated 21.07.2006 under the said Section was passed recording:-
"After going through the records it was found that while computing book profit the assessee had claimed prior period adjustment for Rs. 3,74,59,471/- which was inadmissible nature.
In compliance to this office notice u/s 154 of the Act dated 22.11.2005, the assessee has filed its reply dated 22.02.2006, which is placed on record. The assessee has submitted that calculation of book profits were made strictly an accordance with and in compliance of the provision contained in Section 115JB of the Act. The reply of the assessee has been considered. It is found that prior period expenses cannot be adjusted against book profits of calculating tax u/s 115JB of the Act with these remarks the income is computed as under:

Income as per P & L A/c
2,38,63,629/-

(Prior period adjustment for Rs.3,74,59,471/-Not allowed as discussed above)


Revised income
2,38,63,629/-"
3. In the first appeal, the assessee was unsuccessful and the order under Section 154 was confirmed by the CIT(Appeals), who held as follows:
"4. I have considered facts of the case and arguments taken by Sh. Taneja quite carefully. It is seen that for the purpose of working out the profits u/s 115 JB of the I.T. Act, the profits as computed in the profit and loss account for the relevant accounting year had only to be considered. Certainly, it is undisputed fact that further debit of Rs. 3,74,54,471/- was not the expenditure for the current year but undisputedly it was prior period adjustments on account of change in the depreciation method. Profits for the relevant period as shown in the P & L account is relevant and while working out such profits and adjustments for prior period cannot be allowed as per relevant provision of I.T. Act. Since while passing the 143(3) order, the AO has committed apparent mistake of the law. Therefore, in my considered view the AO was fully justified in rectifying the said mistake through aforesaid order passed u/s 154 of the I.T. Act. Various decisions which are relied upon by Sh. Taneja are having different facts and, therefore, under the facts of present case these cannot be applicable. With this discussion, the rectification order passed by AO is hereby confirmed by rejecting relevant grounds of appeal."
4. It is noticeable from the aforesaid findings of the Assessing officer and the CIT(Appeals) that the respondent-assessee was following the straight line method of depreciation under the Companies Act, 1956, prior to the assessment year 2002-03. However, in the year in question, it changed the method to written down value method and the difference due to the said change of Rs. 3,74,59,471/- was shown in the profit and loss account under the head 'Expenditure - Depreciation'. Due to this change, the said/current year's book profits got reduced to Rs. 13,14,552/-.
5. There are two aspects of the matter. First aspect relates to whether or not this adjustment, is permissible and should be taken into consideration while computing book profits under Section 115JB. We may notice clause (iia) to Explanation 1 to Section 115JB(2) is inserted by the Finance Act, 2006 w.e.f. 1.4.2007 and reads:-
"115JB-

**
**
**
Explanation [1].- For the purposes of this section, "book profit" means the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account for the relevant previous year prepared under sub-section (2), as increased by-"

**
**
**
(iia) the amount of depreciation debited to the profit and loss account (excluding the depreciation on account of revaluation of assets); or"
6. We are not inclined to go into the said question and issue in the present case as we feel that the Assessing Officer could not have examined and gone into the said aspect while exercising limited jurisdiction under Section 154 of the Act. The jurisdiction under the said Section is confined and restricted to rectification of errors and mistakes which are apparent from the record. The Assessing Officer cannot go into a debatable issue on which two or more views are possible and pass an order on merits. We have quoted the orders passed by the Assessing Officer as well as CIT(Appeals). They have not indicated or specifically stated how and why the issue was clear and that no debate or two views were possible. The contention of the assessee, which has been referred to by the Tribunal in the impugned order, shows that there was considerable controversy on the said aspect and this is clear when we read the following paragraph from the order of the Tribunal:-
"As to whether the arrears of depreciation can be provided or not, the matter is settled by various decisions of the Tribunal as also by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kinetic Motor Co. Limited 262 ITR 330 wherein also there was a change in the method of providing depreciation and the profits of the assessee were lowered by Rs. 6,32,65,430/-. The High Court held that under the Companies Act, both the straight-line method and written down value method are recognized and, therefore, once the amount of depreciation actually debited in the profit and loss account was certified by the auditors, it was not permissible for the Assessing Officer to make any book adjustments in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Limited v. CIT 255 ITR 273 . Besides above, we find that there are decisions of the Tribunal holding the similar view, namely, Calcutta Bench of the Tribunal in the case of JCT Limited v. DCIT 253 ITR 61, Cochin Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Apollo Tyres Limitedv. DCIT 43 ITD 464 , Bombay Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Modern Woollens, Ltd. v.DCIT 47 ITD 154 and Amritsar bench of the Tribunal in ITA No. 353/Ars./91 order dated 14.4.1994. In all these cases, it was held that the net profit as shown in the accounts of the assessee after writing off arrears of depreciation of the earlier years would alone represent the book profits of the assessee and it was not for the Assessing Officer to substantiate his own figures in its place. The learned DR however buttressed the view from a different angle and submitted that the arrears of depreciation had been claimed by the assessee below the line of the profit and loss account and, therefore, it cannot form part of the profit & loss account and book profit to be provided only above the profit line. This issue is also not res Integra and the Tribunal in the case of Gulf Oil Corporation Limited v. ACIT 111 ITR 124 dealt with the issue by observing as under:
"6. We have duly considered the rival submissions and material on record. Sub-section (2) of Section 115JB provides that every assesses company shall prepare its profit and loss account in accordance with the provisions of Part-II and Part-III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956. The said Schedule-VI does not speak of the Appropriation Account at all. It is only as a matter if presentation that most of the companies segregate to reflect as to what has been appropriated where out of the profits earned by them. Otherwise, sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (viii) of Note-II in para 3 of Part-II of Schedule- VI specifically provide that the aggregate amounts set aside or proposed to be set aside to reserves should be distinctly shown in the Profit and Loss account. Similarly, sub-clause (b) and sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clauses (xii) and (xiii) respectively in Note-II of Part-II of Schedule - VI provide that profits or losses in respect of transactions not usually undertaken or undertaken in exceptional circumstances or which are of non-recurring nature should be shown in the Profit and Loss Account. The aggregate amount of dividends paid and proposed are also to be shown in the Profit and Loss Account. The point we are trying to drive home is that all the items which are generally classified in the Appropriation Account are in fact to the included in the Profit and Loss Account prepared as Parts-II and III of Schedule-VI. Therefore, we are in agreement with the argument of the learned counsel that the starting point for computation of book profits for the purposes of Section 115JB should be Rs. 660.81 lakhs which is the final balance in the Profit and Loss account carried to balance Sheet. It may also be noted from the above discussion that even extraordinary items have to be debited to the Profit and Loss Account. Having adopted the figure of Rs. 660.81 lakhs as the starting point, the same has to be increased by the items specified in clauses (a) to (f) and has to be reduced by the items specified in clauses (i) to (vii) given in the Explanation. No other adjustment is permitted by law and also as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. (supra). None of the clauses given in the Explanation provide for the increase or decrease of the book profits by extraordinary items. The reference of AS-5 by the learned Department Representative does not in any manner advance the case of the revenue. It merely says that prior period and extraordinary items should be separately disclosed along with their nature so that their impact on the operating results can be perceived. It does not say that they are not part of the Profit and Loss Account. Similarly, the Guidance Note issued by the ICAI also does not help the revenue as it merely says that sometimes, Appropriation Account is included as a separate section of the Profit and Loss Account. But, as we have seen earlier, Parts-II and III of Schedule-VI to the Companies Act do not speak of Appropriation Account at all. In the light of this discussion, we are convinced that it was in accordance with law for the assessee to have taken Rs. 978.55 lakhs as the base figure to compute the book profits for the purposes of Section 115JB."
7. We may also notice that it is the contention of the assessee that the book profits as declared were in confirmity and as per provisions of parts II and III of the Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. It is stated by the assessee that the Assessing Officer and the CIT(Appeals) have not adversely commented or stated that the entry was contrary to parts-II and III of the said Schedule. The first proviso to Section 115JB(2) has not been specifically referred to and applied by the Assessing Officer and the CIT(Appeals). They have not stated as to why and how the book profits were not computed in consonance with provisions of parts II and III of the Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. The issues and contentions being debatable and in the realm of uncertainty, we do not think the Assessing Officer was right in invoking under Section 154 of the Act. The Tribunal was right in observing that the action of the Assessing Officer under Section 154 was not warranted. With the aforesaid observations, we decline to entertain the present appeal. We clarify that we have not examined the question on merits and it is left open. No costs.


IT : Where assessee produced complete accounts, but without supporting vouchers, Assessing Officer should have rejected them and framed best judgment assessment, instead of making arbitrary disallowances
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[2013] 36 taxmann.com 421 (Kolkata - Trib.)
IN THE ITAT KOLKATA BENCH 'A'
Kalyan Mukherjee
v.
Income-tax Officer, Ward-2(2), Asansol*
K. K. GUPTA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER 
AND MAHAVIR SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER
IT APPEAL NO. 1615 (KOL.) OF 2009
[ASSESSMENT YEAR 2005-06]
JUNE  18, 2013 
Section 145, read with section 144, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Method of accounting - Rejection of accounts [No supporting vouchers] - Assessment year 2005-06 - Although assessee had maintained regular books of account, Assessing Officer disallowed 10 per cent expenses and made addition for unexplained investment and undisclosed drawings, for lack of supporting vouchers and documents - Whether, where assessee produced complete books of account but without supporting vouchers, arbitrary disallowance and addition could not be made, and Assessing Officer was required to reject books of account under section 145 and frame best judgment assessment under section 144, based on an honest and fair estimate - Held, yes [Para 8] [Partly in favour of assessee]
FACTS
 
 The assessee was an electrical contractor carrying out Government as well as private contracts. During assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer disallowed 10 per cent of purchases, wages and other expenses for lack of vouchers and supporting documents. He also made addition for unexplained investment in recurring deposits and for undisclosed drawings. The assessee contended that all regular books of account had been maintained and that the investments and drawings had been made from contractual receipts. However, the disallowance and additions were confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals).
 On assessee's appeal:
HELD
 
 The assessee is a contractor carrying out Government as well as private contracts. The assessee produced complete books of account before the Assessing Officer but without supporting vouchers. Even the unexplained credits/transfer entries/deposits in the bank account were inter deposits of business and these were nothing sort of cash credits or unexplained credits. Revenue could not explain how the entire addition was made and what was the basis for same. It only argued that since the books of account were not supported by vouchers, the Assessing Officer and Commissioner (Appeals) had disallowed the expenses, charges and unproved credits/transfers/deposits in the hands of the assessee. It is not the case of the revenue that these deposits /unproved credits/transfer were not related to business transaction, rather the assessee filed a complete chart stating that the entire deposits/transfers/credits were proved and these were related to business transactions only and out of contract receipts. In such circumstances, the assessment order or order of Commissioner (Appeals) cannot be upheld. [Para 6]
 In the absence of supporting material of the books of account i.e., bills and vouchers, the assessing authority should have rejected books of account and should have framed assessment in terms of sections 144 and 145. For that the Assessing Officer must act honestly and not vindictively or capriciously because he must exercise judgment in the matter. However, from records it is evident otherwise. He must make what he honestly believes to be fair estimate of the proper figure of assessment, and for this purpose he must be able to take into consideration local knowledge and repute in regard to the assessee's circumstances, and his own knowledge of previous returns and assessments of the assessee and all other matters which he thinks will assist him in arriving at a fair and proper estimate; and though there must necessarily be guess-work in the matter, it must be honest guess-work. In making a best judgment assessment, the Assessing Officer does not possess absolutely arbitrary authority to assess at any figure he likes, and although he is not bound by strict judicial principles, he should be guided by rules of justice, equity and good conscience. At the same time, there is nothing in the language of section 144 or 145 for holding that an assessment made by an officer under these sections, without conducting a local enquiry and without recording the details and results of that enquiry, cannot have been made to the best of his judgment within the meaning of that section. In other words, the Assessing Officer, while making a best judgment assessment, should make an intelligent, well grounded estimate. Such estimate must be based on adequate and relevant materials. If more than one method or approach is possible, any alternative method can be restored to estimate the quantum in a best judgment assessment. The quantum to be made in a best judgment assessment should be rational and fair in all circumstances of the case. [Para 7]
 The Tribunal confirmed the application of net profit at 5.35 per cent in earlier year i.e. in Assessment Year 2003-04. Keeping in view net profit of earlier years, a reasonable net profit i.e. at the rate of 8 per cent would meet the end of justice. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer is directed to recompute the assessee's income after deleting all the additions as made by him and enhanced by Commissioner (Appeals), but restrict the addition only at 8 per cent of gross contract receipts. It is also mentioned that this net profit rate at 8 per cent cannot be taken as reference to any other years, if facts are not identical or assessee claims that assessment be framed on the basis of accounts, if accounts are found correct. [Para 8]
Somnath Ghosh and Sarnath Ghosh for the Appellant. Javed Khan and L.K.S. Dehiya for the Respondent.
ORDER
 
Mahavir Singh, Judicial Member - This appeal by assessee is arising out of order of CIT(A), Asansol in Appeal No. 262/CIT(A)/Asl/Ward-2(2)/Asl/2007-08 dated 30-06-2009. Assessment was framed by ITO, Ward-2(2), Asansol u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for Assessment Year 2005-06 vide his order dated 31.12.2007.
2. The assessee in this appeal has raised modified grounds in terms of Rule 11 of Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963 and the relevant grounds raised read as under:
"1.  FOR THAT the Ld. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) Asansol acted unlawfully in upholding the purported disallowance made by the Ld. Income-tax Officer, Ward 2(2), Asansol in the sum of Rs. 7,60,963/- being 10% of the expenses claimed under head Purchase and also erred in resorting to enhancement by way of disallowing a further sum of Rs. 67,02,331/- thereby restricting the expenditure to the sum of Rs 1,45,333/- that behalf are absolutely arbitrary, unwarranted and perverse.
2.  FOR THAT the Ld. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) Asansol acted illegally in upholding the impugned disallowance made by the Ld. Income-tax Officer, Ward 2(2), Asansol in the sum of Rs. 2,56,145/- being 10% of the expenses claimed under head Wages and thereafter erred in resorting to enhancement by way of disallowing a further sum of Rs. 23,11,313/- which resulted in excess of the entire claim of expenditure made under that head and the purported action resorted to on that behalf is wholly capricious, unreasonable and perverse.
3.  FOR THAT the Ld. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) Asansol erred in upholding the Impugned disallowance made by the Ld. Income-tax Officer, Ward 2(2), Asansol aggregating to an amount of Rs. 1,22,976/- being 20% of the expenses claimed under heads Travelling & Conveyance Other Indirect expenses, Entertainment and Telephone & Mobile and further erred in resorting to enhancement by way of disallowing the entire claim of expenses made under those heads along with the expenditure claimed under the heads Salary & Bonus and interest on Loan and the purported action resorted to on that behalf is totally biased, flawed and perverse.
4.  FOR THAT the Ld. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) Asansol misread evidences, considered improper issues, failed to consider proper position in law, misplaced onus of proof in upholding the impugned addition in the sum of Rs. 1,04,529/- made by the Ld. Income-tax Officer, Ward 2(2), Asansol on account of unexplained investment by invoking the provisions of s. 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the specious finding on that behalf is absolutely wrong, erroneous, Flawed and contrary to the statutory prescription.
5.  FOR THAT the Ld. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) Asansol gravely erred in upholding the impugned addition of Rs. 4,08,960/- made by the Ld. Income-tax Officer, Ward 2(2), Asansol on account of alleged undisclosed drawings and the impugned finding on such wrong assumption is wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and perverse.
6.  FOR THAT none of the conditions precedent existed and/or have been complied with and/or fulfilled for the Ld. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) Asansol to assume jurisdiction u/s. 251 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the facts and circumstances of the instant case and the specious action on that behalf is altogether arbitrary, unreasonable and perverse.
7.  FOR THAT the Ld. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) Asansol erred in resorting to the impugned enhancement in the sum of Rs. 60,63,926/- by invoking the provisions of s. 68 of the Income-tax Act,1961 under the scope of s. 250(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without judiciously applying his mind on the issue in considering the source of such deposit have been proved on record and the purported action on that behalf is ultra vires, ab initio void and perverse."
3. Brief facts leading to the above appeal are that the assessee is an electrical contractor carrying out Government as well as private contracts. The type of work includes several electrical projects getting temporary and permanent electric connection from West Bengal State Electricity Board (WBSEB) at different sites all over the West Bengal. The assessee to carry out the above projects and in pursuance of this work purchase material, employ labour on wages at specified sites etc. The AO during the course of assessment proceedings made various disallowances and additions as under:
(i)  10% of expenses claimed under the head purchases were disallowed at a sum of Rs. 7,60,963/-.
(ii)  10% of expenses under the head wages at Rs. 2,56,145/-.
(iii)  20% of expenses claimed under the head travelling and conveyance , other indirect expenses, entertainment and telephone and mobile at Rs. 1,22,976/-.
(iv)  Further addition of Rs. 1,04,529/- being unexplained investment u/s. 69 of the Act.
(v)  Further addition of Rs. 4,08,960/- on account of undisclosed drawings.
4. The disallowances made by AO and enhancement made by CIT(A) is as under:
Expenses Accounts Head Expenses debited as pr P&L A/c Disallowed by AO Percentage Enhanced by CIT(A) Total expenses disallowed
Opening stock & WIP617,052.00      
Purchase7,608,627.00 760,963.0010% 6,702,331.007,463,294.00
Wages2,561,458.00 256,145.0010% 2,311,313.002,567,458.00
Travelling & Conveyance186,970.00 37,394.0020% 149,576.00186,970.00
Other Indirect Expenses85,685.00 17,137.0020% 68,548.0085,685.00
Entertainment expenses215,685.00 43,137.0020% 172,548.00215,685.00
Telephone & Mobile Expenses125,636.00 25,127.0020% 100,509.00125,636.00
Salary & Wages187,540.00 Nil  187,540.00187,540.00
Interest on Loan280,588.00 Nil  280,588.00280,588.00
Other expenses359,292.00 -- --
 12,228,533.00 1,139,903.00  9,972,953.00 11,112,856.00
From the above disallowances and enhancement, it is to be first noted that the total contract receipts during the year received by assessee are at Rs. 1,15,38,537/- and closing stock and work in progress is at Rs. 12,70,356/-. Aggrieved against enhancement and confirmation of additions and disallowances, by CIT(A), assessee came in appeal before us.
5. We have heard rival submissions and gone through facts and circumstances of the case. We have perused the material placed before us including assessee's paper book containing pages 1 to 101. We find that the assessee's total contractual receipts are at Rs. 1,15,38,537/-and assessee has claimed expenses on account of purchases for executing his electric jobs/contracts at Rs. 76,08,627/-. Similarly, the assessee has incurred wages expenses at Rs. 24,61,458/-. Similarly, assessee has claimed expenses on account of telephone and mobile at Rs. 1,25,636/-, on entertainment at Rs. 2,15,685/-, on travelling and conveyance at Rs. 1,86,970/- and further Rs. 85,685/- as other expenses. As noted above in the chart, the AO has made disallowance of 10% expenses on all these items and also made addition on undisclosed RD at Rs. 1,04,529/- and personal drawings at Rs. 4,08,960/-. The CIT(A) enhanced these expenses. The assessment was framed by AO u/s. 143(3) of the Act and assessee has produced all regular books of account like cash book, ledger and bank statements etc. However, he failed to produce, on requisition made in respect of various parties, from whom purchases were made and to whom the payments were made during the relevant period. In the absence of the same, the AO disallowed 10% of wages, purchase and some expenses. The AO also made addition on account of undisclosed recurring deposit and assessee's claim was that this amount was transferred by cheque from Current Account No. CC1033 maintained with Oriental Bank of Commerce, Asansol Branch. A copy of current Account was submitted before the AO and assessee tried to explain the same that this is out of explained sources. As regards to addition made on account of personal drawings by the AO at Rs. 4,08,960/- assessee explained that this amount of Rs. 6,20,757/- was transferred in this account is not correct. Actual amount transferred is Rs. 4,45,460/- to this account from current account No.094010200011060 and subsequently it was transferred to his current account. Other cash deposit was made by withdrawn of cash from Oriental Bank of Commerce, Asansol Branch vide A/C No. CC1033. That assessee is an Electrical Contractor of WBSEB and other Government organization, so he has to perform his job all over West Bengal in different sites. Since Oriental Bank has no infrastructure for immediate transfer of funds in different area, assessee was constrained to deposit cash in this account and made payment to parties for immediate transfer of funds. As such there was no concealment of account from any part of the assessee. CIT(A) apart from confirming the additions enhanced the assessment on account of disallowance of expenses at Rs. 9,59,309/- unproved purchases was added in entirety that at Rs. 67,02,331/-. Even the CIT(A) has enhanced the addition on account of unproved wages expenditure at Rs. 23,11,313/- that means the entire wages are disallowed. The CIT(A) also enhanced unexplained cash credits/deposits or credit by transfer as unproved and made addition of these transfers at Rs. 60,63,926/-.
6. Going into the entirety of the case and facts before us, we find that the assessee is a contractor carrying out Government as well as private contracts. The gross contract receipts of the contractor are at Rs. 1,15,38,537/- . Can the assessee carry out contract work of electrical and other undertakings for infrastructure projects without purchase or without incurring any wages? The assessee has produced complete books of account before the AO but without supporting vouchers. Even the unexplained credits/transfer entries/deposits in the bank account are inter deposits of business and these are nothing sort of cash credits or unexplained credits. When these were confronted to Ld. Sr. DR, he could not explain how the entire addition is made and what is the basis of the same? When second opportunity was given, Ld. Sr. DR again could not support either the assessment order or order of CIT(A) but only argued that since the books of account were not supported by vouchers the AO and CIT(A) has disallowed the expenses, charges and unproved credits/transfers/deposits in the hands of the assessee. We find that the assessee's total contract receipts are at Rs. 1,15,38,537/- and addition including enhancement by CIT(A) stands at Rs. 1,60,36,879/-. It is not the case of the revenue that these deposits/unproved credits/transfer are not related to business transactions rather the assessee's counsel has filed a complete chart before us stating that the entire deposits/transfers/credits are proved and these are related to business transactions only and out of contract receipts. In such circumstances, can we uphold the assessment order or order of CIT(A)? In our view no, the answer to above queries is negative. We further find that the assessee before us has produced copy of Tribunal's order in assessee's own case for AY 2003-04 in ITA No. 1833/K/2007 wherein assessee has challenged the net profit rate applied by AO and confirmed by CIT(A) at 5.35% by rejecting the books of account in the absence of the vouchers and following ground was raised by assessee:
"(ii) For that on the facts of the case the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified in sustaining the estimate of Net Profit @ 5.35% of Gross Contract Receipt made by the AO, on an ad hoc basis, rejecting the book results."
and Tribunal considered the application of profit at 5.35% at para 3 of its order as under:
"In the course of assessment proceedings the A.O. found that even bills produced as evidence of purchases did not have any reference or bill numbers while expenditure in respect of items like labour charges entered in the cash book did not tally with the vouchers produced as evidence of payments. No stock register was maintained. No payment certificates as evidence of earnest money and security were produced by the assessee. When asked to explain these issues, the assessee submitted to the A.O. that the accounts were duly audited and that the auditor had gone through all the bills vouchers and relevant papers. However, the assessee found it difficult to collect the relevant papers from various sites for production before the A.O. The assessee further submitted that the work was carried at various locations, papers were destroyed by "natural climate" or the ignorance of illiterate workers. Since bulk of the papers required by the A.O. had been produced the assessee requested the A.O. to consider this as compliance. The A.O. however rejected the assessee s books of account, having further found that the assessee was not even able to reconcile variation in the OD balance statement in respect of the assessees account. Thereafter, the A.O. compared the assessees profits returned in the earlier years and pegged the profit for the year in question also at the same level."
and rejected the claim of assessee for accepting the book results and upheld the application of net profit rate at 5.35%.
7. In view of factual matrix of the case, we are of the view that in the absence of supporting material of the books of account i.e., bills and vouchers the assessing authority should have rejected books of account and should have framed assessment in terms of sections 144 & 145 of the act and for that Assessing Officer must act honestly and not vindictively or capriciously because he must exercise judgment in the matter but from records it is evident otherwise. He must make what he honestly believes to be fair estimate of the proper figure of assessment, and for this purpose he must be able to take into consideration local knowledge and repute in regard to the assessee's circumstances, and his own knowledge of previous returns by and assessments of the assessee and all other matters which he thinks will assist him in arriving at a fair and proper estimate; and though there must necessarily be guess-work in the matter, it must be honest guess-work. In making a best judgment assessment the Assessing Officer does not possess absolutely arbitrary authority to assess at any figure he likes and that although he is not bound by strict judicial principles he should be guided by rules of justice, equity and good conscience. A best judgment assessment is not by way of penalty for non-compliance and it cannot be made capriciously in utter disregard to the material on record. At the same time, there is nothing in the language of section 144 or 145 of the act for holding that an assessment made by an officer under these sections without conducting a local enquiry and without recording the details and results of that enquiry cannot have been made to the best of his judgment within the meaning of that section. The best judgment assessment ought to be based on a fair and proper estimate of the assessee's income and the inferences to be drawn from the available material should be properly inferable inference. The assessment has to proceed upon definite basis or data as in the case of an assessment after enquiry, but the enquiry is summary unlike the case of a normal assessment. The assessment is to be based on materials to the extent to which the materials are discovered. In other words, the Assessing Officer, while making a best judgment assessment, should make an intelligent, well-grounded estimate. Such estimate must be based on adequate and relevant materials. If more than one method or approach is possible, any alternative method can be resorted to estimate the quantum in a best judgment assessment. The quantum to be made in a best judgment assessment should be rational and fair in all circumstances of the case.
8. From the above discussion, we are of the view that a reasonable estimate can be made and the assessee might have made purchases without procuring bills and might have avoided sales tax and other Government dues. It means that assessee might have earned a little higher profit than earlier years. We have seen that Tribunal has confirmed the application of net profit at 5.35% in earlier year i.e. in AY 2003-04. Keeping in view net profit of earlier years, we are of the view that a reasonable net profit i.e. @ 8% will meet the end of justice. Accordingly, we direct the AO to recompute the assessee's income after deleting all the additions as made by AO and enhanced by CIT(A) but restrict the addition only at 8% of gross contract receipts. It is also mentioned that this net profit rate at 8% cannot be taken as reference to any other years, if facts are not identical or assessee claims that assessment be framed on the basis of accounts, if accounts are found correct.
We order accordingly.
9. In the result, appeal of assessee is allowed partly, as indicated above
10. Order pronounced in the open court on 18th June, 2013

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Regards,

Pawan Singla
BA (Hon's), LLB
Audit Officer
 [2013] 36 taxmann.com 412  (Article)
SECTION 44AA(2) IS BEING MISINTERPRETED
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GAURAV PAHUJA
CA
Introduction
1. In this article, the requirement of maintaining books of accounts under section 44AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is discussed in-depth, especially with regard to a civil contractor in respect of which no books of account are prescribed and, hence, the questions of levy of penalty under section 271A for non-maintenance of books of account and the penalty under section 271B of the Act for not getting the books of account audited do not arise. Further, a few significant judgments have been referred to, including the critical analysis of the recent judgment delivered by the Hon'ble ITAT Cochin Bench in the case of K.V. Ramachandran v. Dy. CIT [2013] 32 taxmann.com 200.
Facts of the case
2. K.V. Ramachandran's case (supra).The assessee, a civil contractor, engaged in government contracts, did not maintain any books of account due to the fact that no books of account had been prescribed for a civil contractor. In view of this, it was submitted that the assessee was not guilty of non-compliance, as far as the provisions of the Income-tax Act were concerned. Although CIT(A) had already deleted the penalty under section 271A for non-maintenance of books of account after considering the judgment pronounced in the case of Asstt. CIT v.Aggarwal Construction Co. [2007] 106 ITD 129 (Chd.)(TM), yet the penalty under section 271B for not getting the books of account audited was affirmed by him. Thus, in the appeal before the ITAT it was argued that once the penalty for non-maintenance of books of account was held to be invalid in the absence of any prescribed books of account for a civil contractor, the penalty levied for not getting the books of account audited should also have been quashed. It was submitted that the question of audit arises only in a case where the books of account are maintained. The reliance was placed on the judgment pronounced by the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. Babu Reddy[2010] 38 DTR 147 and on the decision of the Chandigarh Bench of ITAT in the case of Aggarwal Construction Co. (supra) and on the judgment of the Pune Bench in Ramchandra D Keluskar v. Dy. CIT [ITA No. 668/PN/10, dated 17-1-2011].
The DR, on the other hand, reiterated the requirement of section 44AB of the Act for obtaining the audit report and, thus, stated that the plea of the assessee, that no books of account were maintained, was not acceptable.
Critical analysis of the case
3. The significant question of law that arose in the aforementioned case was with regard to the justification for imposition of penalty under section 271B of the Act for not getting the books of account audited in a case where no books of account were maintained by the assessee. Although, the question was directly related with getting the books of account audited under section 44AB, at the same time it was indirectly but very closely related to the requirement of maintenance of books of account.
One cannot get the books of account audited, until and unless such books are maintained. So, the question of levying penalty for not getting the books audited must not be considered in isolation, but with more stress upon the requirement of maintaining the books of account as prescribed by section 44AA of the Act. The said section provides for the assessees who are required to maintain the books of account based upon the nature and size of the business and profession carried on by them and in few cases, the books of account are also prescribed. For the sake of ready reference, the relevant extract of section 44AA is reproduced below:
"44AA. (1) Every person carrying on legal, medical, engineering or architectural profession or the profession of accountancy or technical consultancy or interior decoration or any other profession as is notified by the Board in the Official Gazette shall keep and maintain such books of account and other documents as may enable the [Assessing] Officer to compute his total income in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(2) Every person carrying on business or profession [not being a profession referred to in sub-section (1)] shall,—
(i) if his income from business or profession exceeds [one lakh twenty] thousand rupees or his total sales, turnover or gross receipts, as the case may be, in business or profession exceed or exceeds [ten lakh] rupees in any one of the three years immediately preceding the previous year; or
………
………
keep and maintain such books of account and other documents as may enable the [Assessing] Officer to compute his total income in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(3) The Board may, having regard to the nature of the business or profession carried on by any class of persons, prescribe, by rules, the books of account and other documents (including inventories, wherever necessary) to be kept and maintained under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the particulars to be contained therein and the form and the manner in which and the place at which they shall be kept and maintained."
Sub-section (1) of section 44AA provides that books of account are to be maintained by assessees carrying on a specified profession while sub-section (2) of section 44AA is meant for other assessees, i.e., those who are not covered by sub-section (1), meaning thereby that all assessee(s) carrying on business or professions are required to maintain the books of account, depending on the sub-section applicable to their respective business or profession. However, in those cases where sub-section (1) is applicable, the books of account that are required to be maintained are prescribed under rule 6F of the Income-tax Rules, whereas assessees covered by sub-section (2) are required to keep and maintain such books of account and other documents as may enable the Assessing Officer to compute his total income in accordance with the provisions of the Act, in the absence of any prescribed books of account (unlike for assessees covered by sub-section (1)), as is clearly evident from a plain reading of the section. Further, it is apparent that the business of a civil contractor is not within the ambit of sub-section (1), thus, no books of account are prescribed under rule 6F to be maintained by a civil contractor. Obviously, in such a situation one has to go to sub-section (2) which covers assessees who are not specifically covered by sub-section (1). Moreover, sub-section (2), subject to the monetary limits provided therein, requires an assessee to keep and maintain such books of account and other documents as may enable the Assessing Officer to compute his total income in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Hence, it is nowhere in dispute that the Legislature expects even a civil contractor to maintain books of account by virtue of section 44AA(2).
In view of the facts of the instant case and the above mentioned intention of the Legislature, it is not required to go in-depth of rule 6F, being non-applicable here, but what gains much more importance is section 44AA(2) which covers the remaining assessees, including a civil contractor. It has already been stated that the Legislature aimed to make all assessees to maintain at least some books of account to enable the Assessing Officer to compute his income. Sub-section (2) was inserted to achieve the same purpose. Although such minimum books of account are not prescribed exactly anywhere, yet section 44AA(2) has made it amply clear that whatever books of account are maintained by the assessee in the absence of any prescribed books of account, it must enable the Assessing Officer to compute his income. Accordingly, where it is stated unconditionally that the assessee did not maintain any books of account, as in the instant case, it seems to be in clear contravention of section 44AA(2). Had the Legislature intended to provide or prescribe books of account for each and every assessee, as is done in the case of specified professions mentioned in sub-section (1) of the said section, it would not have provided sub-section (2) to cover the remaining assessee's who are not covered under sub-section (1). Furthermore, where the Legislature intended to provide the relaxation from maintaining the books of account, such relaxation was granted by way of fixing the monetary limit as provided under section 44AA(2)(i). Hence, where an assessee's income or gross receipts from business or profession exceed such limit, he has to maintain minimum books of account to enable the Assessing Officer to compute his income. Even the Legislature provided for consideration of the three years immediately preceding the previous year. Needless to mention here that the Legislature was so cautious while framing the rules with regard to the maintenance of books of account that it firstly covered few professions expressly and prescribed the books of account to be maintained by such professionals, then covered the remaining businesses and professions to maintain such books of account so as to enable the A.O. to compute their income and even in doing so it provided relief to small businessmen and professionals by way of fixing cap thereon. So, the Legislature has taken every possible step to make its intention clear with regard to maintaining books of account in all respects, e.g., by whom and what books of account, where it is prescribed specifically and minimum books of account where it is not so prescribed with the intended purpose to compute income.
While such minimum books of account are not defined or prescribed by the CBDT, it would be preferable only to prescribe the so-called minimum books of account to avoid any confusion and provide absolute clarity as to what books of account are to be maintained by those assessees who are not covered under section 44AA(1), but it is not necessarily required to enable the public at large to comply with the Act in this respect. If at all CBDT has not prescribed the minimum books of account and has left it at the option of desired category of assessees, it must be aimed at providing the flexibility to the assessees simultaneously entitling the A.O. to cause the production of reasonable records and information so as to enable him to compute the income of the assessee.
4. Relevant Case Laws and comments
4.1 Babu Reddy (supra) -In this case it was observed that it was nowhere in section 44AA that the books of account had to be maintained as per the prescribed format. Also, books of account to be maintained had to be prescribed, but such books of account had not been prescribed under the Income-tax Rules, as far as the business of a civil contractor was concerned. In addition, it was stated that the Tribunal had allowed the appeal of the assessee on the ground that when no books of account had been prescribed, the books of account that were maintained by the assessee, could not be found fault with. Moreover, it was concluded that once the A.O. had accepted the return of income filed by the assessee and had processed the same, subsequent initiation of penalty for non-maintenance of books of account was not justified.
4.1-1 Comments - The decision of the Tribunal in this case seems to be absolutely in line with the law to the extent that maintenance of books of account is concerned, as an assessee can maintain such minimum books of account only so as to compute his income as no books of account to be maintained are prescribed. Therefore, the said case stands on a different footing and, thus, should not have been relied upon by the assessees counsel in the present case. Even if it was so relied upon, it must not have been accepted by the Tribunal to the extent the question of maintenance of books of account was concerned due to the very difference in the facts of the case whereas in the case of Babu Reddy (supra), it was stated that the assessee had maintained minimum books of account so as to compute his income and his contention was accepted in the absence of any prescribed books of account while in the present case of K.V. Ramachandran (supra), it was clearly declared by the assessee's counsel that the assessee did not maintain any books of account. The contention behind not maintaining any books of account was explained as no books of account were prescribed by the CBDT in respect of civil contractor. Moreover, the case ofBabu Reddy (supra)was also related to a civil contractor, but as minimum books of account were maintained in that case, the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court dismissed the appeal of the revenue against the assessee and upheld the order of the Tribunal which was in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Hence, in the present case, in the absence of any books of account the relief must not have been granted to the assessee relying upon the judgment pronounced in the case of Babu Reddy (supra).
4.2 Aggarwal Construction Co. (supra) - In this case which was decided by a Third Member, in the absence of consensus between the opinion of the Accountant and Judicial Member, it was mentioned that finding recorded by the A.O., that no books of account were maintained by the assessee, was found to be baseless, as it was not recorded in the assessment order that the A.O. was unable to compute the income of the assessee from the ledger maintained by the assessee, especially when it was admitted that income and expenditure were available in that ledger. It was concluded that section 44AA(2) does not require that the books of account maintained should be true and correct. Whenever a false claim is made by the assessee, the same is liable to be rejected, but even in that case it cannot be said that no books of account were maintained or A.O. was unable to compute the income of the assessee. In short, provisions of section 44AA cannot be said to have been violated, as in order to cover the case of false accounts separate provisions are there under section 271. Hence, provisions of one section, for example, section 271A cannot be clubbed or substituted by the provisions of any other section, say section 271 or vice versa.
4.2-1 Comments In view of the fact that the assessee in the above case had maintained a ledger mentioning the income and expenditure, so as to enable the A.O. to compute his income, the finding of the A.O., that no books of account were maintained, was set aside by the Chandigarh Bench of ITAT. Thus, this case like the case of Babu Reddy (supra)should not have been relied upon by assessee or ought to have been rejected, as far as the question of maintenance of books of account was there due to the fact that here also at least minimum books of account were maintained to facilitate in computing the income.
4.3 Ramchandra D Keluskar (supra) - In this case also like in the present case, the issue of not getting the books of account audited came up before the Tribunal and that too in the case of an assessee who happened to be a civil contractor engaged in Government and Municipal contracts. Another similarity in the two cases was that no books of account were maintained by any of these two assessees and the return was filed on estimation basis only.
4.3-1 Comments One difference in the two cases was that whereas in the case of Ramchandra D. Keluskar (supra),the issue of non-maintenance of books of account was not raised at all by the A.O., while in the present case i.e.,K.V. Ramachandran (supra),the issue of non-maintenance of books of account was well raised by the A.O. and, accordingly, he initiated the penalty under section 271A which was later on deleted by the CIT (A). The case of Ramchandra D Keluskar (supra) was decided by referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the case of Surajmal Parsuram Todi v. CIT [1996]222 ITR 691and the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the case ofCIT v. Bisauli Tractors [2008] 299 ITR 219/[2007] 165 Taxman 1and it was held that where no books of account are maintained by an assessee, the question of getting the books of account audited does not arise at all. The Hon'ble Allahabad High Court observed as under:
"If a person has not maintained the accounts book or any accounts the question of its audit does not arise. In such an event the imposition of penalty under the provision contained in section 271A of the Act for the alleged non-compliance of section 44AA of the Act may arise but the provisions of section 44AB of the Act do not get violated in case where the accounts have not been maintained at all and, therefore, penal provisions of section 271B of the Act would not apply."
In view of the abovesaid judgments, penalty imposed under section 271B was quashed.
Conclusion
5. In the present case, the issue whether the books of account ought to have been maintained under section 44AA(2) by a civil contractor was raised up to the level of the CIT(A) only and not before the ITAT. CIT(A) had concluded that books of account were not required to be maintained in the absence of any prescribed books of account and, thus, penalty raised by the A.O. under section 271A was deleted, but penalty under section 271B was confirmed by him. Had the issue of non-maintenance of books of account been raised before the ITAT by way of an appeal from revenue, it would have definitely decided the case otherwise, i.e., it would have confirmed the penalty under section 271A after considering the true intention of the Legislature (as stated above) behind insertion of section 44AA(2). Consequently, the assessee would not have been able to safeguard himself against the penalty imposed on him under section 271B, as one must not be allowed to take the advantage of his own wrongdoing.


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