| | Succession Act, 1925 - Secs. 57, 213 - Compulsory Requirement of Probate |
| Posted on 24 May 2013 by Guest | |
CourtHigh Court of Gujarat BriefSUCCESSION ACT, 1925 - SECS. 57, 213 - COMPULSORY REQUIREMENT OF PROBATE - PETITIONER IS A HOUSE WIFE AND HER FATHER IN LAW PURCHASED THE PROPERTY IN GANDHINAGAR - EXECUTION OF WILL BY THE FATHER IN LAW OF THE PETITIONER - AS PER THE WILL, THE PROPERTY IS BEQUEATHED TO THE PETITIONER - CASE OF CLARENCE PAIS & ORS. (SUPRA) REFERRED - EVEN WITHOUT PROBATE, THE RIGHTS ACQUIRED BY THE EXECUTOR OR LEGATEE OF THE WILL CAN BE ESTABLISHED BEFORE THE COURT OR BEFORE ANY OTHER AUTHORITY WHICH IN THE PRESENT CASE IS THE REVENUE AUTHORITY - HELD - IMPUGNED COMMUNICATION MADE BY DISTRICT COLLECTOR SET ASIDE – PETITION ALLOWED CitationAppellants: Minaxiben Shashikantbhai Patel Respondents: Dist. Collector Judgement Citations: 2006-LAWS (GJH)-10-27 , 2007-GLR-1-277 , 2007-GCD-1-392 Appellants: Minaxiben Shashikantbhai Patel Respondents: Dist. Collector Court: High Court of Gujarat Judges: Jayant Patel Advocates: B.S.Brahmbhatt Acts and Rules Cited: Succession Act, 1925, S.213,S.57, Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, S.135D, AppealNo: [SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION:19303:2005~ ] For Date : [ Oct 30,2006] HEADNOTE SUCCESSION ACT, 1925 - SECS. 57, 213 - COMPULSORY REQUIREMENT OF PROBATE - PETITIONER IS A HOUSE WIFE AND HER FATHER IN LAW PURCHASED THE PROPERTY IN GANDHINAGAR - EXECUTION OF WILL BY THE FATHER IN LAW OF THE PETITIONER - AS PER THE WILL, THE PROPERTY IS BEQUEATHED TO THE PETITIONER - CASE OF CLARENCE PAIS & ORS. (SUPRA) REFERRED - EVEN WITHOUT PROBATE, THE RIGHTS ACQUIRED BY THE EXECUTOR OR LEGATEE OF THE WILL CAN BE ESTABLISHED BEFORE THE COURT OR BEFORE ANY OTHER AUTHORITY WHICH IN THE PRESENT CASE IS THE REVENUE AUTHORITY - HELD - IMPUGNED COMMUNICATION MADE BY DISTRICT COLLECTOR SET ASIDE – PETITION ALLOWED IMPORTANT PARA: 7 SUCCESSION ACT, 1925 S.213,S.57, BOMBAY LAND REVENUE CODE, 1879 S.135D, (1.) The only question, which arise for consideration of this Court in the present petition is whether for a Will executed by a Hindu qua the property situated outside the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court at Calcutta, Madras and Mumbai, the probate is a compulsory requirement for establishing the rights pursuant to the will or not? In the present case, it is an admitted position that property is situated at Gandhinagar and therefore, the incidental question which may be required to be considered by the Court is whether probate for such will is necessary requirement for claiming any right under the said will or not? (2.) The short facts of the case are that the petitioner is a housewife and her farther-in-law purchased the property in Gandhinagar(Gujarat State) bearing Plot No. 1319/1 at Sector No. 3B admeasuring about 90 Sq. Mtrs. The Registered Sale Deed is also executed by Ilaben Vivekchandra Desai in favour of the father-in-law of the petitioner Chandubhai Jivabhai Patel on 29.03.1996. The said document came to be registered vide No. 1160 with the Sub-Registrar, Gandhinagar and consequently, the father-in-law of the petitioner became owner of the property in question. It appears that the father-in-law of the petitioner Chandubhai Jivabhai Patel, executed a Will dated 03.04.2000, which also came to be registered with the Sub-Registrar, Gandhinagar vide No. 1619. It is the case of the petitioner that as per the said Will, the property is bequeathed to the petitioner, who is wife of Shashikantbhai Patel, the youngest son of the executant of the Will. The executant of the Will Chandubhai Jivabhai Patel since expired on 05.07.2000, the petitioner applied to the revenue authority, i.e. the District Collector for entering mutation on her name based on the Will dated 03.04.2000 of the deceased Chandubhai Jivabhai Patel. It is the case of the petitioner that the process was undertaken and during the course of the said process, the other legal heirs of the deceased Chandubhai Jivabhai Patel consented for mutation in favour of the petitioner. However, the District Collector by the impugned communication dated 30.11.2004 declined to consider the matter on the ground that the probate is not obtained of the Will and the matter will be considered after the probate is obtained and therefore, under these circumstances, the petitioner has approached to this Court by way of the present petition. (3.) I have heard Mr. Brahmbhatt, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Mengdey, learned AGP for the respondent District Collector. As such, on the aspects of the existence of the Will, there is no dispute. Whether the Will is genuine or not is also not in dispute before this Court. Whether by the present Will, rights of the other legal heirs of the deceased are affected in any manner or not is also not an aspect, which is the subject matter of this petition. The only aspect, which arise for consideration is legality and validity of the stand taken by the District Collector for insistence of the probate before making mutation entry in the revenue record based the will of the deceased. (4.) In my view, as per the provisions of Section 57 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as ?the Act?), the provisions of testamentary succession are applicable to the Will made by Hindu, subject to restriction and the modifications specified therein. The Will made by Hindu are differently classified qua the property situated within the territories, which were subject to the control of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay. Whereas, qua all other Wills made by Hindus, a separate clause is provided under clause (c) of the Section 57 of the Indian Succession Act. (5.) As per Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act, the right as executor or legatee pursuant to the Will can be established in any Court of justice unless a Court of competent jurisdiction has granted probate of the said Will. However, sub-section 2 of Section 213 provides that this Section shall not apply to the Will made by Hindu, Buddhist or Sikh where such Wills are of the clauses specified in clause (a) and (b) of Section 57 of the Act. To say in other words, if the Will is falling in the category of the clauses other than Clause (a) and (b) of Section 57 of the Act, the restriction as provided in sub-section 1 of Section 213 of the Act shall not operate. (6.) At this stage, it would be worthwhile to extract certain observations of the Apex Court in the case of Clarence Pais and Ors. Vs. Union of India, reported at 2001 SC 1151 wherein while considering the constitutional validity of the provisions of Section 213 vis-a-vis Section 57 of the Indian Succession Act at para 6, it has been observed by the Apex Court inter alia as under: A combined reading of Section 213 and 57 of the Act would show that where the parties to the will are Hindus or the properties in dispute are not in territories falling under Section 57(a) and (b), sub-section(2) of Section 213 of the Act applies and sub-section(1) has no application. As a consequence, a probate will not be required to be obtained by a Hindu in respect of a will made outside those territories or regarding the immovable properties situate outside those territories.? (emphasis supplied.) (7.) The aforesaid position of law is settled by the highest Court of the country and therefore, no further discussion may be required. If the facts of the present case are considered in light of the above referred legal position, it cannot be disputed that the property is situated at Gandhinagar and is outside the territories of the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay and the property is even otherwise is situated in Gujarat State, which is outside the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay or Madras or Calcutta. Therefore, even without probate, the rights acquired by the executor or legatee of the Will can be established before the Court or before any other authority which in the present case is revenue authority. (8.) Therefore, in view of the aforesaid legal position that for a Will executed by a Hindu qua the immovable property situated outside the territory of original civil jurisdiction of High Court of Bombay and Madras, the Probate is not compulsory for establishing the rights in the property as the property in the present case is situated in Gandhinagar, even without probate the legatee who is the petitioner in the present case can establish the rights pursuant to the Will executed by deceased Chandubhai Jivabhai Patel who is admittedly Hindu. Hence, the stand of the District Collector insisting the probate for the Will in question cannot be sustained in the eye of law and deserves to be quashed and set aside. (9.) In the result, the petition succeeds. The impugned communication made by the District Collector not to proceed with the mutation without their being any probate of the Will in question executed by the deceased Chandubhai Jivabhai Patel is quashed and set aside. Consequently, the District Collector shall be required to consider the matter for entering mutation based on the Will after following the procedure as may be required, if not followed, under Section Section 135 D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and if the rights pursuant to the Will are established before him, the necessary mutation shall be recorded in the revenue record in favour of the petitioner as may be permissible in law. (10.) Petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule made absolute accordingly. Considering the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. D.S. permitted. | |
| Tags :- probate |
| | In case of failure of any party to appoint arbitrator chief justice under section 11(6) is responsible to take necessary steps |
| Posted on 24 May 2013 by Diganta Paul | |
CourtSUPREME COURT OF INDIA BriefThe questions that arise for consideration in this appeal, by special leave are, whether respondent No. 1 has forfeited its right to appoint the arbitrator having not done so after the demand was made and till the appellant had moved the court under Section 11(6) and, if the answer is in the affirmative, whether the appointment of the arbitrator by respondent No. 1 in the course of the proceedings under Section 11(6) is of any legal consequence and the Chief Justice of the High Court ought to have exercised the jurisdiction and appointed an arbitrator CitationM/s. Deep Trading Company …… Appellant Vs. M/s. Indian Oil Corporation and Ors. ……Respondents Judgement REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2673 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24686 of 2007) M/s. Deep Trading Company …… Appellant Vs. M/s. Indian Oil Corporation and Ors. ……Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. LODHA, J. Leave granted. 2. The questions that arise for consideration in this appeal, by special leave are, whether respondent No. 1 has forfeited its right to appoint the arbitrator having not done so after the demand was made and till the appellant had moved the court under Section 11(6) and, if the answer is in the affirmative, whether the appointment of the arbitrator by respondent No. 1 in the course of the proceedings under Section 11(6) is of any legal consequence and the Chief Justice of the High Court ought to have exercised the jurisdiction and appointed an arbitrator? 3. The above questions arise from these facts: On 01.11.1998, an agreement for kerosene/LDO dealership was entered into between the first respondent – Indian Oil Corporation (for short, "the Corporation") and the appellant – Deep Trading Company (for short, "the dealer") for the retail sales supply of kerosene and light diesel oil in the area specified in the schedule. In the course of dealership agreement allegedly some violations were committed by the dealer. Following the show because notice dated 04.03.2004, the Corporation on 12.03.2004 suspended the sales and supplies of all the products to the dealer with immediate effect. 4. Aggrieved by the action of the Corporation, the dealer filed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, "1996 Act") before the District Judge, Etawah seeking an order of injunction against the Corporation from stopping the supply of Kerosene/LDO. On 25.03.2004, the District Judge, Etawah passed a restraint order against the Corporation. 5. The Corporation challenged the order of the District Judge, Etawah dated 25.03.2004 before the Allahabad High Court and also prayed for an interim relief. On 12.07.2004, the Allahabad High Court refused to grant any interim relief to the Corporation. 6. On 09.08.2004, the dealer made a demand to the Corporation by a written notice to refer the disputes between the parties to the arbitrator under the terms of the agreement. In the demand notice, it was also stated by the dealer that if the Corporation fails to appoint the arbitrator, the dealer may be constrained to approach the court under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. 7. It appears that the Corporation challenged the order of the Allahabad High Court in the special leave petition before this Court but that was dismissed on 06.12.2004 being an interlocutory order. 8. On or about 06.12.2004, the dealer moved the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court under Section 11(6) for the appointment of an arbitrator as the Corporation had failed to act under the agreement. While the said proceedings were pending, on 28.12.2004, the Corporation appointed Shri B. Parihar, Senior Manager, (LPG Engineering) of its U.P. State Office as the sole arbitrator. 9. When the above application came up for consideration, the Chief Justice found no reason to appoint the arbitrator, as sought by the dealer, since the arbitrator had already been appointed by the Corporation. The brief order dated 06.12.2007, by which the dealer's application under Section 11(6) was dismissed by the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, reads as under: "1. Heard Mr. Siddharth Singh, in support of this application and Mr. Prakash Padia, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. The dispute in this matter is regarding suspension of the petitioner's agency as a kerosene dealer for some time. The applicant applied for appointment of an arbitrator by writing a letter in March, 2004, but filed the present proceeding on 06.12.2004. An Arbitrator was appointed 3. The contract of the applicant is continuing with the respondents in view of an injunction granted by the Civil Court. 4. The submission of the applicant is that the respondents ought to have moved within thirty days from the date of a request being made. In any case arbitrator has been appointed within thirty days from the filing of the application. Mr. Siddharth Singh, says that the arbitrator conduct should have been appointed after filing of an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 5. In my view, there is no reason to appoint any fresh arbitrator, as sought by the applicant. 6. The application is dismissed." 10. Clause 29 of the agreement dated 01.11.1998 provides as under: "29. Any dispute or difference of any nature whatsoever or regarding any right, liability, act, omission on account of any of the parties here to arising out or in relation to this Agreement shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director (Marketing) of the Corporation, or of some Officer of the Corporation who may be nominated by the Director (Marketing). It is known to the parties to the Agreement that the arbitrator so appointed is a share holder and employee of the Corporation. In the event of the arbitrator to whom the matter is originally referred being transferred or vacating his office or being unable to act for any reason, the Director (Marketing) as aforesaid at the time of such transfer, vacation of office or inability to act, shall designate another person to act as arbitrator in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Such person shall be entitled to proceed with the reference from the point at which it was left by his predecessor. It is also a term of this contract that no person other than the Director (Marketing) or a person nominated by such Director (Marketing) of the Corporation as aforesaid shall act as arbitrator hereunder. The award of the arbitrator so appointed shall be final conclusive and binding on all parties, to the Agreement, subject to the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any statutory modification of or re-enactment thereof and the rules made there under and for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceeding under this clause. The award shall be made in writing within six months after entering upon the reference or within such extended time not exceeding further four months as the sole arbitrator shall by a writing under his own hands appoint." 11. Sub-sections (1), (2), (6) and (8) of Section 11 are relevant for consideration of the present matter which read as follows: "11. Appointment of arbitrators.— (1) A person of any nationality may be an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. (2) Subject to sub-section (6), the parties are free to agree on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators. (3) to (5) xxx xxx xxx (6) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties,- (a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or (b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach an agreement expected of them under that procedure; or (c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, a party may request the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment. (7) xxx xxx xxx (8) The Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him, in appointing an arbitrator, shall have due regard to- (a) any qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement of the parties; and (b)other considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator. (9) to (12) xxx xxx xxx". 12. Sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of Section 11 have no application in the present case as the parties have agreed on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator in Clause 29. Sub-section (2) provides that subject to sub-section (6), the parties are free to agree on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators. Sub-section (6) makes provision for making an application to the concerned Chief Justice for appointment of an arbitrator in three circumstances, (a) a party fails to act as required under the agreed procedure or (b) the parties or the two appointed arbitrators fail to reach an agreement expected of them under that procedure or (c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure. If one of the three circumstances is satisfied, the Chief Justice may exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under Section 11(6) and appoint the arbitrator. In the present case, the dealer moved the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court under Section 11(6)(a) for an appointment of the arbitrator as the Corporation failed to act as required under Clause 29. 13. The three basic facts are not in dispute, namely, (i) on 09.08.2004, the dealer called upon the Corporation by a written notice to appoint an arbitrator in accordance with the terms of Clause 29 of the agreement; (ii) the dealer made an application under Section 11(6) for appointment of the arbitrator on 06.12.2004; and (iii) the Corporation appointed the sole arbitrator on 28.12.2004 after the application under Section 11(6) was already made by the dealer. 14. On behalf of the appellant, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel, relied heavily upon decisions of this Court, (one) Datar Switchgears1 and (two) Punj Lloyd2 and submitted that the learned Chief Justice erred in holding that there was no reason to appoint any fresh arbitrator since the arbitrator has been appointed by the Corporation. 15. Mr. Abhinav Vashishta, learned senior counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, relied upon a decision of this Court in Northern Railway Administration3 and submitted that while considering application under Section 11(6) for appointment of arbitrator, the Court must keep in view twin requirements of Section 11(8) and, seen thus, the view of the learned Chief Justice in the impugned order does not call for any interference. 1 Datar Switchgears Ltd. v. Tata Finance Ltd. and Another: [(2000) 8 SCC 151] 2 Punj Lloyd Ltd. v. Petronet MHB Ltd.: [(2006) 2 SCC 638] 3 Northern Railway Administration, Ministry of Railway, New Delhi v. Patel Engineering Company Limited: [(2008) 10 SCC 240] 16. In Datar Switchgears1, a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the scheme of Section 11, noted the distinguishing features between Section 11(5) and Section 11(6) and then considered the question whether in a case falling under Section 11(6), the opposite party cannot appoint an arbitrator after the expiry of thirty days from the date of demand. This Court held that in cases arising under Section 11(6), if the opposite party has not made an appointment within thirty days of the demand, the right to make appointment is not forfeited but continues, but such an appointment has to be made before the first party makes application under Section 11 seeking appointment of an arbitrator. If no appointment has been made by the opposite party till application under Section 11(6) has been made, the right of the opposite party to make appointment ceases and is forfeited. 17. In Punj Lloyd2, the agreement entered into between the parties contained arbitration clause. The disputes and differences arose between the parties. Punj Lloyd (appellant) served a notice on Petronet (respondent) demanding appointment of an arbitrator and reference of disputes to him. Petronet failed to act. On expiry of thirty days, Punj Lloyd moved the Chief Justice of the High Court for appointment of the arbitrator under Section 11(6). Petronet had not made appointment till the date of moving the application. The designate Judge refused to appoint the arbitrator holding that the remedy available to it was to move in accordance with the agreement. Aggrieved by the said order, a writ petition was filed which was dismissed and the matter reached this Court. A three-Judge Bench of this Court referred to Datar Switchgears1 and held that the matter was covered squarely by that judgment and the view taken by the designate Judge in dealing with the application under Section 11(6) and the Division Bench was not right. This Court restored the application under Section 11(6) before the Chief Justice of the High Court for fresh consideration and appointment of the arbitrator in accordance with Section 11(6). 18. We are in full agreement with the legal position stated by this Court in Datar Switchgears1 which has also been followed in Punj Lloyd2. 19. Section 11(8) provides that Chief Justice or the designated person or institution, in appointing an arbitrator, shall have due regard to two aspects, (a) qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement of the parties; and (b) other considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator. In Northern Railway Administration3, a three-Judge Bench of this Court considered the scheme of Section 11. Insofar as Section 11(8) is concerned, this Court stated that appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators named in the arbitration agreement is not a must, but while making the appointment the twin requirements mentioned therein have to be kept in view. 20. If we apply the legal position exposited by this Court in Datar Switchgears1 to the admitted facts, it will be seen that the Corporation has forfeited its right to appoint the arbitrator. It is so for the reason that on 09.08.2004, the dealer called upon the Corporation to appoint the arbitrator in accordance with terms of Clause 29 of the agreement but that was not done till the dealer had made application under Section 11(6) to the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court for appointment of the arbitrator. The appointment was made by the Corporation only during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 11(6). Such appointment by the Corporation after forfeiture of its right is of no consequence and has not disentitled the dealer to seek appointment of the arbitrator by the Chief Justice under Section 11(6). We answer the above questions accordingly. 21. Section 11(8) does not help the Corporation at all in the fact situation. Firstly, there is no qualification for the arbitrator prescribed in the agreement. Secondly, to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator, it is rather necessary that someone other than an officer of the Corporation is appointed as arbitrator once the Corporation has forfeited its right to appoint the arbitrator under Clause 29 of the agreement. 22. Learned senior counsel for the Corporation, however, referred to an unreported order of this Court in Newton Engineering4. The arbitration clause in that case was similar to the arbitration clause in the present case. The contractor had written to the Corporation to appoint E.D. (NR) as sole arbitrator as per the agreement. But the Corporation wrote back to the contractor that office of E.D. (NR) has ceased to exist due to internal reorganisation. The Corporation offered to the contractor to substitute E.D. (NR) with Director (Marketing) to which contractor did not agree. The Corporation then appointed Director (Marketing) as arbitrator. The contractor made an application under Section 11(6)(c) read with Sections 13 and 15 of the 1996 Act for appointment of a retired Judge as a sole arbitrator. The Single Judge dismissed the petition filed by the contractor. Against that order, the special leave petition was filed by the contractor. This Court in paragraph 9 of the order stated as follows: "9. Having regard to the express, clear and unequivocal arbitration clause between the parties that the disputes between them shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the ED(NR) of the Corporation and, if ED(NR) was unable or unwilling to act as the sole arbitrator, the matter shall be referred to the person designated by such ED(NR) in his place who was willing to act as sole arbitrator and, if none of them is able to act as an arbitrator, no other person should act as arbitrator, the appointment of Director (Marketing) or his nominee as a sole arbitrator by the Corporation cannot be sustained. If the office of ED(NR) ceased to exist in the Corporation and the parties were unable to reach to any agreed solution, the arbitration clause did not survive and has to be treated as having worked its course. According to the arbitration clause, sole arbitrator would be ED(NR) or his nominee and no one else. In the circumstances, it was not open to either of the parties to unilaterally appoint any arbitrator for resolution of the disputes. Sections 11(6)(c), 13 and 15 of the 1996 Act have no application in light of the reasons indicated above." 23. We are afraid that what has been stated above has no application to the present fact situation. In Newton Engineering4, this Court was not concerned with the question of forfeiture of right of the Corporation for appointment of an arbitrator. No such argument was raised in that case. The question raised in Newton Engineering4 was entirely different. In the present case, the Corporation has failed to act as required under the procedure agreed upon by the parties in Clause 29 and despite the demand by the dealer to appoint the arbitrator, the Corporation did not make appointment until the application was made under Section 11(6). Thus, the Corporation has forfeited its right of appointment of an arbitrator. In this view of the matter, the Chief Justice ought to have exercised his jurisdiction under Section 11(6) in the matter for appointment of an arbitrator appropriately. The appointment of the arbitrator by the Corporation during the pendency of proceedings under Section 11(6) was of no consequence. 24. In the course of arguments before us, on behalf of the appellant certain names of retired High Court Judges were indicated to the senior counsel for the Corporation for appointment as sole arbitrator but the Corporation did not agree to any of the names proposed by the appellant. In the circumstances, we are left with no choice but to send the matter back to the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court for an appropriate order on the application made by the dealer under Section 11(6). 25. Civil Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Arbitration Case No. 107 of 2004, M/s. Deep Trading Company v. M/s. Indian Oil Corporation and others, is restored to the file of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for fresh consideration by the Chief Justice or the designate Judge, as the case may be, in accordance with law and in light of the observations made above. No costs. ……………………….J. (R.M. Lodha) ..…..………………...J. (J. Chelameswar) .……………………...J. (Madan B. Lokur) |
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