DEPARTMENT NEEDS TO FILE MA AS ITAT CONSIDERED THE AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35D.FURTHER HOSPITAL IN NOTA INDUSTRAIL UNDERTAKING BEFORE AMENDMENT.
S.35D: Amortisation of preliminary expenses-Professional fees to lawyers.
The assessee claimed one fifth of preliminary expense under section 35D. Assessing Officer disallowed holding it as capital in nature. The Tribunal held that the said fees were incurred for expansion of business and therefore one-fifth of it was allowable as preliminary expense. (A.Y. 2007-08)
Dy. CIT v. Columbia Asia Hospitals (P.) Ltd. (2013) 142 ITD 225 (Bang.)(Trib.)

Fast Track Quick revision of Capital Gain

Kaushal Agrawal

This is our second video of FAST TRACK – QUICK REVISION of Capital Gain. Our First Video was Fast track quick revision of Profits and gains of business or profession. Aim of this video is revision of Capital Gain in shortest possible time covering 90% of syllabus from examination point of view. However in class we devote almost 20 hours to Capital Gain which we have tried to condensed in 24 minutes approx. This was tough but I have tried to best of my ability. I know there are topics in Capital Gain which I have not covered. May be in next video I shall do it. This video is useful for CA, CS, CMA, B Com, MBA students and to all those who are keen to learn tax. Lastly please forgive my mistake and do let us know. And if this video has helped you in any way and generated slightest of interest, then do like it and share it.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vaizjOGsPQw#t=472014-TIOL-05-SC-CT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1105 of 2004

NARANI STORES

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, ERNAKULAM

H L Dattu And C Nagappan , JJ

Dated : December 11, 2013

Appellant Rep. by : Mr. Subramonium Prasad, Adv. Mr.Rajiv Dalal , Barrister Mr. T.G . Narayanan Nair, Adv.
Respondent Rep. by : Mr. Ramesh Babu M.R ., Adv.

Kerala GST - Order passed by Deputy Commissioner without giving enough time to the assesse to reply - matter remanded: Deputy Commissioner ought to have given some more time to the appellant to file his reply and explain in detail as to why the order passed by the assessing authority should not be modified. The right to file a reply has been considered to be an indispensible facet of right to proper hearing. The maxim of audi alteram partem is an epitome of general principles governing fair hearing. The principle of fair hearing has two justiciable elements. The first is that an opportunity of hearing must be given and the second is that the opportunity must be reasonable and adequate. The opportunity of hearing requires to be tested on the anvil of reasonableness and adequacy of such opportunity. The right to file an adequate reply and represent one's case before the decision making authority shelters under the second limb. In a case where huge tax liability is being imposed on an assessee , he has a right to file a reply and represent his case before the adjudicating authority. Should such sufficient opportunity not be afforded to the assessee , he would be deprived of his valuable right. Case remanded to the Deputy Commissioner.

Appeal Allowed

JUDGEMENT

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in T.R.C . No. 82 of 1999, dated 17.12.2002, whereby and whereunder the High Court has set aside the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam (for short "the Tribunal") sustaining the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and allowed the tax revision.

2. The assessment year in question is 1988-89. The appellant assessee is a dealer doing business in provisional stores. He is a registered dealer both under the Kerala General Sales Tax, 1963 (for short, "the Act") and the Central Sales Tax, 1956 (for short, "the 1956 Act").

3. The assessing authority had completed the assessments for the assessment year 1988-89 on 27.11.1990. After completion of such assessment, the assessing authority had issued a demand notice, inter alia, directing the appellant to pay up the tax demanded.

4. Aggrieved by the said assessment order and the demand notice so issued, the assessee had filed an appeal before the First Appellate Authority as envisaged under the provisions of the Act. The First Appellate Authority, by its order dated 06.05.1991 had modified the aforesaid order of assessment and had directed the assessing officer to give effect to the said order. Pursuant to the direction so issued, the assessing authority has passed a fresh order of assessment, dated 26.06.1993.

5. During the interregnum, the intelligence officer had inspected the business premises of the appellant and since there was a discrepancy in the turn-over reflected in the books of accounts and the actual stock that was found, he had imposed a penalty.

6. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in exercise of his powers under Section 35 of the Act had issued a show cause notice, inter alia, directing the appellant to show cause why the orders of assessment passed by the assessing authority should not be revised, dated 27.06.1995.

7. After receipt of the said show cause notice, the appellant had brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that the Managing Director of the firm is under bed rest and his son, who is looking after the business in the meanwhile is out of station and therefore, they may be given some additional time to reply to the said notice.

8. After receipt of the aforesaid letter, the Deputy Commissioner had given them some more time to reply to the show cause notice and also furnish the details, by communication dated 06.07.1995. Since the appellant could not file either his reply or any other details within the time so granted, the Deputy Commissioner has proceeded to pass the ex-parte order, dated 27.07.1995 setting aside the order passed by the assessing authority, dated 26.06.1993 and remanded the matter back to the assessing authority for re-assessment in accordance with law.

9. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant had carried the matter before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by its order dated 17.09.1996, was pleased to allow the appeal filed by the assessee and had granted him all the reliefs that were sought in the Memorandum of Appeal.

10. Aggrieved by the said order passed by the Tribunal, the State had carried the matter before the High Court. As we have already noticed, the High Court has allowed the revenue's revision and has set aside the orders passed by the Tribunal restoring the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner.

11. The assessee is before us in this appeal questioning the correctness or otherwise of the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the High Court.

12. After hearing learned counsel for the parties to the lis , we are of the opinion that the matter requires to be remanded back to the Deputy Commissioner for fresh consideration pursuant to the notice issued by him under Section 35 of the Act. We say so for the reason that the Deputy Commissioner in his order issued under Section 35 of the Act, inter alia, directed the appellant to show cause why the orders passed by the assessing authority, dated 27.11.1990 should not be revised. For multifarious reasons, the assessee could not file the reply in time.

13. In our considered opinion, the Deputy Commissioner ought to have given some more time to the appellant to file his reply and explain in detail as to why the order passed by the assessing authority should not be modified. The right to file a reply has been considered to be an indispensible facet of right to proper hearing. The maxim of audi alteram partem is an epitome of general principles governing fair hearing. The principle of fair hearing has two justiciable elements. The first is that an opportunity of hearing must be given and the second is that the opportunity must be reasonable and adequate. ( Indru Ramchand Bharvani v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 1) . The opportunity of hearing requires to be tested on the anvil of reasonableness and adequacy of such opportunity. The right to file an adequate reply and represent one's case before the decision making authority shelters under the second limb.

14. In a case where huge tax liability is being imposed on an assessee , he has a right to file a reply and represent his case before the adjudicating authority. Should such sufficient opportunity not be afforded to the assessee , he would be deprived of his valuable right. In the facts of the instant case, sufficient time was not granted to the assessee by the Deputy Commissioner who had passed the ex-parte order, dated 27.7.1995 imposing a huge tax liability on the assessee and since the same is opposed to the principles of natural justice, in our considered opinion, the order of the Deputy Commissioner requires to be set aside.

15. This aspect of the matter, though noticed by the Tribunal but has not been adverted to by it and the relief has been granted to the assessee on a different ground. Further, in the revision filed by the revenue, the High Court, though has noticed the said aspect of the matter, but has not given any relief to the assessee .

16. In view of the above, in our considered opinion, the High Court was not justified in allowing the revenue's revision petition.

17. In view of the above, we set aside the orders passed by the High Court as well as the Tribunal. We now remand the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner to review the orders passed by him on 27.07.1995 and give one more opportunity to the appellant and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.

18. All the contentions of both the parties are kept open. No costs.

2014-TIOL-03-SC-CT-LB

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6791 of 2004

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS

BHARTI TELETECH LTD

H L Dattu, Dipak Misra And S A Bobde, JJ

Dated : January 20, 2014

Haryana General Sales Tax Rules, 1975 : Clubbing of units not permissible for availing exemption : The respondent assesse was allowed sales tax exemption under Rule 28A of the Rules for the period 13.12.1991 to 12.12.1998 for an amount of Rs.498.80 lakhs. This benefit was granted subject to the conditions laid down in the sub-rule 11 of Rule 28A of the Rules. The conditions postulated in sub-rule 11 (a) are that the industrial unit after availing of the benefit shall continue its production at least for the next five years not below the level of average production for the preceding five years. There is also stipulation in the sub-rule 11 that if the unit violates any of the conditions laid down in clause (a) of sub-rule 11, it shall be liable to make, in addition to the full amount of tax benefit availed of by it during the period of exemption, payment of interest chargeable under the Act as if no tax exemption was ever available to it.

In the course of adjudication, in reply to the show cause, the assessee explained that it had established another unit as an expansion unit which had come into commercial production w.e.f. 27.3.1998 and for the purpose of determining the level of production after 12.12.1998, the production figures of the expansion unit were also required to be taken into account.

The Supreme Court held: The concept of exemption has been introduced for development of industrial activity and it is granted for a certain purpose to a unit for certain types of good. Exemption can be granted under the Rules or under a notification with certain conditions and also ensure payment of taxes post the exemption period. The concept of exemption is required to be tested on a different anvil, for it grants freedom from liability. In the case at hand, as we understand, it is " unit" specific. The term " unit" has not been defined. The grant of exemption unit wise can be best understood by way of example. An entrepreneur can get an exemption of a unit and thereafter establish number of units and try to club together the production of all of them to get the benefit for all. It would be well nigh unacceptable, for what is required is that each unit must meet the condition to avail the benefit.

In the case at hand, clubbing is not permissible. It amounts to a violation of the conditions stipulated under Rule 11(a)(i) of Rule 28A and, therefore, the consequences have to follow and as a result, the assessee has to pay the full amount of tax benefit and interest.

Revenue Appeal Allowed

JUDGEMENT

Per : Dipak Misra:

Calling in question the legal acceptability and propriety of the judgment and order dated 08.05.2003 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P. No. 16336 of 2002 whereby the Division Bench has quashed the order dated 26.9.2002 passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Haryana which had affirmed the orders passed by the appellate authority, namely, Joint Excise and Taxation and that of the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Gurgaon), the original authority who had, upon initiation of a proceeding under Rule 28 (11) (b) of the Haryana General Sales Tax Rules, 1975 (for short "the Rules" ), come to hold that the respondent-assessee herein had violated the provisions of Rule 28A (11) (a) (i) as it had failed to maintain, without convincing reasons, the requisite production and was, therefore, liable to make full payment of tax exemption benefit availed by it during the concessional period, i.e., 13.12.1991 to 12.12.1998 of sale of Electronic Push Button Telephones (EPBT), the present appeal, by special leave, has been preferred by the State of Haryana and its functionaries.

2. The facts that are imperative to be stated are that the respondent assessee, namely, M/s. Bharti Teletech Limited , was allowed sales tax exemption under Rule 28A of the Rules for the period 13.12.1991 to 12.12.1998 for an amount of Rs.498.80 lakhs. This benefit was granted subject to the conditions laid down in the said sub-rule 11 of Rule 28A of the Rules. The conditions postulated in sub-rule 11 (a) are that the industrial unit after availing of the benefit shall continue its production at least for the next five years not below the level of average production for the preceding five years. There is also stipulation in the sub-rule 11 that if the unit violates any of the conditions laid down in clause (a) of sub-rule 11, it shall be liable to make, in addition to the full amount of tax benefit availed of by it during the period of exemption, payment of interest chargeable under the Act as if no tax exemption was ever available to it. It is apt to note that there is a proviso that provides that the rigors of the said clause would not come into play if the loss of production is explained to the satisfaction of the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner concerned as being due to reasons beyond the control of the unit.

3. As the facts would uncurtain, on 3.05.1997, the assessee submitted an application seeking amendment in the eligibility certificate so as to include certain other items but it was rejected vide order dated 22.7.1997 by the High Level Screening Committee. On an appeal being filed, the Commissioner of Industries accepted the same and remitted the matter to the High Level Screening Committee to revise the eligibility certificate allowing the benefit of sales tax exemption by inclusion of additional items. However, the period of exemption remained unaltered. Be it noted, the assessee was granted the full benefit of exemption for the entire period.

4. After the expiry of the period of exemption, the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Gurgaon), the 2nd appellant herein, while monitoring the production level of the respondent unit, noticed that it was not maintaining the level of production of the preceding five years and, accordingly, initiated a proceeding against it on the foundation that it had violated the conditions enumerated under Rule 28A (11) (a) (i) and was thereby liable to make full payment of tax exemption benefit already availed by it along with interest. As required under the Rules, it issued a notice to show cause to explain non-maintenance of average production after the expiry of the benefit period inasmuch as it had drastically come down to Rs.9.06 crores from 17.52 crores. In the course of adjudication, in reply to the show cause, the assessee explained that it had established another unit as an expansion unit which had come into commercial production w.e.f. 27.3.1998 and for the purpose of determining the level of production after 12.12.1998, the production figures of the expansion unit were also required to be taken into account. A contention was raised before the 2nd appellant that the notice to show cause was premature as it was given prior to the expiry of twelve months from 12.12.1998, that is, the date on which the period of benefit expired.

5. The adjudicating authority rejected the said contention and proceeded to delve into the facts that had emerged before it. It came to hold that the Gross Turn Over (GTO) during January 1999 and December 1999 was Rs.9.06 crores as against the average GTO of Rs.17.52 crores during the five years immediately preceding 12.12.1998. The said authority also considered the GTO for the assessment year 1999-2000 (1.4.1999 to 31.3.2000) which reflected the amount as Rs.4 ,48,05,695.00 for the year immediately preceding, i.e., assessment year 1998-1999.

6. It may be noted that a contention was advanced that the unit during the five years preceding 12.12.1998 had produced 40,83,246 pieces giving yearly average of 8,16,649 pieces against which the average production in the post benefit period is 1898961 pieces which would show that the production actually increased after the expiry of the benefit period. The competent authority, upon perusal of the production chart for the period 13.12.1993 to 12.12.1998, analysed the same and arrived at the average production. The tabular chart prepared by the adjudicating authority is as follows :-

Average Production
Items	Before on period	Expiry benefit	After Expiry benefit period	Increase (+) Decrease (-)
ETBT	330431		163270	(-) 167161
Pagers	4405		Nil	(-) 4405
Spare Parts	481813		1735691	(+) 1253878

7. The reasoning adopted by the 2nd appellant basically was that the claim of the assessee that production had not come down in the post benefit period was wholly unacceptable because it could not be given the same weightage as its individual parts inasmuch as a complete telephone set could not, for the exemption purpose, be equated with its number of parts which constituted its assembly. Being of this view, the 2nd appellant came to hold that it was obligatory on the part of the assessee industrial unit, having availed the benefit of tax exemption for the specified period, to continue its business and to respect the conditions enumerated in the prescription in the rule. The said authority ruled that the assessee, having failed to meet the production level, was liable to be visited with the consequences and, accordingly, directed for making full payment along with interest.

8. Grieved by the aforesaid order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the appellate authority who came to hold that the explanation for loss in production was due to outdated machinery and, hence, the reasons for fall in production could not be held to be beyond the control of the assessee, for it was well within his control to replace the outdated machinery of the old unit instead of putting up a new unit. On the aforesaid bedrock, the appellate authority declined to interfere in appeal.

9. Failure in appeal led the assessee to file an appeal before the Sales Tax Tribunal which, on reappreciation of the factual matrix in entirety, came to hold that the average manufacturing of EPBT in the subsequent three years was approximately of 9.32 lacs as against an average of 3.79 in the preceding five years. That apart, the appellant had not taken the plea that the lower production was because of factors beyond their control. The tribunal further observed that it was not a mere coincidence that the second unit (expansion) became operational soon after the expiry of benefit in the first unit from which it was evident that the assessee had a well thought out plan to deliberately reduce the manufacturing of EPBT drastically in the first unit and increase the production of the said item in the second unit. The tribunal also took note of the fact from the information provided by the assessee it was obvious that the turnover in the expanded unit had increased from Rs.65.49 lacs in 1998-1999 to Rs.31.36 crores in 1999 but on the other hand, the turnover in the first unit had gone down from Rs.13.27 crore during 1998-99 to Rs.4.48 crore during 1999-2000 and hence, it was clearly indicative that the expanded capacity had been created to coincide with the expiry of the benefit period in the first unit. Finally, the tribunal held :-

"Though increase or decrease in the turnover by itself may not be of much consequence in the scheme but the turnover does have direct relationship with the production and since the production of higher value item i.e. EPBT was reduced, the total gross turnover in terms of value was also bound to decline and the spare capacity in the first unit was utilized by increasing the production of spare parts i.e. low value items. It is, therefore, obvious from the facts of the case that the production of EPBT was deliberately reduced in the first unit and increased in the second unit as the appellant company was hoped of getting the benefit of exemption again on the expanded capacity."

10. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the tribunal affirmed the conclusion recorded by the forums below. The aforesaid order of the tribunal came to be assailed before the High Court in a writ petition. The Division Bench of the High Court referred to the rule position and quantity manufactured in lacs and turnover of goods and placed reliance on R.K. Mittal Woolen Mills v. State of Haryana and others (2001) 123 STC 248 and came to hold that the tribunal ought to have set aside the orders of the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner instead of upholding their action on totally erroneous consideration. It opined that the approach of the tribunal was erroneous inasmuch as without pointing out to the violation of the rules, it had passed the order solely on the basis of conjecture. The High Court further observed that even if the factum of reduction of production as stated by the tribunal was accepted as correct, still the exemption on tax could not have been withdrawn as it was not a ground mentioned in sub-rule II (a) (i) of Rule 28A for withdrawal of exemption.

11. Questioning the defensibility of the order passed by the High Court, Mr. Manjit Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, has contended that the High Court in a laconic manner has arrived at the conclusion that the authorities as well as the tribunal has fallen into error by opining that there has been a violation of the rule in question though on a bare reading of the said orders there can be no shadow of doubt that the increased production in respect of the second unit could not have been taken into account for the first unit since the second unit was an individual unit having no concern with the first unit. It is his further submission that the High Court failed to appreciate that the respondent had tried to take recourse to an innovative subterfuge by establishing a new unit producing the same items as the earlier ones and added the production of the second unit to the first unit to claim the benefit which is impermissible. Learned counsel would further submit that when the conditions enumerated under the rule had factually been violated, there was no justification on the part of the High Court to opine on the basis of the decision rendered in the R.K. Mittal Woolen Mills" case that the exemption could not have been withdrawn because there had been no violation of clauses (I) and (II) of sub-rule 11(a) of Rule 28A of the Rules.

12. Mr. Gopal Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent contended, in support of the impugned order, that the appreciation of facts by the High Court and the reasons ascribed by it for annulling the orders of the forums below are absolutely unimpeachable since the assessee was under an obligation to apply for exemption even in respect of expansion and in that background, there was no justification for the forums below not to take into consideration the production of the expanded unit. It is also urged by him that even assuming that there are two units, the same would be covered under the definition of Rule 28A (f) which defines eligible industrial unit and on a proper construction of the provision, the combined conclusion of the production of the units cannot really be found fault with. It is also put forth by him that the provisions relating to exemption and the exemption notifications are required to be liberally construed for industrial growth and the High Court, keeping in mind the said principle, has dislodged the orders passed by the forums below and, therefore, the order impugned should not be taken exception to.

13. To appreciate the rivalised contention raised at the bar, it is appropriate to refer to Rule 28A (11) which reads as follows :-

"11(a) The benefit of taxexemption/ deferment under this rule shall be subject to the condition that the beneficiary/industrial unit after having availed of the benefit, -

(i) shall continue its production at least for the next five years not below the level of average production for the preceding five year; and

(ii) shall not make sales outside the State for next five years by way of transfer or consignment of goods manufactured by it.
(b) In case the unit violates any of the conditions laid down in clause (a), it shall be liable to make, in addition to the full amount of tax-benefit availed of by it during the period of exemption/deferment, payment of interest chargeable under the Act as if no tax exemption/ deferment was ever available to it;

PROVIDED that the provisions of this clause shall not come into play if the loss in production is explained to the satisfaction of the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner concerned as being due to the reasons beyond the control of the units:

PROVIDED FURTHER that a unit shall not be called upon to pay any sum under this clause without having been given reasonable opportunity of being heard."

[Emphasis added]

14. On a bare reading of the said Rule, it is evincible that the conditions which are imposed have been enumerated in clause I (ii) of the said sub-rule 11 (a) of Rule 28A to the effect that in the event of nonmaintenance of the quality of production after the expiry of the exemption, the assessee has to pay the tax benefit availed with interest. In the case at hand, the revenue has pressed clause I (ii) into service. The Division Bench has relied on the decision in R.K. Mittal Woolen Mills (supra) wherein the High Court was dealing with the withdrawal of eligibility of certificate as provided in sub-rules 8 and 9 of Rule 28A. After referring to sub-rule 8 of Rule 28A that deals with the withdrawal of eligibility certificate under certain circumstances. Analysing the said Rule, it was stated thus :-

"A perusal of the aforesaid sub-rule would show that the grounds on which the eligibility certificate and be withdrawn are mentioned therein but the ground of non-production of the change of land use permission from the Town and Country Planning Department is not one of the grounds mentioned therein. Sub-rule (8) of Rule 28A being a part of a taxing statute has, in the nature of things, to be construed very strictly and, therefore, the eligibility certificate can be withdrawn only on the grounds mentioned therein and on no other grounds. The authorities cannot add any other ground to the said sub-rule. We are, therefore, satisfied that the eligibility certificate granted to the petitioner could not be withdrawn only on the ground of nonproduction of the change of land use permission by the Town and Country Planning Department"

15. The said decision, as we perceive, was rendered in a totally different context. In the present case, we are not concerned with the withdrawal of eligibility certificate. We are concerned with the consequences that have been enumerated in clause (b) of sub-rule 11 of Rule 28A which clearly stipulates that in case of violation of clause 11 (a) (i) of Rule 11, the assessee shall be liable for making, in addition to the full amount of tax-benefit availed of by it during the period of exemption/deferment, with interest chargeable under the Act. Thus, reliance placed by the High Court on the said decision is misconceived and inappropriate.]

16. The hub of the matter is whether production of two different units can be combined together to meet the requirement of the postulate enshrined under the Rule. The production of the beneficiary unit had failed to fulfil the stipulation incorporated in sub-rule 11 (a)(i) of Rule 28A of the Rules. It is also the undisputed position that the production of the expanded unit has been computed and clubbed with the first unit to reflect the meeting of the criterion. The competent authority has come to a definite conclusion that the expanded capacity had been created to show that the rate of production is maintained but it is fundamentally a subterfuge. The authority has also taken into consideration the different items produced and how there has been loss of production of EPBT in the first unit. The High Court has failed to appreciate the relevant facts and, without noticing that the respondent-assessee had clubbed the production of the units, lancinated the orders passed by the forums below.

17. Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to clause (f) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 28A which defines " eligible industrial unit" . The definition reads as follows :-

"(f) ' eligible industrial unit' means:-

(i) a new industrial unit or expansion or diversification of the existing unit, which-
(I) has obtained certificate of registration under the Act;

(II) is not a public sector undertaking where the Central Government held 51 per cent or more shares;
(III) is not availing incentive of interest free loan from the Industries Department for investment after the 1st day of April, 1988;

(IV) is not included in Schedule III appended to these rules except the tiny units set up in a rural area on or after 1-4-1992, in which capital investment in plant and machinery including market price of plant and machinery taken on base or otherwise, does not exceed rupees five lakhs, shall not form part of Schedule III;

(V) is not availing or has availed of exemption under Section 13 of the Act;
(ii) a sick industrial unit recommended by the High Powered Committee for the grant of fiscal relief either in the form of exemption from the payment of sales tax or purchase tax or both or deferment of tax."

18. He has laid immense emphasis on the term " expansion" of the existing unit. The term " expansion" has been defined in clause (d) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 28A which reads thus :-

(d) " expansion /diversification of industrial unit" means a capacity set up or installed during the operative period which creates additional productions/manufacturing facilities for manufacture of the same product/products as of the existing unit (expansion) or different products (diversification) at the same or new location -

(i) in which the additional fixed -capital investment made during the operative period exceeds 25% of the fixed capital investment of the existing unit, and

(ii) which results into increase in annual production by 25% of the installed capacity of the Existing Unit in case of expansion.
On a careful reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is quite clear as day that they deal with the eligibility to get the benefit of exemption/deferment from the payment of tax. On a studied scrutiny of clause (f) (i) (I), it is manifest that it is incumbent on the unit to obtain certificate of registration under the Act. The submission of Mr. Jain is that the second unit has obtained the registration certificate under the Act and, hence, the production of the said unit, being eligible, is permitted to be included. Needless to say, obtainment of registration certificate is a condition precedent to become eligible but that does not mean that the production of the said unit will be taken into account for sustaining the benefit of the first unit. They are independent of each other as far as sub-rule 11 of the Rule 28A is concerned. We are disposed to think so as the grant of exemption has a sacrosanct purpose. The concept of exemption has been introduced for development of industrial activity and it is granted for a certain purpose to a unit for certain types of good. Exemption can be granted under the Rules or under a notification with certain conditions and also ensure payment of taxes post the exemption period. The concept of exemption is required to be tested on a different anvil, for it grants freedom from liability. In the case at hand, as we understand, it is "unit" specific. The term "unit" has not been defined. The grant of exemption unit wise can be best understood by way of example. An entrepreneur can get an exemption of a unit and thereafter establish number of units and try to club together the production of all of them to get the benefit for all. It would be well nigh unacceptable, for what is required is that each unit must meet the condition to avail the benefit.

19. We will be failing in our duty if we do not address to a submission, albeit the last straw, of Mr. Jain that any provision relating to grant of exemption, be it under a rule or notification, should be considered liberally. In this regard, we may profitably refer to the decision inHansraj Gordhanadas v. H.H. Dave, Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Surat and others AIR 1970 SC 755 wherein it has been held as follows :-

"...It is well established that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words. The entire matter is governed wholly by the language of the notification . If the tax-payer is within the plain terms of the exemption it cannot be denied its benefit by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority. If such intention can be gathered from the construction of the words of the notification or by necessary implication therefrom, the matter is different..."

20. In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Industrial Coal Enterprises (1999) 2 SCC 607, after referring to CIT v. Straw Board Mfg. Co. Ltd (1989) Supp (2) SCC 523 and Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT (1992) 3 SCC 78, the Court ruled that an exemption notification, as is well known, should be construed liberally once it is found that the entrepreneur fulfills all the eligibility criteria. In reading an exemption notification, no condition should be read into it when there is none. If an entrepreneur is entitled to the benefit thereof, the same should not be denied.

21. In this context, reference to Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Another v. Status Spinning Mills Limited and another (2008) 7 SCC 353 would be fruitful. It has been held therein :-

"It may be true that the exemption notification should receive a strict construction as has been held by this Court in Novopan India Ltd. v. CCE and Customs 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606 , but it is also true that once it is found that the industry is entitled to the benefit of exemption notification, it would received a broad construction. (See Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand (2005) 4 SCC 272 and A.P. Steel Re-Rolling Mill Ltd. v. State of Kerala (2007) 2 SCC 725) . A notification granting exemption can be withdrawn in public interest. What would be the public interest would, however, depend upon the facts of each case."

22. From the aforesaid authorities, it is clear as crystal that a statutory rule or an exemption notification which confers benefit to the assessee on certain conditions should be liberally construed but the beneficiary should fall within the ambit of the rule or notification and further if there are conditions and violation thereof are provided, then the concept of liberal construction would not arise. Exemption being an exception has to be respected regard being had to its nature and purpose. There can be cases where liberal interpretation or understanding would be permissible, but in the present case, the rule position being clear, the same does not arise.

23. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the pronouncement in State of Haryana and others v. A.S. Fuels Private Limited and another (2008) 9 SCC 230 . In the said case, the State of Haryana had approached this Court as the High Court had construed the effect of sub rule 10 (v) of Rule 28A of the Rules which authorises the department to withdraw the tax exemption certificate but had granted liberty to the State to scrutinize if it was a case for withdrawal of the eligibility certificate under sub-rule (8) of Rule 28A of the Rules and, thereafter, to proceed in accordance with the law. This Court, scanning the anatomy of Rule 28A, opined that under sub-rule (8)(b), when the eligibility certificate is withdrawn, the exemption/entitlement certificate is also deemed to have been withdrawn from the first day of its validity and the unit shall be liable to payment of tax, interest or penalty under the Act as if no entitlement certificate had ever been granted to it. Thereafter, the Court adverted to sub-rule 11 (a) and, in that context, it observed thus :-

"... there are several conditions which are relevant; firstly, there is a requirement of continuing the production for at least next five years; secondly, consequences flowing in case of violation of the conditions laid down in clause (a). In other words, in case of non continuance of production for next five years, the result is that it shall be deemed as if there was no tax exemption/entitlement available to it. The proviso permits to the dealers to explain satisfactorily to the DETC that the loss in production was because of the reasons beyond the control of the unit. The materials have to be placed in this regard by the party. The High Court seems to have completely lost sight of sub-rule (11)(b)."

24. In the case at hand, as we have already held, clubbing is not permissible. It amounts to a violation of the conditions stipulated under Rule 11(a)(i) of Rule 28A and, therefore, the consequences have to follow and as a result, the assessee has to pay the full amount of tax benefit and interest. The approach of the High Court is absolutely erroneous and it really cannot withstand close scrutiny.

25. In view of our aforesaid analysis and prismatic reasoning, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside and those of the tribunal and other authorities are restored. There shall be no order as to costs.

--
Regards,

Pawan Singla , LLB

M. No. 9825829075

Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur upheld while granting compensation to former HC Judge

Posted on 24 January 2014 by Vineet Kumar

Court

New Delhi District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum

Brief

The three member bench presided by judge C.K. Chaturvedi awarded a compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the complainant, Justice Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh, together as a consolidated damages for deficiencies etc., and award Rs.10,000/- for litigation expenses as the Indian Railways shifted the reserved seats of the Judge and his family members to another coach without informing them. The Forum held that the facts clearly show an attempt by the Railways to accomodate some other persons in place of reserved seats of the complainants resulting in ''hardship, inconvenience, humiliation and harassment to complainant, Judges who are not used to such hiccups and inconvenience in the journies during the career.'' The Forum also stated that the Railways resorted to falsehood instead of ''expressing regrets.''

Citation

Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Judgement

CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL FORUM-VI

(DISTT. NEW DELHI),

'M' BLOCK, 1STFLOOR, VIKAS BHAWAN, I.P.ESTATE, NEW DELHI-110001.

Case No.C.C./191/13 Dated:

In the matter of:

1. Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh

S/o. Late Sh. Raosaheb Deshmukh.

2. Prerna Deshmukh

W/o. Justice Sh. Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh

3. Shraddha Deshmukh

D/o. Justice Sh. Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh,

All R/o. 77, Type VII Bunglow,

New Moti Bagh,

New Delhi-110 021.…....COMPLAINANTS

VERSUS

1. The General Manager, Northern Railways

Head Office,

1st Floor, Baroda House,

Anne Building,

K.G. Marg,

N. Delhi-110 001.

2. The General Manager, North Central Railways

Head Office,

Subedar Ganj,

Allahabad-211 003.

3. Union of India

Ministry of Railways

Through its Secretary,

Rail Bhawan, Rafi Marg,

New Delhi-110 001

Also at:

1/704, G.T. Road,

Shahdara,

Delhi-110 032.

....... OPPOSITE PARTIES

ORDER

President : C.K. Chaturvedi

The complainant, Justice Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh serving as Chairman of the Company Law Board, at Delhi undertook a journey from Datia (MP) To Bhopal on 28.11.2012, after getting the reservation of seats done at Delhi, against PNR No.214-0423846, for confirmed seats NO.29,30 and 41, in Coach B-3. It is alleged that the train at Datia stops for only 2 minutes, and when the complainant with his family members reached bogie B-3, he found the bogie locked from inside. This created a great uneasiness and anxiety to complainants as they feared missing the train. A police attendant with Justice Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh entered the coach B-3, from some other coach vestibule and opened the coach, and hurriedly they entered into the train with difficulty. On entering the coach, they learned from TTE that there was no reservation in the name of complainants in that bogie, and the seat No.29,30 and 41 were reserved for some other passengers, who were supposed to board the train from onward station Vidisha. The Justice, stood clueless and embarrassed in the bogie, with luggage, not knowing what to do. The TTE, after some time found that their name were showed in coach B-2, at seat No.17,18 and 20. They were asked to shift to B-2. The Justice, in his old age, with luggage crossed the whole bogie to reach the place, and suffered a trauma. The complainant issued a legal notice dt. 23.12.2012 to G.M. Northrn Railway and after two and half months, through lawyer was informed that earlier PNR was released, on allotment of seat from Head Quarter, VIP quota release of seats, in B-2, and that TTE had helped them accordingly.

The complainant has raised a issue not only of deficiency on their parts of OP, as mentioned above, but also a issue of false pleas taken by railways to say that seats were allotted in VIP Quota, when no one had approached for this quota, as there was no question of this, as the complainants had confirmed ticket in B-3. The reply of OP-1,2,3, shows further indulging in falsehood by relying on some circular of 19.7.2005, to justify clubbing of seats when a single male VIP, is accompanying with females, to justify change of seats from B-3 to B-2. The reply further denies that B-3 was not closed from inside, which was factually incorrect. The reply also took untenable pleas of territorial jurisdiction, despite the clear position in S-11 of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as relied by Complainant in complaint and rejoinder.

We have considered the complaint in the light of reply filed. The Ld. Counsel for Railway wanted to make long submissions, to defend a case in which doctrine of res-ipsa coquitor applies, and it is for OP to explain. The written version has failed to show any communication to complaints about change of bogies and sitting plan, and why bogies B-3 was found locked, as also release of seats in B-3 without any one seeking H.O. Quota, for complainant and how the new PNR was created. The earlier ticket placed at page 29 of the file does not indicate an VIP status.

These facts clearly show an attempt inside the Railways to accommodate some other persons in place of reserved seats, for complainants for whatever reasons, resulting in avoidable hardship, inconvenience, humiliation and harassment to complainant, Judges who are not used to such hiccups and inconvenience in the journies during the career. We hold OP guilty of deficiency and award punitive damages for resorting to falsehood to defend in defensible rather than straight away expressing regrets.

We award a compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the complainants together as a consolidated damages for deficiencies etc., and award Rs.10,000/- for litigation expenses.

The order shall be complied within 30 days from the receipt of the copy of the order; otherwise action can be taken under Section 25 / 27 of the Consumer Protection Act.

Copy of the order be sent to the parties free of cost.

Pronounced in open Court on 17.01.2014

(C.K.CHATURVEDI)

President

(S.R.CHAUDHARY) (ASHA KUMAR)

Member Member

Bombay HC restrains Jubilant Agri from infringing Pidlite's trademark

Posted on 24 January 2014 by Vineet Kumar

Court

Bombay High Court

Brief

The Bombay High Court restrained Jubilant Agri & Consumer Products Limited not to use words like 'Marine' in its products, which infringes on Pidilite Industries Limited brand 'Fevicol Marine'

Citation

I.T.C. Limited Company vs. G.T.C. Industries Ltd. and another Asian Paints Ltd. vs. Home Solutions Retail (India) Ltd. Carew Phipson Ltd. vs. Deejay Distilleries Hem Corporation Private Limited and Ors. vs. ITC Limited Ultratech Cement Limited vs. Alaknanda Cement Pvt. Ltd. Corn Products Refining Co. vs. Shangrila Food Products Ltd F.D. Diesel vs. S.M. Diesel Shaw Wallace and Company Ltd. and another vs. Mohan Rocky Spring Water Breweries Ltd

Judgement

Bombay High Court

KPPNair 1 NMSL 1717 of 2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

NOTICE OF MOTION (L) NO. 1717 OF 2013

SUIT (L) NO. 752 OF 2013

Pidilite Industries Limited ...Applicant

In the matter between:

Pidilite Industries Limited ...Plaintiff

vs.

Jubilant Agri & Consumer Products Limited ...Defendant

Mr. V.R. Dhond, Senior Advocate, along with Mr. Nishad Nadkarni, Mr. Vaibhav Keni

and Mr. Sumeet Rane, instructed by M/s. LEGASIS PARTNERS, for the

Applicant/Plaintiff.

Mr. Ravi Kadam, Senior Advocate, along with Mr. A.A. Kirpekar, instructed by M/s.

MAG LEGAL, for the Defendant.

CORAM: S.J. KATHAWALLA, J.

Order reserved on: 10th

October, 2013

Order pronounced on: 13th

January, 2014

ORDER:

1. The above Suit is filed by the Plaintiff against the Defendant on the ground

that the Defendant is infringing the registered trademarks of the Plaintiff, infringing

the copyrights of the Plaintiff and committing the tort of passing off its goods as the

goods of the Plaintiff in the circumstances set out in the Plaint.

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KPPNair 2 NMSL 1717 of 2013

2. By the above Notice of Motion, the Plaintiff has sought adinterim/interim

reliefs restraining the Defendant from infringing the trademarks and copyrights of

the Plaintiff and/or committing the act of passing off its goods as that of the Plaintiff.

3. By an ex parte order dated 29th August,2013, adinterim injunction in terms

of prayer clauses (a) and (b) of the Notice of Motion have been granted in favour of

the Plaintiff and against the Defendant which prayers are reproduced hereunder:

"(a) That pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, the

Defendants, its Directors, proprietors, partners, owners, servants,

subordinates, representatives, stockists, dealers, agents and all other

persons claiming under them be restrained by an order and

injunction of this Hon'ble Court from infringing the Plaintiff's

MARINE Registered Marks bearing registration Nos. 1319822,

1319821 and 1319823 in any manner and from using in relation to

Impugned Goods or any other goods for which the MARINE Marks

are registered or any goods similar to the goods for which MARINE

Registered Marks are registered, the Impugned Mark or any other

mark which is identical or similar to MARINE Registered Marks or

any essential feature thereof including the mark MARINE or any

other marks similar thereto and from manufacturing, selling,

offering for sale, advertising or dealing in Impugned goods under

Impugned Mark and from manufacturing, selling offering for sale,

advertising or dealing in any goods (for which MARINE Registered

Marks are registered or which are similar to the goods for which

MARINE Registered Marks are registered) bearing the Impugned

Mark or any other mark which is identical or similar to MARINE

Registered Marks or any essential feature thereof including the mark

MARINE or any other marks similar thereto;

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KPPNair 3 NMSL 1717 of 2013

(b) That pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, the

Defendants, its Directors, proprietors, partners, owners, servants,

subordinates, representatives, stockists, dealers, agents and all other

persons claiming under them be restrained by an order and

injunction of this Hon'ble Court from infringing in any manner the

Plaintiff's copyright in the artistic work comprised in/reproduced on

either of the MARINE Artistic Works including in particular the

MARINE Artistic Work 2 and MARINE Artistic Work 3 and from

reproducing/copying the said artistic works or a substantial part of

the said artistic works (including in particular the depiction of the

plywood in a slanting manner floating in water which is splashing

along with droplets of water) on the Impugned Goods or the

Impugned Labels (including those depicted at Exhibit K to the Plaint)

or any bottles, cartons, packaging material or advertising material,

literature or any other substance and from manufacturing and

selling or offering for sale products upon or in relation to which the

said artistic works have been reproduced or substantially reproduced

or by issuing copies of such works to the public".

The Notice of Motion is now taken up for final hearing.

4. The infringement alleged by the Plaintiff relates to three registered

trademarks (two word marks and one label mark), which marks along with their

registration numbers are reproduced hereunder as A, B and C respectively.

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KPPNair 4 NMSL 1717 of 2013

FEVICOL MARINE

Reg. No.

1319822 (Word

mark)

Reg. No.

1319821 (Word mark)

Reg. No.

1319823 (Label

mark)

5. The Registration Certificates in respect of the above three registered marks

are at pages 58, 61 and 63 of the Plaint. All three registrations are effective since 9th

November, 2004. Two registrations (Pages 58 @ 59 and 61 @ 62 of the Plaint) have

a user claim of 1st May, 2003. The third registration (Page 63 @ 64 of the Plaint) has

a user claim of 1st May, 2003. The Plaintiff has laid stress on the fact that all the

three registrations are absolute and unconditional, and in particular the Registrar,

although entitled to, did not impose any condition or limitation on the word

'MARINE' whilst granting registration and resultantly registration has been granted

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KPPNair 5 NMSL 1717 of 2013

in respect of the entirety of the marks.

6. In addition to the three registered trademarks, the Plaintiff has filed

applications for registration in respect of five other trademarks, particulars of which

are given hereunder:

Trademark Reg/Appln. Details Class Status

FEVICOL MARINE (label) 2110954 1 Pending

MARINE 1918007 1 Pending

MARINE 1972339 1 Pending

FEVICOL MARINE(Label) 2110954 1 Pending

FEVICOL MARINE(Label) 2425737 1 Pending

As can be seen from the table above, three of the five applications are for label

marks and two applications are in respect of the word marks, and that all the five

applications are pending registration. The two pending word marks applications are

in respect of the word 'MARINE' (by itself/stand alone). These applications have

been numbered 1918007 and 1972339. A perusal of the advertisement in respect of

Trademark Application No. 1972339 (for the word mark 'MARINE' ) establishes that

the user claimed therein has been since 2003. According to the Plaintiff, due to an

inadvertent error, Trademark Application No. 1918007 also for the word mark

'MARINE' wrongly mentioned the user claim as "proposed to be used". According

to the Plaintiff, upon this error being noticed, the Plaintiff filed an application in

Form TM16 for amending the user claim date, copy of which is tendered in Court.

7. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant by using the mark 'JIVANJOR

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KPPNair 6 NMSL 1717 of 2013

MARINE PLUS' is infringing the Plaintiff's registered mark and is also guilty of

passing off their goods as that of the Plaintiff.

8. The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's mark is 'FEVICOL MARINE' and

the Defendant's mark is 'JIVANJOR MARINE PLUS' and that both the Plaintiff and the

Defendant are using the word 'MARINE' in a descriptive manner. The main defence

of the Defendant is that the word 'MARINE' is inherently descriptive, is devoid of

any distinctive character, is incapable of being registered as trademark and therefore

cannot be claimed to be a trademark of the Plaintiff even though it forms part of the

registered trademark/label mark 'FEVICOL MARINE'.

9. As submitted by the Plaintiff it is essential to examine at the outset, whether

the word 'MARINE' forms an essential part of each of the three registrations set out

as A, B and C in paragraph 4 above. I have perused the three marks set out as A, B

and C in paragraph 4 above. As can be seen from the said marks, what is set out at

A is the word mark 'FEVICOL MARINE'. The two components of the registered

word mark are the word 'FEVICOL' and the word 'MARINE' which are arranged side

by side. Both these words are in the same font and of the same size and are

therefore of equal prominence. At B, the registered word mark 'FEVICOL MARINE'

is set out. This word mark consists of the words 'FEVICOL MARINE' written one

below the other. The word 'FEVICOL' is written in a font which is slightly larger

than the word 'MARINE' . The word 'MARINE' however, notwithstanding the slight

difference in the font size, is very prominent and therefore constitutes a prominent

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KPPNair 7 NMSL 1717 of 2013

and essential feature of the registered mark and cannot be regarded as insignificant

or inconsequential or non essential or not noticeable. The mark set out at C in

paragraph 4 above, is a label mark consisting of the device of two elephants pulling

a sphere and the words 'FEVICOL' and 'MARINE' written one below the other. Once

again both these parts are of comparable prominence and the word 'MARINE' forms

an essential and prominent part of the registered mark as well. The word 'MARINE'

therefore cannot be regarded as inconsequential or insignificant or non essential or

something that will not be noticed.

9.1 It is also correctly submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that when

comparing two marks (a registered mark and the offending/impugned mark) in an

infringement action, the Court will compare the offending/impugned mark with the

prominent and essential features of the registered marks and that the Court is not

required to only compare the single most prominent feature of the registered mark.

In other words, in the exercise of comparing rival marks, more than one prominent

and essential feature can exist.

9.2 Therefore upon perusal of all the three registered marks, I am prima facie

satisfied that the word 'MARINE' forms a prominent and essential part or feature of

all the three registered trademarks set out at A, B and C in paragraph 4 above.

10. The Plaintiff has submitted that the products bearing the Suit marks are

promoted and/or advertised and/or bought and/or sold and/or associated with the

mark/word 'MARINE' and not merely 'FEVICOL MARINE'. This submission is

vehemently denied/disputed by the Defendant.

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KPPNair 8 NMSL 1717 of 2013

10.1 As pointed out by the Plaintiff, its business activity extends to manufacture

and sale of (i) adhesives; (ii) sealants; (iii) construction and paint chemicals; (iv)

automotive chemicals; (v) art material, (vi) industrial and textile resins; and (vii)

organic pigments and preparations. This diversity of business and products is carried

out by the Plaintiff through various divisions. One such division is the Fevicol

Division. The Fevicol Division manufactures and/or markets several products under

different brand names such as: (i) MARINE ; (ii) DDL; (iii) SPEEDX; (iv) PL111, (v)

NAIL FREE, etc. These products cater to different segments and/or are for different

purposes (e.g. NAIL FREE is an adhesive used in relation to glass and/or mirror;

'MARINE' is an adhesive used in relation to wet and/or humid conditions). These

individual products are identified and/or distinguished from one another by using

different brand names. These brand names are known as product identification

marks/brands. 'MARINE' is one such subbrand/product identification mark. When

used in conjunction with the house mark 'FEVICOL' or independently thereof, the

product identification marks/brands indicate and/or connote to the trade and/or

members of the public (i) what that product is (e.g. 'MARINE' brand adhesive);

and/or (ii) with which house brand (in FEVICOL) the same is associated. This is

necessary since the product bearing one product identification mark/brand cannot or

may not meet the purpose of another product bearing another product identification

mark, even though both products may bear the same house mark 'FEVICOL'. Hence

the product identification marks/brands serve to distinguish and/or identify the

individual product in question. The product identification marks/brands therefore

serve the important purpose of identifying and/or distinguishing one product from

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KPPNair 9 NMSL 1717 of 2013

the other. It is for this reason that the Plaintiff had obtained separate trademark

registrations and/or filed separate trademark applications for the various product

identification marks/brands. The Plaintiff has at pages 41 to 52 of the Plaint

annexed its catalogue which shows the use of several product identification

marks/brands. The Plaintiff is therefore correct in its submission that no one will

go to a shop and ask for 'FEVICOL'. If he does so, he will be asked, "what 'FEVICOL '

product?".

10.2 The Plaintiff has in support of its contention that in the trade, products are

known by, called for and sold with reference to these product identification

brands/marks, placed on record some of the bills and/or invoices. Pages 35 to 40

are the invoices which show that individual products are referred to and/or sold

and/or purchased with reference to product identification marks/brands. A perusal

of the same shows that the invoices issued by the Plaintiff as well as the orders

received by the Plaintiff refer to a product only by the different brand names like

'MARINE', 'DDL', etc. (i.e. without use of the housemark 'FEVICOL'). The Plaintiff has

in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Plaint referred to: (i) the sale of the

Plaintiff's product under the 'MARINE' mark; (ii) the success and popularity of the

products bearing the 'MARINE' mark; (iii) the goodwill generated in respect of the

'MARINE' mark/'MARINE' products; and (iv) the efforts made by the Plaintiff to

advertise/promote the 'MARINE' products/brand. It is evident from the Certificate

of Khanna & Panchmia, Chartered Accountants, dated 17th July, 2013, annexed as

ExhibitH1 to the Plaint, that the Plaintiff began the sale of 'MARINE' labelled

products/commenced the use of the 'MARINE' brand from the Financial Year 2003

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KPPNair 10 NMSL 1717 of 2013

2004. It is the case of the Defendant that they commenced using the impugned

mark in June, 2012. If the sales figures of the Plaintiff upto 31st March, 2012 are

considered, the aggregate sales by the Plaintiff till 31st March, 2012, are in excess of

Rs. 130 crores. If half of the sales for the Financial Year 20122013 (period April to

September) are added, the total sales are in excess of Rs. 180 crores. Consequently,

by the time the Defendant commenced the use of the impugned mark, the Plaintiff

had been in the market for more than nine years and had aggregated sales in excess

of Rs. 180 crores.

10.3 The Defendant has submitted that there are several products available in

the market containing the mark 'MARINE'. However, the Defendant has been unable

to show the sales of the other 'MARINE' products. Therefore, the extensive and

continuous sales of the Plaintiff's 'MARINE' products/use of the 'MARINE' mark has

to be seen in the backdrop of the fact that the Defendant has been unable to place

before this Court sufficient material to show any significant sales of other 'MARINE'

products. Consequently as submitted by the Plaintiff, the position that emerges is

that the Plaintiff was the only one who was manufacturing and/or selling products

(of any significant volume) with the 'MARINE' trademark. Resultantly, a person who

wanted the 'MARINE' adhesive would ask for 'MARINE' and not 'FEVICOL MARINE'

as there was no other 'MARINE' branded products in the market for him to need the

addition of the prefix 'FEVICOL' to distinguish one 'MARINE' from the other. The

Plaintiff has also correctly submitted that when a customer goes to a shop to buy

biscuits depending on what he wants, he simply asks for them by their product

identification mark/brand or subbrand e.g. 'Marie' or 'Monaco' or 'Goodday' or

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KPPNair 11 NMSL 1717 of 2013

'Krackjack' or '50:50' or 'Maska Chaska'. He does not preface it with the name of the

manufacturer i.e. Parle or Britannia.

10.4 In the circumstances, it is clear that by reason of open, continuous and

extensive sales over a period of about nine years, the mark 'MARINE' either by itself

or as a component/constituent of the registered trademark 'FEVICOL MARINE' has

acquired a secondary meaning/further distinctiveness and has become exclusively

associated with the Plaintiff.

11. It is submitted on behalf of the Defendant that the word 'MARINE' is a

common dictionary word and that until the application for the word mark 'MARINE'

proceeds for registration, no monopoly in respect thereof can be granted. It is

submitted that granting reliefs to the Plaintiff will amount to creating a monopoly in

the Plaintiff's favour over a common word in the English language and that the Court

should be slow in passing any orders which would have this effect. The Plaintiff has

relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of I.T.C. Limited Company vs.

G.T.C. Industries Ltd. and another1

and the decision in the English Law of Joseph

Crosfield cited therein to urge that the word 'MARINE' is a "part of the great common

of the English language" and/or "devoid of distinctive character" and/or "not capable

of distinguishing the goods of one trader from another" and therefore the Court

would be in error in granting an injunction.

11.1 As set out hereinafter, the Defendant has itself applied for registration of a

mark described by it as the 'MARINE PLUS' (Label) comprising of the words 'MARINE

1 2002 (25) PTC 465 Bom.

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KPPNair 12 NMSL 1717 of 2013

PLUS' as its leading and essential feature and is therefore estopped from contending

that the word 'MARINE' is descriptive or has become publici juris or 'common to

trade'. By the act/action of making the application, it manifested its own state of

mind/understanding that 'MARINE PLUS' used by it was used as a mark. This is not

in any way altered/diluted/affected by the subsequent withdrawal of the application

(on legal advice) post the filing of the Suit.

11.2 The Defendant itself has contended that the word 'MARINE' is a dictionary

word, meaning "of or relating to the sea" (as defined in the Oxford English Reference

Dictionary). The dictionary meaning "of or relating to the sea" does not in any

manner describe the products of the Plaintiff/Defendant or the characteristics of the

products of the Plaintiff/Defendant. The word 'MARINE' is not descriptive of the

products of the Plaintiff/Defendant. The Defendant has also relied on the meaning

of the word 'MARINE GLUE' as "glue that is not water soluble". The word 'MARINE

GLUE' finds no mention in the Oxford Dictionary, but only in an online dictionary, the

author, veracity or acceptance of which is not known and which is neither a widely

accepted nor a renowned dictionary as the Oxford Dictionary. Added to this, as

stated hereinabove, the fact that the Defendant itself applied for registration of the

same as a trademark, inherent in which is the admission that 'MARINE' is distinctive

and in any event capable of distinguishing the products of one person from those of

another and is capable of being registered as a trademark. The contention of the

Defendant that the word 'MARINE' is a common, customary term, generic,

laudatory or nondistinctive mark within the meaning of Section 9 (c ) of the Trade

Marks Act, 1999 ("the Act") in relation to "waterproof adhesives" cannot be

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KPPNair 13 NMSL 1717 of 2013

accepted. The Plaintiff is correct in its contention that persons purchasing the

products of the Plaintiff and the Defendant would normally be carpenters, who

would not be necessarily aware of the alleged meaning of the word 'MARINE' and

the descriptive nature of the mark, if any, (which is denied by the Plaintiff), and is of

no significance to them, and any product bearing the mark 'MARINE' would be

associated by them with the Plaintiff and purchased accordingly.

11.3 The Judgment of this Court in I.T.C. Ltd. vs. G.T.C. (supra), or for that

matter the English decision of Joseph Crosfield cited therein have absolutely no

application or relevance to the present case. The judgment of this Court in ITC, as

also the case of Joseph Crosfield makes it apparent that the said case pertain to

rectification. In the case of ITC (supra), the Registry had rejected an opposition

that the mark applied for was a common word and/or non distinctive and/or

descriptive and/or laudatory and granted registration. The grant of registration was

challenged before the High Court in a rectification petition. The subject matter of

the challenge in the proceedings before this Court was the validity and/or

correctness of the registration granted. It is as a part of this inquiry that the Court

considered whether the word 'Gutsy' could be registered i.e. whether it was capable

of distinguishing goods of the trader or of a non distinctive character. The same

inquiry was done in the case of Joseph Crosfield. This inquiry cannot be made or be

gone into in the present case. The present action is one of infringement. The

correctness of the registration has been conceded. The Registry has held that the

marks in question (whose registration has been granted) are fit to be registered.

They have been found to be: (i) capable of distinguishing the goods of one trader;

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and (ii) not descriptive or of a distinctive character. As submitted by the Plaintiff

therefore the correct question to be addressed is what does the registration cover?

Does it include 'MARINE' or does it exclude 'MARINE'? If 'MARINE' is included, an

action for infringement will lie and the Defendant can only rely upon the statutory

defences (Sections 30 and 35 read with Section 17 of the Act). If 'MARINE' is not

included, the infringement part of the action will fail. Therefore there cannot be a

third option. I have already reached a prima facie finding as set out in paragraph 9.2

hereinabove that the word 'MARINE' forms a prominent and essential part or feature

of all the three registered trademarks set out at 'A', 'B' and 'C' in paragraph 4 above.

11.4 In any event, even otherwise there is no substance in the Defendant's

contention. This is because there is no absolute and/or total and/or complete bar to

the registration of a common word. An ordinary word can become distinctive by use.

In the present case, the Plaintiff has been the only user of the 'MARINE' mark in the

market since 2003 and has used it extensively and on a pronounced scale for nine

years.

11.5 Relying on the decision of the Learned Single Judge of this Court in Asian

Paints Ltd. vs. Home Solutions Retail (India) Ltd. 2

, the Defendant contended that this

decision is an authority for the general proposition that where the Plaintiff's

registered trade mark contains descriptive/nondistinctive content, injunction must

be refused. The facts of the case were as under:

(i) The Plaintiff was the registered proprietor of the device/label mark "ASIAN

PAINT HOME SOLUTIONS". The device/label was an artistic work which depicted a

2 2007 (35) PTC 697

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house in the alphabet "O". The registration covered goods (inter alia paints) under

Class 2. The Plaintiff had secured no registration in respect of services.

(ii) The Defendant on the other hand was offering 'services' in respect of home

care convenience and utility stores offering home products of other manufacturers

under their brand name under one roof.

(iii) In relation to these services, the Defendant was using the mark "HOME

TOWN" and not "HOME SOLUTIONS".

(iv) The Defendants contended that the adoption of its corporate name "Home

Solutions Retail (India) Ltd." was bona fide because the corporate name was

descriptive of the intended business of the Defendant Company. In this context, the

Court made the following observations:

(a) In paragraph 5, the Court concluded that having regard to the fact that the

registration covered goods, and the Defendant's mark was used in relation to

services. The Court therefore held that,"Thus understood, it will not be a case of

infringement of registered trademark as such";

(b) In paragraph 7 the Court answered the question whether the rival marks were

identical or deceptively similar. The Court concluded that there was a marked

difference in the rival marks viz. "ASIAN PAINTS HOME SOLUTIONS" and " HOME

TOWN". The Court therefore answered the issue by observing that, " By no standards

it can be said that the two marks are identical or similar". A similar finding is to be

found in paragraph 10 of the judgment.

the Defendant of the mark "HOME SOLUTIONS" in its corporate name was mala

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fide. The Court answered it in the negative, in paragraph 9, by observing that the

corporate name of the Defendant was reflective of its intended business namely that

of offering services (solutions) in respect of homes. A similar finding is to be found

in paragraphs 10 and 13 of the judgment.

(d) It was in this backdrop that the Court accepted the defence based on Section

30 (2) and Section 35 of the Act. Even whilst doing so, the Court caveated it by

saying that, "at this stage of the proceedings" and "at least at this adinterim stage".

11.6 The observations in the above judgment in the said decision are therefore to

be viewed and construed in the context of that matter. They do not lay down any

general proposition of law. All that is observed therein is that in that case on the

basis of the material before it, at that stage (adinterim) the court was satisfied that

the expression "HOME SOLUTIONS" was generic and publici juris and inherently

incapable of becoming distinctive of any single person. The present case is

completely different. In this case the marks are not different or dissimilar; both the

parties are using it in relation to goods i.e. there is no goods vs. services issue. The

Defendant's adoption as set out hereinafter is prima facie lacking in bona fides and

no material has been placed on record to show that the mark is publici juris. The

Defendant's defence on "descriptive" fails on facts in the present case since 'MARINE'

is not descriptive and in any case has been used as a trademark. The said judgment is

of no assistance to the Defendant.

11.7 The Defendant has also relied on the judgment in the case of Carew Phipson

Ltd. vs. Deejay Distilleries3 wherein it is held that purely descriptive terms are totally

3 AIR 1994 Bom 231

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unregisterable. However this judgment has no application to the present case since

the case in question is one of passing off. The Plaintiff therein therefore could

claim no statutory monopoly. The principles which govern a case of infringement

and those which govern a case of passing off are very different on many issues. In

an infringement action, the Defendant must bring itself within the ambit of the

statutory exceptions/defences provided in the Act itself (Sections 17, 30, 35, etc.). As

set out hereinafter, in the present case it has clearly failed. Hence the judgment is of

no relevance. Moreover, as set out above, the word 'MARINE' is not descriptive of

the Defendant's product and by reason of open, continuous and extensive sales over

9 years has become distinctive of the Plaintiff and its products.

11.8 I am therefore prima facie of the view that the submissions of the Defendant

as recorded in paragraph 11 hereinabove cannot be accepted.

12. The Defendant has also submitted that the Plaintiff has been using the word

'MARINE' in a descriptive manner and in fact the Plaintiff has never used and/or

promoted the stand alone word 'MARINE' as a trademark. It is submitted that it is

amply clear from the Plaintiff's product specifications, product features and benefits,

label highlights, tag lines of the Plaintiff's promotional material etc. that the term

'MARINE' is used by the Plaintiff to designate the characteristics and quality and

intended purpose of its products. It is submitted that the Defendant is also using the

word 'MARINE' in a descriptive manner to describe that the water insoluble

adhesive is to be used for 'MARINE PLY' and the said adoption is therefore honest

and bona fide.

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12.1 The Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Plaintiff has in response

submitted that the manner in which the Plaintiff is using the word 'MARINE' is to be

judged primarily from the product of the Plaintiff. Additionally, reference can be

made to: (i) the manner in which the word 'MARINE' is shown in advertisements;

and (ii) the manner in which products bearing the mark 'MARINE' are purchased

and sold in the trade. If any one of the above is considered, it will immediately

become apparent that the Plaintiff is using the word 'MARINE' as a mark and not in

a descriptive sense.

12.2 I have in the earlier paragraphs of this order already recorded my prima facie

finding that the word 'MARINE' forms a prominent and essential part or feature of

all the three registered trademarks set out at A, B and C in paragraph 2 above and

that the mark 'MARINE' in relation to the business of adhesives has come to be

exclusively identified and/or associated with the Plaintiff alone. I have also perused

the advertisements of the Plaintiff's products depicted at pages 92, 93 and 94 of the

Plaint and have noted that as submitted by the Plaintiff the containers bearing the

Plaintiff's products have the entirety of the registered trademark of the Plaintiff

together with an additional feature of the device of a plank being immersed in the

water. If the trade dress of these containers is seen, it is obvious that the Plaintiff

has applied to the container, the entirety of the registered trademark at page 63 of

the Plaint. The Plaintiff is therefore using in relation to its goods and on them its

registered trademark as registered. It is therefore clear from the said advertisements

that the word 'MARINE' is used by the Plaintiff as a trademark and not in a

descriptive sense.

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12.3 Again, if the advertisements at pages 92 to 94 of the Plaint are seen, they

also show that in between the registered trademark (as registered) and the image of

a wooden plank being immersed in water, are the words "Waterproof Adhesive".

These are descriptive words and indicate the quality, characteristic or intended use

of the product. This further reinforces the Plaintiff's submission that it is using the

word 'MARINE' as a mark and not in a descriptive sense. It is correctly submitted on

behalf of the Plaintiff that had the word 'MARINE' being used in a descriptive sense,

there was no need or warrant to add the description "Waterproof Adhesive" as has

been done by the Plaintiff. It is therefore apparent that 'MARINE' is the trademark

and "Waterproof Adhesive" is the description.

12.4 Consistent with this, the representative invoice (page 35 of the Plaint),

purchase orders (pages 36, 38 to 40 of the Plaint) and the Plaintiff's product guide

(page 39 of the Plaint) clearly indicate that the word 'MARINE' is used as a mark

and not in a descriptive sense. The Defendant has relied on the items at pages 65 to

87 of the Plaint and the reference to the description 'FEVICOL MARINE' therein.

However, the same does not assist the Defendant since as submitted by the Plaintiff

the documents at pages 65 to 87 of the Plaint are not invoices which show how the

product is sold in the market or associated with the public. These documents on the

face thereof state that they are "DEPOT CHALLANCUMBILL" and "NOT AN

INVOICE". They are internal documents between the Plaintiff and its Dealers.

12.5 As submitted by the Plaintiff, the fact that the Plaintiff is using the word

'MARINE' as a mark is further reinforced from the extract of the Plaintiff's product

guide which is at pages 41 to 52 of the Plaint. This extract refers to 11 products of

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the Fevicol Division of the Plaintiff and contains a photograph of the actual

container in which the products are sold. It can be seen from the product guide that

for all the products Fevicol is used as a house/umbrella mark in conjunction with

individual product identification marks/brands like SPXPRESS; PL 111; PL 222;

707FW; DDL; SR998; 998FW; SR 50. If the Defendant's argument is to be accepted,

each of the above products identification marks/brands will have to be regarded as

descriptive. As correctly submitted by the Plaintiff, how such alpha numeric can be

regarded as descriptive defies logic and that this reinforces the fact that these

descriptions are product identification marks/brands which are used in conjunction

with the house/umbrella marks/brands.

12.6 The Plaintiff has filed a Trademark Application No. 1918007 seeking

registration of the word mark 'MARINE'. In respect of this application, the Registrar

of Trademarks while advertising the same has imposed the condition "This is subject

to association with registered/pending Registration No. 1319821". Trademark No.

1319821 is the registered trademark (word mark 'FEVICOL MARINE' and the

registration certificate in respect thereof is at page 61 of the Plaint). Section 16 of

the Act contains provisions for registration of a trademark as an associated

trademark. A reading of Section 16 of the Act makes it clear that for the applicability

thereof, it is essential that, (i) there are two marks; (ii) there is a common

owner/proprietor; and (iii) the two marks must be identical or so resemble one other

as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion (deceptively similar). In other words,

association can only be ordered between two trademarks when they are identical or

deceptively similar. In ordering association between the two, the Registrar obviously

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concluded that there was identity/deceptive similarity between the two. It is obvious

that there can be no identity/deceptive similarity between 'FEVICOL' and 'MARINE' .

The question of identity/deceptive similarity could only arise if the Registrar

compared 'MARINE' and 'FEVICOL MARINE' (and not 'MARINE' and Fevicol only).

The Plaintiff is correct in its submission that the Registrar treated the word 'MARINE'

forming a part of 'FEVICOL MARINE' as a trademark, since in the absence thereof,

there could never be an order of association. To put it differently, the Registrar

accepted that the word 'MARINE' (which formed part of the registered trademark

'FEVICOL MARINE' ) was very much a trademark. Though it is true that it is this

Court which has to decide whether the word 'MARINE' is used by the Plaintiff as a

trademark or in a descriptive sense, the Plaintiff has correctly tried to draw support

from the aforesaid condition imposed by the Registrar of Trademarks in order to

submit that even the Registrar of Trademarks was of the view that the word

'MARINE', in the registered trademark 'FEVICOL MARINE', is a trademark (and not

descriptive) and considered 'MARINE' and 'FEVICOL MARINE' as

identical/deceptively similar.

12.7 As submitted by the Plaintiff, there is yet another fundamental fallacy in the

argument of the Defendant viz. the assumption that the word 'MARINE' is

descriptive of the use to which the Plaintiff's product is put. As set out in the Plaint

and on the products themselves, the Plaintiff's product is a water resistant synthetic

adhesive which is used for conditions where the product will be exposed to water or

high humidity. The Defendant has assumed that 'MARINE' is synonymous with

and/or indicative of water. This is not the case, as the Defendant itself has disclosed

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at page 83 of its reply affidavit, by relying on the Oxford Dictionary that the word

'MARINE' is understood as indicative of matters pertaining to the sea.

12.8 For the aforestated reasons, I am of the view that the Plaintiff is using the

word 'MARINE' as a trademark and not in a descriptive sense.

13. The Defendant has strenuously contended that the Defendant itself is using

the word 'MARINE' in a descriptive sense. This contention of the Defendant is denied

and disputed by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has drawn the attention of this Court to

the photograph at page 99 of the Plaint. This photograph shows that in addition to

the words "JIVANJOR" and the words 'MARINE PLUS', the Defendant has also used

the words " 'MARINE' PLYWOOD SPECIAL ADHESIVE" & "HEAT AND WATERPROOF

ADHESIVE". As submitted by the Plaintiff, this makes it clear that where the

Defendant wishes to use words which are descriptive of its product, it has used the

words " 'MARINE' PLYWOOD SPECIAL ADHESIVE" & "HEAT AND WATERPROOF

ADHESIVE". Hence it is this description which is descriptive. The words "MARINE

PLUS" are not descriptive but are used as a mark. In other words, what the

Defendant is trying to convey to the members of the trade and the public is that the

product in question is sold under the 'MARINE' brand/subbrand.

14. The Defendant has further contended that the adoption of the word

'MARINE PLUS' by the Defendant is honest and bona fide.

14.1 As stated above, the Plaintiff adopted its trademark in 2003 and has since

then been using the same openly, continuously and on an extensive scale. By June

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2012, when the Defendant purportedly started the use of the impugned mark, the

Plaintiff had been in the market for nine years and had sales in excess of Rs. 180

crores. Again, as already held hereinabove, the word 'MARINE' forms an essential

part of the Plaintiff's trademark/brand and the products of the Plaintiff were sold

and purchased with reference to the word 'MARINE'. The trade packaging/dress of

the containers in which the Plaintiff's products were sold contained a pictorial

depiction of a plank of wood dipping into the water and water being splashed in

the process. The Plaintiff's product containing the pictorial depiction of a plank of

wood dipping into water with water being splashed (at pages 92, 93 and 94 of the

Plaint) is reproduced hereunder:

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A picture of the very same pictorial depiction on the product of the Defendant (page

99 of the Plaint) is reproduced hereunder:

If both the pictorial depictions are compared it becomes instantly apparent that the

Defendant when it entered the market, not only copied the Plaintiff's mark

'MARINE' but even the artistic work comprising the device of a wooden plank being

dipped into the water, and the water splashing. The statement now made by the

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Defendant that they have since 2013 stopped using the said pictorial depiction of a

plank of wood dipping into water with water being splashed in the process, does not

in any way help the Defendant's contention that their adoption is honest and bona

fide.

14.2 Further, the Defendant also filed a Trademark Application No. 2456946 for the

label mark 'MARINE PLUS' which label mark is reproduced hereunder.

Had the Defendant not been using 'MARINE'/'MARINE PLUS' as a trade mark it

would have never applied for registration of the label mark titled 'MARINE PLUS'

(label) containing the words "MARINE' PLUS" as its leading, prominent and

essential feature. The Defendant has now contended that the Trademark Application

No. 2456946 for the label 'MARINE'/'MARINE PLUS' has been withdrawn by them.

14.3 As laid down in several decisions of this Court as well as other Courts, the

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Defendant who seeks registration of a mark is estopped from urging that the mark is

incapable of registration. Faced with the said judgments, the Defendant has

borrowed the language used by a Learned Single Judge in his decision in Hem

Corporation Private Limited and Ors. vs. ITC Limited4

and has come up with an

argument that the rule of estoppel does not apply to the present case because the

Defendant had applied for a label mark registration for the entire get up for

packaging including the descriptive words 'MARINE PLUS'. In the said decision the

Learned Judge has held, "The Reliance upon the Defendant's application for

registration of the label mark is, however, of no assistance in considering this aspect.

The application for registration was not of the word mark "MADHUR". The label

contains the entire get up of the packaging including the words "MANGALDEEP

MADHUR 100". The label by itself only begs the question viz. whether the word

MADHUR is used as a mark or not."

14.4 In my view, as submitted by the Plaintiff, this attempt to distinguish itself,

now belatedly made by the Defendant in the written submissions does not withstand

scrutiny for the reasons mentioned hereinbelow:

(i) The mark applied for by the Defendant is reproduced hereinabove. It is true

that it is a label mark. However, if the mark is seen, the most prominent and

noticeable part/feature of the mark is the word 'MARINE PLUS'. The mark has been

described in the column "TM Applied for" as 'MARINE PLUS' Label" .The word

'MARINE' therefore forms a prominent and/or essential feature of the mark applied

4 Notice of Motion No. 3940 of 2009 in Suit No. 2808 of 2009

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for. More importantly, the Defendants understood the trademark applied for as "

'MARINE' PLUS".

(ii) The Defendant was therefore attempting to obtain a monopoly over the words

'MARINE' PLUS' and 'MARINE' and in view thereof, the rule of estoppel stated above

will apply. The question to be asked is, "Had the Defendant's mark been registered,

would it have objected and/or been entitled to object to 'MARINE PLUS' or 'MARINE'

being used by someone else?" The answer is obvious.

(iii) The Defendant understood this to mean exactly what the Plaintiff asserts, as

is clear from its own assertion and actions. It is an admitted fact that, after the

Plaintiff pointed out the said application, the Defendant withdrew the same. The

Defendant (at page 26 of its Written Submissions) has at several places accepted that

the application made was a mistake ["mistaken application", "mistaken advice

received"; "realizing its mistake", etc.]. The Plaintiff has correctly raised a question,

"If the label mark application was for the entire get up for packaging including the

descriptive words 'MARINE PLUS', then why did the Defendant withdraw it and why

does the Defendant still continue to call it a mistake?" The answer is selfevident.

The Defendant itself considered the application as made, a source/cause for concern

and therefore not only withdrew it but asserted that the very making of it was a

mistake.

(iv) The applicability of the principle and/or rule of estoppel is not restricted to

cases where the mark objected to and mark applied for are identical, but covers cases

where there is identity of the prominent and/or essential features, as is evident from

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the decision of this Court in Ultratech Cement Limited vs. Alaknanda Cement Pvt.

Ltd.5

, decided on 28th June, 2011, where the doctrine/principle was applied. In that

case, the Plaintiffs' mark was "Ultratech Cement. The Engineers Choice" and the

Defendant had sought registration of a label containing the word "Ultra Tuff".

(v) The decision of the Learned Single Judge in Hem Corporation (supra)

extracted in clause 13.3 is not in any manner inconsistent with the Plaintiff's

submission. In the facts of that case, the Learned Judge did not consider the label

mark application sufficient to attract the test/principle. This was on the facts of that

particular case. The case at hand has to be decided on its own merits and the facts of

the present case. On the present facts, the principle/test is squarely applicable.

I am therefore prima facie satisfied that the adoption of the word 'MARINE PLUS' by

the Defendant is neither honest nor bona fide.

15. The Defendant has next contended that the Suit is liable to be dismissed

under Section 35 of the Act, since the purpose of using the word 'MARINE PLUS' on

the Defendant's label is to educate or inform the customers that the products offered

by the Defendant are heat and water proof, and the word 'MARINE PLUS' is a bona

fide description of the character of the Defendant's product offered under the mark

'JIVANJOR MARINE PLUS'. The Defendant also contends that the use of the word

'MARINE PLUS' is protected under Section 30 (2) of the Act.

5 2011 (5) BCR 588

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15.1 The aforestated conduct on the part of the Defendant in copying the label of

the Plaintiff; using the mark 'MARINE' and applying for the registration of the label

titled 'MARINE PLUS' (label) makes it abundantly clear that the adoption of the

mark 'MARINE PLUS' is as a trademark and is with a view to encash upon the

significant goodwill and reputation acquired by the Plaintiff's 'MARINE' marks. The

word 'MARINE PLUS' is not descriptive, and in any event is not used by the

Defendant as a bona fide description of the character of the product of the

Defendant. The case of the Defendant that the use of 'MARINE PLUS' is to indicate

to the customers that its product is "heat and water proof" is contrary to its own case

that 'MARINE' means "of or relating to the sea" and not "heat and water proof".

Furthermore, the product of the Defendant depicted at ExhibitE to the reply at page

80, specifically bears the legend "Heat & water proof adhesive" and hence the use of

'MARINE PLUS' to communicate the same to the customer was not even necessary.

The Defendant is obviously using 'MARINE PLUS' as a trademark and not in the

descriptive sense. Since the Defendant is using 'MARINE'/ 'MARINE PLUS' as a

trademark, Sections 35 and 30 (2) of the Act cannot be resorted to. In any event,

the additional requirement of bona fide use is lacking for the purpose of Section 35.

The defence sought to be raised is clearly an afterthought. The Defendant has

admitted that 'JIVANJOR MARINE PLUS' ( and in effect 'MARINE PLUS' which is a

leading and essential feature thereof) has been adopted and is being used as a

trademark by the Defendant.

16. The Defendant has also relied on Section 17 of the Act in support of its

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contention that the Plaintiff cannot restrain the Defendant in any manner from

using the word 'MARINE'. In this context, the arguments of the Defendant are as

follows:

(i) Section 17 (1) of the Act prescribes that, in the case of a 'composite mark'

(namely a mark consisting of several matters), the exclusive right conferred by

registration, is on the trademark taken as a whole;

(ii) Section 17 (2) (b) of the Act expressly prescribes that where a composite

mark contains matter which is common to the trade or is otherwise of a non

distinctive character, registration of the composite mark shall not confer any

exclusive rights in the matter forming only a part of the whole of the registered

mark;

(iii) In other words, the statute does not grant protection (exclusivity) over such

parts or constituents of a composite mark, which are 'common to the trade' or of a

'nondistinctive character';

(iv) The word 'MARINE' forms a part or constituent of the composite mark

"FEVICOL MARINE". In relation to the goods to which it is applied/used, the word

'MARINE' is common to the trade and/or of a nondistinctive character.

Consequently, by reason of Section 17 (2) (b), the Plaintiff cannot claim any

exclusivity;

(v) The Plaintiff's reliance on the fact that the Registrar whilst granting

registration, did not impose a condition or limitation (qua the word 'MARINE') is of

no assistance, since the provisions relating to "disclaimer" (existing in the 1958 Act)

have been deleted in the 1999 Act. The reason for the deletion of the provisions

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relating to disclaimer is because Section 17 explicitly clarifies the legal position that

there is no exclusivity in respect of descriptive or nondistinctive constituents or

parts of a registered mark. Therefore, the requirement of a disclaimer provision is

unnecessary. Reliance in this behalf is placed on the Statement of Objects and

Reasons of Section 17, which are extracted at page 17 of the Defendant's

submissions; and

(vi) If this test is applied, then the marks to be compared are "JIVANJOR MARINE

PLUS" and "FEVICOL MARINE". These are not deceptively similar.

16.1 The Defendant has sought to suggest that by reason of the deletion of

provisions relating to disclaimer, the Registrar cannot impose any conditions or

limitations whilst granting registration. As correctly submitted by the Plaintiff, this

suggestion is contrary to the provisions of the 1999 Act i.e. Sections 18 (4), 20 (1)

and 23 of the Act which expressly authorise and empower the Registrar, at the stage

of acceptance and advertising of applications, to impose, inter alia conditions or

limitations on the mark applied for. The submission relating to disclaimer by the

Defendant is therefore of no substance.

16.2 It is true that the registration of a composite mark confers upon the

registered proprietor a monopoly over the trademark taken as a whole. It is not the

Plaintiff's contention that the registration of a composite mark confers upon the

registered proprietor exclusivity over each and every constituent part thereof (no

matter how minuscule or insignificant it may be in relation to the mark considered

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as a whole). The Court therefore has to examine the mark as a whole. As a part of

this evaluation process, the Court is required to determine what is/are the prominent

and/or essential features of the mark taken as a whole. The protection and/or

exclusivity will be conferred on these features and not on insignificant trivia. This

Court has therefore at the outset after considering the relevant factors prima facie

come to the conclusion that the word 'MARINE' forms a prominent and/or essential

feature of the registered trademark (considered as a whole) . If the Defendant's

arguments are accepted, the consequences will be startling. Composite marks will

become useless. The same will be infringed with impunity by the simple expedient of

using a trademark which has, as its essential or prominent feature(s), the essential

and prominent feature of the registered mark with the addition of other matter. The

mandate of Section 17 (1 ) will be totally frustrated.

16.3 Again, in my view, nothing in Section 17 (2) of the Act bars the Plaintiff's

entitlement to the relief as claimed. Section 17 (2) (a) is plainly not applicable . The

defendant does not even claim so. The Defendant's only claim that Section 17 (2)

(b) of the Act bars the grant of relief in the Plaintiff's favour. The Defendant's claim

in this behalf is premised on the assumption that the word 'MARINE' is ' common to

the trade' and/or 'of a nondistinctive character'. For this plea to succeed, the

Defendant must establish that the word 'MARINE' is either 'common to the trade' or

'of a nondistinctive character'. The onus to do so is entirely on the Defendant. As set

out herein, the Defendant has failed to discharge the burden or onus upon them.

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KPPNair 33 NMSL 1717 of 2013

16.4 The aforestated reliance on Section 17 of the Act and the submissions made in

regard thereto by the Defendant therefore cannot be accepted and are rejected.

17. The Defendant has contended that there are some other entities across India

and internationally that are using the word 'MARINE' as a part of their label and the

word 'MARINE' has become publici juris/common to trade. The Defendant has also

set out in a tabular format the labels inter alia containing the word 'MARINE' which

it claims are in use. The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff therefore has no

exclusive rights/monopoly over the word 'MARINE'. The Defendant has also

produced copies of four invoices as evidence of sale of two other products under the

mark 'MARINE'.

17.1 It is a settled legal position that the use of a registered mark or the essential

feature thereof by others is not a defence available to the Defendant in an action for

infringement and passing off. Merely because the Plaintiff has chosen to sue one

infringer first and has not at such time sued others for infringement is also no

defence in an action for infringement and passing off and it is settled law that it is

the prerogative of the Plaintiff/registered proprietor/owner of a mark whom to sue

so as to protect its rights. Furthermore, it is essential for the Defendant to

demonstrate substantial and continued use over a period of time of the mark by

others failing which no defence of common to the trade/publici juris can be set up.

(Corn Products Refining Co. vs. Shangrila Food Products Ltd.6

; F.D. Diesel vs. S.M.

6 AIR 1960 SC 142

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KPPNair 34 NMSL 1717 of 2013

Diesel7

; Ultratech Cement Ltd. vs. Alaknanda Cement Pvt. Ltd.(supra); Shaw Wallace

and Company Ltd. and another vs. Mohan Rocky Spring Water Breweries Ltd.8

. The

Defendant has failed to prove that there are a number of entities over India or

internationally that are using the word 'MARINE', or that such use is substantial or

continuous over a period of time. As submitted by the Plaintiff, let aside proof, there

is not even a pleading to this effect. The four invoices produced by the Plaintiff are

insufficient and deserve to be disregarded. They do not satisfy the test of extensive,

actual and continuous use in the market. The Defendant has tried to take

advantage of the reputation of the Plaintiff not only by the use of the mark

'MARINE'/'MARINE PLUS' but also by the use of the copied impugned label and

hence cannot be allowed to rely upon the alleged use of the mark 'MARINE' on other

grounds. The submissions advanced by the Defendant to distinguish the above

judgments are unconvincing and of no assistance to the Defendant.

18. The Defendant has submitted that the Plaintiff has not disclosed that their

application for the mark 'MARINE' are under opposition and not pending as claimed

by the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff has concealed the fact that the trademark

Application Nos. 2110954 and 1918007 for the marks 'FEVICOL MARINE' and

'MARINE' are opposed by Blue Coat Pvt. Ltd.

18.1 The Plaintiff has stated in paragraph 9 at page 8 to the Plaint that the

trademarks 'FEVICOL MARINE' (Label) and 'MARINE' under application Nos.

7 1994 PTC 75

8 2006 (33) PTC 180 (Bom)

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KPPNair 35 NMSL 1717 of 2013

2110954 or 191 8007 are pending and the same is true. The Plaintiff has correctly

submitted that the marks are /will be pending until they proceed to registration and

the Plaintiff has rightly stated that the trademarks 'FEVICOL MARINE ' (Label) and

'MARINE' under Application Nos. 2110954 or 1918007 are pending. The

oppositions are proceedings between the Plaintiff and another entity and do not in

any manner impact nor bear significance for the purpose of the present Suit and the

issues raised in the present Suit. The proceedings filed by Blue Coat Pvt. Ltd. will be

decided on its own merits. The question of disclosing the same or suppressing the

same does not and cannot therefore arise.

19. The Defendant has further contended that the Plaintiff has concealed the fact

that the Plaintiff's trademark registrations under Nos. 1319821, 1319822 and

1319823 for the mark 'FEVICOL MARINE' are under rectification before the

Intellectual Property Appellate Board and hence the Plaintiff deliberately did not file

the legal proceedings certificate.

19.1 The Plaintiff is correct in its submission that the Plaintiff has specifically

craved leave to refer to and rely upon the entries of the Register of Trademarks in

relation to the registration of the Plaintiff referred to in the Plaint and hence the

question of suppression of the said document does not arise. In any event the records

of the Registry are public documents and can be accessed by the Defendant at any

given point of time. The said rectification proceedings are pending and the Plaintiff

is and continues to be the registered proprietor of the trade marks under 1319821,

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KPPNair 36 NMSL 1717 of 2013

1319822 and 1319823 and the registrations as on the date of filing the Suit were

and continue to be valid and subsisting. The said rectification proceedings filed by a

third party are irrelevant in so far as the present proceedings are concerned. The

question of disclosing the same or suppressing the same does not and cannot

therefore arise.

20. The Defendant has next contended that the Plaintiff had issued a legal notice

to Blue Coat Pvt. Ltd. on 28th June, 2010, and that the said Blue Coat Pvt. Ltd. had

responded to the said legal notice on 3rd August, 2010, and filed

oppositions/rectifications against the trademarks 'FEVICOL MARINE'/'MARINE' of

the Plaintiff. The Defendant contends that despite the same, the Plaintiff has not

taken any action against Blue Coat Pvt. Ltd. and that Blue Coat Pvt. Ltd. continues to

use the label mark inter alia containing the words 'BLUECOAT MARINE'. The

Defendant submits that the Plaintiff has concealed and suppressed this material fact

in the Plaint. The Plaintiff has correctly submitted that the aforesaid alleged facts

have no bearing whatsoever on the present Suit and the question of suppression

does not arise. It is settled law that the Plaintiff is not obliged to take action against

every small infringer (assuming that Blue Coat Pvt. Ltd. is still using the mark).

21. The Defendant has lastly contended that the Plaintiff has obtained trademark

registration for the mark 'FEVICOL MARINE', wherein the essential feature of the

mark is "FEVICOL". The Defendant contends that it is using the word 'MARINE

PLUS' in combination and conjunction with its house mark 'JIVANJOR' and that the

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KPPNair 37 NMSL 1717 of 2013

deciding factor for determining the difference between both the marks is the

presence of 'FEVICOL' and 'JIVANJOR' which are the essential and distinguishing

features of the rival marks and have coexisted for years without any confusion or

deception. The Defendant contends that there is no likelihood of confusion or

wrong/mistaken association of the Defendant's mark and the Plaintiff's mark.

22. As held hereinabove, the Defendant has adopted an essential feature of a

registered trademark of the Plaintiff. This by itself is actionable. Actual confusion

need not be proved for infringement. It is required for passing off. Secondly, even

for passing off, there is a clear case of deception and/or confusion. The contention of

the Defendant is not tenable since the Defendant itself states that 'JIVANJOR' is the

housemark of the Defendant. It is evident that the product identification mark used

by the Defendant is 'MARINE PLUS' and that the same is being used as a trademark.

The consumers can never identify the product only by the house mark and it is

inevitable that the products are referred to and called out only by their product

identification marks. It is the settled position that the use of a mark as a subbrand

also amounts to infringement and an injunction ought to follow. As pointed out by

the Plaintiff, the products bearing the housemark 'FEVICOL' have achieved a

turnover close to around Rs. 1000 crores, out of which the turnover of the products

bearing the mark 'MARINE' (which is only one of the products of the many products

bearing the house mark 'FEVICOL') has exceeded Rs. 100 crores. The mark 'MARINE'

by itself has gained tremendous reputation and goodwill and further distinctiveness

and secondary meaning which is associated by the consumers, trade and public at

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KPPNair 38 NMSL 1717 of 2013

large with the Plaintiff alone. The invoices produced by the Defendant themselves

show that the products of the Defendant are also referred to as 'MARINE PLUS COP',

'JJ MARINE PLUS, 'JJ MARINE PLUS CLP, 'J MARINE PLUS COP', i.e. 'MARINE

PLUS' being the leading and essential feature and not 'JIVANJOR'. Furthermore, the

fact that the Defendant refers to its 'mark' as 'JIVANJOR MARINE PLUS ' itself is an

admission on the part of the Defendant that 'MARINE PLUS' is being used as a

trademark/part of its trademark. Whether the rival marks are similar or not will have

to be approached from the point of view of average intelligence and imperfect

recollection of consumers who would normally be carpenters or such similarly

literate persons and are bound to get confused.

23. For the aforestated reasons, the Notice of Motion is allowed in terms of prayer

clauses (a), (b) and (c ). The Defendant shall pay cost of the Notice of Motion to the

Plaintiff.

24. The hearing of the Suit is expedited. Defendant to file written statement on

or before 27th January, 2014. Place the Suit for framing of issues on 29th January,

2014.

(S.J. KATHAWALLA, J.)

Tags :- bombay hc restrains jubilant agri infringing pidlite s trademark

CBI arrests Email alleged hacker for hacking over 900 email accounts

CBI ARRESTS A PUNE BASED PRIVATE PERSON, AN ALLEGED OPERATOR OF HACKING WEBSITES, AND CONDUCTS SEARCHES AT PUNE, MUMBAI & GHAZIABAD

The Central Bureau of Investigation arrested a Pune based private person, an alleged operator of hacking websites.

CBI has registered two Regular Cases against Pune based private person & unknown others U/s 120-B r/w 379 IPC and Section 66 of IT Act r/w Section 43(a), 43(g), 43(j) & 66C of IT Act. It has been alleged that a number of internet websites advertised that the website operators could get access to e-mail account in exchange for a fee varying from $250 to $500. The Customers desirous to get unauthorized access, submitted e-mail accounts to these websites. Upon receipt of the order, as well as the e-mail addresses, the website operators gained access to such e-mail accounts and sent a proof of such access to the Customers. On receipt of payment from Customers these website operators shared the password with the Customers.

Based on the information, CBI succeeded in tracking down the prime suspect and his associates for operating websites www.hirehacker.net and www.anonymiti.com from Pune(Maharashtra). Operators of the these websites are allegedly responsible for obtaining unauthorized access to over 900 email accounts between February of 2011 and February of 2013. Out of these about 171 email accounts pertain to victims located in India.

Searches have been conducted at Pune; Ghaziabad & Mumbai at the premises of accused & his suspected associates.

The present operation is the outcome of international investigation coordinated and conducted by the the Central Bureau of Investigation(India), Federal Bureau of Investigation(US), Combating Organized Crime (DCCO) of Romania, and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in the People's Republic of China.

The accused is being produced in the Court at Pune for taking the transit remand.

CBI Press Release
New Delhi , 24.01.2014

Reminder for filing of TDS Statements within Due Date

Posted In Income Tax | Articles | No Comments »

As per the records of Centralized Processing Cell (TDS), the Original TDS Statement(s) for Quarter 2 of FY 2013-14 (July – September, 2013) has not been submitted within the prescribed due date by many of the deductors.

Please note that late filing of TDS Statements not only delays TDS Credits to the deductees, but Also attracts provisions of section 234E of the Income Tax Act. The Levy for Late filing of TDS Statements is a sum of two hundred rupees for every day during which the failure continues.

Intimation u/s 200A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 intimating an outstanding demand for the relevant quarter, including demand under section 234E towards Fee for delayed filing of Regular TDS Statement(s), have already been sent by CPC (TDS) on Registered email address and by post, at the address, as mentioned in the relevant TDS Statement (s).

It is requested to submit TDS Statements within the due date to avoid any unreasonable delay in availability of TDS Credits to the deductees and the Levy for Late filing.

For any assistance, you can write to ContactUs@tdscpc.gov.in or call our toll-free number 1800 103 0344

Top Arguments in HR Process Outsourcing

Posted In Corporate Law | No Comments »

Human Resources form a skeletal part of any business organization. There are various functions involved in HR, as a process. These include recruitment, payroll, statutory compliance, employee engagement and performance assessment in broad angles. Some of these functions are easier to handle while some require a lot of keen attention, accuracy and repeated investigation to ensure timely and quality in deliveries. For example, if you take payroll as a function, the HR manager needs to ensure the employees get their right salary in the right time. Also there are various factors related to payroll such as time tracking, employee attendance, statutory compliance and related aspects. Such functions are monotonous and involve much labor. Also in a situation where there is a new HR manager, there are many chances that this person can make mistakes since he has very less knowledge about the organization. All these factors have led to the advent of HR outsourcing as a trend in the market.

HR process outsourcing can help in addressing issues related to staffing and skills of employees. These issues could sometimes be cost-related aspects of the organization which are considered non-profits. As per the modern business organization concept, the role of the HR manager is purely related to ensuring employee productivity, satisfaction and in turn retention.

Ultimately, HR outsourcing enables organizations to focus on their core mission by entrusting the HR functions to professional partners who can handle these with the right level of expertise in the right time that is measured and decided based on the organization's situation. For example, if your business falls in the manufacturing division, HR function is your non-core activity since your organization's mission is different, while your profession HR partner's business is to enable you to manage your HR functions, being their core activity.

Argument 1: The Cost Aspect

The modern day organizations look at saving on all costs related to operations, manpower, technology and other related elements. When it comes to HR outsourcing, in organizations where HR is not a core function, obviously there is a lot of argument in the cost aspect. The services need to be unmatched to any other player in the market and the life of the contract depends purely on the fact whether the expectations is being met by the HR partner or not for the cost that is being incurred on the service. The organization needs to clearly decide on what proportion of their HR activity needs to be outsourced, based on which the cost aspect needs to be looked at. For example, if an organization opts to outsource payroll, it is wise to choose a partner who can handle all the related aspects of payroll, holistically. This would save much cost and time for the organization.

Argument 2: Realistic Expectations

Every organization, in this business world understands that realistic expectations matters a lot for any vendor. For every single rupee that is being spent on a service from the vendor, there is an expected outcome in terms of the value for the cost. Many organizations, if they get hurt in the first business transaction in terms of service from the vendor such as any delay in delivery or lesser quality, then they come to a conclusion of opting for an in-house solution. But that is where there are unstable expectations being met. If the HR manager resigns from his job, then again there are all chances of mistakes and delays till the new person sets in. So it is always better to choose the right partner and set the realistic expectations and understand how far he can deliver for your business.

Argument 3: Creativity & Flexibility

During earlier days, it was a scenario where one size would fit for all, but now it is not the scenario. In the modern day scenario there is a need for creativity and flexibility, which is a prime expectation for every business in every function. Especially when it comes to the human resources function, the market changes are phenomenal since it revolves around skills. Based on this, the creativity and innovation is required for the HR services provider, especially in the technology perspective.

Argument 4: Chances for Success

Every business needs 100% chances for success. With the complexity involved in the HR processes such as payroll, statutory compliance and attendance tracking, it is preferred that a professional service provider can handle your requirements in the best possible way. Thus, chances of success are high when outsourcing is opted for. With the attrition rate being high, having a single HR manager handle all your processes throughout is not possible. When there is a change that occurs, it creates some gaps that will create some % of failure which is not the case when outsourced.

Conclusions

To conclude, HR process outsourcing helps for functions such as payroll, statutory compliance, and time & attendance management. But, in all of these cases you need to keep a track of all the background data management to keep the sensitive data safe. Thus, it is important to choose an efficient service provider to handle such functions in a safe and secure manner to prevent any discrepancies.

Stella Lauren is a guest writer, who writes such interesting and useful posts that help businesses to plan all related aspects of Payroll Processing Company.

Rationale behind withdrawal of Banknotes issued prior to 2005

Posted In RBI / FEMA | Notifications | 4 Comments »

Further to our RBI Press Release dated January 22, 2014 on the subject and in response to the queries raised, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) clarifies that the rationale behind its move to withdraw banknotes printed prior to 2005 is to remove these banknotes from the market because they have fewer security features compared to banknotes printed after 2005. It is standard international practice to withdraw old series notes.

The RBI has already been withdrawing these bank notes from the market in a routine manner through banks. In Reserve Bank's view, the volume of the banknotes printed prior to 2005 today, still in circulation, is not significant enough to impact the general public in a large way.

However, it advises that the members of public may initiate the process of exchanging notes at bank branches at their convenience. Further, even July 1, 2014 onwards, members of public can exchange any number of these old series notes from the bank branches where they have their accounts.

The RBI assures that it will continue to monitor and review the process of withdrawal of old series notes so that the public is not inconvenienced in any manner.

Regardless of the above, the RBI reiterates that the notes printed prior to 2005 will continue to be legal tender.

Press Release: 2013-2014/1491 Dated : 24 Jan 2014

PAN Allotment only after verifying documents with Original

Posted In Income Tax | Notifications | 8 Comments »

DIRECTORATE OF INCOME TAX (SYSTEMS)

ARA Centre, Ground Floor, E-2, Jhandewalan Extension, New Delhi-110055

F.No: oPAN/1/3/2003/Part Dated: 24.1.2014

Sub: Change in procedure for PAN allotment.

1. The fee for processing a PAN application shall be Rs 105/- (inclusive of all taxes).

2. Subsequent to notification S.O.No 3794(E) dt 23.12.2013, the procedure for PAN allotment process will undergo a change w.e.f. 03.02.2014.

2.1 From 03.02.2014 onwards, every PAN applicant has to submit self-attested copies of Proof of Indentify (POI), Proof of Address (POA) and Date of Birth (DOB) documents and also produce original documents of such POI/POA/DOB documents for verification at the counter of PAN facilitation centers. List of documents of POI/POA/DOB is given in the Instructions part of Form 49A/49AA.

2.2 The copies of Proof of Identity (POI), Proof of Address (POA) and Date of Birth (DOB) documents attached with PAN application form, will be verified vis a vis their original documents at the time of submission of PAN application at PAN facilitation Centres.

2.3 Original documents shall not be retained by the PAN Facilitation Centres and will be returned back to the applicant after verification.

Sd/-

(N.J. Singh)

Joint Director of Income Tax (Systems)-I, New Delhi

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Chartered Accountant Finance

Tuesday, January 28, 2014

[aaykarbhavan] Judgment and Information

Fast Track Quick revision of Capital Gain

Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur upheld while granting compensation to former HC Judge

Court

Brief

Citation

Judgement

Bombay HC restrains Jubilant Agri from infringing Pidlite's trademark

Court

Brief

Citation

Judgement

CBI arrests Email alleged hacker for hacking over 900 email accounts

Reminder for filing of TDS Statements within Due Date

Top Arguments in HR Process Outsourcing

Rationale behind withdrawal of Banknotes issued prior to 2005

PAN Allotment only after verifying documents with Original

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