IT : Where assessee was a charitable institution and delay in filing appeal happened due to wrong advice and ignorance of law, delay in filing appeal should be condoned
IT : Where Commissioner failed to dispose application of registration within stipulated period of six months, application for registration was deemed to have been allowed
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[2013] 33 taxmann.com 516 (Jodhpur - Trib.)
IN THE ITAT JODHPUR BENCH
Nosegay Public School Management Committe
v.
Commissioner of Income-tax*
HARI OM MARATHA, JUDICIAL MEMBER
AND N.K. SAINI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
AND N.K. SAINI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
IT APPEAL NOS. 127 & 128 (JODH.) OF 2012
DECEMBER 19, 2012
I. Section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Charitable or religious trust - Registration of [Time limit for filing application for registration] - Assessee-trust filed instant appeal along with an application for condonation of delay of about 1660 days - Reason for this delay was stated to be due to wrong advice and ignorance of law of persons who were managing this institution - Whether considering fact that assessee was a charitable institution and Assessing authorities had found objects of assessee charitable in nature, delay in filing appeal was to be condoned - Held, yes [Para 11] [In favour of assessee]
II. Section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Charitable or religious trust - Registration of [Time limit for disposal of application] - Assessee filed an application for registration under section 12A - Date of creation of institution was mentioned as 9-11-1985 - Commissioner disposed of application after six months from date of receipt and granted registration with effect from 1-4-2005 - Whether, since impugned order was passed beyond six months period, application for registration was deemed to have been allowed - Held, yes - Whether therefore, Commissioner was to be directed to grant registration to assessee with effect from 9-11-1985 - Held, yes [Para 12][In favour of assessee]
CASE REVIEW-I
Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji [1987] 167 ITR 471 (SC); Vedabai alias Vijayantabhai Baburao Patil v. Shantarm Baburao Patil[2002] 253 ITR 798/122 Taxman 144 (SC); CIT v. Ram Kishan Gupta [2007] 295 ITR 578 (All.) and Motilal Padampat Sugar Mill Co. Ltd. v.State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 118 ITR 325 (SC) (para 11) followed.
CASE REVIEW-II
Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial Shri Hari Paramarth Dham Trust v. CIT [2007] 117 SOT 281 (Delhi)(SB)(para 12)followed.
CASES REFERRED TO
Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji [1987] 167 ITR 471 (SC) (para 7), Vedabai alias Vijayantabhai Baburao Patil v. Shantarm Baburao Patil [2002] 253 ITR 798/122 Taxman 144 (SC) (para 7), CIT v. Ram Kishan Gupta [2007] 295 ITR 578 (All.) (para 8), Motilal Padampat Sugar Mill Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 118 ITR 325 (SC) (para 9) and Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial Shri Hari Paramarth Dham Trust v. CIT [2007] 17 SOT 281 (Delhi)(SB)(para 11).
Suresh Ohja for the Appellant. G.R. Kokani for the Respondent.
ORDER
Hari Om Maratha, Judicial Member - Both the appeals by the assessee committee (trust) is directed against the order passed by learned CIT (Admn.), Bikaner dt. 14th June, 2007 passed under s. 12A(a) of the IT Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" in short). By this common order, we will dispose of both the appeals which are interrelated.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellant had filed application for registration of a charitable trust/institution under s. 12A(a) of the Act in Form No. 10A. As per his application in Column No. 4, date of creation of the Institution has been mentioned as 9th Nov., 1985. The assessee received a notice of hearing in this case in which it is stated that since you have applied for registration under s. 12A(a) on 30th March, 2006, after expiry of one year from the date of registration under the Rajasthan Societies Registration Act (RSRA), 1958 (on 9th Nov., 1985), therefore, you are directed to attend this office on 22nd Aug., 2006 at 11.00 AM and explain the reasons for the delay. The assessee filed condonation petition on 2nd April, 2007 stating therein that due to lack of awareness of the law, we could not apply for registration of the society in time and when it came to our notice, we immediately applied for the same. Through this letter, it was prayed that the delay in filing the application may be condoned. It was also suggested in the alternative that in case the delay is not condoned, registration may be granted from 1st April, 2005 in view of cl. (ii) of proviso to s. 12A(a) of the Act. The CIT had inquired into the nature and objects of this Committee/Institution and had found that its objectives are undisputedly charitable in nature and, therefore, it deserves registration under s. 12A(a) of the Act. Later on, on 14th June, 2007, the learned CIT registered the assessee under s. 12A(a) w.e.f. 1st April, 2005.
3. But despite fact that certificate of registration under the Act was granted, the appellant is aggrieved on two grounds :
| (i) | that the order passed by the CIT, Bikaner on 14th June, 2007 is not as per law and as such it is illegal because as per law the CIT is bound to pass order accepting or rejecting application for registration under s. 12A. within six months from the date of application filed in his office, and | |
| (ii) | the assessee has mentioned the date of registration of the society as 9th Nov., 1985, the registration deemed to have been granted w.e.f 9th Nov., 1985, as the CIT has not considered the condonation petition at all. It was argued that without giving reasons for rejection of condonation application and without mentioning anything in this regard, the CIT cannot reject the application. The deemed rejection of application will also not arise. |
4. In this manner, the appellant has pleaded - one that the order in question is not at all a valid order in the eyes of law because it has been passed beyond the permitted time, and two, deemed registration would be from the date of its registration, when order was not passed within six months of the receipt of application for registration by the CIT.
5. Before us, lengthy arguments were advanced by learned Authorised representative which was controverted by learned CIT-Departmental Representative who supported the appellate order. Because the issue before us is admixture of facts and law, we would like to extract the entire submissions which was made by the assessee before CIT, in verbatim, as under :
"To
The CIT, Bikaner.
Reg. Nosegay Public School Management Committee, Sriganganagar
Assessment year:
Sub : For grant of s. 12A of IT Act 1961
Dear Sir,
I want to draw your kind attention towards the fact that an application for registration was submitted by the society on dt. 30th March, 2006. In this connection it is stated that in the application the date of creation of the society was mentioned as 9th Nov., 1985.
In this connection, it is stated that after application of registration what I have been able to understand that one report from the AO/Jt. CIT was called for. The order sheet dt. 8th Aug., 2006 is crystal clear, for your ready reference the contents thereof are being reproduced herewith :
The predecessor of your goodself issued one notice dt. 9th Aug., 2006 in respect of the fact that the registration application was submitted after expiry of one year from the date of registration. The assessee submitted replies vide letter dt. 2nd April, 2007 stating full facts and the reasons mentioned therein were on account of lack of awareness, of the law. The relevant paragraph is being reproduced hereunder :
But due to lack of awareness of the law we could not apply for the registration of the society in time and when it came to our notice, we applied for the registration.
From the perusal of the above you will observe that your predecessor was requested so as to condone the delay and to grant registration retrospectively.
Now, I want to draw your kind attention towards the provision of s. 12AA of the IT Act. The relevant provisions are being reproduced hereunder :
(2) Every order granting or refusing registration under el. (b) of sub-s. (1) / shall be passed before the expiry of six month from the end of the month in which the application was received under cl. (a) or cl. (aa) of sub-s. (1) of s. 12A.
In this respect from the perusal of above you will observe that order has to be passed within six month from the date of submission of the application. In case of the assessee an application was submitted on 30th March, 2006. The six month expired on 30th Sept., 2006. In the meanwhile no order for refusal was passed by the CIT, Bikaner. The word shall has been used. Therefore in case of the assessee the registration shall be deemed to have been granted in view of the above provisions.
It is. therefore, humbly prayed that necessary order for the period prior to 1st April, 2005 may kindly be passed so that the assessee may be able to take legal benefit as provided in the Act. Hope you will consider the request and pass the order for granting registration from the date of application.
I also want to draw your kind attention that the Department himself has accepted that the society is a charitable institution. The report of the lower authorities is self explanatory in this regard.
Without prejudice to above it is stated that if the predecessor of your goodself was of the opinion that registration cannot be granted retrospectively in that case speaking order should have been passed.
There is no order at all in respect of refusal of registration under s. 12AA/12A of the IT Act, 1961.
Further, without prejudice to above it will be worth mentioning here that only on account of delay adverse view should not be drawn. There is a direct judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst Katiji & Ors. [1987] 62 CTR (SC) 23 : [1987] 167 ITR 471 (SC). The relevant paras are being reproduced hereunder :
1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
The judgment of Supreme Court is very clear regarding the subject.
As far as the ignorance of law is concerned I want to draw your kind attention towards the order of Tribunal Jodhpur Bench, Jodhpur reported in 30 TW 158 the relevant portion is being reproduced as under :
In this case the Honb'le Supreme Court has held that Court should adopt rational, common sense and pragmatic approach. And reliance can also be placed on the judgment of apex Court in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mill Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors . [1979]118 ITR 326 (SC). In this case it was held that 'there is no presumption that even; person knows the law. It is often said that everyone is presumed to know the law, but that is not correct statement. There is no such maxim known to the law.
From the perusal of the above you will observe that there was reasonable cause made known to the CIT Bikaner regarding delay. Though the matter became barred by limitation by that time but the reason was submitted to the CIT, Bikaner.
In above mentioned fact and circumstances you will observe that the order passed by your predecessor is a cyclostyled order in which the period seems to have been typed under some wrong impression.
I want to also draw your kind attention that the matter in respect of the period prior to 1st April, 2005 remained undisposed of in the order. In the other word there is no order for the period prior to 1st April, 2005. It is, therefore, prayed that order may kindly be passed, in view of s. 12AA of the IT Act, 1961, in case of disposal of application after expiry of six month.
It is therefore prayed that necessary order for the period prior to 1st April, 2005 may kindly be passed for granting registration under s. 12A and 12AA of the IT Act, 1961.
It is also prayed that a chance of personal hearing may kindly be allowed so that the assessee may be able to come forward with suitable submission and put his submission.
Hope you will consider the request.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
For Nosegay Public School Management Committee
dt. 11th Jan., 2012"
6. It was found that the appeal filed before the Tribunal is time barred. This appeal was received in this office on 5th March, 2012. This appeal is directed against the order of learned CIT dt. 14th June, 2007. The delay in filing this appeal is 1660 days. A condonation petition has been filed which is duly supported by an attested affidavit. The averments taken in this affidavit of the Managing Trustee are being reproduced verbatim, to understand the 'reasons' for this delay :
"Affidavit
I Papinder Singh Sudan s/o Shri Hakam Singh Sudan, age 60 years, resident of Chak 7-E Chhoti, Sriganganagar declare on oath as under :
That I am Managing Trustee of Nosegay Public School, Sriganganagar and conversant with the affairs of the trust and also competent to swear this Affidavit.
That Nosegay Public School Management Committee is a Society created vide Memorandum of Association and was got registered videregistration certificate dt. 9th Nov., 1985,
That an application under s 12A of the IT Act was submitted vide application dt. 30th March, 2006 before the CIT, Bikaner.
That the CIT, Bikaner allowed the registration to the Society Nosegay Public School Management Committee w.e.f. 1st April, 2005.
That the society applied for registration since its beginning i.e. from date of creation.
That the society now submitted an appeal before the Tribunal Jodhpur Bench, Jodhpur against the order of the CIT, Bikaner dt. 14th June, 2007. The appeal is barred by limitation.
That the appeal in question is delayed substantially on account of ignorance of law and as per the advice of the tax consultant of the Society at that time.
That now the present consultants of the Society advised that an appeal should have been submitted. It has also been made known that no order can be passed on an application under s. 12A of the IT Act after period of six months from the date of application.
That since the Members of Society were not aware about the IT Act and consequences thereof but the consultant advised that it makes no difference if the registration to the Society has been granted w.e.f. 1st April, 2005 in place of dt. 9th Nov., 1985 whereas the society was created and running for fulfilment of aims and objects thereof after creation.
That the application under s. 12A of the IT Act submitted by the Society was decided by the CIT, Bikaner vide order dt. 14th June, 2007 i.e. after expiry of 6 months from the date of submitting of the application.
That an application in respect of condonation of delay was also submitted before the CIT Bikaner vide application dt. 2nd April, 2007 prepared by the then consultant.
What has been stated above is true to the best of my knowledge and nothing has been concealed. God may help me.
Deponent
Sd/-
(Papinder Singh Sudan)"
7. With the support of this affidavit and application for condonation of delay it has been prayed that in the interest of substantial justice, this delay may kindly be condoned. This request was repelled by learned CIT- Departmental Representative stating that this delay is inordinate, therefore, it should not be condoned. After considering rival stands, we have found that the reason for this delay is stated to be due to wrong advice and 'ignorance of law' of the persons who are managing this institution. We have gone through the decisions relied upon by the learned Authorised Representative in respect of condonation of this delay. We have noticed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as back as in the year 1987, had an occasion to decide such an issue in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst Katiji [1987] 167 ITR 471 (SC). The Hon'ble Supreme Court has titled (tilted) their decision overwhelmingly in the favour of the substantial justice when it is pitted against the pedantic reasons. Subsequently, the Hon'bie apex Court reiterated their view while deciding the case of Vedabai alias Vijayanatabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil [2002] 253 ITR 798/122 Taxman 114 (SC) in which their lordship have held as under:
"In exercising discretion under s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to condone delay for sufficient cause in not preferring an appeal or other application within the period prescribed, Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor and calls for a more cautious approach, in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The Court has to exercise its discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression 'sufficient cause' the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. The expression 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction."
8. Similarly, Hon'ble Allahabad High Court has very succinctly dealt with this issue threadbare while deciding the case of CIT v. Ram Kishan Gupta[2007] 295 ITR 578. It has been held in this case as under:
"In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are of the view that the sufficient cause had been brought on record to condone the delay of five days. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order dt. 26th July, 1999, is set aside. The delay in filing the appeal before the Tribunal is condoned and the Tribunal is directed to decide the appeal on the merits in accordance with law. Since the appeal was filed in the year 1992, it would be appropriate that the Tribunal expedites the hearing of the appeal and decide the same within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order.
The appeal stands allowed as above, however in the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs."
9. The Hon'ble apex Court has laid down a firm law vide which 'ignorance of law' has been treated as a 'sufficient cause' and reasonable excuse for any default committed under the law when the cause of substantial justice is under consideration. The Hon'ble apex Court while dealing with the case ofMotilal Padampat Sugar Mill Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 118 ITR 325 (SC) has held thus :
"On the basis of an announcement in a newspaper that the State of U.P. had decided to grant exemption from sales-tax for a period of three years to all new industrial units in the State, the appellant wrote a letter in October, 1968, to the director of industries of its intention to set up an industrial unit for the manufacture of Vanaspati, in reply to which the director confirmed that there will be no sales-tax on the finished product of the appellant's Vanaspati factory from the date it gets power connection for commencing production. Thereupon the appellant approached financiers for financing the project and initiated negotiations with manufacturers for the purchase of machinery for the factory. In December, 1968, the Chief Secretary to Government and adviser to the Governor reiterated the assurance that the appellant would be entitled to the tax holiday. On the appellant's request for confirmation, the Chief Secretary in a reply dt. 22nd Dec, 1968, confirmed that 'the State Government will be willing to consider your request for grant of exemption from U.P. sales-tax for a period of three years from the date of production', and the appellant to apply formally to the Secretary in the Industries Department and in the meantime to 'go ahead with the arrangements for setting up of the factory'. Since the financial institutions were not satisfied with that reply, the appellant approached the Chief Secretary again and the latter wrote a letter dt. 23rd Jan., 1969, to the effect that the appellant 'will be entitled to exemption from U.P. sales-tax for a period of three years from the date of going into production', the exemption being applicable to Vanaspati sold in the State, and in view of this assurance the appellant went ahead with the setting up of the Vanaspati factory. Thereafter, the State Government took a policy decision in January, 1970, that new Vanaspati units will be given only a graded partial concession during the first three years of production and once again the State Government revised its policy in August, 1970, rescinding even the partial exemption. In the meantime, the appellant had written a letter to the effect that it would be availing of the partial exemption. The appellant thereupon filed a writ petition which it amended and in the amended petition raised the plea that the Chief Secretary, acting on behalf of the State Government, had given an unequivocal assurance that the appellant would be entitled to exemption from payment of sales-tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production, intending or knowing that it would be acted upon by the appellant, and the appellant, relying on that assurance, established the factory by investing a large amount, and, therefore, the State Government was bound to Honour the assurance and exempt Vanaspati manufactured and sold by the appellant for a period of three years from 2nd July, 1970. The High Court rejected the plea. On appeal to the Supreme Court:
Held, reversing the decision of the High Court, that the facts necessaiy for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel were clearly present and the Government was bound to carry out the representation and exempt the appellant from sales-tax in respect of sales of Vanaspati effected by it in Uttar Pradesh for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production and was not entitled to recover such sales-tax from the appellant :
Held, also, on the facts, that the fact that the appellant wrote a letter accepting the concessional rate of sales-tax did not amount to waiver.
It is elementary that waiver is a question of fact and it must be properly pleaded and proved. No plea of waiver can be allowed to be raised unless it is pleaded and the factual foundation for it is laid in the pleadings. Waiver means abandonment of a right and it may be either express or implied from conduct, but its basic requirement is that if must be "an intentional act with knowledge', There can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived is fully informed as to his right and with full knowledge of such right, he intentionally abandons it.
Where one party by his words or conduct makes to another a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not.
It is not necessary, in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that the promisee, acting in reliance on the promise, should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is only that the promisee should have altered his position: the alteration of position need not involve any detriment to the promisee. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promisee, if the promisor were allowed to go back on the promise.
Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the forni of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution.
Since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government, because, on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. When the Government is able to show that in view of the facts which have transpired since the making of the promise, public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise, the Court would have to balance the public interest in the Government carrying out a promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to act upon it and alter his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies. It would not be enough for the Government just to say that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Government were required to Honour it. The Government cannot claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency; nor can the Government claim to be the sole judge of its liability and repudiate it on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances. The Government will have to disclose to the Court what are the subsequent events on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether those events are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. Mere claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the Government from the liability: the Government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so that the Court can judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demands. It is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the Government, that overriding public interest requires that the Government should not be held bound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government. The Court, would insist on a highly rigorous standard of proof in the discharge of the Government's burden in this regard.
But even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be competent to the Government to resile from the promise on giving reasonable notice, which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position provided of course it is possible for the promisee to restore status quo ante. If, however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable
The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied in the teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law. Promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the Government or even a private party to do an act prohibited by law. There can also be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power. The legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative. function by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Per curiam : (i) If the U.P. Sales-tax Act, 1948, did not contain a provision enabling the Government to grant exemption it would not be possible to enforce the representation against the Government, because the Government cannot be compelled to act contrary to the statute, but since s. 4A of the U.P. Sales-tax Act, 1948, confers power on the Government to grant exemption from sales-tax, the Government can legitimately be held bound by its promise to exempt the appellant from payment of sales-tax. It is true that taxation is a sovereign or Governmental function, but no distinction can be made between the exercise of a sovereign or Governmental function and a trading or business activity of the Government, so far as the doctrine of promissory estoppel is concerned.
(ii) There is no presumption that every person knows the law. It is often said that everyone is presumed to know the law, but that is not a correct statement: there is no such maxim known to the law.
Decision of the Allahabad High Court reversed."
10. Therefore, taking the cumulative effect of these decisions, particularly when appellant before us is a Charitable Institution, and the CIT as well as the ITO have found the objects of the appellant 'charitable in nature' no doubt has been raised in this regard, we are left with no option to condone this delay in filing appeal before Tribunal. In such a institution the trustee or any in-charge has got no personal interest, but such institutions serve the public cause of charity. Anybody so connected may have perfunctory interest and such like long delays usually occur. There are raft of decisions which favour condonation of such delays, instead of defeating the cause of charity at the very threshold. That is why the law has permitted such institution to exist and flourish for public cause. We are aware that there may be some institutions which may also work against the dictum of the law and avail personal benefits of its trustees but such cases have to be segregated. In the light of the above decisions, we are of the considered opinion that this appeal deserves to be admitted after condoning the delay. Accordingly, we admit this appeal.
11. Coming to the merits of the case, we have found that the CIT undeniably has passed the order under s. 12A(a) beyond six months of the receipt of application in Form No. 10A in its office on 30th March, 2006. The impugned order was passed on 14th June, 2007, beyond six months as has been prescribed in s. 12A. In such eventualities, the application for registration is deemed to have been allowed. We may rely on the decision of Hon'ble Special Bench of Tribunal, Delhi rendered in the case Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial Shri Hari Parmarth Dham Trust v. CIT[2007] 17 SOT 281 (Delhi) (SB). In the above order it has been held that if the order is not passed by CIT within 6 months of receipt of application in Form 10A, under s. I2A, it is deemed that it stand allowed. The order passed by CIT refusing registration was treated as a 'nullity' liable to be quashed. Thus, registration was deemed to be granted 'as applied for by the assessee'. In this case also, similar situation has occurred. The only difference is that the CIT has registered the Institution but w.e.f. 1st April, 2005, ignoring the date of registration given in the Form No. 10A. The ratio of the above Tribunal order of the Special Bench the application is 'deemed allowed' as applied for by the assessee. Since the assessee had applied to get registration from the date of its inception, it is wrong and illegal to allow the same w.e.f. 1st April, 2005 under this deeming provision. This registration has to be treated to have been granted with effect from the date of its inception i.e. 9th Nov., 1985. Accordingly, we direct the CIT to grant registration to the appellant w.e.f. 9th Nov., 1985, which already deemed to have been granted. In view of our above finding, the other appeal would be of academic interest only.
12. In the result, both the appeals stand allowed.
Regards
Prarthana Jalan
__._,_.___
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