Saturday, February 22, 2014

[aaykarbhavan] Judgments and Information [4 Attachments]






Rate of exchange of conversion of each of the foreign currency with effect from 21th February, 2014

Notification No.13/2014-Customs (N.T.),  Dated the 20th February, 2014
            S.O.       (E). – In exercise of the powers conferred by section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), and in super session of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) No.9/2014-CUSTOMS (N.T.), dated the 6th February, 2014 vide number S.O.360 (E), dated the 6th February, 2014, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before such super session, the Central Board of Excise and Customs hereby determines that the rate of exchange of conversion of each of the foreign currency specified in column (2) of each of Schedule I and  Schedule II annexed hereto into Indian currency or vice versa shall, with effect from 21st February, 2014 be the rate mentioned against it in the corresponding entry in column (3) thereof, for the purpose of the said section, relating to imported and export goods.
SCHEDULE-I
S.No. Foreign Currency Rate of exchange of one unit of foreign currency equivalent to Indian rupees
(1)
(2)
(3)


               (a)
                (b)
 
 
(For Imported Goods)
  (For Export Goods)
1.
Australian Dollar
56.65
55.15
2.
Bahrain Dinar
170.40
161.05
3.
Canadian Dollar
57.10
55.70
4.
Danish Kroner
11.70
11.35
5.
EURO
86.85
84.85
6.
Hong Kong Dollar
8.10
8.00
7.
Kuwait Dinar
228.40
215.30
8.
New Zealand Dollar
52.25
50.95
9.
Norwegian Kroner
10.45
10.15
10.
Pound Sterling
105.30
103.00
11.
Singapore Dollar
49.95
48.75
12.
South African Rand
5.85
5.45
13.
Saudi Arabian Riyal
17.15
16.20
14.
Swedish Kroner
9.75
9.45
15.
Swiss Franc
71.35
69.40
16.
UAE Dirham
17.50
16.55
17.
US Dollar
62.95
61.95





  SCHEDULE-II
S.No. Foreign Currency Rate of exchange of 100 units of foreign currency equivalent to Indian rupees
(1)
(2)
(3)


(a)
(b)
 
 
(For Imported Goods)
  (For Export Goods)
1.
Japanese Yen
62.00
60.50
2.
Kenya Shilling
74.70
70.35





 [F.No.468/01/2014-Cus.V]
                                    (Akshay Joshi )

Identification of Bogus PAN Card through Aadhar number

Rules for Issuing Pan Card
The Income Tax Department has made changes in rules for issuing Permanent Account Number (PAN) Card. It has vide notification S.O. 3794 (E) dated 23.12.2013, amended Rule 114 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 to provide , inter alia, that the application for allotment of PAN shall be accompanied by proof of date of birth of the applicant in addition to proof of identity (POI)/proof of address (POA). The notification has also amended the prescribed list of documents which can be furnished as POI/POA and Aadhar Card has been included as one of the POI and POA document.
The number of PAN Card holders in the country as on 17.2.2014 is 20.24 crores. So far, 9.73 lakhs PAN have been issued where Aadhar has been captured and seeded in PAN database for maintain uniqueness.
Identification of bogus/duplicate PAN Card is an integral part of the data management system. In order to ensure that bogus PAN cards are not issued, the Income-tax Department has started capturing Aadhar number, as mentioned in para above, in PAN application forms in cases where it is available so that the additional uniqueness is brought in PAN allotment process.
This information was given by the Minister of State for Finance, Shri J.D. Seelam in written reply to a question in Lok Sabha today.

CPC Automates Default identification process in respect of TDS statements

The Centralized Processing Cell (TDS) automated for the first time, the Default identification process in respect of TDS statements submitted. CPC (TDS) has  highlighted the need for correct and complete reporting of data in the TDS statements and has therefore, implemented processes to enforce compliance.
With the above functionality made available by TRACES, intimations have been sent to the deductors, wherever applicable, through SMS and e-mail services and through Registered/ Speed Post. Further, TRACES has also provisioned for easy access to this information by way of display in Deductor's Dashboard and by availability of electronic copies of Justification Reports for the defaults generated with respect to relevant TDS statements.
In view of the close of the month approaching fast, you are advised to pay the outstanding demand at an early date to avoid Penal Interest u/s 220(2)of the Actread with Rule 119A, apart from intimation of other recovery proceedings as per Income Tax Act, 1961. If the demand has already been paid, you are requested to file a Correction Statement by tagging the challan and the Justification report can be verified for closure of demand, if the revision has already been submitted and processed.
How to pay the demand?
The following steps shall help you analyze and pay the demand:
· Download the Justification Report from our portal TRACES to view your latest outstanding demand.
·   Use Challan ITNS 281 to pay the above with your relevant Banker or use any other Challan, which has adequate balance available
·   Download the Conso File from TRACES  portal.
·  Prepare a Correction Statement using version 3.8 of the Return Preparation Utility (RPU) and version 4.1 & 2.137 of the File Validation Utility (FVU)
·  Submit the Correction Statement at TIN Facilitation Centre.
· If the demand is due to mismatch of challan(s), the Online Correction facility on TRACES can be used for tagging the same.

2014-TIOL-92-ITAT-DEL
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
BENCH 'F' NEW DELHI
ITA Nos.2666 & 2667/Del/2013
Assessment Years:2008-09 & 2007-08
M/s MARIGOLD MERCHANDISE (P) LTD
SHOP NO.4/36 DDA MARKET
DAKSHINPURI EXTENSION, NEW DELHI-110062
Vs
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
CEN CIRCLE, FARIDABAD
R P Tolani, JM And B C Meena, AM
Date of Decision: December 12, 2013
Appellants Rep by: Dr Rakesh Gupta & Shri Ashwani Taneja, Advs.
Respondent Rep by: 
Shri Gunjan Prasad CIT (DR)
Income Tax - Section 2(14), 10(1), 144, 145, 153A - Whether the burden to prove that a particular transaction is not of agricultural land, squarely lies on Revenue and when no steps are taken by assessee to develop the land, it retained its character as agricultural land - Whether no additions could be made in the assessment u/s 153A if there is no incriminating material found as a result of search - Whether if the group to which the assessee belongs was in real estate business, consequently assessee's transaction of purchase and sale of agricultural land, also becomes trading asset - Whether the AO can reject the books of accounts just to change the head or interpret the law in their own way.

Search
 and seizure operations were conducted on 17- 9-2008 in assessee's premises which is referred to belonging to one Basant Bansal, which in turn has been named as sub-group of Kamdhenu Group. During the course of search no surrender of undisclosed income was made in the group. Notice u/s 153A was issued on 9-3-2010. In response thereto the assessee filed same returns as were filed earlier i.e. declaring loss of Rs. 2,73,866/- for A.Y. 2007-08 and loss of Rs. 6,14,908/- for A.Y. 2008-09.

During both the years the assessee had sold lands claimed to be agricultural lands, which are held as stock in trade. Huge gains on sale of such lands were declared which are claimed to be agriculture lands. Thus, the gains were claimed by the assessee as exempt as agriculture income.

AO during the course of assessment u/s 153A proposed as to why instead of exempt agricultural income as claimed, it be held as adventure in the nature of trade and commerce and the gains thereon be treated as business income. Assessee filed various replies in this behalf claiming that the land under consideration was agricultural land and not a capital asset within the meaning of sec. 2(14) of the Act.

The submissions of the assessee were rejected by the AO broadly on the following reasoning:

(i) The mere fact that this land was mentioned as agricultural land in revenue record does not by itself make the gains to be exempt as agriculture income. The assessee has failed to show that the land was actually used for agricultural purposes. It may be true that the land purchased by the assessee was agricultural, but assessee has admitted that it was for the purpose of purchase and sale of land and the land was purchased not for carrying out any agricultural activity but for business purposes.

(ii) The case law cited by the assessee that agricultural land was not a capital asset in terms of sec. 2(14) and the profits arising from the sale thereof was exempt income, has not been disputed. However, in assessee's case it is taxable as the assessee is into business of purchase and sale of agricultural land which formed the regular business activity of the assessee company. Therefore, the income was to be held as adventure in the nature of trade and profit and gains there from was liable for taxation as business income whether from sale of agricultural land or non-agricultural land.

(iii) Land under consideration situated at Village Behrampur, Distt.- Gurgaon, Haryana was purchased in the year 2005- 06, a part of which was sold in the year 2006-07 and in 2007-08 relating to assessment year under consideration. Another land situated at Village Maidawas, Distt.- Gurgaon, Haryana sold during the year was purchased in the preceding year. Therefore, it is apparent from the period of holding also that the intention of the assessee was not to perform any agricultural activity on the land. Also, it is nowhere mentioned in the MOA of the company that either main object or ancillary object of the company was agriculture. Moreover, it is not important what is preached but more important is what is professed. In the case of the assessee, it has been seen that the company since its inception in the year 2003-04 has been solely working with the intention to acquire land in and around Gurgaon, Haryana and then either sell it at profit or develop a land project on it.

The AO then referred to the facts of other 11 companies of the group whose major shareholders and directors are referred to be Shri Basant Bansal and Shri Roop Bansal. According to AO, a holistic view of the facts and circumstances was to be taken which in sum and substance are as follows:

(i) The various group companies and the above two persons along with Smt. Abha Bansal and Shri Pankaj Bansal had purchased these lands and the promoters were waiting to strike deal claiming the land to be agricultural land except one company M/s Misty Meadows Pvt. Ltd. which had business other than buying and selling of agricultural land.

(ii) Various companies have been floated by Basant Bansal family to avoid statutory restrictions about the holding of acquiring of land. It is claimed by AO that Basant Bansal family started their career in the field as land buying agent for M/s EMAAR MGF group. Besides, they also floated various own companies and purchased various lands as are evidenced from the sale-deeds mentioned in the order.

(iii) All the companies of the group were engaged in acquiring land for the purpose of developing real estate projects or selling the land itself on profit.

(iv) The conduct of the group companies is shown to be prominent activity of sale and purchase of agricultural land. It was not meant for agricultural activity but to sell or build to earn profits.

(v) M/s M3M India Ltd., flagship company of the group was to develop mega residential complex in the name of M3M Golf Estates and the MOU was signed on 4-4-2007.

(vi) Thus, facts and submission of the assessee company as discussed above very well establish that sole aim of transaction in agricultural land by the assessee company and other companies of the group is in the nature of business and not for agriculture. The intent and purpose for purchasing the land by the said company and than selling it or part thereof within a short period of time is certainly not agriculture. The fact that the said company and other companies as discussed earlier have huge land banks speak volume of the intent/purpose/usage of the said land being a trading asset. It is amply clear that it is not for agriculture but to further develop the same for commercial venture either by developing themselves or by selling the same to some other company who would carry out it's commercial exploitation in future. So the profit from sale of such a land can by no means qualify for exemption.

(vii) Moreover, land in and around at Gurgaon is so costly that to purchase land for agriculture would be very imprudent. Therefore, the only logical conclusion that can be derived from the facts and conduct of the assessee company is that the assessee company has purchased the agricultural land as a part of its business and with the intention to sell the same at profit. Hon'ble Supreme court in its judgment in the case of CIT vs M/s Sutjej Cotton Mills Supply Agency Lt. 100 ITR 706 has held that "if the dominant intention was to carry on an adventure in the nature of business, the profit can be taxed". Since it is proved that the intention of the assessee was to earn profit from transaction of purchase and sale of agricultural land, profit earned can be taxed from sale of such agricultural land as business income.

(viii) The assessee has treated the agricultural land as Fixed asset in its Books of account, the receipts on sale of it as capital receipt and the resultant profit has been claimed exempt. However, in view of the fact mentioned in paras above, receipt on sale of agricultural land is to be considered as revenue receipt. AO held that books are incorrectly written and liable to be rejected. It is a well settled principle that the Books of account should be written to give true and fair picture of the affairs of the business of the assessee. Section 145(3) of the LT. Act categorically states that when the AO is not satisfied about the correctness or completeness of the accounts of the assessee or where the method of accounting provided in sub-section (1) of section 145 or accounting standards as notified under sub section (2) of section 145 have not been regularly followed by the assessee, the AO may make an assessment in the manner provided in section 144 of the Act. AO thus held that the assessee has failed to present a true & fair picture of accounts by treating the revenue receipts as capital receipts. As such the assessee has failed to work out the profits in a correct manner. According to AO he was left with no alternative but to invoke the provisions of section 145(3) of the LT. Act & reject the books of accounts and make the assessment of income of the assessee in the manner provided in section 144 of the Act.

For rejecting books of account, AO further relied on the ratio of decisions of Supreme Court in the cases of M/s CIT Vs. M/s Sutlej Cotton Mills Ltd. (2002-TIOL-546-SC-IT);and Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT (2002-TIOL-383-SC-IT) for the proposition that the assessee's entitlement to a particular deduction will depend on the relevant provisions of law and not on the view which the assessee may take about its right and the existence or absence of entries in the books of account cannot be decisive in the matter. Based on these observations, the AO made the additions. CIT(A) rejected the appeal of the assessee. 

On further appeal, Tribunal held that,

++ coming to the first issue, the legality of addition, it is settled law that in block assessment consequent to search u/s 153A read with sec. 143(3) no addition can be made unless some incriminating material in this behalf is found as a result of search. It emerges from record that no incriminating material in behalf of the purchase of these lands and sale of these lands have been found as a result of search. In any case the whole issue revolves around the change of nature of income i.e. from exempt to taxable as business income. The purchases of agricultural land has been accepted by department as part of fixed asset/ investment of the assessee by assessment u/s 143(3). Both the lower authorities have rather relied only on the original return of income, returns on record and explanations filed by the assessee and not on any incriminating material found as a result of search. Besides, DR has not been able to point out any incriminating material found as a result of search or the reliance of the lower authorities thereon;

++ the issue is not of the legal challenge to the block assessment itself, the assessee's grounds and contentions agitate one legal issue i.e. whether in the absence of any incriminating material found during the course of search addition can be made by AO as undisclosed income u/s 153A. More so when all these transactions are disclosed by the assessee in the original returns of income and accepted by the department as such. Thus merely because a search is conducted and even though no incriminating material is found as a result thereof the original assessment of the assessee cannot be reviewed or substituted by a change of opinion about any claim of deduction, allowance or claim of exempt income;

++ various Benches of the ITAT including Delhi have upheld this view and deleted such additions which are not based on incriminating material found as a result of search. In view thereof, on this issue we hold that the AO could not have made these additions in the impugned assessee u/s 153A, there being no incriminating material indicating any undisclosed income found as a result of search. This ground of the assessee is accordingly allowed;

++ coming to the rejection of books of a/cs, the assessee maintained regular books of a/cs which are duly audited. No inconsistencies or defects have been pointed out therein. The assessee has purchased the land as agriculture land which is evidenced by the purchase deed. This has been accepted by department u/s 143(3) in A.Y. 2006-07. The assessee has claimed to have carried out agriculture operations and earned agriculture income which is offered in the return of income, which is accepted. Conveyance of sale of land also demonstrates that the land in question was agriculture land. It has not been disputed that the assessee on its own as an independent entity has not carried out any development activity or moved any application for commercial exploitation of the land to any local, state or Central agency. These glaring facts and circumstance do not raise any occasion for rejection of books. If at all, the AO could have changed the head of income by exercising his assessment power. In the absence of any worthwhile defect in the books of accounts, rejection of books was unjustified. This ground of the assessee is also allowed;

++ coming to the merits of the case, the main allegation of the lower authorities is to the effect that the assessee group taken as a whole was engaged in various activities of real estate development, therefore, an inference has been drawn that the assessee also should be deemed to be engaged in real estate business. In our considered view this assumption has no legs to stand. First of all lower authorities have not demonstrated that the assessee as a group was engaged in dubious and colourable devices. In a big group launching of several corporate entities is permissible by law and each company is an independent assessee in the eyes of law and separately assessed. Their activities are to be analyzed on the basis of actual activities and cannot be ignored merely because the associate concern is engaged in some other activities. Thus, this inference by lower authorities amounts to a pure guess work and conjecture which we are unable to subscribe. Therefore, group companies' business activities, which are distinct and separate entities, cannot be held as a factor to discard the assessee's actual activity, which is evidenced by record. Further, it has been demonstrated by the assessee that it was mainly solitary transaction of the assessee to hold the agriculture land in question as fixed asset, carry out agriculture operation thereon and sell it as agriculture land. We do not find any facts on record to hold any other view. Thus, we are unable to subscribe the view that assessee was engaged in adventure in the nature of trade;

++ coming to the nature of agriculture land and its geography, it has not been disputed that the land in question was situated outside the specified municipal limits and as per the prescription of sec. 2(14) it does not amount to an asset. In order to come under the cane of capital gains, the law has first to qualify as an asset as per I.T. Act. The income arising from the sale of agriculture land falls u/s 2(14)(iii) read with sec. 10(1) and is to be treated as agriculture income. The interpretation put by the lower authorities is out landish and based on surmises and conjectures, divorced from the actual facts;

++ apropos the lower authorities holding that the assessee was into adventure in the nature of trade, therefore, the nature, geography and activity of the land should be ignored, the statutory provisions should be given a go bye and assessee is to be some how held as engaged in the adventure in the nature of trade and taxed on exempt income. In our view, there is no enabling provision in the income tax prescribing that even if the assessee's income is exempt by a provision, then it can be forcibly brought into the tax net by assuming the assessee's activity to be adventure in the nature of trade. It is a settled position that real estate companies can also hold separate port folio of land as stock in trade and as investment port folio; the sale of investment portfolio is always taxed as capital gains. Thus, assuming worst against assessee, even if it is inferred that it has carried on business activity so long as it holds specified agriculture land in terms of sec. 2(14) i.e. not being an asset; its transfer will neither attract capital gain tax nor can be treated as business income. In view of the foregoing, the assessee's gains were profits from sale of specified agriculture land which does not come within the definition of asset as prescribed u/s 2(14) and by virtue of sec. 2(1A)(a) read with sec. 2(14)(iii) r.w.s. 10(1) the assessee's gains from sale of such agriculture land are exempt income. Thus, assessee succeeds on all the counts.
Assessee's appeals allowed
ORDER
Per: R P Tolani:
These are two assessee's appeals against separate orders of CIT(A) relating to A.Y. 2007-08 and 2008-09. Common grounds raised are as under:
(i) Additions made u/s 153A are bad in law and on facts inasmuch a none of them is based on any incriminating material found during the course of search conducted on 17-9-2008 on Kamdhenu group and thus additions are beyond the scope of section 153A.
(ii) The lower authorities erred in holding that the gains on sale of agriculture land in question which are exempt by way of Explanation 1 to Section2(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with clause (ii) or (iii) of sub-section (14) of section 2 as adventure in the nature of trade and thereby taxing the same income as business income.
(iii) The land in question are outside the Municipal limits as prescribed by section 2(14)(ii) or (iii).
(iv) That on the facts and circumstances of the case the CIT(A) erred in upholding the invoking of provisions of section 145(3) and framing of the assessment u/s 144.
1.1. Issues, facts and conclusions being same for both the years, they are disposed of by common order for the sake of convenience.
2. Brief facts are : Search and seizure operations were conducted on 17- 9-2008 in assessee's premises which is referred to belonging to one Basant Bansal, which in turn has been named as sub-group of Kamdhenu Group. During the course of search no surrender of undisclosed income was made in the group. Notice u/s 153A was issued on 9-3-2010. In response thereto the assessee filed same returns as were filed earlier i.e. declaring loss of Rs. 2,73,866/- for A.Y. 2007-08 and loss of Rs. 6,14,908/- for A.Y. 2008-09.
2.1. During both the years the assessee had sold lands claimed to be agricultural lands, which are held as stock in trade. Huge gains on sale of such lands were declared which are claimed to be agriculture lands. Thus, the following gains were claimed by the assessee as exempt as agriculture income:
Asstt. Yr.
Amount.
2007-08
Rs. 31,40,73,445/-
2008-09
Rs. 5,83,13,400/-
2.2. Assessing officer during the course of assessment u/s 153A proposed as to why instead of exempt agricultural income as claimed, it be held as adventure in the nature of trade and commerce and the gains thereon be treated as business income. Assessee filed various replies in this behalf claiming that the land under consideration was agricultural land and not a capital asset within the meaning of sec. 2(14) of the Income-tax act.
"3.3 The assessee has replied vide its letter dated 06.12.2010 that the land under ) consideration is agricultural land which is not a capital asset within the meaning of the definition of section 2(14) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2(lA): Agriculture Income:
"Agricultural income" means-
[(a) any rent or revenue derived from land which is situated in India and is used for agricultural purposes;]
(b) any income derived from such land by -
(i) Agriculture,
(i )-----------------
Further Explanation 1 to sec. 2(lA) which was inserted by the Finance Act' 1989 w.e.f: 01.04.1970 provides as under:
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that revenue derived from land shall not include and shall be deemed never to have included any income arising from the transfer of any land referred to in item (a) or item (b) of sub-douse (iii) of clause (14) of this section].
From the above, it is clear that Agricultural Income is exempt from land u/s 10(1) of the Income-tax Act' 1961 and any kind of income relating to Agriculture was exempt from tax till the year 1989 when the Government of Income has inserted the explanation 1 to Section 2(1A) of the Act w.r.e.f 01.04.1970 to tax certain types of receipts relating to agriculture. As per the Explanation, the income arising from the transfer of land referred to in item (a) or (b) of sub clause (iii) of clause (14) of Section 2 would not be included as Agricultural Income.
Therefore, the land which are not covered in item (a) or (b) of sub clause (iii) of clause (14) of Section 2 are still outside the scope of Explanation 1 to Section 2(1A) of the Income-tax Act and not subject to tax even today.
Section 2(1)(iii) has been reproduced herein below, which provides as under:
14) "Capital asset: means property of any kind held by an assessee, whether or not connected with his business or profession,
but does not include - ..........................
[(iii) agricultural land in India, not being land situated -
(a) in any area which is comprised within the jurisdiction of a municipality (whether known as a municipality, municipal corporation, notified area committee, town area committee, town committee , or by any other name) or a cantonment board and which has a population of not less than tea thousand according to the last preceding census of which the relevant figures have been published before the first day of the previous year; or
(b) in any area within such distance, not being more than eight kilometers, from the local limits of any municipality or cantonment board referred to in item (a), as the Central Government may, having regard to the extend of, and scope for, urbanization of that area and other relevant considerations, specify in this behalf by notification in the Official Gazette;]
In view of the above, it is clear that land, which is situated within the jurisdiction of Municipality or Cantonment Board, which has a population of not less than Ten Thousand or land situated in any area within eight kilometers from the local limits of any municipality or cantonment board would be treated as Capital Assets only and would be subject to tax only. Agriculture Land which is outside the jurisdiction of Municipality or Cantonment Board having a population of less than Ten Thousand or land situated outside eight kilometer from local limits of Municipality would be outside the scope of Capital Assets and would not be subject to tax at all.
In this regard, Assessee Company placed its reliance on the following rulings:
[1976] 103 ITR 785 (SC) Tea Estate India (P.) Ltd. v, CIT.
[1993} 204 ITR 631 (SC) Smt. Sarifabibi Mohmed Ibrahim v. CIT.
[1987} 167 ITR 136 (KERALA) CITv. Smt. T.K. Sarala Devi.
[1997} 225 ITR 510 (KER.) HIGH COURT OF KERALA ClT v. R. Krishnarjunan.
[2010} 124 ITO 1 (AHD.) Ramjibhai P. Chaudhry v. DC/T.
[2002} 257 ITR 756 (Del), CIT v. Deep Chand.
[1992} 194 ITR 125 (KER) C/T v. Murali Lodge."
2.3. The submissions of the assessee were rejected by the assessing officer broadly on the following reasoning:
(i) The mere fact that this land was mentioned as agricultural land in revenue record does not by itself make the gains to be exempt as agriculture income. The assessee has failed to show that the land was actually used for agricultural purposes. It may be true that the land purchased by the assessee was agricultural, but assessee has admitted that it was for the purpose of purchase and sale of land and the land was purchased not for carrying out any agricultural activity but for business purposes.
(ii) The case law cited by the assessee that agricultural land was not a capital asset in terms of sec. 2(14) and the profits arising from the sale thereof was exempt income, has not been disputed. However, in assessee's case it is taxable as the assessee is into business of purchase and sale of agricultural land which formed the regular business activity of the assessee company. Therefore, the income was to be held as adventure in the nature of trade and profit and gains there from was liable for taxation as business income whether from sale of agricultural land or non-agricultural land.
(iii) Land under consideration situated at Village Behrampur, Distt.- Gurgaon, Haryana was purchased in the year 2005- 06, a part of which was sold in the year 2006-07 and in 2007-08 relating to assessment year under consideration. Another land situated at Village Maidawas, Distt.- Gurgaon, Haryana sold during the year was purchased in the preceding year. Therefore, it is apparent from the period of holding also that the intention of the assessee was not to perform any agricultural activity on the land. Also, it is nowhere mentioned in the MOA of the company that either main object or ancillary object of the company was agriculture. Moreover, it is not important what is preached but more important is what is professed. In the case of the assessee, it has been seen that the company since its inception in the year 2003-04 has been solely working with the intention to acquire land in and around Gurgaon, Haryana and then either sell it at profit or develop a land project on it.
2.4. The assessing officer then referred to the facts of other 11 companies of the group whose major shareholders and directors are referred to be Shri Basant Bansal and Shri Roop Bansal. According to assessing officer, a holistic view of the facts and circumstances was to be taken which in sum and substance are as follows:
(i) The various group companies and the above two persons along with Smt. Abha Bansal and Shri Pankaj Bansal had purchased these lands and the promoters were waiting to strike deal claiming the land to be agricultural land except one company M/s Misty Meadows Pvt. Ltd. which had business other than buying and selling of agricultural land.
(ii) Various companies have been floated by Basant Bansal family to avoid statutory restrictions about the holding of acquiring of land. It is claimed by assessing officer that Basant Bansal family started their career in the field as land buying agent for M/s EMAAR MGF group. Besides, they also floated various own companies and purchased various lands as are evidenced from the sale-deeds mentioned in the order.
(iii) All the companies of the group were engaged in acquiring land for the purpose of developing real estate projects or selling the land itself on profit.
(iv) The conduct of the group companies is shown to be prominent activity of sale and purchase of agricultural land. It was not meant for agricultural activity but to sell or build to earn profits.
(v) M/s M3M India Ltd., flagship company of the group was to develop mega residential complex in the name of M3M Golf Estates and the MOU was signed on 4-4-2007.
(vi) Thus, facts and submission of the assessee company as discussed above very well establish that sole aim of transaction in agricultural land by the assessee company and other companies of the group is in the nature of business and not for agriculture. The intent and purpose for purchasing the land by the said company and than selling it or part thereof within a short period of time is certainly not agriculture. The fact that the said company and other companies as discussed earlier have huge land banks speak volume of the intent/purpose/usage of the said land being a trading asset. It is amply clear that it is not for agriculture but to further develop the same for commercial venture either by developing themselves or by selling the same to some other company who would carry out it's commercial exploitation in future. So the profit from sale of such a land can by no means qualify for exemption.
(vii) Moreover, land in and around at Gurgaon is so costly that to purchase land for agriculture would be very imprudent. Therefore, the only logical conclusion that can be derived from the facts and conduct of the assessee company is that the assessee company has purchased the agricultural land as a part of its business and with the intention to sell the same at profit. Hon'ble Supreme court in its judgment in the case of CIT vs M/s Sutjej Cotton Mills Supply Agency Lt. 100 ITR 706 has held that "if the dominant intention was to carry on an adventure in the nature of business, the profit can be taxed". Since it is proved that the intention of the assessee was to earn profit from transaction of purchase and sale of agricultural land, profit earned can be taxed from sale of such agricultural land as business income.
(viii) The assessee has treated the agricultural land as Fixed asset in its Books of account, the receipts on sale of it as capital receipt and the resultant profit has been claimed exempt. However, in view of the fact mentioned in paras above, receipt on sale of agricultural land is to be considered as revenue receipt. Assessing officer held that books are incorrectly written and liable to be rejected. It is a well settled principle that the Books of account should be written to give true and fair picture of the affairs of the business of the assessee. Section 145(3) of the LT. Act categorically states that when the AO is not satisfied about the correctness or completeness of the accounts of the assessee or where the method of accounting provided in sub-section (1) of section 145 or accounting standards as notified under sub section (2) of section 145 have not been regularly followed by the assessee, the AO may make an assessment in the manner provided in section 144 of the Act. Assessing officer thus held that the assessee has failed to present a true & fair picture of accounts by treating the revenue receipts as capital receipts. As such the assessee has failed to work out the profits in a correct manner. According to assessing officer he was left with no alternative but to invoke the provisions of section 145(3) of the LT. Act & reject the books of accounts and make the assessment of income of the assessee in the manner provided in section 144 of the Act.
2.5. For rejecting books of account, assessing officer further relied on the ratio of decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of M/s CIT Vs. M/s Sutlej Cotton Mills Ltd. 116 ITR 1 (SC) = (2002-TIOL-546-SC-IT); and Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT 82 ITR 363 (SC) =(2002-TIOL-383-SC-IT) for the proposition that the assessee's entitlement to a particular deduction will depend on the relevant provisions of law and not on the view which the assessee may take about its right and the existence or absence of entries in the books of account cannot be decisive in the matter. Based on these observations, the assessing officer made the impugned additions.
2.6. Aggrieved, assessee preferred first appeal before the CIT(A) challenging the additions being outside the scope of section 153A of the Act, on following issues:
(i) no incriminating material except the registered sale deeds, which were already disclosed and discussed in the regular assessment, were found during the course of search;
(ii) the assessing officer erred in resorting to provisions of sec. 145(3) and making assessment u/s 144 of the Act.
(iii) Profit on sale of agricultural lands in question was not taxable in view of Explanation 1 to Section 2(1A) read with section 2(14)(ii) or (iii) of the I.T. Act.
(iv) Assessing officer erred in holding that the agricultural land situated outside the specified municipal limits were not capital assets.
(v) Assessing officer erred in treating the sale of agricultural land being exempt and taxing it to be 'business income' as adventure in the nature of the trade
2.7. Apropos the first issue i.e. scope of Sec. 153A and effect on block assessment of any incriminating material not being found during the course of search, 2 issues were raised before CIT(A):
(i) The assessments in the case of assessee had become final and were not abated, therefore, no addition can be made qua the settled issues.
(ii) In any case no addition can be made u/s 153A as no incriminating material was found or relied in this behalf as a result of impugned search.
2.8. CIT(A) apart from various case laws mentioned in the order relied on ITAT Delhi Bench judgment in the case of Shivnath Rai Harnarain (India) Vs. DCIT (2008) 117 TTJ 480, inter alia holding as under:
"From reading s.153A and second proviso to s.153A, it is further clear that on the date of initiation of search or requisition under s.132 or s.132A the pending assessment or reassessments relating to any assessment year falling within a period of six assessment years shall stand abated but assessment or reassessments can be done under s.153A of the Act in cases of completed assessments or in cases where assessments have not been framed due to non filing of returns etc. for the abovementioned assessment years even if such assessment made under .153A is not based on material found during course of search
The word "abate" or "abatement has not been defined in the Act or in the circular. According to Chambers Dictionary the word "abate means demolition on or to put an end to.
In view of our above analysis of the provisions of sections, the contentions of the learned counsel for the assessee have no force because there is no requirement for an assessment made under s.153A of the Act being based on any material seized in the course of Search. Further, under the second proviso to s.153A pending assessment or reassessment proceedings in relation to any assessment year falling within the period of six assessment years referred to in s.153A(b) of the Act shall come to an end (abate), which means that the Assessing Officer gets jurisdiction for six assessment years referred to in s.153A(b) of the Act for making an assessment or reassessment. Further, it is not the contention of the assessee before us that any income, which was already subjected to assessment under s.143(3) or under s.143(3)/ 147 of the Act completed prior to search in respect of six assessment years referred to in s.153A(b) of the Act and in the second proviso to s.153A, has also been included in the assessment framed under s.153A of the Act, Hence, in these circumstances, the contention of the assessee in support of ground Nos. 1 and 2 of its appeal are liable to be rejected and the same are rejected accordingly. Consequent upon our findings given hereinabove, we. hold that in the existing facts and circumstances of the case the Assessing Officer was Perfectly justified in framing assessment under s.153A of the Act for the assessment years under consideration and accordingly the ground Nos. 1 and 2 of the appeal of the assessee are rejected.
iii) The similar issue was recently decided by the Hon'ble De . High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Bhatia vs. CIT in IT No. 1626, 1632, 1998, 20 6, 2019. 2020/2010 dated 7.8.2012 = (2012-TIOL-641-HC-DEL-IT).
In this case the Hon'ble High Court has held that once search is initiated and documents are found, assessment u/s 153A for six A.Ys. prior to search a mandatorily to be made. The operative part is contained in paras no. 18 to 22 of the order of Hon'ble Delhi High Court, which reads as under:
…………….. ."
2.9. After narrating the relevant paras of Hon'ble Delhi High Court judgment in the case of Anil Bhatia (supra), the CIT(A) held this issue against the assessee by following observations:
22. In the light of our discussion, we find it difficult to uphold the view of the Tribunal expressed in Para 9.6 of its order that since the returns of income led by the assessee for all the six years under consideration before the search took lace were processed under Section 143(l)(a) of the Act the provisions of Section 153A cannot be invoked. The Assessing Officer has the power under Section 153A to make assessment for all the six years and compute the total income of the assessee, including the undisclosed income, notwithstanding that the assessee filed returns before the date of search which stood processed under Section 143(1)(a). The other reason given by the Tribunal in the same paragraph of its order that no material was found during the search is factually unsustainable since the entire case and arguments before the departmental authorities as well as the Tribunal had proceeded on the basis that the document embodying the transaction with Mohini Sharma was recovered from the assessee. While summarizing the contentions of the assessee in Paragraph 5 of its order, the Tribunal itself has referred to the contention that no document much less incriminating material was found during the search of the assessee's premises-except one unsigned undertaking for loan. Again in Paragraph 10 of its order, while dealing with the assesse 's contention against the addition of Rs. 1.50.000/- being unexplained loan given to Mohini Sharma, the Tribunal has stated that it has analyzed "the subject document carefully, recovered from search" suggesting that the document was recovered during he search from the assessee. The Tribunal has even proceeded to delete the addition of Rs. 1,50, 000/- as well as the notional interest on merits. holding that the document was unsigned, that Mohini Sharma was not examined by the income tax authorities and there was no corroboration of the unsigned document. If it is not in dispute that the document was found in the course of the search of the assessee, then Section 15A is triggered, Once the Section is triggered} it appears mandatory for the Assessing Officer to issue notices under Section 153A calling upon the assessee to file returns for the six assessment years prior to the year in which the search took place. There are contradictions in the order of the Tribunal. We are unable to appreciate how the Tribunal can say in Para 9.6 that no material was found during the search and at the same time in Paragraph 10 deal with the merits of the additions based on the document recovered during the search which allegedly contain the loan transaction with Mohini Sharma. Therefore, both the reasons given by the Tribunal for holding that the assessments made under Section 153A were bad in law do not commend themselves to us. The result is that the first substantial question of law is answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
IV. Similar finding was given by ITAT, Mumbai in case of ACIT vs. Pratibha Industries Ltd. in ITA NO. 2197 to 2199 /Mumbai/ 2008& others vide order dated 18.12.2012 = (2013-TIOL-50-ITAT-MUM) wherein it was held that assessment u/s 153A are mandatory to be made even if no incriminating documents are seized.
Keeping in view the plain and unambiguous language of provisions of section 153A and case laws mentioned above, the action of the AO in initiating proceedings, u/s 153A and completing the assessment u/s 153A r.w.s. 143(3) is confirmed.
This ground of appeal is accordingly dismissed."
The CIT(A) rejected assessee's both pleas in this behalf.
2.10. Apropos second issue about rejection of books u/s 145(3) of the Act, the CIT(A) rejected the ground of the assessee by following observations:
6.8 As regards rejection of books of accounts u/s 145(3) the AO has observed that the assessee treated the agriculture land as fixed asset in its books of accounts and the receipt on sale of it was shown as capital receipt and the resultant profit has been claimed as exempt. However, as per detailed discussion in the assessment order, the AO came to the conclusion that the books of accounts should be written in manner that they reflect true and correct affairs of the business and that when the AO was not satisfied about the correctness or the completeness of the account of the assessee or where the matter of accounting provided in sub-sec. 1 of sec. 145 or accounting standard as notified under sub. Sec. 2 of sec. 145 have not bee regularly followed by the assessee, the AO may make an assessment in the manner provided in sec. 144 of IT Act. As per AO, the books of accounts of the assessee did not present true and fair picture of account in as much as revenue receipts were claimed as capital receipt and accordingly true income was not reflected. Therefore provisions f 145(3) of IT Act were applied and the income from sale of such land was taxed as business income.
6.8.2 As regards such objection and ground of appellant the appellant has not made any specific submission. Moreover as discussed in detail the transactions of purchase and sale of agricultural land are found to be of adventure in the nature of trade and therefore the same are to be taxable under the business head whereas the appellant in his books of accounts claimed such surplus as exempt income. Therefore the books of account of the appellant cannot said to be correct and true and provisions of sec. 145(3) are definitely applicable.
This ground of appeal is also accordingly stand dismissed"
2.11. Apropos third issue relating to taxability of amount on sale of agricultural land the CIT(A) held as under:
6.6 I have carefully considered the submissions of the appellant as also the finding of the AO. It may be noted that the appellant has purchased such agriculture land at village Baherampur Distt. Gurgaon, measuring 206 canal 1 marlas for total consideration of Rs. 13251000/-. Part of such land has been sold in A.Y, 2007-08 for total sale value of Rs. 32 Cr. The cost of land attributable to such land sold in AY. 2007-08 was arrived at Rs. 5926555/- and accordingly profit on sale of land was arrived at Rs. 314073445/- In A.Y. 2008-09 the land was sold for Rs.62700000/- and cost for land attributable to such sale was at Rs. 3771695/- therefore profit on such sale was determined at Rs. 58928305/-. There is no dispute that the land was an agricultural land and was not a capital asset. The AO has also not disputed the fact of sale of agricultural produce from such land. The land is definitely not within the municipal jurisdiction and this fact is also not disputed by the AO. The AO's case is that such agricultural land was definitely not purchased for agricultural purposes and that the dominant intention and object of the assessee was never to purchase such agricultural land for agricultural purposes or to keep the s e for investment purposes. The AO has accordingly held that the assessee is in the business of sale and purchase of land and that purchase of such agricultural land was with-the dominant object of earning of profit and not to utilize the same for long term investment purposes. This fact is stated to be evidenced from the fact that the land was purchased only during the A.Y. 2006-07 and it was sold in A.Y. 2007-08 & 2008-09 and accordingly substantial profit was booked and earned. The A has also noted that even in the MOU of the appellant company, there is no any major object or any other minor object for purchasing of agricultural land for agricultural operations. The AO keeping in view overall business transactions and nature of activities of the other sister companies of the appellant group has observed that the sole object of the appellant company is to acquire land in and around Gurgaon in Haryana and sell the same on profit. As per AO, such corroborative facts as also facts gathered from business transactions in respect of purchase of such agricultural land by the sister companies also proved that such transactions by appellant company were definitely of business nature. Relying on such facts including corroborative evidence the AO has held that the conduct of the appellant company as a group indicated that such purchase and sale of agricultural land was17 adventure in the nature of trade and therefore surplus amount Rs. 314073445/- arising on such sales in respect of A.Y. 2007-08 was taxed as income from business and profession. Similarly in respect of A.Y. 2008-09, such surplus amounting to Rs. 58928305/- was taxed.
On the other hand the appellant's case is that the agriculture land has been sold at village Baherampur which is not situated in jurisdiction in Gurgaon Municipality and that prior to sale the appellant was cultivating the land and was producing crops namely mustard and bazra etc. Copy of girdawari issued by patwari of the village was also enclosed in the written submission. The crop produced on the said agriculture land was sold to M/s Munshi Ram Banarsidas and Rameshwardas & Sons, commission agents. The appellant's case is that agricultural income is defined u/s 2(lA) of IT Act and that such income on account of sale of agricultural land will not be covered within the meaning of capital asset in view of the fact that only the gain arising from the agriculture land specified in sub clause (iii) of sec. 2(14) comes within the meaning of capital asset. In simple words the agricultural land not situated in municipal area will not be treated as capital asset and surplus arises therefrom will therefore not be liable for capital gain. Therefore such surplus was not taxable as capital gain u/s 45 of IT Act. It is stated that as the agricultural land was not capital asset therefore the other issues whether the appellant was holding the land for agricultural purposes and the period of holding of land was for very less period are of no relevance. It is contended that in respect of agriculture income nature or class of income is relevant and not the recipient of the income and exemption of agriculture income is available irrespective e of character of recipient. The appellant has also referred to sec. 4 of IT Act and it is stated that sec. 4 of is charging section which provides for taxation of total income of the previous year, subject to provisions of sec. 5 to include all income from whatever sources derived and total income u/s 5 is subject exempt item under sec. 10 which provides that is stated to be exempt u/s 10 of IT Act. The appellant has also placed reliance in the case of Hindustan Industrial Resources Ltd. Vs. ACIT (2011) 335 ITR 77 = (2009-TIOL-26-HC-DEL-IT) in which the Hon. Delhi High court has held that when on the date of purchase the land in question was agriculture land and on the date of acquisition the character of land continued to be agriculture land and between these two period i.e. purchase of land and acquisition of this land by 1he competent authority there is no. change in the nature and character of the land then surplus from such sale of land cannot be taxed as capital gain. he appellant in his detailed written submission has essentially contended that the nature of land at the time of purchase as well as at the- time sale was only agricultural and "that such agricultural land being no capital asset therefore such surplus arising on the sale of such land cannot be taxed. The various case laws referred an relied upon by the appellant also stated to be support such proposition of law.
It may be noted that the whole defense of the appellant is mainly revolving over the facts that the said land is agricultural land not situated in municipal area and such land being not a capital asset therefore not liable to Income Tax particularly capital gain. However as discussed earlier all these facts are not disputed by the AO and in fact the AO has not taxed such surplus simply on the basis of these grounds and the AO's case is that such transactions are of business nature being adventure in the nature of trade and therefore such surplus was taxed under the business head. Therefore essentially it is to be examined whether in the given circumstances the action of the AO to treat such transaction as adventure in he nature of trade / business was justified or not. It may be noted that as per definition of business u/s 2(13) of IT Act business includes any-trade, commerce or manufacturing or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. The issue as to what should constitute as adventure in the nature of trade, has been considered and examined by various higher courts.
In the case of R. Dalmia vs. CIT (1982) 137 ITR 665, the Hon. Delhi High Court has held that to determine the nature of transaction, the dominant intention of the assessee has to be seen and if the intention was to embark on adventure in the nature of trade as distinguished from a capital investment it could not make a difference if the transactions is a single and isolated one.
The Hon. MP High Court in the case of Bhagirath Prasad Bilgaiya vs. CIT (1983) 139 ITR 916, has held that reference to an adventure in the nature of trade appearing in the definition of business postulates the existence of the certain elements in the nature of adventure which in law would invest it with the character of trade or business. In other words the Hon. Court has. held that to constitute a transaction as adventure it is not necessary that all parameters of definition of business should be met out and if certain elements of business are manifested in such transaction it can be held to be in the nature of trade or business.
The Hon. Supreme Court in the case of M/s Dalmiya cement Ltd. Vs CIT (1976) 105 ITR 633 = (2002-TIOL-772-SC-IT-LB) has held that to qualify a transaction being adventure in the. nature of trade, the transaction need not relate to assessee's business or to his legal business.
The Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Rajputana Textile Agencies Ltd. VS. CIT (19611 421TR 743 has held that in considering the question where the transaction is or is not an adventure in the nature of trade one has to be take to consideration the intention of the assessee. keeping in view the legal requirements which are associated with concept of trade or business.
The Hon. Allahabad High court in the case of ITO Vs. Rani Ratnesh Kumari (1980) 123 ITR 343 has held that apart from dominant and even sole intention in respect of specific transaction which may qualify for an adventure in the nature of trade, subsequent conduct of the assessee must also be considered
Further the Hon, Supreme Court in the case of G. Venkat swami Naidu & Co. Vs. CIT 35 ITR 594 has held that in cases where purchases have en made solely and exclusively with intention to "resell at a profit and purchaser has no intention of holding property for himself or otherwise enjoying or using it, presence of such an intention is a relevant factor and unless it is obstructed by presence of other factors it could raise a strong presumption that the transaction is an adventure in the nature of trade.
The Hon. Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. Premji Gopalbhai (1978) 113 1TR 785 has held that the sole intention to resell at a profit is a strong factor to determine the transaction as adventure in nature of trade. It is held that even if the land which is not a commercial commodity is purchased and it can be shown that the purchase of the land was made solely and exclusively with an intention to resell it at a profit it would be a strong factor to indicate that the transaction would be an adventure in nature of trade.
The Hon. MP High court in the case of CIT Vs. Jawahar Development Association (1981) 121 ITR 431 has held that the fact that the land is agricultural land is not relevant and the mere fact that the land is an agricultural land cannot make the profit arising from sales exempt from Income Tax.
The appellant's case is to be examined keeping in view the above mentioned broad parameters which justify taxing of such transactions as adventure in the nature of trade. It may be noted that as per Memorandum of Article of Association of the appellant company one of the object incidental to the attainment of the main objects is stated as under:
-To acquire by purchase lease, exchange or otherwise any property and any movable or immovable property and any rights or privileges which the company may deem necessary convenient for the main business of the company."
g) Such incidental object prima facie indicate that one of the main objection, the appellant company is also to acquire by purchase, lease, exchange or otherwise any movable or immovable property
i) It may also be noted that in the said MOU it is nowhere stated or provided that the company will be purchasing agricultural land for carrying out agricultural operation or for keeping such land for long term investment basis. From these facts it is clearly emerged that one of the main object of the appellant company as per MOU is definitely to deal with in immovable property by way of purchase, sale, lease etc. as a business activity and agricultural activity is definitely not a major or incidental object of the appellant company. The appellant in its earlier reply also regularly shown its business as sale, purchase and dealing in real estate.
ii) It may be noted that such agricultural land measuring 206 canal 16 marla was purchased for Rs. 13251000 lacs during A.Y. 2006-07 and in the very next A.Y. i.e. 2007 -08 part of such land (91 kanal 28.5 marla] was sold for Rs.32 cr. Another land measuring 25 kanal 9 marla from the same land purchased in A. Y. 2008-09 was sold in 2008-09 on 6.7.2007 for Rs. 6.26 Cr. The dominant intention of the appellant is clearly manifested by such sale transaction in as much as the appellant has sold such land in a very less period and that, the intention of the appellant was not to hold such land for a substantial period. The above fact indicates that the dominant objective and intention was to purchase such land and to utilize and earn business profit at the earliest possible occasion. Therefore even if the said land was agricultural land the, intention of the appellant; was not to keep it for agricultural purposes or as an investment but to derive profit-at the earliest possible time.
iii) The appellant consist of a group in which there are other corporate entities also and as discussed by the AO the other sister concerns/ companies as also its directors are broadly found to be involved in the business of real estate property. The broad details of such company I individual as discussed by the AO in the assessment order are as under:
a) Marigold Merchandise Pvt. Ltd.
b) Misty Midows Pvt. Ltd.
c) Manglam Multiplex Pvt. Ltd.
d) Dignity Buildcom Pvt. Ltd.
e) M/s Marhsal Buildcon
f) MIs M3M India Ltd.
g) Bonus Builders Pvt. Ltd.
h) Benchmark Infotech Pvt. Ltd.
iv] It may also be stated that the main persons of this group including Sh. Basant Bansal, Sh. Roop Bansal and' other family members also started their career in the business of real estate as land buying agent for M/s EMMAR MGF Group and subsequently by floating many Pvt. Ltd. companies they have expanded their business of real estate to large scale. The companies associated with the appellant company and its directors are definitely found to be engaged in the business of real estate. There is no evidence on record that any agriculture land has been purchased for carrying of agricultural operation for keeping the same for long term basis as an investment. Therefore even from such corroborative / circumstantial evidence it is proved the dominant and main intention of the appellant company w s to purchase such agriculture land to embark on the business transactions of adventure in the nature of trade and to earn the profit at the earliest possible.
v} It may also be stated that the whole of such areas adjoining Gurgaon including Sohna, Dharuheda, Rewari etc. is covered under National Capital Region. In these areas and particularly in the area where the appellant has purchased land though as per revenue record such land may be of agricultural land but for all practical purposes such land is of commercial nature. The appellant definitely purchased such land for the main ~motive of earning of profit in as much as being in the business of property business m and around such area, the appellant was having good business prudence to expect substantial gain in the shortest period.
vi) As regards the claim of the appellant that the land was agricultural and agriculture produce was sold which indicated that agricultural operations were carried out it may be noted that when the land is question is purchased with a motive of using or utilizing as an business asset. to earn profit then such incidental receipts on account of agriculture produce cannot change the nature of such transaction which are prima facie of adventure in the nature of trade".
Aggrieved, assessee is before us in both the years.
3. Ld counsel for the assessee Shri Rakesh Gupta, contends that the only issue effective issue in these appeals pertains to:
(i) Whether in the absence of any incriminating material found as a result of search assessing officer is enabled to make such addition;
(ii) Whether the books of accounts can be rejected u/s 145(3) in the facts and circumstances of the case;
(iii) additions made by Ld. A.O. & confirmed by Ld. CIT(A) on the ground that to profit / gain arising from purchase and sale of specified agricultural land held by assessee as fixed assets, cannot be held as exempt income and is liable to be treated as business income.
3.1. Ld. Counsel reiterated the facts and contends that it has been assumed that because assessee belongs to a group of companies engaged in real estate business, the gains in question, derived from sales of agricultural land by asssesee amounts to adventure in the nature of trade. Consequently such gains which are otherwise exempt as agricultural income are assessable as business income in assessee's hands.
3.2. Adverting further to facts, ld counsel contends that appellant purchased impugned agricultural land at village Behrampur District Gurgaon Haryana, admeasuring 206 kanal 16 Marlas for Rs. 1,32,51,000/-, which is duly reported with return of income for A.Y. 2006-07. The impugned land has been shown as fixed asset in the books of a/cs which are assessed u/s 143(3). The agricultural land is situated beyond 8 km. from the limit of nearest municipal committee. Out of this agricultural land, the appellant sold 92 kanal 8.50 marla for Rs. 32 Crores in AY 2007-08 and balance in AY 2008-09. The said land was purchased and sold as agricultural land by conveyance which is not disputed by Ld. A.O. & by Ld. CIT(A).
3.3. Assessee was searched on 17.09.2008, which lead to impugned assessments which are framed u/s 153A i.e. by way of block assessment for assessing undisclosed income on the basis of any incriminating material found as a result of search. Original assessment for A.Y. 2006-07 was were framed u/s 143(3) in which assessee's claim of income, purchase of this agricultural land is duly disclosed therein. The assessment has been accordingly framed and purchase of agricultural land has been accepted. Except very same original documents no incriminating material was available before AO during the course of 153A assessments. Reference is made to para 3 of the 153A assessment Order which clearly shows that the impugned addition has been made "after examination of return of income, accompanying documents and the details / documents / evidences filed during the course of assessment proceedings……….." which clearly implies that the addition has not been made on the basis of any incriminating evidence found as a result of search, but on the basis of return filed by the assessee and available record. Reading of the entire assessment order reveals that no reference is made to any incriminating material found as a result of search, while making the impugned additions under 153A assessments. This is so because, as a matter of fact, no material, much less the incriminating material qua the impugned additions was discovered as a result of the search.
3.4. One of the ground, before Ld. CIT (A) was to the effect that there being no incriminating evidence found as a result of search qua these additions, hence no such addition can be made u/s 153A i.e. block assessment for assessing undisclosed income, that too by only changing the nature or head of income which is already assessed.
3.5. Detailed arguments, plethora of evidence and catena of judgments were cited before lower authorities. Rejecting them ld. CIT(A) held that there is no such requirement under the law that addition should be based on incriminating material as noted in Para 5.4.3 at page 12, 16 of the appeal order. Ld. Counsel thus submits that at the outset itself, such additions can not at all be made in assessment made u/s 153A on income which is already assessed u/s 143(3) and when no incriminating material in this regard is found as a result of search.
3.6. It is pleaded that, by now it is a settled proposition of law based on Hon'ble Delhi and Rajasthan high court judgments and a catena of ITAT judgments that no additions could be made in the assessment u/s 153A if there is no incriminating material found as a result of search. Following case laws are relied upon:-
(i) All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd. v. DCIT (2012) 18 ITR (Trib) 106 (Mumbai)(SB) = (2012-TIOL-391-ITAT-MUM-SB) for the proposition that in assessments that are abated, the AO retains the original jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction conferred on him u/s 153A for which assessments shall be made for each of the six assessment years separately. In other cases, in addition to the income that has already been assessed, the assessment u/s 153A will be made on the basis of incriminating material, which in the context of relevant provisions means - (i) books of account, other documents, found in the course of search but not produced in the course of original assessment, and (ii) undisclosed income or property discovered in the course of search.
(ii) Gurinder Singh Bawa v. DCIT (2012) 28 Taxmann.com 328 (Mum trib)- for the proposition that where in search assessment under section 153A all assessments pertaining to six immediately preceding assessment years were complete, Assessing Officer cannot make any addition there under unless there is any incriminating material discovered during the search.
(iii) Jai Steel India v. ACIT 259 CTR 281(HC) (Rajasthan)
29. The argument of the learned counsel that the AO is also free to disturb income, expenditure or deduction de hors the incriminating material, while making assessment under s. 153A of the Act is also not borne out from the scheme of the said provision which as noticed above is essentially in context of search and/or requisition……...if taken to its logical end would mean that even in cases where the appeal arising out of the completed assessment has been decided by the CIT(A),ITAT and the high court, on a notice issued under section 153A of the Act, the AO would have power to undo what has been concluded upto the High Court. Any interpretation which leads to such conclusion has to be repelled and/or avoided as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.P. Varghese
(iv) Kusum Gupta v. DCIT, ITA Nos. 4873/Del/2009, (2005-06) 2510 (A.Y. 2003-04), 3312(A.Y. 2004-05) 2833/Del/2011 (A.Y. 2006-07)
15. Since there is no change on this material fact that during all these assessment years no incriminating material was recovered or statement was recorded during the course of search suggesting non-genuineness of the claimed gifts or expenses etc. and no such addition/disallowance was made in the original assessment which remained unabated, we following the decision on the issue hereinabove in the appeal preferred by the revenue for A. A 2002-03, hold that such addition/disallowance cannot be made in the assessment framed u/s 153A of the Act in this A. Y in appeals. In result the issue is decided in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In view of this finding the remaining grounds questioning the merits of additions/disallowances do not need adjudication as they have become infructuous and academic only . Consequently appeals preferred by the assessee for the A.Ys. 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07 are allowed and appeals preferred by the revenue in the A.Ys. 2002-03, 2005-06, 2006-07 are dismissed.
(v) MGF Automobiles Ltd. V. ACIT, ITA No's 4212 & 4213/Del/2011 = (2013-TIOL-747-ITAT-DEL) - In the present case it is apparent that on the date of search be on 12/09/2007, the assessments for assessment year 2004-05 & 2005-06 were already completed. There was no incriminating material found during search for these years as is apparent from arguments of Ld. AR and from records and Ld. Departmental Representative did not bring to our notice regarding any incriminating material having been found during search. Therefore following the Judicial Precedents, we are of the opinion that though assessments for the above year were bound to be reopened but additions could be made only if some incriminating document was found during search.
(vi) Tarannum Zafar Khan Vs. ACIT, ITA Nos. 5888 to 5890/Mum/2009
18.3 One more reason is there that most of the additions have been made in the routine manner as the issue has not been discussed in right perspective in taking into consideration the submission and other evidences filed. It is also a matter of fact that no incriminating material was found during the course of search as only during the assessment proceeding, these expenses were found made through credit cards. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, we delete the addition of Rs.9,057/-.
(vii) Vee Gee Industrial Enterprises vs. ACIT, ITA No. 1/Del/2011 & ITA No.2/Del/2011 = (2013-TIOL-706-ITAT-DEL)
15. In view of the above, we agree with the contentions of assessee and allow ground no.1 of the appeal. In respect of second ground of appeal regarding disallowance of telephone, car expenses etc we observe that no incriminating material was found in respect of such expenses which could enable the Assessing Officer to disallow a part of it during proceedings u/s 153A. This has been held in various pronouncements of various courts and the latest being by Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Jai Steels India vs. CIT in 259 CTR (Raj) 281, where the Hon'ble Court has held that in case of assessment u/s 153A, the completed assessment can be tinkered only on the basis of incriminating material found during search. Therefore, in the present case without any incriminating material Assessing Officer was not justified in making disallowance.
(viii) ITA Nos. 1153 to 1159/Hyd/2012 Mir Mazharuddin, 24.1.2013 addition cannot be made in assessment completed u/s 153A without any reference to the seized material. He further held that it is also not the case of the AO that the seized material if any suggested inflation of agricultural income. He, therefore, concluded that such type of addition cannot be made in the assessment u/s 153A dehorse the material found at the time of search
(ix) Asha Kataria, I.T.A. Nos. 3105, 3106 & 3107/Del/2011 20.5.2013 = (2013-TIOL-420-ITAT-DEL)
52. we find that in this case the assessment was made u/s. 153A of the I.T. Act. Hence, reliance upon the decision of the Special Bench in the case of All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd. (Supra) is also germane and support the case of the assessee. As expounded in this case assessment u/s. 153A can be made only on the basis of incriminating material found during the course of search.
3.7. Ld. Counsel pleads that AO has not referred to any incriminating material found as a result of search while making impugned additions. Ld. CIT (A) has also not rebutted the fact that there is no evidence much less the incriminating evidence found as a result of search. Ignoring the assesses pleadings the ground has been disposed of by Ld. CIT(A) summarily by holding that there is no such requirement under the law that addition should be based on incriminating material. It is vehemently argued that in view of these pleadings and binding judicial precedents, the decision of CIT (A) deserves to be reversed.
3.8. Ld counsel further pleads that even on merit, the impugned addition is not sustainable. The said land was purchased as agricultural land and held as fixed asset in its books of accounts. This has been accepted by 143(3) assessment in A.Y. 2006-07 which has become final. The purchase of agriculture land has also been accepted by Ld. A.O at para 3.4(a) at page 4 of the block assessment order. Ld. CIT(A) has also held that it was agricultural land and was not capital asset in para 6.6, page 39, 40, 43 of the appeal order. Ld counsel then referred to following documents placed on paper book to emphasize these facts:
(i) PB 29-44 is the copy of purchase deed showing the nature of land as agricultural land. This is part of assessment record u/s 143(3) for A.Y. 2006-07.
(ii) PB 45-48 is the sale deed of impugned agricultural land wherein at PB 47 the nature of impugned sold land has been mentioned as agricultural land.
(iii) PB 27-28 is the evidence in the form of certificates from Tehsildar certifying the land as agricultural land and further that it is located beyond 8 Km. from municipal area.
(iv) PB 59-62 is the copy of girdawari showing the growing of agricultural crop on this land.
(v) PB 63-64 is the copy of evidence of sale of agricultural produce.
3.9. It is pleaded that agricultural land situate beyond specified limits of municipal committee, which is not regarded as "capital asset", by legal prescription u/s 2(14) its sale or transfer would not give rise to taxable capital gain. The impugned land being not an asset in the eyes of law, its transfer or sale will not be chargeable as taxable gains by express mandate of the law. The Act further provides that such income, profit or gains would be treated as agricultural income exempt u/s 2(1A)(a) r.w.s 2(14)(iii) r.w.s. 10(1). This was explained in great detail before Ld. CIT(A) by way of submissions and by relying upon catena of judgments in the cases of:
- Manubhai A. Sheth Vs. Second ITO 128 ITR 87 (Bom);
- Nadirshah Rustamji Mulla Vs. ITO 154 ITR 629 (Bom.);
- Sulekha Sandip Parikh Vs. Sixth ITO 159 ITR 775 (Bom);
- Singhai Rakesh Kumar Vs. UOI 247 ITR 150 (SC) = (2002-TIOL-545-SC-IT-LB);
- Raghottama Reddy Vs. ITO 169 ITR 174 (A);
- Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. Vs. ACIT 32 SOT 497 (Cochin).
3.10. Reference is made to PB 187 which is a chart showing agricultural income returned for various years, which is ironically accepted and assessed as such by the department.
3.11. Before Ld. CIT(A) it was inter alia demonstrated that profit on sale of agricultural land is not taxable relying upon Delhi High Court decision in the case of Hindustan Industries Resources Ltd. Vs. ACIT 335 ITR 77 = (2009-TIOL-26-HC-DEL-IT) for the proposition that possible future intent of different use of the agricultural land held is not material nor is the quantum of surplus on sale and status of the recipient, these factors do not alter the nature of agricultural land. Besides it has been held by various judicial precedents that even the real estate companies can hold the portfolio of land as agricultural land. Case laws relied on are:
- Gordhanbhai Kahandas Dalwadi Vs. CIT 127 ITR 664(Guj);
- Dr. Motibai D. Patel Vs. CIT 127 ITR 671 (Guj);
- Manibhai Motibhai Patel Vs. CIT 131 ITR 120(Guj);
- CWT Vs. Shashiben 205 CTR 298(Guj).
3.12. It is further contended that the impugned agricultural land right from the year of purchase in A.Y. 2006-07 was held as fixed asset i.e. as an investment in books of accounts and was never held as business asset. This is evident from the fact that it was shown as fixed asset and not as stock in trade in balance sheet. Further, no development work whatsoever was undertaken by the appellant nor any license for commercial exploitation was applied so as to suggest even any future intention for non agricultural use. The land was purchased and sold in kanals and marlas and not in yardage or feet. Neither any plotting was done, nor change of land use (CLU) was applied. Thus looking from any angle there is no iota of evidence or any incriminating material to indicate that there was even any endeavour much less any future intent to use land for non agricultural purposes. The facts and record clearly demonstrate that no real estate development activity was done by the assessee qua impugned agricultural land.
3.13. Before Ld. CIT (A) appellant duly met with and distinguished as well as the A.O's reliance on the decision of Madhya Pradesh High court in the case of CIT Vs. Jawahar Developers 127 ITR 431.
3.14. Reliance is placed on the ratio of decision of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case ofManibhai A. Seth Vs. ITO 128 ITR 387, holding in identical facts that the land was agricultural land.
3.15. Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of DLF Housing and Construction P. Ltd. Vs. CIT 9 Taxmann 207 (Delhi) observed that burden to prove that a particular transaction is not of agricultural land, squarely lies on revenue and when no steps are taken by assessee to develop the land, it retained its character as agricultural land.
3.16. Following other case laws cited before Ld. CIT (A) apropos his query about drawing adverse inference on the phenomenal growth in the land prices are also cited before us:.
(i) Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. H.V. Mungale [1983] 12 Taxman 201 (Bom.)"while determining the character or the nature of the land, it must necessarily be taken into account that the land which is recorded as agricultural land in the revenue papers cannot be used for non-agricultural purposes by the owner, unless the land is allowed to be converted to non-agricultural purposes by appropriate authorities."
(ii) In Sercon (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1982] 136 ITR 881 (Guj.), the land in question was not used for agricultural purposes, but it was shown in the revenue records as an agricultural land and as no permission had been taken for non-agricultural user under the Bombay Land Revenue Code and there was no evidence of preparation, etc., it was held that the land retained its character as an agricultural land and, hence, the surplus realised on its sale was not capital gains liable to tax.
(iii) CIT vs. Debbile Alemao (Smt.) (2010) 46 DTR 341 (Bom.) = (2010-TIOL-752-HC-MUM-IT) Land which was shown as agricultural land in the revenue records and never sought to be used for non agricultural purposes by the assessee till it was sold has to be treated as agricultural land, even though no agricultural income was shown by the assessee from this land, and therefore, no capital gain was taxable on the sale of the said land.
(iv) D.L.F. United Ltd. 158 ITR 342 HC DELHI
"15. It would be apparent that if the assessee-company had sold this land without development or conversion into plots to somebody else, it would not be liable to tax. The liability to tax would arise if it had made a scheme for converting the agricultural land into urban plots. So, we would answer the second question on the basis that the receipt in this case is in the nature of a capital gain resulting from the acquisition of agricultural land and the fact that the land was lying fallow and not being used for agriculture makes no difference."
That in the sale deeds of the lands in question specifically mentioned the fact that the said land is agricultural land this is also mentioned in the land description that its entry in the land revenue records of the state government is its self, a prima facie evidence that demonstrate that the said land is not meant for any other purpose what to say any non-agricultural purpose. Further, the sale deeds also mentioned "That the said land has not notified under section 4 or 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 either for the planned development or for any other purpose" that means the future intend use cannot be other than agricultural purposes viz to undertake any commercial activity that demonstrates, whatsoever, 'Adventure in the nature of trade'.
(v) Shri K. Gnaneshwar Dt. 19.12.2012 ITA No.526A/Hyd/2005 : AY 2000-01, ITA No.508/Hyd/2007, ITA No.543/Hyd/2006, ITA No.226/Hyd/2007, ITA No.1407/Hyd/2010, & IT(SS)A No.44/Hyd/2009
"para 47 There is no material on record to show that the assessee carried on activities of buying and selling of land in a systematic manner so as to justify the action of the Revenue authorities in treating the activity of the assessee as an adventure in the nature of trade. The land was sold in acreage and not by making plots. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the sale of land cannot be considered as an adventure in the nature of trade and income derived from such sale should be treated as agricultural income……Para 57 the nature of land sold is of agricultural nature, and hence the income derived on the sale of such land have to be treated as agricultural income exempt under S.10 of the Act"
3.17. There is no legislative intention which deprives any business group to hold any such products or commodity which are in its capital investment to tax it as business income.
A. Business entity is allowed to have any commodity as its capital investment account, even it is dealing in real estate. Similar observation was also given by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Hindustan Industrial Resources Ltd. (supra).
B. Secondly, maintenance of investment and trading share port folio by assessee has been allowed and clarified in the case of share trading entities by the CBDT vide Circular no. 4/2007, dated 15-6- 2007, which emphasizes that it is possible for a tax payer to have two portfolios, i.e., an investment portfolio comprising of securities which are to be treated as capital assets and a trading portfolio comprising of stock-in-trade which are to be treated as trading assets. Where an assesse has two portfolios, the assessee may have income under both heads i.e., capital gains as well as business income."
Reliance is further placed on the recent judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Delhi Apartments Pvt. Ltd. (ITA 569/2012 judgment delivered on: 07.03.2013) para 7 = (2013-TIOL-195-HC-DEL-IT) thereof; holds that an assessee could hold lands both as business asset or as an investment. There is no bar on an assessee who is in business of sale-purchase of land, also to hold land as an investment which will be capital asset. In these circumstances, the Tribunal held that the assessee could very well be a trader in land as well as an investor in land simultaneously, depending on what his intention was and how he treated the asset in question. Hon'ble High Court upheld the Tribunal's finding that in the present case, the land was purchased and was shown as an asset in the balance sheet and that the land had also been used for agricultural purposes which led the Tribunal to the inference that the land was held as an asset and, therefore, the assessee had appropriately offered it for taxation under the head 'capital gains."
3.18. Without prejudice to above, ld counsel contends that assesses books were rejected without any justification whatsoever. No inconsistencies or complexity have been pointed out about inability to determine the assessee's true income. Books of accounts are audited and in order to willy- nilly reject the books it was done by a presumptuous plea that land ought to have been treated as stock in trade. In umpteen no of assessments, heads of income, nature of expenses from capital to revenue or vice versa are changed. It doesn't imply that AO will reject duly maintained books of accounts in every such case. There was no justification for lower authorities to reject the books just to change the head or interpret the law in their own way. For the sake of arguments even if such agricultural land is treated as business asset yet the gain from it would nonetheless be exempt as agricultural income.
3.19. Further reliance is placed on the ratio of decisions for this proposition in the cases of:
- CIT Vs. Sir Kameshwar Singh 3 ITR 305 (PC);
- Hindustan Resources Ltd. Vs. ACIT 335 ITR 77 (Del.) (2009-TIOL-26-HC-DEL-IT);
- Raja Mustafa Ali Khan Vs. CIT 16 ITR 330 (PC);
- CIT Vs. Diwan Bahadur S.L. Mathias 7 ITR 48 (PC);
- K. Simrathmull vs. CIT 64 ITR 166 (Mad.);
CIT Vs. Manilal Somnath 106 ITR 917 (Guj.);
- Maganlal Morarbhai Vs. CIT 118 ITR 224 (Guj.); and
- CIT Vs. Madhabhai H. Paatel 208 ITR 638 (Guj.).
3.20. Ld counsel for the assessee endeavored to dislodge various observations and inferences drawn by lower authorities.
(i) AO has mentioned that appellant was in the business of real estate as explained in the reply filed during assessment proceeding and also in earlier years and only activity performed is purchase and sale of land and also in the computation of income, nature of business has been mentioned as real estate business. In reply it is submitted that this observation of Ld. AO is incorrect as the company was incorporated on 161.2004 and the subject transaction of purchase in A.Y. 2006-07 which is accepted u/s 143(3) and sale in A.Y. 2007-08 is only transaction of purchase and sale.
(ii) AO has mentioned that crop inspection book filed by the assessee shows that the name of the owner is Mukandi and not the appellant. In reply it is submitted that the said land was given on batai to Mukandi and that is how his name appears (PB 10). Even otherwise, if it is not the case of the AO that appellant was not the owner of subject land, then there is no question of taxing the gain on sale resulting from such land. In fact, CIT(A) has mentioned in his order that only dispute is about the head of income and thus the controversy raised by AO is not of any significance.
(iii) AO has mentioned that though the land was agricultural but it was so in revenue record only and that there was no evidence to show that the land was held for agricultural purpose. In reply, it is submitted that this observation of AO is to the utter disregard of evidence before him and placed in the paper book, reference to which has been made above (PB 59-62, 63-64, 187). Moreover, Ld. CIT(A)'s finding at page 39, 40, 43 of the appeal order is relied upon.
(iv) AO has held that short duration which the subject land was held by the assessee and group companies dealing in real estate business means that appellant was in the business of real estate. It is submitted that this proposition was raised by CIT(A) consequently it is proposed to be dealt below.
3.21. Adverse observations of Ld. CIT(A) are met as under by the counsel:-
(i) Ld. CIT(A) has mentioned that though the land was agricultural land but since it was purchased and sold at short interval, it shows that it was purchased with an intention to do business. Also, MOA also indicates shows the objective of real estate business of the appellant.
In reply, it is submitted that MOA may contain various objectives but what has to be seen on facts as to what has actually been done by the company. Appellant company was undisputably entitled to purchase agricultural land as fixed asset and derive agricultural income there from which has been offered and taxed as agricultural income. Thus, actual activity has to be seen instead what is mentioned in the MOA. MOA's object clause is so comprehensively worded so as to include right from fishing trade to aeroplane manufacturing. Thus, object clause should not be the sole criteria to the utter disregard of the evidence and actual activity undertaken. Reliance is placed on:
- ITO Vs. Neon Property P Ltd. ITA no. 1171/Del/2011 dated 13.5.2011;
- CIT. vs. PKN Co. Ltd. 60 ITR 65 (SC)
Merely because agriculture land was purchased in one year and sold as such in other year, alone is not enough, to term it as activity of business. Objective of best possible earnings from an investment is always there and is not prohibited by any law. There is no proposition of law that investment in agricultural land unless held for a particular number of years would cease to be investment or the asset as non agricultural land. If market price of investment i.e. agricultural land has substantially appreciated, no prudence demands that it should still be retained and not liquidated.
Land was purchased in Kanals and Marlas, sold in Kanals and marlas, not purchased/sold in yardage, no CLU applied, no developmental work undertaken, no approvals taken, no plotting done- all these factors amply demonstrate that intention was not to do business with this land.
Without prejudice to above, even if it is assumed that impugned agricultural land was purchased and sold with the dominant intention to do business, though contested yet it is submitted that even then, the gain retains the character of agriculture income and do not become business income.
(ii) Ld. CIT(A) has extensively quoted case laws to show that the impugned nature of purchase and sale of land may constitute an adventure in the nature of trade.
In the synopsis filed before ITAT, ld counsel has filed a chart and detailed case laws wise submissions to demonstrate that facts of the case laws cited by Ld. CIT(A) to hold various proposition against assessee are entirely different than those of the appellant. In as much as they deal with issues of sale of shares under different portfolios, no. of transactions of land, sold land measured in square feet or meters etc.. They are not being repeated for the sake of brevity.
(iii) Ld. CIT(A) has held that since the group to which the appellant belongs was in real estate business, consequently appellant's impugned transaction of purchase and sale of agricultural land, also becomes trading asset and also from the fact that land in and around Gurgaon was quite lucrative business proposition.
In reply, it is submitted that it is a misconceived finding. Assessee company is an independent and incorporated entity, in the eyes of law and it maintains/ carries out its independent affairs. Merely because other group companies have business transaction it cannot result into a colored assumption that assessee is also having business activities, therefore its fixed asset should be deemed to be trading assets. Further, only because land in and around Gurgaon can fetch better price, it can not be the reason to term the investment in agriculture as trading asset by such outlandish presumptions. It has been held by several judicial authorities that even real estate companies can hold agricultural land is fortified by following judicial decisions:-
- DLF United Ltd. 161 ITR 714(Del),- ITO. Vs. Neon Property P Ltd. ITA no. 1171/Del/2011 dated 13.5.2011
- Delhi Apartments P Ltd. ITA 569/2012 dated 7.3.2013 (Del)(HC) (2013-TIOL-195-HC-DEL-IT)
4. Ld. CIT(DR), on the other hand, apropos jurisdictional issue contends that the case laws relied on by the ld. Counsel for the assessee in the case of Jai Steel India (supra), the facts were different in the sense that in original assessment the assessee had not claimed sales-tax incentives to be capital in nature. After the search in 153A assessment assessee claimed that the assessing officer should now grant deduction thereon, reducing it from the income by treating it to be capital receipt. Ld. DR referred to the question of law in this behalf. In these peculiar facts the decision was rendered rejecting the assessee's claim for reduction of such income. Ld. CIT(A) has in detail considered the plain and unambiguous language of provision of sec. 153A and upheld the assessment. His order is relied on.
4.1. Apropos rejection of books of accounts,, it is contended that it has not been disputed that assessee is group of host of companies together are combinedly engaged in real estate operations at a large scale. The assessee itself in reply dated 26-10-2010 on the queries raised by assessing officer regarding business activities of the company submitted the following reply:
"The assessee is carrying on the business of developing various land projects as well as deals in sale and purchase of land and has occupied the following business premises used as Registered office of the company and paid rent amounted to Rs. 12000/- during the year under consideration."
4.2. Thus assessee itself has admitted that it was carrying on business of developing various land projects, sales deals and purchase of land. The assessee has maintained books of accounts in a manner to camouflage its real activities in the name of holding the land as fixed asset and avoid tax by colourable and dubious claims. All these facts put together make out a justifiable case of rejection of books u/s 145(3). Order of lower authorities is relied on.
4.3. Apropos the merits of the case, ld. DR contends that a host of companies were launched by Basant Bansal family under various names. They started the career as buying agent for another real estate giant MGF group. Subsequently the assessee group started acquiring land through various companies of the group and transferred it to M/s Manglam Multiplex Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Dignity Buildcom Pvt. Ltd.; M/s Marshall Buildcon Pvt. Ltd.; M/s M3M India Ltd. Assessing officer has taken a holistic picture to uncover the assessee's effort, endeavored to indulge in hide and seek behind the mist of corporate entities and shielding its activities behind a corporate veil. Assessing officer has demonstrated that the land purchased by the assessee was not meant for carrying out agricultural activities but with the main object to make profits by selling it to builders and developers. Reliance is placed on following case laws for the proposition that in such circumstances the addition can be made.
- CIT Vs. Sutlej Cotton Mills supply Agency 100 ITR 706;
- R. Dalmia vs. cIT (1992) 137 ITR 665 (Del.);
- CIT Vs. Jawahar Development Association 127 ITR 431 (MP)'
- Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT 82 ITR 363 (SC) (2002-TIOL-383-SC-IT).
4.4. Coming to the legal arguments, Sec. 2(1A)/ 2(14)(iii) r.w.s. 10(1), ld. CIT(DR) contends that the main argument of the assessee is to be effect that the land in question is outside the specified municipal limits and such land being not a capital asset is not liable to income-tax tax. Assessing officer has not taxed the gains on the basis that purchase and sale of land by the assessee is an adventure in the nature of trade and the surplus is liable to be taxed as business income. As per Sec. 2(13) of the I.T. Act, business includes any trade, commerce or manufacturing or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade. In the case of R. Dalmia 137 ITR 665 the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has held that for determining the nature of the transaction the dominant intention of the assessee is to be seen.
4.5. To determine that assessees venture was in the nature of trade or from a capital investment. Entries in the books of a/cs are not material and the real nature of transaction is to be seen. Reliance is placed on Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment in the case of Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra). Similar view has been held in various other case laws relied on by the CIT(A) in his order. It is further pleaded that the MOA of the assessee no where provides that it will be purchasing agricultural land for carrying out agriculture operation or for keeping such land for long term basis. Thus, the agriculture activity claimed to be carried on by the assessee is neither a major nor an incidental object of the assessee company. The short period of holding and the amount of huge earning itself indicates that the object of the assessee was not to hold the land as agriculture land but to engage in the business of selling it to earn huge profits. It is pleaded that, therefore, the addition has been rightly confirmed by the lower authorities. Their orders are relied on.
5. We have heard rival contentions and gone through the relevant material placed on record. Coming to the first issue, the legality of addition, it is settled law that in block assessment consequent to search u/s 153A read with sec. 143(3) no addition can be made unless some incriminating material in this behalf is found as a result of search. It emerges from record that no incriminating material in behalf of the purchase of these lands and sale of these lands have been found as a result of search. In any case the whole issue revolves around the change of nature of income i.e. from exempt to taxable as business income. The purchases of agricultural land has been accepted by department as part of fixed asset/ investment of the assessee by assessment u/s 143(3). Both the lower authorities have rather relied only on the original return of income, returns on record and explanations filed by the assessee and not on any incriminating material found as a result of search. Besides, ld. DR has not been able to point out any incriminating material found as a result of search or the reliance of the lower authorities thereon. Ld. DR has endeavored to distinguish the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court judgment in the case of Jai Steel India (supra) from assessee's case which the ld. Counsel for the assessee has effectively countered by citing paras 25-26 of this judgment, as under:
"25. The argument of the learned counsel that the AO is also free to disturb income, expenditure or deduction de hors the incriminating material, while making assessment under section 153A of the act is also not borne out from the scheme of the said provision which as noticed above is essentially in context of search and/or requisition. The provisions of Sections 153A to 153C cannot be interpreted to be a further innings for the AO and/or assessee beyond provisions of Sections 139(return of income), 139(5) (revised return of income), 147 (income escaping assessment) and 263 (revision of orders) of the Act.
26. The plea raised on behalf of the assessee that as the first provision provides for assessment or reassessment of the total income in respect of each assessment year falling within the six assessment years, is merely reading the aid provision in isolation and not I the context of the entire section. The words 'assess' or 'reassess' have been used at more than one place in the Section and a harmonious construction of the entire provision would lead to an irresistible conclusion that the word 'assess' has been used in the context of an abated proceedings and reassess has been used for completed assessment proceedings, which would not abate as they are not pending on the date of intimation of the search or making of requisition and which would also necessarily support the interpretation that for the completed assessments, the same can be tinkered only based on the incriminating material found during the course of search or requisition of documents."
5.1. The issue is not of the legal challenge to the block assessment itself, the assessee's grounds and contentions agitate one legal issue i.e. whether in the absence of any incriminating material found during the course of search addition can be made by assessing officer as undisclosed income u/s 153A. More so when all these transactions are disclosed by the assessee in the original returns of income and accepted by the department a such. Thus merely because a search is conducted and even though no incriminating material is found as a result thereof the original assessment of the assessee can not be reviewed or substituted by a change of opinion about any claim of deduction, allowance or claim of exempt income.
5.2. In our considered view, Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Anil Bhatia (supra) though has held that consequent to search assessing officer has to frame the block assessment for 6 years. Nevertheless the other issue which has been held is to the effect that addition under block assessment cannot be made u/s 153A as undisclosed income if no incriminating material is found as a result of search. This has been followed by Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Jai Steel India (supra). By now various Benches of the ITAT including Delhi have upheld this view and deleted such additions which are not based on incriminating material found as a result of search which are cited by the ld. Counsel and are mentioned above. In view thereof, on this issue we hold that the assessing officer could not have made these additions in the impugned assessee u/s 153A, there being no incriminating material indicating any undisclosed income found as a result of search. This ground of the assessee is accordingly allowed.
5.3. Coming to the rejection of books of a/cs, the assessee maintained regular books of a/cs which are duly audited. No inconsistencies or defects have been pointed out therein. The assessee has purchased the land as agriculture land which is evidenced by the purchase deed. This has been accepted by department u/s 143(3) in A.Y. 2006-07. The assessee has claimed to have carried out agriculture operations and earned agriculture income which is offered in the return of income, which is accepted. Conveyance of sale of land also demonstrates that the land in question was agriculture land. It has not been disputed that the assessee on its own as an independent entity has not carried out any development activity or moved any application for commercial exploitation of the land to any local, state or Central agency. These glaring facts and circumstance do not raise any occasion for rejection of books. If at all, the assessing officer could have changed the head of income by exercising his assessment power. In the absence of any worthwhile defect in the books of accounts, rejection of books was unjustified. This ground of the assessee is also allowed.
5.4. Coming to the merits of the case, the main allegation of the lower authorities is to the effect that the assessee group taken as a whole was engaged in various activities of real estate development, therefore, an inference has been drawn that the assessee also should be deemed to be engaged in real estate business. In our considered view this assumption has no legs to stand. First of all lower authorities have not demonstrated that the assessee as a group was engaged in dubious and colourable devices. In a big group launching of several corporate entities is permissible by law and each company is an independent assessee in the eyes of law and separately assessed. Their activities are to be analyzed on the basis of actual activities and cannot be ignored merely because the associate concern is engaged in some other activities. Thus, this inference by lower authorities amounts to a pure guess work and conjecture which we are unable to subscribe. Therefore, group companies' business activities, which are distinct and separate entities, cannot be held as a factor to discard the assessee's actual activity, which is evidenced by record. Further, it has been demonstrated by the assessee that it was mainly solitary transaction of the assessee to hold the agriculture land in question as fixed asset, carry out agriculture operation thereon and sell it as agriculture land. We do not find any facts on record to hold any other view. Thus, we are unable to subscribe the view that assessee was engaged in adventure in the nature of trade.
5.5. Coming to the nature of agriculture land and its geography, it has not been disputed that the land in question was situated outside the specified municipal limits and as per the prescription of sec. 2(14) it does not amount to an asset. In order to come under the cane of capital gains, the law has first to qualify as an asset as per I.T. Act. The income arising from the sale of agriculture land falls u/s 2(14)(iii) read with sec. 10(1) and is to be treated as agriculture income. The interpretation put by the lower authorities is out landish and based on surmises and conjectures, divorced from the actual facts.
5.6. Apropos the lower authorities holding that the assessee was into adventure in the nature of trade, therefore, the nature, geography and activity of the land should be ignored, the statutory provisions should be given a go bye and assessee is to be some how held as engaged in the adventure in the nature of trade and taxed on exempt income. In our view, there is no enabling provision in the income tax prescribing that even if the assessee's income is exempt by a provision, then it can be forcibly brought into the tax net by assuming the assessee's activity to be adventure in the nature of trade. It is a settled position by Hon'ble Delhi High court in Delhi Apartments Pvt. Ltd. and DLF United Ltd. (supra) that real estate companies can also hold separate port folio of land as stock in trade and as investment port folio; the sale of investment portfolio is always taxed as capital gains. Thus, assuming worst against assessee, even if it is inferred that it has carried on business activity so long as it holds specified agriculture land in terms of sec. 2(14) i.e. not being an asset; its transfer will neither attract capital gain tax nor can be treated as business income. In view of the foregoing and respectfully following the case law cited by the assessee we have no hesitation but to hold that the assessee's gains were profits from sale of specified agriculture land which does not come within the definition of asset as prescribed u/s 2(14) and by virtue of sec. 2(1A)(a) read with sec. 2(14)(iii) r.w.s. 10(1) the assessee's gains from sale of such agriculture land are exempt income. Thus, assessee succeeds on all the counts.
6. In the result, assessee's appeals for both the assessment years in question are allowed.
(Order pronounced in open court on 27.12.2013)




2014-TIOL-75-ITAT-MUM
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
BENCH 'G' MUMBAI
CO No.204/M/2013
Assessment Year: 2003-2004
ITA No.879/M/2011
NIKKI AGARWAL
601, A-WING, AURUS CHAMBERS
BEHIND MAHINDRA TOWERS
S S AMRUTWAR MARG
WORLI, MUMBAI-400013
PAN NO:AEIPA3109A
Vs
ASSTT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
CENTRAL CIRCLE-32, MUMBAI
ITA No.879/M/2011
Assessment Year: 2003-2004
ASSTT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
CENTRAL CIRCLE-32, MUMBAI
Vs
NIKKI AGARWAL
720/A-5, LOK BHARTI CHS LTD
MAROL MAROSHI ROAD, MAROL
ANDHERI (E), MUMBAI-400059
ITA No.8915/M/2010
Assessment Year: 2004-2005
NIKKI AGARWAL
C/O M/s RAVI & DEV
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS
377-B, FIRST FLOOR, JAGANNATH 
SHANKER SETH MARG, CHIRA BAZAR
MUMBAI-400002
Vs
ASSTT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
CENTRAL CIRCLE-32, MUMBAI
ITA No.8916/M/2010
Assessment Year: 2005-2006
NIKKI AGARWAL
C/O M/s RAVI & DEV
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS
377-B, FIRST FLOOR, JAGANNATH 
SHANKER SETH MARG, CHIRA BAZAR
MUMBAI-400002
Vs
ASSTT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
CENTRAL CIRCLE-32, MUMBAI
ITA No.880/M/2011
Assessment Year: 2005-2006
ASSTT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
CENTRAL CIRCLE-32, MUMBAI
Vs
NIKKI AGARWAL
C/O M/s RAVI & DEV
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS
377-B, FIRST FLOOR, JAGANNATH 
SHANKER SETH MARG, CHIRA BAZAR
MUMBAI-400002
D Karunakara Rao, AM And S T M Pavalan, JM
Date of Hearing: December 6, 2013
Date of Decision: January 22, 2014
Appellant Rep by: Shri Devendra Mehta
Respondent Rep by: Shri Pritam Singh, DR
Income Tax Sections - 14A, 68, 132/132A, 143(1), 143(2), 143(3), 153A - Whether when there are no incriminating materials found during the search, no addition can be made in the case of completed assessment - Whether the disallowance made u/s 68 is to be treated as uncalled for as the same is beyond the scope of section 153A / 153C of the Act.

A) Assessee
 is an individual. A search and seizure action was carried out at the office and residential premises of the assessee. AO made addition on account of 'sale proceeds on shares of Database Finance Ltd', which are otherwise accounted in the books of accounts, towards unexplained expenditure relating to the long term capital gains on sale of the same shares. 

CIT (A) confirmed the additions made by AO. Assessee questioned the addition and the validity of the assessment u/s 153A. Assessee contended that no seized material was used for making the additions either on account of inflated investment or on account of disallowance u/s 14A of the Act. Considering the fact that no incriminating material was found from the assessee's premises during the search action, the notice u/s 153A was not required to be issued. Even it is issued validly, no addition can be made in the cases of completed assessments without the support of the incriminating material issued or acquired in search action u/s 132 / 132A of the Act.

Revenue contended that the first proviso to section 153A empowers the AO to issue notice u/s 153A of the Act in respect of the 6 AYs prior to the assessment year in which the search took place. The relevance of the existence of incriminating material is not provided in the said provisions. There should not be any difference qua the completed assessments and the abated assessments for all six AYs in so far as the powers of the AO is concerned and make additions either based in the incriminating material or otherwise.

Assessee contended that in case of completed assessments, AO is empowered to made additions only based on the incriminating materials and not otherwise. For making the routine additions, which are normally done in the regular assessments, the completed assessment need not be disturbed by invoking the provisions of section 153A of the Act if not for reiterating the returned or assessed income as the case may be.

B) AO made addition u/s 68 on account of 'unexplained gifts received by the assessee'. 

C) AO made disallowance u/s 14A r.w.r. 8D. Assessee contended that the issue being applicability of section 14A, the AO erroneously applied the Rule 8D for the assessment year in question which actually applicable form the assessment year 2008-09. The issue may be sent back to AO for fresh adjudication. 

After hearing both the parties, the ITAT held that,

A) ++ there is no incriminating material before the AO to support the above additions. The valuation report, which is garnered by the authorities constitutes mere estimates and the provisions of section 132 is not required to obtain such report from the DVO. AO has not used even the said valuation report and the AO disallowed what is reported in the books. It is certainly not based on either the unaccounted books of accounts of the assessee or books not produced to the AO earlier or the incriminating material gathered by the investigation wing of the revenue. Thus, such assessments or additions are unsustainable in law. In views of the judgement of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Jain Steels (India) Ltd. the additions made by the AO in the absence of any incriminating material are not sustainable;

B) ++ the disallowance made u/s 68 is uncalled for as the same is beyond the scope of section 153A / 153C of the Act. No incriminating material in support of the additions made u/s 68 of the Act was brought to our notice by the Revenue. Therefore, the addition made u/s 68 of the Act is deleted;

C) ++ considering the factual matrix of the case as well as the prayer of the assessee for remanding, we proceed to set aside the ground raised by the assessee for fresh adjudication considering the judgment of Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. and adopting the "reasonable basis" and after rejecting the basis adopted by the assessee.
Assessee's appeal partly allowed
Case laws followed:
Shri Govind Agarwal vs. ACIT vide ITA Nos.3389/M/2011 (AY: 2002-2003) and ITA No. 3390/M/2011 (AY: 2004-2005)

Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT (2010-TIOL-564-HC-MUM-IT)
ORDER
Per: Bench:
There are five appeals under consideration. Out of these five appeals, there is a couple of cross appeals for the AYs 2003-04 and 2005-2006 and appeal ITA No. 8915/M/2010 is filed by the assessee for the AY 2004-2005. All these five appeals are filed against the common order of the CIT (A)-41, Mumbai dated 25.11.2010. Since, the issues raised in all these 5 appeals are identical, therefore, for the sake of convenience, they are clubbed, heard combinedly and disposed of in this consolidated order.
2. At the outset, Shri Devendra A. Mehta, Ld Counsel for the assessee brought our attention that there is a delay of 51 days in filing the Cross Objections before the Tribunal. In this regard, Ld Counsel brought our attention the affidavit dated 3.10.2013 filed by him and read out the relevant contents of the same which read as under:
"i)……
ii) Shri Nand Kishor Katwankar is office assistant working in my office since 1985. He is usually assigned the work of submitting and collecting documents from the Income Tax Department of various clients. He collected the grounds of appeal of Ms. Nikki Agarwal for the AY 2003-2004.
iii) Usually, the documents collected from Income Tax Department are placed before me for reviews. However, as I was out of town, he kept the grounds of appeal in relevant file but inadvertently, did not bring it to my notice for further action.
iv) As soon as the file was put up for before me for preparation of written submission, I noticed that the Cross Objection against the Revenue's appeal were not prepared and filed before the Hon'ble Tribunal.
v) I reiterate that the above mistake was a bona fide mistake and an inadvertent lapse on our part and assessee should not be allowed to suffer because of it."
2.1. In this regard, Ld Counsel for the assessee relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors [1987] 167 ITR 471 = (2002-TIOL-444-SC-LMT); another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Concold of India Insurance Co. Ltd vs. Smt. Nirmala Devi, 118 ITR 507 and some other decisions of the Hon'ble High Courts of which are relevant for the proposition that "the delay in filing of appeal due to lapse on part of assessee's Counsel who was looking after tax matters, is a sufficient cause for condonation of delay."
2.2 On hearing the above submissions of the Ld Counsel and after hearing the Ld DR on this issue, we find that there is a reasonable and sufficient cause for delay of 51 days in filing the Cross Objections before the Tribunal, considering the same, we condone the delay and proceed to adjudicate the appeal on merits.
3. Firstly, we shall take up the cross appeals for the AY 2003-2004. In these two cross appeals, CO No. 204/M/2013, is filed by the assessee and the grounds raised in this appeal read as under:
"1. The Ld CIT (A) erred in law and facts in holding that the AO was empowered to make additions in the order passed u/s 153A of the Act in respect of completed assessment even in the absence of incriminating material found as a result of search.
2. The ACIT erred in law and as well as in the facts in making addition of Rs. 34,87,500/- on account of sale proceeds of shares of Database Finance Ltd and Rs. 1,74,375/- on account of unexplained expenses relating to long term capital gain on sale of shares and Database Finance Ltd in the order passed u/s 153A even in the absence of incriminating material found as a result of search."
4. Briefly stated relevant facts of the case are that the assessee is an individual. The assessee's income consists of interest, capital gains and other miscellaneous income. A search and seizure action was carried out at the office and residential premises of the assessee on 3.1.2008. In connection with the search action u/s 132 and in response to the notice u/s 153A, assessee filed the return of income declaring the total income of Rs. 90,390/- against the original return of income filed on 26.11.2003. Assessment was completed u/s 153A r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act after determining the assessed income of Rs. 37,52,20/-. Assessment has reached finality and the AO made addition on account of 'sale proceeds on shares of Database Finance Ltd', which are otherwise accounted in the books of accounts, towards unexplained expenditure relating to the long term capital gains on sale of the same shares. Matter travelled to the first appellate authority.
5. During the proceedings before the, after considering the submissions made by the assessee, CIT (A) confirmed the above additions made by the AO. Aggrieved with the above decision of the CIT (A), the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal by raising the above mentioned grounds.
6. During the proceedings before us, Shri Devendra Mehta, ld Counsel for the assessee raised the above mentioned grounds and questioning the additions and the validity of the assessment u/s 153A of the Act. In this regard, Ld Counsel for the assessee submitted various arguments before us, which are common to the ones already mentioned in detail and adjudicated by us in connection with the appeals filed in the case of Shri Govind Agarwal vs. ACIT vide ITA Nos.3389/M/2011 (AY: 2002-2003) and ITA No. 3390/M/2011 (AY: 2004-2005) vide order dated 10.01.2014. For the sake of completeness of this order, relevant port ions of the said order of the Tribunal (supra) are reproduced here under:
"6. Before the Tribunal: During the proceedings before us, Ld Counsel for the assessee brought our attention to the contents of the relevant assessment order passed u/s 153A r w s 143(3) of the Act and demonstrated that no seized material was used for making the additions either on account of inflated investment or on account of disallowance u/s 14A of the Act. Fairly referring to the proceedings during the search action, Ld Counsel mentioned that it is the valuation report of the DVO which was garnered by the office of the DIT (inv) during the search action. This was the only material collected by the Revenue in the search, which was available for the AO both for issuing the notice as well as for making additions. He reasoned that the Valuation report can as well be obtained during the normal assessment or reassessment proceedings and there is no need for invoking the provisions of section 153A of the Act in this regard.
7. Further, Ld Counsel has two fold arguments to make before us i.e., (i) considering the fact that no incriminating material was found from the assessee's premises during the search action, the notice u/s 153A was not required to be issued. Even it is issued validly, no addition can be made in the cases of completed assessments without the support of the incriminating material issued or acquired in search action u/s 132 / 132A of the Act. In this regard, Ld Counsel relied on the Rajasthan High Court judgment in the case of Jai Steel (India) Ltd (supra); Coordinate Bench decisions in the case of Pratibha Industries Ltd (supra) and Gurinder Singh Bawa (supra) and Special Bench decision in the case of All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd vs. DCIT - 2012-TIOL-391-ITAT-MUM-SB. Ld Counsel argued in respect of the completed assessment, such as the present one, assessment will be made only on the basis of books of accounts or other documents not produced in the original assessment but in the course of the search and undisclosed income or property discovered in the course of the search. None of these conditions are met by the Revenue before issuing of the notice u/s 153A of the Act or before making additions. Therefore, as per the Ld counsel, the impugned notice is invalid one and additions should be deleted. Fairly referring to the Delhi High Court judgment in the case of CIT vs. Anil Kumar Bhatia vide ITA No.1626/2010, dated 7.8.2012 (Del.) = (2012-TIOL-641-HC-DEL-IT), Ld Counsel mentioned that this issue regarding the addition to be made in a completed assessment where no incriminating material was found, was left open. Para 23 of the said judgment is relevant in this regard. Further, relying on the order of the ITAT, Jodhpur in the case of Dinesh Tabacco Industries vs. DCIT vide ITA No.184 & 185/JU/2011 dated 22.2.2013, Ld Counsel reiterated that the notice becomes invalid when there is no incriminating material. Similar view was repeated by the Ld Counsel by relying on the decision of the ITAT, Kolkata in the case of LMJ International Ltd vs. DCIT, 119 TTJ 214 (Kol). The said decision of the of ITAT Kolkata (supra) is relevant for the proposition that where noting incriminating was found in course of search relating to assessments, assessment for such years cannot be disturbed. He culled out many other decisions which are as under.
a) Anil P Khimani vs. DCIT 2010 TIOL-177-ITAT-MUM
b) Meghmani Organics Ltd vs. DCIT [2010] 36 DTR 187 (Ahd)
c) Suncity Allys Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [2009] 124 TTJ 674 (Jodh)
d) ACIT vs. PACL India Ltd [ITA No.2637/ Del/2010] = (2013-TIOL-734-ITAT-DEL)
e) Shri Deepen A Parekh vs. ACIT [ ITA No.467/Mum/2011]
f) MGF Automobiles Ltd vs. ACIT [ITA No.4212 & 4213/Del/2011] =(2013-TIOL-747-ITAT-DEL)
Further, Ld Counsel filed a copy of the order of the Tribunal in the case of Govind Agarwal HUF vs ACIT vide ITA No.217/Mum/2011 (AY 2008-2009) which is a part of the assessee's group and where notice u/s 153C was issued. Ld Counsel mentioned that the Tribunal has upheld the invalidity of such notice and deleted the additions made on account of gift emanated from the books of accounts.
(ii) The second aspect of his arguments relates to the treatment to be given to the DVO's report, if the said report constitutes any incriminating material. Mentioning that the Revenue did not consider the same as a incriminating material for the purpose of issuance of notice u/s 153A of the Act, Ld Counsel mentioned that the office of DIT (Inv) referred the impugned house property (Mangaldeep at Udaipur) to the valuation cell for identifying the market value of the property, not the cost of acquisition. (Aarch Consulatants & Valuers, Mumbai) The valuers submitted a report on 16.2.2008 determining the value of the property at Rs. 3,67,09,000/- as the fair market value as against the disclosed amount of Rs. 1.56 Crs by the assessee in the books of accounts as on 31.3.2007. It is the submission of the assessee that such reports of the DVO ignored by the DIT office during the search proceedings cannot constitute incriminating material and the AO should not rely on such reports for issuance of notice u/s 153A of the Act and for making additions u/s 143(3) r.w.s 153A of the Act. As per the Ld Counsel such reports are mere estimates and the additions are not sustainable in the search assessment. In this regard, Ld Counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax v. Dhariya Construction Co, 328 ITR 515 which is relevant for the proposition that "having examined the records, we find in that case Department sought reopening of the assessment based on the opinion given by the DVO. The opinion given by the District Valuation Officer is not per se information for the purpose of reopening an assessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961". AO has to apply his mind and form a belief there from. The Department was not entitled to reopen the concluded assessment based on such DVO's report. Such reports are mere an opinion of the valuer, the third party and never can be equated to the opinion of the AO and relied on the Guwahati High Court judgment in the case of Bhola Nath Majumdar v. Income-tax Officer 221 ITR 608 and the judgment of Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Brig. B. Lall v. Wealth-tax Officer 127 ITR 308. In these cases, the concealment proceedings were quashed on this basis. Referring to the another judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Suraj Devi, 328 ITR 604 and in the case of CIT vs. Naveen Gera [2011] 328 ITR 516 = (2010-TIOL-596-HC-DEL-IT), Ld Counsel mentioned that the additions cannot be made on the basis of the valuation report of the DVO in the absence of any incriminating material. The burden vests on the Revenue in such cases. Referring to the facts of the present case, Ld Counsel mentioned that the assessee disclosed investment of Rs. 46,13,007/- on the house as on 31.3.2002 whereas the AO came to the conclusion that the land value of Rs. 14.8 lakhs is the only investment on the house, no construction was undertaken by this date. AO came to such conclusion for assessee's failure to furnish the supporting bills to demonstrate the fact of part construction of the impugned residential property. It is a case of mere presumption and the additions are unsustainable on such presumption. AO has no evidence to infer that the assessee's figure of Rs. 46,13,007/- is bogus and Rs. 14.8 lakhs is the only investment on the said property. In fact, Rs. 14.8 lakhs is the cost of the land plots on which the house was constructed and assessee spent the balance of Rs. 31,33,007/- in construction of the house. Therefore, the proceedings initiated u/s 153A is required to be quashed and the addition based on the surmises of the AO should not be sustained.
8. On the other hand, Ld DR relied heavily on the order of the AO and the CIT (A). In connection with the legal issue regarding the validity of the notice u/s 153A of the Act, Ld DR filed a copy of the order of the Tribunal in the case of Scope (P) Ltd vs. DCIT [2013] 33 Taxmann.com 167 (Mumbai Trib.) dated 20.3.2013 and stated that under the provisions of section 153A of the Act, AO is bound to proceed for all the 6 AYs immediately preceding AY relevant to the previous year in which search was conducted even if there is no incriminating material to indicate any undisclosed income during the original assessment completed u/s 143(3) for any year. This is the case where regular assessment u/s 143(3) was completed on 7.11.2007 prior to the date of search on 15.11.2007 and the addition was made u/s 14A of the Act and not based on any seized material found during the search. Though such disallowance was deleted for other reasons but the validity of the notice was upheld in this case. CIT-DR also brought our attention to the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Gopal Lal Bhadruka vs. DCIT [2012] 27 Taxmann.com 167 (AP) = (2012-TIOL-357-HC-AP-IT) in his favour. Of course, this is the case where assessments completed u/s 158BD of the Act and not u/s 153A as in the present case. Further, Ld DR also filed the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Madugula Venu vs. DIT [2013] 29 Taxmann.com 200 (Delhi), which is relevant for the proposition that the notice issued u/s 153A calling upon assessee to file the returns for earlier 6 AYs cannot be challenged on the ground that it would cause certain degree of hardship to assessee. Ld DR has brought our attention to para 7 of the said judgment of the Delhi High Court and mentioned that "the section couched in mandatory language which implies that once there is a search, the AO has no option but to call upon the assessee to file the returns of the income for the earlier six assessment years. It is not merely the undisclosed income that will be brought to tax in such assessments, but the total income of the assessee, including both the income earlier disclosed and income found consequent to the search, would be brought to tax. The normal provisions relating to inquiry, affording opportunity etc., which are provided for in sections 142, 143 etc are to be followed by the assessing officer". Of course, the above explanation of the provisions does not refer to the present debate relating to the "incriminating material" based additions in the cases of completed assessments.
Decision of the Tribunal:
9. We have heard both the parties on the legal issue relating to the sustainability or validity of the additions made in the assessments made u/s 153A read with section 143(3) of the Act in respect of completed assessments.
10. The stand of the Revenue is that the first proviso to section 153A empowers the AO to issue notice u/s 153A of the Act in respect of the 6 AYs prior to the assessment year in which the search took place. The relevance of the existence of incriminating material is not provided in the said provisions. As per the revenue there should not be any difference qua the completed assessments and the abated assessments for all six AYs in so far as the powers of the AO is concerned and he is empowered to issue notice u/s 153A and make additions either based in the incriminating material or otherwise.
11. Per contra, the case of the assessee is that the AO may be empowered to issue notices for all the six AYs in view of the cited decisions i.e.? Jai Steel (India) Ltd (supra), Scope (P) Ltd (supra) etc. However, in case of completed assessments, AO is empowered to made additions only based on the incriminating materials and not otherwise Jai Steel (India) Ltd (supra), LMJ International Ltd (supra), Gurinder Singh Bawa (supra) etc. For making the routine additions, which are normally done in the regular assessments, the completed assessment need not be disturbed by invoking the provisions of section 153A of the Act if not for reiterating the returned or assessed income as the case may be. Judgment in the case of Jai Steel (India) Ltd (supra) supports the above legal proposition. As per the assessee, regarding the cases of abated assessments, considering the scheme of assessments u/s 153A, per contra, even the routine additions are done in these assessments.
12. We have heard the parties and their divergent stands on the legal issue and the validity of the instant assessment/reassessment with the routine additions u/s 68 and section 14A of the Act based on the accounted transactions. The instant case for the AY 2002-03 deals with the case of disturbing the 'completed assessment'. Earlier the assessment was completed u/s 143(1) of the Act. Completeness of the summary assessment is considered and held in favour of the assessee vide many judgments cited above. In the assessment u/s 153A, the AO made (i) Addition u/s 68 on account of artificially inflated investment in house duly disclosed in the balance sheet of the assessee Rs.31,33,070/-; and (ii) disallowance u/s 14A: Rs. 23,31,469/-. Admittedly, there is no incriminating material before the AO to support the above additions. The valuation report, which is garnered by the authorities constitutes mere estimates and the provisions of section 132 is not required to obtain such report from the DVO. As such, for making aforesaid additions of Rs 31,33,070/-, AO has not used even the said valuation report and the AO disallowed what is reported in the books. Similar is the case with the additions u/s 14A of the Act. Therefore, undisputedly, the impugned quantum additions are made merely based on the entries in the accounted books and certainly not based on either the unaccounted books of accounts of the assessee or books not produced to the AO earlier or the incriminating material gathered by the investigation wing of the revenue. Considering the legal propositions place before us by the assessee's counsel, we are of the opinion, such assessments or additions are unsustainable in law.
13. For the sake completeness of the assessee, we insert here some of the extracts from relevant judgments and they are:
A. [2013 36 taxmann.com 523 (Rajasthan) in the case of Jai Steel (India) vs. ACIT - From Held portion:
….The requirement of assessment or reassessment under the said section has to be read in the context of sections 132 or 132A, inasmuch as, in case nothing incriminating is found on account of such search or requisition, then the question of reassessment of the concluded assessments does not arise, which would require more reiteration and it is only in the context of the abated assessment under second proviso which is required to be assessed.
……From a plain reading of the provision along with the purpose and purport of the said provision, which is intricately linked with search and requisition under sections 132 and 132A, it is apparent that:
(a) the assessments or reassessments, which stands abated in terms of second proviso to section 153A, the Assessing Officer acts under his original jurisdiction, for which, assessments have to be made;
(b) regarding other cases, the addition to the income that has already been assessed, the assessment will be made on the basis of incriminating material and
(c) in absence of any incriminating material, the completed assessment can be reiterated and the abated assessment or reassessment can be made.
…..The argument of the assessee that the Assessing Officer is also free to disturb income, expenditure or deduction de hors the incriminating material, while making assessment under section 153A is also not borne out from the scheme of the said provision which as noticed above is essentially in context of search and/or requisition.
Para 26 of the Judgment: The plea raised on behalf of the assessee that as the first proviso provides for assessment or reassessment of the total income in respect of each assessment year falling within the six assessment years, is merely reading the said provision in isolation and not in the context of the entire section. The words 'assess' or 'reassess' have been used at more than one place in the Section and a harmonious construction of the entire provision would lead to an irresistible conclusion that the word 'assess' has been used in the context of an abated proceedings and reassess has been used for completed assessment proceedings, which would not abate as they are not pending on the date of initiation of the search or making of requisition and which would also necessarily support the interpretation that for the completed assessments, the same can be tinkered only based on the incriminating material found during the course of search or requisition of documents.
B. [2012] 28 Taxmann.com 328 (Mumbai -Trib.) in the case of Gurinder Singh Bava vs. DCIT
…. Whether since assessment under section 153A was passed by Assessing Officer on basis of material available in return of income and there was no reference to any incriminating material found during search and since no assessment was abated, assessment under section 153A was to be quashed being made without jurisdiction available under section 153A - Held, yes [Para 6.2] [In favour of assessee]
Para 6.1 of the Order: The Special bench in the case of Alcargo Global Logistics Ltd. (supra), has held that provisions of section 153A come into operation if a search or requisition is initiated after 31.5.2003 and on satisfaction of this condition, the AO is under obligation to issue notice to the person requiring him to furnish the return of income for six years immediately preceding the year of search. The Special Bench further held that in case assessment has abated, the AO retains the original jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction under section 153A for which assessment shall be made for each assessment year separately. Thus in case where assessment has abated the AO can make additions in the assessment, even if no incriminating material has been found. But in other cases the Special Bench held that the assessment under section 153A can be made on the basis of incriminating material which in the context of relevant provisions means books of account and other documents found in the course of search but not produced in the course of original assessment and undisclosed income or property disclosed during the course of search. In the present case, the assessment had been completed under summary scheme under section 143(1) and time limit for issue of notice under section 143(2) had expired on the date of search. Therefore, there was no assessment pending in this case and in such a case there was no question of abatement. Therefore, addition could be made only on the basis of incriminating material found during search.
B. All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle-44 [2012] 23 taxmann.com 103 (Mum.) (SB) = (2012-TIOL-391-ITAT-MUM-SB)
Para 58 of SB decisions: Thus, question No.1 before us is answered as under :
(a) In assessments that are abated, the AO retains the original jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction conferred on him u/s 153A for which assessments shall be made for each of the six assessment years separately ;
(b) In other cases, in addition to the income that has already been assessed, the assessment u/s 153A will be made on the basis of incriminating material, which in the context of relevant provisions means - (i) books of account, other documents, found in the course of search but not produced in the course of original assessment, and (ii) undisclosed income or property discovered in the course of search.
14. Thus, in case of the completed assessments either u/s 143(1) or 143(3), the above extracts are uniform in advocating against making additions in routine manner in the assessments made u/s 153A of the Act when there is no incriminating material gathered in the search action. Statutory notice u/s 153A of the Act can also be issued to reiterate the returned income or for making additions based on the incriminating material or unproduced books of account. Otherwise, additions made in routine matter as in the present appeal are not sustainable. Further, for the sake completeness of the order, we have perused the orders/judgments relied upon by Ld DR for the revenue and found they are distinguishable on facts for one reason or other. To start with, we have perused the judgment of Honble Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Madugula Venu (supra) and find that, though explained the provisions in plain language, it does not dealt with the relevance or factum of incriminating material. Further, the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Gopal Lal Bhadruka (supra) is not on the notices issued u/s 153A of the Act and the same is pronounced in the context of the notice u/s 153C of the Act. Further, also, the Coordinate Bench decision in the case of Scope (P) Ltd (supra) has granted relief to the assessee though the notice issued u/s 153A of the Act was upheld. However, this order has not considered the then existing decision of the Coordinate Bench decision in the case of Pratibha Industries Ltd (supra) which is relevant for the proposition that the completed assessment may not be disturbed in the absence of any incriminating material specific to the assessee. In fact, all these judgments take spirit from the Special Bench decision in the case of All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd (supra), which is relevant for the proposition that the assessment u/s 153A will be made on the basis of incriminating material such as books of accounts, other documents found in the search but not produced in the course of original assessment and undisclosed income or property discovered in the course of the search.
15. We also find that the CIT(A) made a reference to the incriminating material, which yielded disclosure of some undisclosed income. But, on perusal of the documents, we find that the CIT(A) entered into an error zone and the disclosure is only Rs 5 crores in this case and the same relates to the lands deals. In principle this disclosure has nothing do with the impugned additions u/s 68 or 14A of the Act. In the instant case, specific to the assessee, no incriminating material with the details was referred either in the assessment order or in the order of the CIT (A) for making the impugned additions. As per the cited judgment in the case of Jai Steels Ltd, supra, the assessment u/s 153A is only for reiteration rather than making any additions in a routine manner without the strength of the incriminating materials. Similar view was taken up by the ITAT, Delhi 'H' Bench, in the case of V.K. Fiscal Services P Ltd vs. DCIT vide ITA Nos.5460 to 5465/Del/2012 (www.itatonline.org). In this regard, para 13 from the said order of the ITAT Delhi Bench (supra) is relevant and the same reads as under:
"13. Applying the above case laws to the facts of the case, we have to necessarily quash the assessment proceedings for AY 2004-2005, 2005-06, 2007-08, 2008-09 on the following grounds.
(a) No books of accounts belonging to the assesse were found and seized in the premises of the other person. What was found was in the hard disk was only a confirmation of account that an attached annexures. Such documents cannot be said to be books of accounts or documents belonging to the assessee.
(b) The Revenue has not produced the record of the searched person to demonstrate that satisfaction was recorded during the course of assessment proceedings in the case of M/s. Global Reality Ventures P. Ltd. On the date of recording of satisfaction, first notice u/s 153(c) was issued. There is no indication whatsoever, that the assessment proceedings in the case of Global Reality Ventures P. Ltd were in progress or not, at the point of time and that the AO during the course of that proceedings recorded this satisfaction. The procedure contemplated under the Act was not followed.
(c) The satisfaction is recorded on 23rd July, 2010. The relevant AY would be 2011- 12. The six preceding AYs relevant to this AY would be 2005-06 / 2006-07 / 2007-08 / 2008-09 / 2010-11. Thus, the notice issued u/s 153'C' for the AY 2004- 05 is clearly barred by limitation.
(d) Even otherwise, as there is no incriminating material found during the course of search, the AO should have dropped the proceedings initiated u/s 153'C' of the Act.
(e) As there is no dispute that no assessment or reassessment has abated in this case for the reason, that the date of search, the date of search which in the case on hand would be 25.3.2010, by virtue of First Proviso to section 153'C', i.e., the date of passing an order u/s 127 transferring the cases of the assessee to the present Assessing Officer no assessment or reassessment was pending. When no assessment has abated, the question of making any addition or making disallowance which are not based on only material found during the search is bad in law."
16. In these circumstances, we have no doubt about the absence of any seized material which are incriminating in nature to back the additions u/s 68 or 14A o the Act made in the assessment made u/s 153A of the Act for the AY under consideration. Regarding the DVO's report gathered during the search action, we find that the report suffers from certain deficiencies qua cost of construction of residential property and the land obtained thereto. The said report constitutes an opinion of the third party which cannot be used by the AO for making additions and such additions, if any, cannot be sustained legally. As such, we find that the AO has not used the said report of the DVO also for making additions of Rs. 31,33,007/-, the difference between accounted amount of Rs. 46,13,007/-, claimed as the amount spent on construction of house and acquisition of land as on 31.3.2002 minus Rs. Rs. 14.8 lakhs, the investment made on the land plots. AO made addition for assessee's failure to provide evidences / bills in support of the claim of expenditure on the construction. It the presumption of the AO that the plots since acquired only by July 2001, the assessee would not have spend Rs. 31,33,007/- by 31.3.2002. This is merely a presumption rather conclusion based on any evidences. Such additions are unsustainable in law in the assessments made u/s 153A r.w.s 143(3) of the Act.
17. Rajasthan High Court judgment in the case of Jai Steel (India) (supra), vide para 18, it is categorically mentioned that "the requirement of assessment or reassessment under the said section (153A) has to be read in the context of sections 132 or 132A of the Act, inasmuch as, in case nothing incriminating is found on account of search or requisition, then the question of reassessment of the concluded assessments does not arise, which would more reiteration………….". Thus, the judgment of Hon'ble High court in the case of Jai Steel Ltd, supra and above decisions of the Tribunal are categorical in concluding that, in case of the concluded assessments like the present one, the additions are made only based on the incriminating material discovered during the search action. The facts of the Jai Steel Ltd (supra) are identical to the present one i.e. AO made additions by reassessing u/s 153A on the completed assessment u/s 143(1) of the Act. Thus, considering the judgment in the case of the Jai Steel Ltd (supra), the arguments on the legal issue raised before us stands covered. Therefore, considering the Rajasthan High Court's judgment in the case of Jai Steels Ltd, supra, we have no difficulty in (i) upholding the issue of notice u/s 153A of the Act and (2) in disapproving the making of the impugned additions u/s 68 and 14A of the Act, which are not backed by the incriminating materials. In the absence of incriminating material, the role of the AO is only to reiterate the returned income filed in response to the notice u/s 153A of the Act. Accordingly, in substance, the common legal issue raised in the grounds for both the appeals of the assessee (ITA NO 3389 & 3390/M/2011) is allowed.
18. Regarding other two grounds on the merits of the additions raised in both the appeals, considering the relief granted to the assessee on the legal ground, we find the adjudication is only of academic importance. Therefore, we dismiss the same academic.
19. In the result, both the appeals of the assessee are partly allowed."
7. From the above, it is evident that the arguments relating to the validity of the notice u/s 153 are disapproved. Consequently, we confirm the validity of the notice issued u/s 153A of the Act. However, considering the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court judgment in the case of Jai Steel (India) Ltd and other orders of the Tribunal (supra), we are of the opinion that the additions made by the AO in the absence of any incriminating material are not sustainable. Accordingly, additions are deleted and the ground nos.1 & 2 raised by the assessee are allowed.
8. In the result, Cross Objection of the assessee is allowed.
I.T.A. No.879/M/2011 (AY: 2003-2004)
9. This appeal filed by the Revenue on 31.01.2011 is against the order of the CIT (A)-41, Mumbai dated 25.11.2010 for the AY 2003-2004.
10. In this appeal, Revenue raised the following grounds which read as under:
"i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld CIT (A) has erred in admitting and accepting new argument of assessee during the appellate proceedings that the transaction of purchase of shares were off market transactions without providing any opportunity to the AO.
ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld CIT (A) has erred in treating the purchase as well as the sale transactions of the shares of the M/s. Database Financial ltd as genuine without taking into account the following facts.
a. The purchase as well as sale of the said shares were admitted on oath u/s 131 dated 3.1.2008 and u/s 132(4) dated 4.2.2008 on the behalf of the assessee, as to be non genuine and tax there upon was also paid by the assessee.
b. The authenticity of the documents related to purchase and sale of the said shares is not confirmed by the broker or any other party and these very documents were admitted to be created for the purpose of the "managed capital gain" by the assessee / asessee's representative u/s 131 and 132(4) of the Act.
c. The assessee had purchased the said shares on price before split even after the split of the shares had taken place.
d. The sale price of shares were manipulated and the activity of the company and its balance sheet does not show that the share of face value of Rs. 1 should be sold at an average price of Rs. 85.06".
iii) Whether the Ld CIT (A) has erred in relying on the decision of Hon'ble Jodhpur Tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. Chandresh Kumar Maheswari 120 TTJ 132 Jdh as the facts are distinguishable?
iv) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Ld CIT (A) was justified in deleting the addition of Rs. 1,74,375/- made on account of unexplained expenses incurred by the assesse for arranging the bogus long term capital gain.
v) whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld CIT (A) was justified to accept the genuineness of the questionable share transactions without taking into account the ratio decidendi laid down in the case of Somnath Maini vs. CIT [2008] 306 ITR 414 (P &H) which has under similar facts and circumstances held that the burden to prove the genuineness of such transactions was primarily on the assessee and mere leading of evidence by the assessee that the transactions were genuine cannot be treated as conclusive."
11. The issues raised by the Revenue in this appeal relates to the additions made by the AO on account of 'sale proceeds on shares of Database Finance Ltd', which are otherwise accounted in the books of accounts, towards unexplained expenditure relating to the long term capital gains on sale of the same shares. No incriminating material suggesting the bogus nature of the transactions is brought to our notice by the Revenue. Considering the fact that we have already deleted the additions made by the AO in this regard, while adjudicating the appeal CO No.204/M/2013 in the above paragraphs of this order. We rely on the judgment in the case of Jai Steel (India) (supra) too. Therefore, the adjudication of these grounds becomes academic. Accordingly, grounds raised by the Revenue are dismissed as academic.
12. In the result, appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
I.T.A. No.8915/M/2010 (AY: 2004-2005) (By assessee)
13. This appeal filed by the assessee on 21.12.2010 is against the order of the CIT-41, Mumbai dated 25.11.2010 for the AY 2004-2005.
14. In this appeal, assessee raised the following grounds which read as under:
"1.0. the order passed by the Ld CIT (A) confirming the assessment order u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 153A of the Act is both bad-in-law and bad-in-facts.
1.1. In doing so, he did not appreciate that no addition could have been made while completing assessment u/s 153A of the Act in the case of completed assessments if no undisclosed income was determinable from the material found as a result of search.
2.0 The ld CIT (A) erred in law as well as the facts, in confirming the addition u/s 68 of the Act on account of unexplained gifts received by the asessee during the year from the following family members of Shri B.R. Agarwal.
Name of the DonorAmount Rs
Shri Ashish Agarwal Rs.8,00,000
Shri Preeti AgarwalRs.10,00,000
15. Ground No.1 raised in this appeal is identical to that of the ground raised by the assessee vide CO No. 204/M/2013 for the assessment year 2003-2004, which is adjudicated by us in the above paragraphs of this order. While adjudicating the said appeal, we have already decided the issue in favour of the assessee. Considering the same and following the principles of consistency, ground no.1 of the instant appeal should also be decided in favour of the assessee. Accordingly, the legal issue involved in ground no.1 is allowed in favour of the assessee.
16. Ground no.2 relates to the addition u/s 68 on account of 'unexplained gifts received by the asessee'. In this regard, Ld Counsel for the assessee relied on the order of the Tribunal in the case of M/s. Govind Agarwal (HUF) vs. DCIT vide ITA No.8917/M/2010, dated 16.5.2013,for the AY 2005-06 and read out the relevant paras 6 & 7 of the said order of the Tribunal dated 16.5.2013 (supra) which read as under:
"6. We have heard the rival contentions on the preliminary issue as to whether the addition can be made in the present case once the assessment for the assessment year 2005-06 has attained finality and no incriminating material was found during the course of search. On a perusal of the records and the findings of the Assessing Officer and the learned Commissioner (Appeals), we find that there is no reference to any seized material or any incriminating documents so as to suggest that addition made in the assessment order are based on any incriminating material found at the time of search. Once that is so and also that the assessment for the assessment year 2005- 06 has attained finality before the date of search, then no addition can be made under section 153A. The Mumbai Special Bench decision of the Tribunal in All Cargo Global Logistic Ltd. (supra), after analyzing the relevant provisions of the Act, came to the following conclusion and ratio:-
"(a) In assessment that are abated, the Assessing Officer retains the original jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction conferred on him under section 153A for which assessments shall be made for each of the six assessment years separately.
(b) In other cases, in addition to the income that has already been assessed, the assessment under section 153A will be made on the basis of incriminating material which in the context of relevant provisions means books of account, other documents, found in the course of search but not produced in the course of original assessment and undisclosed income or property discovered in the course of search."
7. In this case, the question answered in clause (b) would be applicable as the addition in the assessment order passed under section 153A, can be made only on the basis of incriminating material found in the course of search in case where the assessment has already been finalized. Thus, in this case, no addition can be made over and above the returned income which has become final prior to the date of search and there is no material found at the time of search. The aforesaid Mumbai Special Bench decision of the Tribunal in All Cargo Global Logistic Ltd. (supra) has also been reaffirmed and applied by the co-ordinate bench in Gurinder Singh Bawa (supra). The relevant observation of the Tribunal is reproduced herein below:-
"6. We have perused the records and considered the rival contentions carefully. The dispute raised is regarding legal validity of addition made by AO under section 153A of the Act. Under the provisions of section 153A, in all cases, where search is conducted under section 132 of the Act, AO is empowered to assess or reassess total income of six assessment years preceding the assessment year in which search was conducted. The section also provides that assessment or reassessment relating to any assessment year falling within period of six assessment year if pending on the date of initiation of search shall abate. There have been divergent views regarding scope of application of section 153A in cases where no incriminating material was found indicating any undisclosed income. Some of the Tribunal Benches had taken the view that in case no incriminating material was found AO had no jurisdiction to make assessment or reassessment under section 153A while some other Benches held that jurisdiction under section 153A was automatic to reassess six immediate preceding assessment years irrespective of the fact whether any incriminating material was found or not. Another aspect on which there had been divergent views was whether even if AO had jurisdiction under section 153A, addition can be made in assessment / reassessment only when some incriminating material has been found. All these aspects had been referred to the Special Bench of the Tribunal in case of Alcargo Global Logistics Ltd. and order of Special Bench dated 6.7.2012 has been referred.
6.1 The Special bench in the case of Alcargo Global Logistics Ltd. (supra), has held that provisions of section 153A come into operation if a search or requisition is initiated after 31.5.2003 and on satisfaction of this condition, the AO is under obligation to issue notice to the person requiring him to furnish the return of income for six years immediately preceding the year of search. The Special Bench further held that in case assessment has abated, the AO retains the original jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction under section 153A for which assessment shall be made for each assessment year separately. Thus in case where assessment has abated the AO can make additions in the assessment, even if no incriminating material has been found. But in other cases the Special Bench held that the assessment under section 153A can be made on the basis of incriminating material which in the context of relevant provisions means books of account and other documents found in the course of search but not produced in the course of original assessment and undisclosed income or property disclosed during the course of search. In the present case, the assessment had been completed under summary scheme under section 143(1) and time limit for issue of notice under section 143(2) had expired on the date of search. Therefore, there was no assessment pending in this case and in such a case there was no question of abatement. Therefore, addition could be made only on the basis of incriminating material found during search."
Thus, on the facts of the case, we hold that the additions made by the Assessing Officer with regard to unexplained gift of Rs. 10,00,000, made under section 68 and disallowance of Rs. 1,01,300 under section 14A, are beyond the scope of section 153A / 153C. Consequently, we set aside the impugned order passed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) and on the preliminary ground itself, both the additions are deleted. Thus, the issues arising out of the ground are treated as allowed."
17. Considering the above settled position of the issue, we are of the opinion that the disallowance made u/s 68 is uncalled for as the same is beyond the scope of section 153A / 153C of the Act. No incriminating material in support of the additions made u/s 68 of the Act was brought to our notice by the Revenue. Therefore, the addition made u/s 68 of the Act is deleted and the ground no.2 raised by the assessee is allowed.
18. In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed.
I.T.A. No.8916/M/2010 (AY: 2005-2006) (By assessee)
19. This appeal filed by the assessee on 21.12.2010 is against the order of the CIT (A)-41, Mumbai dated 25.11.2010 for the assessment year 2005-2006.
20. In this appeal, assessee raised the following grounds which read as under:
"1.0. The order passed by the Ld CIT (A) confirming the assessment order u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is both bad-in-law and bad-in-facts.
1.1 In doing so, he did not appreciate that no addition could have been made while completing assessment u/s 153A of the Act in case of completed assessments if no undisclosed income was determinable from the material found as a result of search.
2.0 The Ld CIT (A) erred in law as well as in facts, in confirming the addition u/s 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on account of unexplained gifts received by the assessee during the year from the following family members of Shri B.R. Agarwal.
Smt. Leeladevi Agarwal (Donor) : Rs.10,00,000/-
3.0 The Ld CIT (A) erred in directing the AO to re-compute disallowance u/s 14A on the basis of judgment of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Company Ltd vs. DCIT (328 ITR 81) (2010-TIOL-564-HC-MUM-IT) without realizing that no expenditure whatsoever was incurred by the assessee and claimed as a deduction while computing her total income."
21. Ground No.1 raised in this appeal is identical to that of the ground raised by the assessee vide CO No. 204/M/2013 for the assessment year 2003-2004, which is adjudicated by us in the above paragraphs of this order. While adjudicating the said appeal, we have already decided the issue in favour of the assessee. Considering the same and following the principles of consistency, ground no.1 of the instant appeal should also be decided in favour of the assessee. Accordingly, the legal issue involved in ground no.1 is allowed in favour of the assessee.
22. Ground no.2 relates to the disallowance u/s 68 of the Act on account of 'unexplained gifts received by the asessee'. This ground is exactly identical to that of the ground no.2 raised by the assessee for the AY 2004-05. Keeping in view the findings given by us in assessee's appeal ITA No. 8915/M/2010 (AY: 2004-2005), vide para ….of this order and following the same, we hold that the disallowance made u/s 68 is beyond the scope of section 153A, therefore, the ground no.2 raised by the assessee is allowed.
23. Ground no.3 relates to the disallowance u/s 14A of the Act. In this regard, Ld Counsel In this regard, Ld Counsel for the assessee relied on the order of the Tribunal in the case of M/s. Govind Agarwal (HUF) vs. DCIT vide ITA No.8917/M/2010, dated 16.5.2013, for the AY 2005-06 and read out the relevant paras 6 & 7 of the said order of the Tribunal dated 16.5.2013 (supra) which read as under:
"6. We have heard the rival contentions on the preliminary issue as to whether the addition can be made in the present case once the assessment for the assessment year 2005-06 has attained finality and no incriminating material was found during the course of search. On a perusal of the records and the findings of the Assessing Officer and the learned Commissioner (Appeals), we find that there is no reference to any seized material or any incriminating documents so as to suggest that addition made in the assessment order are based on any incriminating material found at the time of search. Once that is so and also that the assessment for the assessment year 2005- 06 has attained finality before the date of search, then no addition can be made under section 153A. The Mumbai Special Bench decision of the Tribunal in All Cargo Global Logistic Ltd. (supra), after analyzing the relevant provisions of the Act, came to the following conclusion and ratio:-
"(a) In assessment that are abated, the Assessing Officer retains the original jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction conferred on him under section 153A for which assessments shall be made for each of the six assessment years separately.
(b) In other cases, in addition to the income that has already been assessed, the assessment under section 153A will be made on the basis of incriminating material which in the context of relevant provisions means books of account, other documents, found in the course of search but not produced in the course of original assessment and undisclosed income or property discovered in the course of search."
7. In this case, the question answered in clause (b) would be applicable as the addition in the assessment order passed under section 153A, can be made only on the basis of incriminating material found in the course of search in case where the assessment has already been finalized. Thus, in this case, no addition can be made over and above the returned income which has become final prior to the date of search and there is no material found at the time of search. The aforesaid Mumbai Special Bench decision of the Tribunal in All Cargo Global Logistic Ltd. (supra) has also been reaffirmed and applied by the co-ordinate bench in Gurinder Singh Bawa (supra). The relevant observation of the Tribunal is reproduced herein below:-
"6. We have perused the records and considered the rival contentions carefully. The dispute raised is regarding legal validity of addition made by AO under section 153A of the Act. Under the provisions of section 153A, in all cases, where search is conducted under section 132 of the Act, AO is empowered to assess or reassess total income of six assessment years preceding the assessment year in which search was conducted. The section also provides that assessment or reassessment relating to any assessment year falling within period of six assessment year if pending on the date of initiation of search shall abate. There have been divergent views regarding scope of application of section 153A in cases where no incriminating material was found indicating any undisclosed income. Some of the Tribunal Benches had taken the view that in case no incriminating material was found AO had no jurisdiction to make assessment or reassessment under section 153A while some other Benches held that jurisdiction under section 153A was automatic to reassess six immediate preceding assessment years irrespective of the fact whether any incriminating material was found or not. Another aspect on which there had been divergent views was whether even if AO had jurisdiction under section 153A, addition can be made in assessment / reassessment only when some incriminating material has been found. All these aspects had been referred to the Special Bench of the Tribunal in case of Alcargo Global Logistics Ltd. and order of Special Bench dated 6.7.2012 has been referred.
6.1 The Special bench in the case of Alcargo Global Logistics Ltd. (supra), has held that provisions of section 153A come into operation if a search or requisition is initiated after 31.5.2003 and on satisfaction of this condition, the AO is under obligation to issue notice to the person requiring him to furnish the return of income for six years immediately preceding the year of search. The Special Bench further held that in case assessment has abated, the AO retains the original jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction under section 153A for which assessment shall be made for each assessment year separately. Thus in case where assessment has abated the AO can make additions in the assessment, even if no incriminating material has been found. But in other cases the Special Bench held that the assessment under section 153A can be made on the basis of incriminating material which in the context of relevant provisions means books of account and other documents found in the course of search but not produced in the course of original assessment and undisclosed income or property disclosed during the course of search. In the present case, the assessment had been completed under summary scheme under section 143(1) and time limit for issue of notice under section 143(2) had expired on the date of search. Therefore, there was no assessment pending in this case and in such a case there was no question of abatement. Therefore, addition could be made only on the basis of incriminating material found during search."
Thus, on the facts of the case, we hold that the additions made by the Assessing Officer with regard to unexplained gift of Rs. 10,00,000, made under section 68 and disallowance of Rs. 1,01,300 under section 14A, are beyond the scope of section 153A / 153C. Consequently, we set aside the impugned order passed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) and on the preliminary ground itself, both the additions are deleted. Thus, the issues arising out of the ground are treated as allowed."
24. Considering the above settled position of the issue, we are of the opinion that the disallowance made u/s 14A is uncalled for as the same is beyond the scope of section 153A / 153C of the Act. No incriminating material was brought to our notice by the Revenue in support of the additions made u/s 14A of the Act. Therefore, the addition made u/s 14A of the Act is deleted and the ground no.3 raised by the assessee is allowed.
25. In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed.
I.T.A. No.880/M/2011 (AY: 2005-2006) (By Revenue)
26. This appeal filed by the Revenue on 31.01.2011 is against the order of the CIT (A)-41, Mumbai dated 25.11.2010 for the assessment year 2005-2006.
27. In this appeal, Revenue raised the following grounds which read as under:
"1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld CIT (A) has erred in directing the AO to recomputed the disallowance u/s 14A by adopting reasonable basis for effecting apportionment of the expenditure.
2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT (A) erred in holding that provisions of Rule-8D does not have retrospective effective following the decision of Mumbai High Court in the case of M/s. Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Company Ltd."
28. The only issue involved in this appeal relates to the applicability of the provisions of section 14A of the Act. In this regard, Ld Counsel mentioned that the issue being applicability of section 14A, the AO erroneously applied the Rule-8D for the assessment year in question which actually applicable from the assessment year 2008-2009 as held by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT reported in 328 ITR 81 (Bom) = (2010-TIOL-564-HC-MUM-IT). In this regard Ld Counsel mentioned that the issue may have to be sent back to the files of AO for fresh adjudication and deciding the issue afresh on the 'reasonable basis' after rejecting the basis adopted by the assessee for determining the disallowable sum u/s 14A of the Act.
29. On the other hand, Ld DR has no objection to remand the matter to the files of AO for fresh adjudication on this issue.
30. We have heard both the parties and perused the record. Considering the factual matrix of the case as well as the prayer of the Ld Counsel for remanding, we proceed to set aside the ground raised by the assessee for fresh adjudication considering the said judgment and adopting the "reasonable basis" and after rejecting the basis adopted by the assessee. AO shall grant reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Accordingly, ground no.1 & 2 raised by the revenue are allowed for statistical purposes.
31. In the result, appeal of the Revenue is allowed for statistical purposes.
(Order pronounced in the open court on 22.1.2014.)



2014-TIOL-207-HC-AHM-IT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
AT AHMEDABAD
Special Civil Application No.7543 of 2005
ME AND MUMMY HOSPITAL
Vs
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX
Akil Kueshi And Sonia Gokani, JJ
Dated: February 12, 2014
Appellants Rep by: Mr JP Shah with Mr Manish J Shah, Adv.
Respondent Rep by: 
Mr Sudhir M Mehta, Adv.
Income tax - Sections 69, 69A, 69B, 142A - Whether when neither from the order of reference nor from any other material, the Revenue could point out that AO had invoked the provisions of sections 69, 69A or 69B of the Act and in the process desired to obtain the estimate of unexplained investment or expenditure and for which purpose DVO's report was called, reference to the valuer is not permissible.

The
 petitioner, a partnership firm, purchased property for hospital jointly with one 'P' HUF. AO made reference order to Valuation officer calling for valuation of investment made by petitioner in construction / renovation of hospital building. AO framed assessment but left the question of investment in the acquisition of the hospital building unchanged. When the petitioner received the notice from the District Valuation Officer calling for details about the said investment, petition was filed challenging the order of reference.

Petitioner contended that since neither the assessment nor reassessment was pending on such date, AO had no authority to call for DVO's report u/s 142A. The report cannot be in anticipation of reopening the assessment. The Valuer's report is called for only by way of fishing inquiry, which is not permissible. Before making a reference calling for the report of the Valuer, AO must be satisfied that valuation for the purpose of sections 69, 69A and 69B is required to be made which was not present in the said case. In absence of his own satisfaction, such reference could not have been made.

Revenue contended that the petition is not maintainable. The petitioner has challenged only the order of reference. The Valuer's report is yet to be made. At this stage, therefore, the petition is premature. Assessment was not yet finalized when the reference order was passed. AO was within his right to call for the report of DVO. 

After hearing both the parties, the High Court held that, 

++ the assessment was not yet over on the day on which the said reference order was passed. In the present case, such proceedings were not yet terminated and were thus pending. AO, if other parameters of section 142A were satisfied, did have jurisdiction to call for the report from the Valuer. Suffice to conclude that assessment proceedings were pending before AO when the reference order was passed;

++ as per section 142A, for the purposes of making assessment or reassessment under the Act, where an estimate of the value of any investment referred to in section 69 or section 69B or the value of any bullion, jewellery or other valuable article referred to in section 69A or section 69B or fair market value of any property referred to in sub-section (2) of section 56 is required to be made, such reference to make an estimate of such value can be made to the Valuation Officer. There must be a case where an estimate of the value of such investment or value of billion or jewellery or valuable article is required to be made;

++ for applicability of section 69, 69A and 69B, the common thread is that the assessee has made certain investments or expenditure or is found to be the owner of any billion, jewellery etc. and the same are not recorded in the books of account. Unless, there is prima facie application of sections 69, 69A and 69B of the Act, reference to the valuer is simply not permissible. It is only when there is some material before AO to hold that in case of an assessee falls under sections 69, 69A and 69B as the case may be, that he can, to estimate the value of such unexplained investment or expenditure in bullion, jewellery etc., call for the report of the Valuer. AO would have no authority to call for the report of the Valuer under section 142A to judge whether there has been any unexplained investment or expenditure as referred to in sections 69, 69A and 69B of the Act. It would only amount to fishing inquiry and not investigation u/s 142A of the Act. In the present case, no such material emerges from the record. To the contrary, neither from the order of reference nor from any other material, the respondent could point out that AO had invoked the provisions of sections 69,69A or 69B of the Act and in the process desired to obtain the estimate of unexplained investment or expenditure and for which purpose DVO's report was called. No independent reasons, either flowing from the file or even in the form of an affidavit assuming the same would be permissible, are brought to our notice. Thus quite apart from the petitioner's grievance that the AO merely acted under the directives of the superior and did not, on his own application of mind, desire to call for the report, in absence of any valid reasons for making a reference, in our opinion, the order must fail.
Assessee's petition allowed
JUDGEMENT
Per: Akil Kureshi:
1. Petitioner has challenged reference order dated 30.3.2005 made by respondent no.1 Assessing Officer to Valuation Officer, Baroda calling for the valuation of investment made by the petitioner in the construction/renovation of the property mentioned in the order, namely, hospital building situated on the third floor of Jalnidhi complex, Surat.
2. Petition arises in the following factual background:-
2.1 The petitioner is a partnership firm. For the Assessment Year 2002-03 the petitioner filed its return of income on 29.10.2002. During the previous year relevant to the said assessment year, the petitioner had purchased a property for a hospital jointly with one Praful Doshi-HUF. The petitioner declared cost of property in the return at Rs.83.87 lakhs (rounded off).
2.2 On 30.3.2005, the Assessing Officer passed the impugned order requesting the Valuation Officer, Baroda to calculate the correctness of the cost of investment and authorized the said officer under section 142A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ("the Act" for short) to inspect the property and make such investigation as considered necessary. The order of reference reads as under:-
Date:30/3/2005
"To:
The Valuation Officer
Valuation Cell,
Income tax Department,
Baroda.
Sir,
Sub:-Valuing the cost of investment in the property belonging to M/s. Me & Mummy Hospital, 3rd floor, Jalnidhi, Opp.Bhumali Besides Navdi Ovara, Nanpura, Surat 395 ------------------------------------
M/s. Me & Mummy Hospital has invested in the construction/renovation of the property as per the details indicated below:-
DETAILS:
1
Description of the Assets/ property giving exact location with complete address
building/ Clinic at 3rd floor, Jalnidhi, Opp. Bahumali Besides Navdi Ovara, Nanpura, Surat 395 001
2
Name & complete address of the Assessee with Telephone No., if any
M/s. Me & Mummy Hospital 3rd floor, Jalnidhi, Opp. Bahumali Besides Navdi Ovara, Nanpura, Surat 395001
3
Name & complete address & Telephone No. of the C.A/Lawyer or Assessee's Authorised Representative dealing with the case, if any
M/s. Hiren M. Diwan & Co. Surat 0261 2470102
4
Amount declared by the assessee as filed in the return of income for the Assessment Year or as admitted during Survey/Search
Rs.83.87 lakhs as on 31/3/2002 (cost price)
5
Estimated cost of investment 
6
Registered Valuer if any (copy of the Valuer's Report to be submitted if available)Not available
7
Whether Valuation of Plant & Machinery is also required or whether a separate reference has been made directly to the Valuation Officer (M&P) or the same is attached with the reference
Yes, and also furniture and fittings.
8
Period for which Valuation is requiredF.Y.2001-02
9
Grounds on which the opinion of the assessing officer is basedN.A.
2(a) It is certified that the assessment for the period relevant to the above mention valuation period have been finalized. But, the Addl.CIT Range-6 has directed to refer the building to Valuation Cell.
(b) The Assessment is getting time barred on 31/3/2005 for A.Y.2002-03. You are requested to submit the report on or before 30/4/2005 so that case can be reopened, if any variation is found preferably by 30/04/2005.
In order to elucidate the correctness of the cost of investment, I require and authorize you u/s.142(A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to inspect the property and to make such investigation and seek clarification and material from the assessee and other concerned persons as are considered necessary and take such measures as are deemed fit for determining the true and correct cost of investment of the said property. You are requested to send your Valuation report to me in duplicate urgently and preferably by 30/4/2005.
Yours faithfully,
(SANJAY PUNGLIA)
Asst. Commissioner of Income-tax Circle-6, Surat."
3. On 31.3.2005, the Assessing Officer framed assessment of the return filed by the petitioner but left the question of investment in the acquisition of the hospital building unchanged. The petitioner carried the assessment order in appeal. We are not concerned with the details of the appellate proceedings.
4. When the petitioner received the notice from the District Valuation Officer ("DVO" for short) dated 15.4.2005 calling for details about the said investment, the petitioner filed this petition and challenged the very order of reference.
5. Learned counsel Mr.J.P.Shah for the petitioner inviting our attention to the reference order raised following contentions:
(1) That as per the Assessing Officer the assessment was already finalized when the order of reference was passed. Therefore, since neither the assessment nor reassessment was pending on such date, the Assessing Officer had no authority to call for DVO's report under section 142A of the Act.
(2) That such report cannot be in anticipation of reopening the assessment as was done in the present case.
(3) The Assessing Officer had no reason to call for the valuation. The Valuer's report is called for only by way of fishing inquiry, which is not permissible.
(4) Before making a reference calling for the report of the Valuer, the Assessing Officer must be satisfied that valuation for the purpose of sections 69,69A and 69B is required to be made. In the present case, no such eventuality existed when the reference was made.
(5) He lastly contended that the Assessing Officer called for the report under the directives of his superior. In absence of his own satisfaction, such reference could not have been made.
6. Counsel relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Umiya Coop. Housing Society Ltd. reported in [2009] 314 ITR 272 (Guj) to contend that if no proceedings for assessment or reassessment are pending, the Assessing Officer would have no jurisdiction to call for the report of DVO.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel Mr. Sudhir Mehta for the Department opposed the petition raising following contentions:-
(1) The petition is not maintainable. The petitioner has challenged only the order of reference. The Valuer's report is yet to be made. At this stage, therefore, the petition is premature.
(2) That the assessment was not yet finalized when the reference order was passed. In any case the petitioner had filed appeal against such order of assessment. The appeal would be continuation of the assessment proceedings and that therefore, the Assessing Officer was within his right to call for the report of DVO. In this context, counsel relied on the decision of Uttarakhand High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Rajendra Aggarwal reported in [2012] 22 taxmann.com 40 (Uttarakhand) = (2012-TIOL-373-HC-UKHAND-IT) in which the petitioner's challenge to the order of reference under section 142A of the Act made by the Assessing Officer was rejected. The Court observed that the Assessing Officer was well within his power under section 142A to take up the issue of valuation of investment in the petitioner's plant for reassessment, if necessary.
8. From the record, it emerges that the order of reference was passed on 30.3.2005. Though loosely mentioned in the said order but explained in the affidavit-in-reply filed before the Court, the assessment was not yet over on the day on which the said reference order was passed. Admittedly, the order of assessment was passed only on 31.3.2005. As held by this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Umiya Co-op. Housing Society Ltd.(supra) the matter can be referred to Valuation Officer only when the proceedings of assessment or reassessment are pending before the Assessing Officer. In the present case, however, such proceedings were not yet terminated and were thus pending. Even without, therefore, resorting to the logic adopted by Uttarakhand High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Rajendra Aggarwal (supra), it can be safely taken that Assessing Officer, if other parameters of section 142A were satisfied, did have jurisdiction to call for the report from the Valuer. Uttarakhand High Court in the said decision, considered pendency of appeal against order of assessment as continuation of the assessment, and therefore, held that during the pendency of such appellate proceedings also power under section 142A can be exercised by the Assessing Officer. The decisions of Delhi, Allahabad and Karnataka High Courts taking contrary view were not followed. In the present petition, we are not concerned with this controversy and would, therefore, refrain from giving any expression of our opinion on the same. Suffice to conclude that assessment proceedings were pending before the Assessing Officer when the reference order was passed.
9. Despite such conclusion the crucial question is whether the requirements of exercising such powers under section 142A calling for DVO's report are satisfied. In this context, we may peruse the provisions of section 142A more minutely. Section 142A pertains to estimate by Valuation Officer in certain cases and reads as under:-
"Estimate by Valuation Officer in certain cases.
142A(1) For the purposes of making an assessment or reassessment under this Act, where an estimate of the value of any investment referred to in section 69 or section 69B or the value of any bullion, jewellery or other valuable article referred to in section 69A or section 69B or fair market value of any property referred to in sub-section (2) of section 56 is required to be made, the Assessing Officer may require the Valuation Officer to make an estimate of such value and report the same to him.
(2) The Valuation Officer to whom a reference is made under sub-section (1) shall, for the purposes of dealing with such reference, have all the powers that he has under section 38A of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957(27 of 1957).
(3) On receipt of the report from the Valuation Officer, the Assessing Officer may, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard, take into account such report in making such assessment or reassessment: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply in respect of an assessment made on or before the 30th day of September, 2004, and where such assessment has become final and conclusive on or before that date, except in cases where a reassessment is required to be made in accordance with the provisions of section 153A."
Explanation: In this section, "Valuation Officer" has the same meaning as in clause (r) of section 2 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957(27 of 1957)"
10. Power of the Assessing Officer for making a reference to the Valuation Officer seeking the estimate flows from sub-section (1) of section 142A. It provides that for the purposes of making assessment or reassessment under the Act, where an estimate of the value of any investment referred to in section 69 or section 69B or the value of any bullion, jewellery or other valuable article referred to in section 69A or section 69B or fair market value of any property referred to in sub-section (2) of section 56 is required to be made, such reference to make an estimate of such value can be made to the Valuation Officer.
11. We are not concerned with the fair market value of the property referred to in sub-section (2) of section 56. We would, therefore, confine our inquiry with respect to the provisions contained in sections 69, 69A and 69B of the Act. Since sub-section(1) permits the Assessing Officer to call for the Valuer's report where an estimate of the value of such investment or value of billion or jewellery of valuable article is required to be made, for the purposes of invoking powers under sub-section (1) of section 142A, therefore, there must be a case where an estimate of the value of such investment or value of billion or jewellery or valuable article is required to be made.
12. Section 69 of the Act pertains to unexplained investment and starts with the expression " Where in the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year the assessee has made investments which are not recorded in the books of account, if any, maintained by him for any source of income and the assessee offers no explanation about the nature and source of investments...."
13. Section 69A pertains to unexplained money etc. and starts with the expression "Where in any financial year the assessee is found to be the owner of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article and such money, bullion, jewellery or valuable article is not recorded in the books of account, if any, maintained by him for any source of income and the assessee offers no explanation about the nature of source of acquisition of the money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article...."
14. Likewise section 69B of the Act pertains to amount of investments etc., not fully disclosed in books of account. The said section starts with expression "Where in any financial year the assessee has made investments or is found to be the owner of any bullion, jewellery or other valuable article, and the Assessing Officer finds that the amount expended on making such investments or in acquiring such bullion, jewellery or other valuable article exceeds the amount recorded in this behalf in the books of account maintained by the assessee for any source of income, and the assessee offers no explanation about such excess amount..."
15. All these three provisions give rise to deeming fiction and consider such unexplained investment, unexplained money or investment not fully disclosed to be deemed income of the assessee. These provisions start with an essential requirement that the assessee has made such investments or that the assessee is found to be the owner of such money, bullion, jewellery etc. or where assessee has made investment or is found to be the owner of bullion, jewellery etc. which are not recored in the books of account and the assessee offers no explanation about the nature and source of such investment or expenditure or the explanation offered by the assessee, in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, is not satisfactory. Common thread which runs through all these three provisions is that the assessee has made certain investments or expenditure or is found to be the owner of any billion, jewellery etc. and the same are not recorded in the books of account.
16. The Valuer's report under section 142A of the Act is for the purpose of estimating value of such investment referred to in section 69 or section 69B or the value of any bullion, jewellery or other valuable article referred to in section 69A or section 69B of the Act. Unless, therefore, there is prima facie application of sections 69, 69A and 69B of the Act, reference to the valuer is simply not permissible. It is only when there is some material before the Assessing Officer to hold that in case of an assessee falls under sections 69, 69A and 69B as the case may be, that he can, to estimate the value of such unexplained investment or expenditure in bullion, jewellery etc., call for the report of the Valuer. Initial starting point for triggering a reference to the Valuer, therefore, has to be invocation of sections 69,69A or 69B of the Act. It is only when any of these provisions come into play that the Assessing Officer can resort to section 142A for estimating the value of such investment or expenditure. Sequence cannot be put in the reverse. In other words, the Assessing Officer would have no authority to call for the report of the Valuer under section 142A to judge whether there has been any unexplained investment or expenditure as referred to in sections 69, 69A and 69B of the Act. It would only amount to fishing inquiry and not investigation under section 142A of the Act. In our opinion, the scheme of the provisions when read harmoniously would lead to a situation where in case the Assessing Officer, during the pendency of assessment or reassessment, is of the opinion that sections 69, 69A and 69B of the Act can be invoked; in order to estimate such unexplained investment or expenditure in acquisition of bullion, jewellery or valuable article, he can resort to valuation by the Valuation Officer in terms of sub-section (1) of section 142A of the Act. In the present case, no such material emerges from the record. To the contrary, neither from the order of reference nor from any other material, the respondent could point out that the Assessing Officer had invoked the provisions of sections 69,69A or 69B of the Act and in the process desired to obtain the estimate of unexplained investment or expenditure and for which purpose DVO's report was called. He simply gave no reasons in the order. No independent reasons, either flowing from the file or even in the form of an affidavit assuming the same would be permissible, are brought to our notice. Thus quite apart from the petitioner's grievance that the Assessing Officer merely acted under the directives of the superior and did not, on his own application of mind, desire to call for the report, in absence of any valid reasons for making a reference, in our opinion, the order must fail.
17. The objection of the Revenue that the petition is premature must be rejected out of hand. If the reference to DVO is simply not competent, we fail to see why the petitioner should be made to go through the gamut of supplying details permitting the Valuer to make his estimate. If eventually such report itself can be of no legal value, the inquiry must be terminated at the threshold. We do not see any other stage where the assessee can oppose the reference to the Valuer itself.
18. Under the circumstances, impugned order dated 30.3.2005 is quashed. The petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. No order as costs.
--


2014-TIOL-199-HC-KAR-IT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
AT BANGALORE
ITA No.635/2006
1) THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
C R BUILDING, QUEENS ROAD, BANGALORE
2) THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
CENTRAL CIRCLE -2(3), C R BUILDING
QUEENS ROAD, BANGALORE
Vs
M/s H M CONSTRUCTIONS
GENEVA HOUSE, NO.14
CUNNINGHAM ROAD
BANGALORE-560052
Dilip B Bhosale And B Manohar, JJ
Date of Decision: January 20, 2014
Appellant Rep by: Shri K V Aravind, Adv.
Respondents Rep by: 
Shri A Shankar And Shri M Lava, Advs. For Shri Abhinav Anand
Income Tax - Sections 147, 148, 151, 260A - search - Whether causing disappearance of certain documents from the record including reasons recorded by the AO as contemplated u/s 148(2) and its approval, if any, obtained u/s 151, may be considered as innocent - Whether in the absence of order granting approval by the Commissioner u/s 151 or in the absence of any indication in the orders passed by the authorities including the order of the Tribunal or the materials on record that such approval was obtained, it is possible to assume that such approval u/s 151 is obtained.
The assessee concern is in construction business. Tribunal held that reopening of the assessment was bad in law as the reasons recorded were not in proper format as contemplated by sub- Section (2) of Section 148 and that the prior approval of the Commissioner u/s 151 for issuing notice u/s 148 was not obtained. Counsel for the parties were ad-idem that if the second question of law was answered against the revenue, the appeal should fail and in that event the first question need not be considered on merits. The Tribunal had extensively considered the materials on record to hold that the reasons recorded by AO for reopening of the assessment for the year 1995-96 were not in the proper format. Though we may not agree with the findings recorded by the Tribunal in respect thereof, we have examined whether prior approval of the Commissioner as contemplated by Section 151 was obtained, taking the case of Revenue that the reasons recorded u/s 148(2) were sufficient and were in proper format. It was clear as crystal that if the assessment was reopened after expiry of the four years from the end of relevant AY, no notice u/s 148 shall be issued unless the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner was satisfied on the reasons recorded by AO that it was a fit case for issuance of such notice. To examine whether the approval u/s 151(1) was obtained, as observed earlier, we proceed on the assumption that AO had recorded good and sufficient reasons as required under sub-Section (2) of Section 148. Admittedly, neither the reasons recorded by AO under sub-Section (2) of Section 148 nor approval granted by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner as contemplated by the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 151 was on record.
Before HC, the Revenue's counsel had submitted that the original record/file does not contain either the reasons u/s 148(2) or the approval granted by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner u/s 151(1). It was further submitted that even the record that was placed for consideration of the Tribunal had been destroyed. Thus, in the absence of either the reasons recorded by AO or approval granted by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, an attempt was made to find out from the other materials on record whether the approval u/s 151 was obtained before issuing the notice u/s 148 thereof. On the other hand, assessee's counsel had had invited our attention to the order of assessment passed in the connected ITA No.641/2006 dated 26-02-2004, of the very same assessee, pertaining to AY 1996-97. It had submitted that insofar as reopening of the assessment for the AY 1996-97 was concerned, the approval of the CIT, as required u/s 151 was obtained and it was also placed on record in that case. The Revenue's counsel had invited our attention to certain observations made by AO and the Tribunal and submitted that it was possible to draw an inference that approval of CIT u/s 151 was obtained by AO before issuing notice u/s 148 thereof. It was submitted that there was no finding recorded by either of the authorities below including the Tribunal that approval as contemplated by Section 151 was either referred to or mentioned in the orders. The Tribunal had, at length, considered the issue whether the reasons recorded by the AO for reopening of the assessment were in proper format, and held that no such reasons were recorded. The Tribunal recorded such finding and further observed that the note sent to the Commissioner by the AO was not sanctioned/approved u/s 151.
Held that,
++ in the absence of the order granting approval by the Commissioner u/s 151 or in the absence of any indication in the orders passed by the authorities below including the order of the Tribunal or the materials on record that such approval was obtained, it would not be possible to assume that such approval u/s 151 was obtained. The provisions contained in Section 151 were indubitably mandatory in nature and since compliance thereof was either not made or could be established by the revenue, in our opinion, benefit will have to be given to the assessee. Though we do not agree with all the reasons recorded by the Tribunal in the order, it had rightly decided the second question in favour of the assessee. We do not find any reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the Tribunal on the second question and hence, the appeal will have to be dismissed on this ground alone. Before we part, we observe that causing disappearance of certain documents from the record including reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer as contemplated by sub-Section 2 of Section 148 of the Act and approval, if any, obtained under Section 151 may not be innocent or innocuous. The Commissioner, therefore ought to have conducted an enquiry, to find out whether the approval under Section 151 was obtained or if yes, how it disappeared from the record and who was responsible for the same? Though we do not wish to record any positive finding on the conduct of the assessee, we feel that the authorities below ought to have taken disappearance of record to its logical conclusions. In the result, the second question is answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue and as a result thereof the appeal fails and dismissed as such. No costs.
Revenue's appeal dismissed
JUDGEMENT
Per: Dilip B Bhosale:
This Income Tax Appeal, under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act'), is directed against the order dated 28th October 2005 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore Bench-B (for short 'the Tribunal') in ITA No.1666/Bang/2004 whereby the Tribunal allowed the appeal, pertaining to the assessment year 1995-96, filed by the respondent- assessee. Appeal before the Tribunal was directed against the order dated 30-03-2004 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-VI, Bangalore, (for short the 'Appellate Authority') whereby the said appeal, filed by the assessee against the assessment order dated 28-3-2003, was dismissed.
2. In the present appeal, the respondent formulated the following substantial questions of law:
1. Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the fixed deposits of Rs.70,00,000/- noticed during the search, in the name of 10 persons, who were not identified by the assessee, could be treated as income of the assessee overlooking the statement of Sri.Seshaprakash and that whether the findings recorded by the Tribunal are perverse?
2. Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that reopening of the assessment was bad in law as the reasons recorded were not in the required format and the prior approval of the Commissioner had not been obtained in accordance with law?
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant materials on record including the order of the Tribunal.
4. It appears to us that the Tribunal while dealing with the second question of law held that reopening of the assessment was bad in law as the reasons recorded were not in proper format as contemplated by sub- Section (2) of Section 148 of the Act and that the prior approval of the Commissioner under Section 151 for issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act was not obtained. Learned counsel for the parties are ad-idem that if the second question of law is answered against the revenue, the appeal should fail and in that event the first question need not be considered on merits. In view thereof, with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, we have gone through the relevant materials on record and so also the provisions contained in Sections 147, 148 and 151 of the Act. The Tribunal has extensively considered the materials on record to hold that the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening of the assessment for the year 1995-96 were not in the proper format. Though we may not agree with the findings recorded by the Tribunal in respect thereof, we have examined whether prior approval of the Commissioner as contemplated by Section 151 of the Act was obtained, taking the case of Revenue that the reasons recorded under Section 148(2) of the Act were sufficient and were in proper format.
5. Having regard to the scheme of the provisions contained in Sections 147, 148 and 151 of the Act, it is clear as crystal that if the assessment is reopened after expiry of the four years from the end of relevant assessment year, no notice under Section 148 of the Act shall be issued unless the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner is satisfied on the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer that it is a fit case for issuance of such notice. To examine whether the approval under Section 151(1) of the Act was obtained, as observed earlier, we proceed on the assumption that the Assessing Officer had recorded good and sufficient reasons as required under sub-Section (2) of Section 148 of the Act. Admittedly, neither the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer under sub-Section (2) of Section 148 of the Act nor approval granted by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner as contemplated by the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 151 of the Act is on record.
6. Mr.Aravind, learned counsel appearing for the revenue fairly submitted that the original record/file does not contain either the reasons under Section 148(2) or the approval granted by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner under Section 151(1) of the Act. He placed the original file before us for our perusal. We also did not find those documents in the file. He also, on instructions, submitted that even the record that was placed for consideration of the Tribunal has been destroyed. Thus, in the absence of either the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer or approval granted by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, we made an attempt to find out from the other materials on record whether the approval under Section 151 of the Act was obtained before issuing the notice under Section 148 thereof.
7. In this connection, Mr.Shankar, learned counsel for the respondent-assessee invited our attention to the order of assessment passed in the connected ITA No.641/2006 dated 26-02-2004, of the very same assessee, pertaining to the assessment year 1996-97. He submitted that insofar as reopening of the assessment for the assessment year 1996-97 is concerned, the approval of the Commissioner of Income Tax, as required under Section 151 of the Act was obtained and it was also placed on record in that case. In support of this contention, he invited our attention to the observations made by the Assessing Officer at paragraph 2. In this paragraph, the Assessing Officer has observed that "Notice under Section 148 was issued to the assessee on 26-3-2003, with the approval of the Commissioner of Income Tax." He submitted that such observations do not find place in the order for the assessment year 1995-96. That apart, it appears from the observations made by the Appellate Authority, in the order dated 30-03-2004, the assessee had raised the following ground of challenge:
"It is contended that the order of reassessment is bad in law and void- Ab-initio for want of requisite jurisdiction since the mandatory requirements to assume jurisdiction u/s. 148 of the Act did not exist and have not been complied with."
It is on the basis of this ground of challenge, Mr.Shankar, learned counsel appearing for the assessee vehemently submitted that though such ground was raised, the Appellate Authority did not examine whether approval as contemplated under Section 151 of the Act was obtained.
8. On the other hand, Mr.K.V.Aravind, learned counsel appearing for the revenue invited our attention to certain observations made by the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal and submitted that it is possible to draw an inference that approval of the Commissioner under Section 151 of the Act was obtained by the Assessing Officer before issuing notice under Section 148 thereof. Though, he made feeble attempt to invite our attention to the orders of the Tribunal and of the authorities below in support of this contention, he could not and did not point out any such observation so as to hold that approval under Section 151 was obtained before issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act. He fairly submitted that there is no finding recorded by either of the authorities below including the Tribunal that approval as contemplated by Section 151 of the Act was either referred to or mentioned in the orders. The Tribunal has, at length, considered the issue whether the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening of the assessment were in proper format, and held that no such reasons were recorded. The Tribunal recorded such finding and further observed that the note sent to the Commissioner by the Assessing Officer was not sanctioned/approved under Section 151 of the Act. In the absence of the order granting approval by the Commissioner under Section 151 or in the absence of any indication in the orders passed by the authorities below including the order of the Tribunal or the materials on record that such approval was obtained, it would not be possible to assume that such approval under Section 151 of the Act was obtained. The provisions contained in Section 151 of the Act are indubitably mandatory in nature and since compliance thereof was either not made or could be established by the revenue, in our opinion, benefit will have to be given to the assessee. Though we do not agree with all the reasons recorded by the Tribunal in the order, it has rightly decided the second question in favour of the assessee. We do not find any reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the Tribunal on the second question and hence, the appeal will have to be dismissed on this ground alone. Order accordingly.
9. Before we part, we observe that causing disappearance of certain documents from the record including reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer as contemplated by sub-Section 2 of Section 148 of the Act and approval, if any, obtained under Section 151 of the Act may not be innocent or innocuous. The Commissioner, therefore ought to have conducted an enquiry, to find out whether the approval under Section 151 of the Act was obtained or if yes, how it disappeared from the record and who was responsible for the same? Though we do not wish to record any positive finding on the conduct of the assessee, we feel that the authorities below ought to have taken disappearance of record to its logical conclusions.
10. In the result, the second question is answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue and as a result thereof the appeal fails and dismissed as such. No costs.
--


2014-TIOL-198-HC-AHM-IT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
AT AHMEDABAD
Tax Appeal No.588 of 2013
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX - III
Vs
BHOGILAL RAMJIBHAI ATARA
Akil Kureshi And Sonia Gokani, JJ
Date of Decision: February 4, 2014
Appellant Rep by: Mr Pranav G Desai, Adv.
Respondents Rep by: 
Mr S N Soparkar, Sr Adv. Mr B S Soparkar, Adv.
Income Tax – Section 41(1) – Keywords – "deemed income", "remission of liability", "cessation of liability"
Whether it amounts to remission or cessation of liability merely because when many of the creditors were not found at the given address and some of them stated that they had no dealing with the assessee - Whether merely on these grounds the outstanding liability amount can be added as deemed income u/s 41(1).
The assessee filed return of income which showed a sum of Rs.37.52 lacs by way of his debt. The AO inquired into such outstanding dues of the assessee. The assessee supplied details of 27 different creditors. The AO issued summons to all these so called creditors and questioned them about the alleged credit to the assessee. The AO in his order recorded that number of parties were not found at the given address and many of them stated that they had no concern with the assessee. On the basis of such findings and considering that the debts were outstanding since several years, the AO applied section 41(1) of the Income Tax Act i.e., remission of liability and added the entire sum as income of the assessee. The AO held that liabilities have ceased to exist within the meaning of Section 41(1) of the Act and therefore, the same should be deemed to be the income of the assessee. On appeal, it was rejected by the CIT(A). On further appeal, the assessee approached the Tribunal and it was allowed. The Tribunal observed that there was no finding that the impugned liabilities were trading liabilities in respect of which the assessee had obtained any benefit or advantage either by way of their remission or cessation in the year under appeal. The Tribunal observed that assessee has not written off the impugned liabilities shown in the accounts and the AO has not brought sufficient material on records to establish as to how the ingredients of Section 41(1) were satisfied so as to bring the impugned addition within its ambit.
On appeal, the Departmental Representative vehemently contended that the creditors whose details were given by the assessee were not even found. In many cases, those who were found stated that they have not given credit to the assessee. On the other hand, the counsel for the assessee supported the order of the Tribunal contending that there had been no cessation of liability.
Having heard the parties, the HC held that,
we are in agreement with the view of the Tribunal. Section 41(1) of the Act as discussed in the above three decisions would apply in a case where there has been remission or cessation of liability during the year under consideration subject to the conditions contained in the statute being fulfilled. Additionally, such cessation or remission has to be during the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration. In the present case, both elements are missing. There was nothing on record to suggest there was remission or cessation of liability that too during the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2007-08 which was the year under consideration. It is undoubtedly a curious case. Even the liability itself seems under serious doubt. The Assessing Officer undertook the exercise to verify the records of the so called creditors. Many of them were not found at all in the given address. Some of them stated that they had no dealing with the assessee. In one or two cases, the response was that they had no dealing with the assessee nor did they know him. Of course, these inquiries were made ex parte and in that view of the matter, the assessee would be allowed to contest such findings. Nevertheless, even if such facts were established through bi-parte inquiries, the liability as it stands perhaps holds that there was no cessation or remission of liability and that therefore, the amount in question cannot be added back as a deemed income under section 41(c) of the Act. This is one of the strange cases where even if the debt itself is found to be non-genuine from the very inception, at least in terms of section 41(1) of the Act there is no cure for it. Be that as it may, insofar as the orders of the Revenue authorities are concerned, the Tribunal not having made any error, this Tax Appeal is dismissed.
Revenue's appeal dismissed
JUDGEMENT
Per: Akil Kureshi:
Revenue is in appeal against the judgment of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dated 28.2.2013 raising following questions for our consideration:
"A. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Appellate Tribunal is right in coming to the conclusion that the ingredients of section 41(1) of the Act are not satisfied in the instant case?
B. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Appellate Tribunal is justified in deleting the addition of Rs.37,52,752/- made by the A.O. under section 41(1) of the IT Act?"
Briefly stated, the facts are that for the assessment year 2007-08, the assessee filed return of income which showed, besides others, a sum of Rs.37.52 lacs by way of his debt. The Assessing Officer inquired into such outstanding dues of the assessee. The assessee supplied details of 27 different creditors. The Assessing Officer issued summons to all these so called creditors and questioned them about the alleged credit to the assessee. In detail, the Assessing Officer in his order of assessment recorded that number of parties were not found at the given address. Many of them stated that they had no concern with the assessee. Some of them conveyed that they did not even know the assessee.
On the basis of such findings and considering that the debts were outstanding since several years, the Assessing Officer applied section 41(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and added the entire sum as income of the assessee. The Assessing Officer held that liabilities have ceased to exist within the meaning of section 41(1) of the Act and therefore, the same should be deemed to be the income of the assessee.
The assessee carried the matter in appeal. CIT (Appeals) rejected the appeal. The assessee thereupon approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal by the impugned judgment, allowed the assessee's appeal making following brief observations:
"7. We have heard both the parties. There is no finding that the impugned liabilities were trading liabilities in respect of which the assessee had obtained any benefit or advantage either by way of their remission or cessation in the year under appeal. The assessee has not written off the impugned liabilities shown in the accounts. The A.O. has not brought sufficient material on records to establish as to how the ingredients of section 41(1) are satisfied so as to bring the impugned addition within its ambit. ?The judgment of Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in C.I.T. V. Nitin Garg, cited supra is squarely applicable. In this view of the matter ground No.1 taken by the assessee is allowed.
8. On the facts of the case, we do not consider it appropriate to restore the matter to the file of the CIT (A)/AO so as to give them second inning in order to establish the applicability or nonapplicability of section 41(1). It is a settled principle of law that a statutory provision can be invoked only when the conditions stipulated by it are established. In the present case, conditions of section 41(1) are not satisfied. It is the policy of law to ensure that the litigations are brought to an end expeditiously. In this view of the mater, matters under appeal cannot be restored at the request of the parties so as to give second inning to the parties to establish their cases."
Learned counsel for the Revenue vehemently contended that the creditors whose details were given by the assessee were not even found. In many cases, those who were found stated that they have not given credit to the assessee. He, therefore, submitted that the Tribunal committed serious error in deleting the addition.
On the other hand, learned counsel Shri Soparkar for the assessee supported the order of the Tribunal contending that there had been no cessation of liability. Section 41(1) of the Act would not apply. In any case, it was not established that such liability ceased during the year under consideration.
The counsel relied on following decisions:
(I) In the case of CIT v. Miraa Processors (P) Ltd. (2012) 208 Taxman 93 (Guj.) = (2012-TIOL-289-HC-AHM-IT) in which Division Bench of this Court observed as under:
"14. As pointed out in the case of Sugauli Sugar Works (P) Ltd. (supra), vide the last five lines of the paragraph-6 of the judgment, the question whether the liability is actually barred by limitation is not a matter which can be decided by considering the assessee's case alone but has to be decided only if the creditor is before the concerned authority. In the absence of the creditor, it is not possible for the authority to come to a conclusion that the debt is barred and has become unenforceable. There may be circumstances which may enable the creditor to come with a proceeding for enforcement of the debt even after expiry of the normal period of limitation as provided in the Limitation Act."
(ii) In the case of CIT v. Nitin S. Garg, (2012) 208 Taxman 16 (Guj.) = (2012-TIOL-294-HC-AHM-IT), it was observed as under:
15. In the case before us, it is not been established that the assessee has written off the outstanding liabilities in the books of account. The Appellate Tribunal is justified in taking the view that as assessee had continued to show the admitted amounts as liabilities in its balance sheet the same cannot be treated as assessment of liabilities. Merely because the liabilities are outstanding for last many years, it cannot be inferred that the said liabilities have seized to exist. The Appellate Tribunal has rightly observed that the Assessing Officer shall have to prove that the assessee has obtained the benefits in respect of such trading liabilities by way of remission or cessation thereof which is not the case before us. Merely because the assessee obtained benefit of reduction in the earlier years and balance is carried forward in the subsequent year, it would not prove that the trading liabilities of the assessee have become non existent.
16. Moreover, as pointed out in the case of Sugauli Sugar Works (P) Ltd. (supra), vide the last five lines of the paragraph-6 of the judgement, the question whether the liability is actually barred by limitation is not a matter which can be decided by considering the assessee's case alone but has to be decided only if the creditor is before the concerned authority. In the absence of the creditor, it is not possible for the authority to come to a conclusion that the debt is barred and has become unenforceable. There may be circumstances which may enable the creditor to come with a proceeding for enforcement of the debt even after expiry of the normal period of limitation as provided in the Limitation Act."
(iii) In the case of CIT v. G.K. Patel & Co. (2013) 212 Taxman 384 (Guj)., in which a Division Bench of this court held and observed as under:
"To the extent the said decision holds that a unilateral act on the part of the debtor cannot bring about a cessation of his liability, the same would not be applicable to the facts of the present case, in view of the insertion of Explanation 1. However, at the cost of repetition it may be stated that in this case there is no unilateral act on the part of the debtor so as to bring about a cessation of its liability. Therefore, the other part of the decision would still apply to the facts of the present case, namely that the cessation of liability has to be either by reason of operation of law, i.e., on the liability becoming unenforceable at law by the creditor and the debtor declaring unequivocally his intention not to honour his liability when payment is demanded by the creditor, or a contract between the parties, or by discharge of the debt – the debtor making payment thereof to his creditor. In the present case, admittedly there in no declaration by the assessee that it does not intend to honour its liabilities nor is there any discharge of the debt. In the aforesaid premises, as no event had taken place in the year under consideration to indicate remission or cessation of the liabilities in question, the provisions of section 41(1) of the Act could not have been invoked. The reasoning adopted by the Tribunal while holding that section 41(1) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case is in line with the principles enunciated in the above decision. The Tribunal, therefore, committed no legal error so as to give rise to any question of law warranting interference by this court."
We are in agreement with the view of the Tribunal. Section 41(1) of the Act as discussed in the above three decisions would apply in a case where there has been remission or cessation of liability during the year under consideration subject to the conditions contained in the statute being fulfilled. Additionally, such cessation or remission has to be during the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration. In the present case, both elements are missing. There was nothing on record to suggest there was remission or cessation of liability that too during the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2007-08 which was the year under consideration. It is undoubtedly a curious case. Even the liability itself seems under serious doubt. The Assessing Officer undertook the exercise to verify the records of the so called creditors. Many of them were not found at all in the given address. Some of them stated that they had no dealing with the assessee. In one or two cases, the response was that they had no dealing with the assessee nor did they know him. Of course, these inquiries were made ex parte and in that view of the matter, the assessee would be allowed to contest such findings. Nevertheless, even if such facts were established through bi-parte inquiries, the liability as it stands perhaps holds that there was no cessation or remission of liability and that therefore, the amount in question cannot be added back as a deemed income under section 41(c) of the Act. This is one of the strange cases where even if the debt itself is found to be non-genuine from the very inception, at least in terms of section 41(1) of the Act there is no cure for it. Be that as it may, insofar as the orders of the Revenue authorities are concerned, the Tribunal not having made any error, this Tax Appeal is dismissed.


S.28(i):Business loss–Capital loss–Loss on revaluation of Government securities-Loss was held 
to be not allowable. 
The assessee was a public limited banking company carrying on the activities of banking. The 
assessee had invested certain amount in securities for the purpose of complying with the RBI 
Instructions to the effect that a minimum percentage of its total deposits to be invested in such 
securities, in the wake of deposits that it had received from its customers as part of its business 
activity. The assessee had indicated such investment as a permanent asset and had claimed that it was 
held as stock-in-trade, being a part of the trading asset. The assessee claimed that though none of 
these securities had been actually transferred resulting in a loss, the loss was being computed on the 
premise that on valuing securities at market value on the last date of the Financial year, the market 
value of the assets having gone down, the assessee had incurred a loss of Rs.1,09,10,252 as the market 
value of the securities was less than the cost of acquisition. The said loss was claimed as business 
loss. The Assessing Officer opined that the assets in the nature of investments in securities could not 
be termed as stock-in-trade as it was an investment to fulfil the RBI Instructions and Guidelines. He, 
therefore, held it as investments and not as part of the business asset of the assessee, valued for 
trading. Nevertheless, the claim of the assessee had been allowed to an extent of 30 per cent based on 
the RBI circular relating to the investments in securities, allowing a bank to treat 30 per cent of the 
investments as current investment whereas 70 per cent of the investment should be in the nature of 
permanent investments. The view of the assessing authority was affirmed by the Commissioner 
(Appeals). The Tribunal, however, allowed the assessee's claim in full. The Court held that the 
Assessee, as per its own admission, holding the investment in securities in terms of RBI instructions 
as permanent investment, cannot treat the same as part of stock-in-trade, hence cannot claim loss by 
way of revaluation on the last day of accounting year as allowable revenue loss. No assessee can 
claim an investment of lasting nature, to be part of its trading asset or as an asset held by way of stock 
in trade. Question as to whether an asset is an trading asset or is an asset in the nature of a lasting asset 
investment held as part of investment made by the banking company is a question which has to be 
answered in each case and not either based on the RBI circular or guidelines or even a circular issued  
Monthly Digest of Case Laws (November 2013) http://www.itatonline.org 
17 
by the Board in general. Tribunal was, therefore, not justified in allowing the loss as claimed by the 
assessee. (AY. 1993 – 1994] 
CIT .v. ING Vysya Bank Ltd. (2013) 94 DTR 425/ 24 taxmann.com 51 (Karn.)(HC)

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S.37(1): Business expenditure-Premium paid on the insurance Policies in the names of the 
Partners is allowable deduction. [S.10(10D)] 
Assessee a partnership firm purchased insurance policies in the names of the partners .Assessee firm 
was proposer therein and the partners were shown to be assured person. In the column relating to the 
payment of sum assured in the policies , it has been stated that the sum assured is payable to the 
proposer or assigns or nominee meaning thereby that the sum assured would be payable only to the 
assessee& not to the assured person. The AO disallowed the claim which was upheld by CIT (A). On 
further appeal in Tribunal, the Tribunal allowed the appeal & held that as per s/10(10D), the sum 
assured , received either by the employer or employee , forms part of the total Income & is assessable 
to tax in the hands of the recipient. Since the assured sum was chargeable to tax at the time of its 
receipt, the payment was revenue expenditure deductible u/s 37(1). The premium paid on the 
insurance policies in the names of the partners is allowable deduction u/s 37(1), subject to an 
undertaking to be furnished by the assessee to the LIC to the effect that the sum assured would form 
part of the total income of the assesse at the time of receipt thereof & no benefit of exemption u/s 
10(10D) would be available to it. (AY.2008-09) 
Reliance International .v. ITO(2013) 157 TTJ 766 / 94 DTR 14/157 TTJ 766 (Luck.)(Trib.

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IN THE INCOME TAX APP ELLATE TRIBUNAL,
KOLKATA 'B' BENCH, KOLKATA
Coram : Shri Abraham P. George (Accountant Member)
and Shri George Mathan (Judicial Member)
I.T .A. No. : 1400/Kol./ 2011
Assessment year : 2007-2008
Shri Harish Kumar Manikant Goda Vs Income Tax Officer
Appearances by:
Shri Subash Agarwal, Advocate, for the assessee
Shri P.B. Pramanick, JCIT, Sr. D.R, for the Department
Date of concluding the hearing : February 14, 2014
Date of pronouncing the order : February 19, 2014
ORDER
Per Abraham P. Geroge :
1. In this appeal, assessee assails an addition of Rs.3,62,100/- which was scaled down by ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-XIX, Kolkata to Rs.2,68,150/-.
2. Facts apropos are that assessee is an individual , had filed his return for the impugned assessment year declaring income of Rs.1,69,635/-. It seems that return was originally subject only to a processing under section 143(1) of the Act. The assessment was reopened under section 147 of the Act. Reason for reopening is not available in the assessment order. During the course of reassessment proceedings, Assessing Officer based on certain documents came to a finding that jewellery worth Rs.5.5 lakhs was handed over by the assessee to the in-laws of his daughter. As per Assessing Officer, said jewellery was not shown in assessee's balance- sheet. No return of wealth was filed by the assessee. According to the Assessing Officer, the maximum gold jewellery that can be possessed by a married man, who has not filed any wealth-tax return, can be only 200 grams. Taking per gram rate of Rs.939.5, Assessing Officer reached a figure of Rs.1,87,900/-, as the maximum value of gold jewellery that can be possessed by the assessee. The difference of Rs.3,62,100/- was added as unaccounted income.
3. In its appeal before ld. CIT(A ppeals), argument of the assessee was that only 400 grams of jewellery was handed over to the in-laws of his daughter at the time of marriage and on various occasions. As per the assessee, such jewellery was purchased over a large number of years out of savings. Assessee further submitted that there were regular withdrawals made by him from his accounts and, therefore, surplus money was available with him for purchasing small quantities of gold ornaments over a long period of time. As per the assessee, the total amount spent by him for the marriage of his daughter was Rs.12.32 lakhs and the jewellery given to the in-laws of his daughter was only 400 grams.
4. Ld. CIT(Appeals) partly accepted the claim of assessee. According to him, withdrawals were made by the assessee over a number of years from his accounts and, therefore, the cl aim that some of jewellery was purchased in the earlier years out of savings, could not be brushed aside.
He was of the opinion that credit to the extent of 300 grams of jewellery coul d be allowed to the assessee. He, therefore, held that at the rate of Rs.939.5 per gram the maximum value of jewellery that could be held by the assessee was only Rs.2,81,850/-. He, therefore, directed the Assessing Officer to restrict the addition to Rs.2,68,150/-.
5. Now before us, l d. A.R. strongly assailing the order of ld. CIT(A ppeals) submitted that 400 grams of jewellery was not a huge holding and not something which was not achievable for a common man.
According to him, reopening of assessment was based on complaint given by the son-in-law of the assessee who was trying for a divorce from assessee's daughter. As per l d. A.R. when withdrawals were found sufficient for more than 400 grams, ld. CIT(A ppeals) erred in coming to a conclusion that assessee could at the best hold onl y 300 grams of jewellery.
6. Per contra, ld. D.R. supported the order of ld. CIT(Appeals).
7. We have heard the rival contentions and perused the material available on record. Ld. CIT(Appeals) has not disputed the claim of assessee that he was having drawings from his accounts in the earlier years. Admittedl y assessee was having only 400 grams of jewellery, which was given by him to the in-laws of his daughter at the time of marriage.
Assessee who was regularl y filing return of income claimed that he had acquired such jewellery over a number of years. Since he was having a daughter to marry off, this is not an unbelievable version. Endeavour of every Indian is to accumulate some jewellery which can be used at the time of marriage of his/her daughter. At the best, assessee can only be considered as a doting father. It is not required for an assessee to file personal balance-sheet along with the return of income. Hence, the question of jewellery not appearing in the balance-sheet, in our opinion, is irrelevant. The reopening, as well as assessment, in our opinion, was an aftermath of famil y disputes between the daughter of the assesese and her husband. This is not a case where undisclosed income or unaccounted income could have been assessed. The addition made is deleted in full.
8. In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed.
Order pronounced in the open court on 19th day of February, 2014.

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL "B" BENCH, MUMBAI
BEFORE S/SHRI B.R.MITTAL,(JM) AND RAJENDRA (AM)
I.T.A.Nos. 6216 to 6221/Mum/2009
(Assessment Yeasr: 2002-03 t o 2007-08)
M/s B.J.Hotels Pvt Ltd. Vs. Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax
Appellant by : Shri Manish Sanghavi
Respondent by : Shri Pereetam Singh
Date of Hearing : 13.2.2014
Date of Pronouncement : 19.2.2014
O R D E R
Per Bench
The assessee has filed these six appeals for assessment years 2002-03 to 2007-08 against common order of ld. CIT(A) dated 6.10.2009.
2. These appeals are arising out of assessment orders passed u/s 143(3) read with section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
3. At the time of hearing, ld. AR submitted that assessee has taken an additional ground disputing the validity of assessment orders passed by the AO by initiating proceedings u/s 153A of the Act on the ground that there was no search in the case of this assessee. Ld. AR submitted that the said ground is taken for the first time before He relied on the decision of Hon'ble apex Court in the case of National the Tribunal.
Thermal Power Co. Ltd vs CIT, 229 ITR 383(SC) and submitted that the ground taken by assessee is relating to jurisdictional issue and it goes to the validity of the assessment proceedings and therefore the said additional ground be admitted by Tribunal though it is raised for the first time. Ld. AR submitted that there is no "punchnama" in the case of assessee. It is relevant to state that the Tribunal on the earlier occasion adjourned the appeals directing the ld. DR to furnish a copy of "punchnama" evidencing that the search had taken place in the case of the assessee before us. However, Ld. DR could not produce the copy of "Punchanama" but submitted a Note and stated that the search had taken place in the case of Bawa Group and its family members including the assessee. Ld. DR has filed the details of persons in whose cases search had taken place and submitted that the name of the assessee is appearing in the said list. He further submitted that warrant No. in the case of assessee is No.4455 as per list filed. Ld. DR submitted that the assessee had never raised this issue and even declared income during the search.
4. Be that as it may, ld. DR could not produce copy of "Punchanama" to decide the issue as to whether any search in the case of assessee had taken place.
5. Since the said issue had been taken by assessee for the first time before the Tribunal and it requires investigation of facts , it was conceded by ld. Representatives of both the parties that the matter may be restored to the file of ld. CIT(A) to decide the issue as to whether the search had taken place in the case of assessee after considering requisite details as may be placed before him. Since this issue goes to the validity of the assessment order, we set aside the order of the ld. CIT(A) with a direction that he will decide the jurisdictional issue of the validity of the assessment and thereafter dispose off the appeals on the basis of material as may be placed before him by a reasoned order. In view of above, all these appeals filed by the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes by restoring the same to the file of the ld. CIT(A)
6. In the result, all the six appeals of the assessee for assessment years 2002-03 to 2007-08 are allowed for statistical purposes.
The above order was pronounced in the open court on 19th February, 2014.

Garware Wall Ropes Ltd vs. ACIT (ITAT Mumbai)

No S. 14A/ Rule 8D disallowance if primary object of investment is to hold controlling stake in group concern and not to earn tax-free income
We find merit and substance in the contention of the assessee that no expenditure had been incurred by the assessee for earning the exempt income on this point because the investment has been made by the assessee in the group concern and not in the shares of any un-related party. Therefore, the primary object of investment is holding controlling stake in the group concern and not earning any income out of investment. Further the investment were made long back and not in the year under consideration. Therefore, in view of the fact that the investment are in the group concern we do not find any reason to believe that the assessee would have incurred any administrative expenses in holding these investments. The AO has not brought on record any material to show that the assessee has incurred any expenditure in relation to the income which does not form part of the total income

Visvesvaraya Technological University vs. ACIT (Karnataka High Court)

S. 10 (23C): An institution which regularly makes more than 10% – 15% surplus is existing for profit & is not eligible for exemption
In our opinion, "Surplus" cannot be more than 10% – 15% so as to meet contingencies or unforeseen expenditure. If an University or an educational institution under the guise of "surplus" start making huge profit, in our opinion, it would cease to exist for net making profit and in that event would not be entitled for exemption under this provision. On facts, the University collects huge sums which are 3-4 times more than the requirement. Such "surplus" which is invested in fixed deposits and fetches huge interest cannot be stated to be "incidental"

Dholadhar Investment Pvt. Ltd vs. CIT (Delhi High Court)

S. 254: Tribunal is not required to consider pleadings, material etc to which its pointed attention is not drawn
It is true, as held by the Supreme Court in a long line of cases that the Tribunal is duty-bound to consider all the grounds, the evidence produced and consider the contentions of the parties before it and all other material brought to its notice in a judicial spirit and should not feel incommoded by technicalities: The duty is limited to the points raised before it. It would be placing an impossible burden on the Tribunal if it is ordained to rule upon aspects and contentions which were not raised by the parties before it or to deal with pleadings, evidence or material to which its pointed attention was not drawn in the course of the proceedings and which lies buried in the forest of papers filed by the parties

CROWN Consultants Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (Bombay High Court)

S. 147: Assessee is not entitled to challenge validity of reopening on a ground not stated in objections to AO
Just as the revenue cannot improve upon its case for reopening before the Court and but must stand or fall by the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment, the same test would be applicable in case of an assessee i.e. it must stand or fall by its objection to the grounds for reopening of assessment. It is not open to the assessee to urge fresh objections before the Court which the AO had no occasion to deal with, unless of course the notice to reopen is ex-facie without jurisdiction not requiring consideration of any argument such as beyond limitation


DCIT vs. Panasonic AVC Networks India Co Ltd (ITAT Delhi)

Transfer Pricing: Adjustment to profit margin for "capacity underutilization" can be made. In choosing comparables, there cannot be a cherry picking for deciding parameters of rejection. All comparables must face the same test
Under Rule 10B (1)(e)(ii), an adjustment to the net profit margin has to be made for "capacity underutilization". Capacity underutilization by enterprises is an important factor affecting net profit margin in the open market because lower capacity utilization results in higher per unit costs, which, in turn, results in lower profits. Of course, the fundamental issue, so far as acceptability of such adjustments is concerned, is reasonable accuracy embedded in the mechanism for such adjustments, and as long as such an adjustment mechanism can be found, no objection can be taken to the adjustment. On facts, the CIT(A)'s approach is reasonable and the adjustments are on a conceptually sound basis
 

DCIT vs. Air Liquide Engineering India (ITAT Hyderabad)

Transfer Pricing: TPO cannot sit in judgement on commercial expediency. RBI approval means the payment is at ALP. If overall TNMM analysis done, royalty cannot be analyzed separately
The TPO is not entitled to sit on judgment on the business and commercial expediency of the assessee in paying royalty to its' parent company as per the provisions of the Act as laid down clearly by the Delhi High Court in EKL Appliances 345 ITR 241. It is also noted that various Tribunals such as DCIT vs. Sona Okegawa Precision Forgings (ITA No. 5386/Del/2010), Hero Motocorp (ITA No 5130/Del/2010), ThyssenKrupp Industries (ITA No 6460/Mum/2012), Abhishek Auto Industries (ITA No 1433/Del/2009) have taken a view that RBI approval of the Royalty rates itself implies that the payments are at Arm's Length and hence no further adjustment needs to be made viewed from this angle too. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that once TNMM has been applied to the assessee company's transaction, it covers under its ambit the Royalty transactions in question too and hence separate analysis and consequent deletion of the Royalty payments by the TPO seems erroneous. We draw support from Cadbury India (ITA No 7408/Mum/2010 and ITA No.7641/Mum/2010 wherein the ITAT upheld the use of TNMM for Royalty
 

Tilda Riceland Pvt Ltd vs. ACIT (ITAT Delhi)

Transfer Pricing: No bar on reliance of private database u/R 10D(3). Nuances of the CUP Method under Rule 10B(1)(a)(i) explained
(i) Rule 10 D(3) is only illustrative in nature and merely describes the information required to be maintained by the assessee under section 92D "shall be supported by authentic documents, which may include the following …". The logic employed by the Transfer Pricing Officer that since databases compiled by private entities is not included in rule 10D (3), such databases cannot be relied upon by the assessee is clearly fallacious inasmuch as an item not being included in illustrative list of required documents does not take outside the ambit of 'acceptable document' for the required purposes. In any event, all that Tips Software does is to collect the data, compile the same in easy to refer format and make it available to the end-user of such data online. The data is public data maintained by the customs department at various ports. It was also open to the TPO to, if he had any doubts, call for further information from this database supplier and examine authenticity of the data so furnished. His summary rejection of the data as unreliable on a technical ground is not tenable in law
 

Lummus Technology Heat Transfer BV vs. DCIT (ITAT Delhi)

Transfer Pricing: Unaudited segmental accounts can be relied upon for comparing profitability of controlled transactions with uncontrolled transactions. While size is relevant in entity level comparison, it is not relevant in transaction level comparison within the same entity
(i) In applying the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) under Rule 10B(1)(e) it is not necessary that the net profit computations, in the case of internal comparables (i.e. assessee's transactions with independent enterprise), have to be based on the audited books of accounts or the books of accounts regularly maintained by the assessee. All that is necessary for the purpose of computing arm's length price, under TNMM on the basis of internal comparables, is computation of net profit margin, subject to comparability adjustments affecting net profit margin of uncontrolled transactions, on the same parameters for the transactions with AEs as well as Non AEs, i.e. independent enterprises, and as long as the net profits earned from the controlled transactions are the same or higher than the net profits earned on uncontrolled transactions, no ALP adjustments are warranted. It is not at all necessary that such a computation should be based on segmental accounts in the books of accounts regularly maintained by the assessee and subjected to audit
 

DCIT vs. Panasonic AVC Networks India Co Ltd (ITAT Delhi)

Transfer Pricing: Adjustment to profit margin for "capacity underutilization" can be made. In choosing comparables, there cannot be a cherry picking for deciding parameters of rejection. All comparables must face the same test

Deloitte Consulting India Pvt.Ltd vs. ACIT (Bombay High Court)

Rejection of stay application by ITAT on the ground that "the financial position of the assessee is very sound" and "government also needs liquid funds to manage its day to day affairs" & without discussing prima facie case is in disregard of law laid down in KEC International 251 ITR 158 (Bom)
The assessee filed a revised return in which it withdrew a claim for deduction of Rs.5.86 crore paid to its AE. The assessee claimed s. 10A deduction on the enhanced income. The AO held that the revised return was filed to get over s. 92-C(4) and the proviso thereto which provides that no deduction u/s 10-A would be allowed in respect of income enhanced having regard to the Arms Length Price (ALP). The AO's stand was upheld by the Tribunal. The AO levied penalty of Rs. 2.05 crore and refused to grant stay. The assessee filed a Writ Petition. The High Court held that that the assessee held a prima facie case on merits and granted partial stay of the demand till the decision of the CIT(A). Subsequently, the CIT(A) dismissed the penalty appeal and the assessee filed a stay application before the Tribunal. The Tribunal (order attached) rejected the stay application on the ground that "the financial position of the assessee is very sound" and "government also needs liquid funds to manage its day to day affairs". The assessee filed a Writ Petition to challenge the said order of the Tribunal. HELD by the High Court:
The impugned order of the Tribunal has been passed in total disregard of the principles laid down in KEC International Ltd 251 ITR 158 (Bom) wherein a Division Bench of this Court laid down parameters to be observed by the Authorities while considering the stay application. The Tribunal has not even given short prima facie reasons recording the Petitioner's case. The Petitioner does has a strong prima facie case on merits before the Tribunal. Thus, having regard to the fact that the Petitioner has already paid the full tax amount and also 25% of the penalty amount earlier, the Tribunal ought not to have required the Petitioner to deposit a further sum of Rs.50.00 lakhs. In fact, the Tribunal while passing the impugned order has not only ignored the directions in KEC but also the observations made by this Court in the Petitioner's own case
Note: The guidelines laid down in KEC International have been reiterated in UTI Mutual Fund (No. 1) 345 ITR 71 (Bom). In UTI Mutual Fund (No. 2) 31 TM 222 (Bom) it was held that financial hardship was not necessary for grant of stay. Click here for more law on stay of demand

IT-I : Mere fact that certain credit balance appearing in previous years' books of account remained unchallenged, did not shift burden of assessee of proving genuineness of said credit and, therefore, in case of failure of assessee to establish same, amount in question could be added to assessee's taxable income under section 68
IT-II : Where Assessing Officer made addition on account of alleged bogus freight and forwarding expenditure by relying on testimony and deposition of an employee of assessee-company, in view of fact that testimony of said employee remained unrebutted, impugned addition was to be confirmed
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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 3 (Delhi)
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Usha Iron & Ferro Metal Corpn. Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of Income-tax*
S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND NAJMI WAZIRI, JJ.
IT APPEAL NO. 132 OF 2011 
C.M. APPLICATION NO. 1020 OF 2011
DECEMBER  2, 2013 
I. Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Cash credits [Amount appearing in previous books of account] - Block period 1-4-1990 to 14-2-2001 - Pursuant to search proceedings, Assessing Officer completed assessment wherein certain addition was made by invoking provisions of section 68 - Assessee challenged said addition taking a plea that said credit balance had been reflected in previous years' books of account and also subjected to assessment - Whether mere fact that amount in question remained unchallenged in previous proceedings no way shifted burden of proving what assessee claimed as a credit balance as on date of search and seizure - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, when assessee could not substantiate such credit in favour of third party, impugned addition made by Assessing Officer was to be upheld - Held, yes [Para 7][In favour of revenue]
II. Section 143 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Assessment - Additions to income [Bogus claim of expenditure] - Block period 1-4-1990 to 14-2-2001 - During assessment proceedings, Assessing Officer made addition on account of alleged bogus freight and forwarding expenditure by relying on testimony and deposition of employee of assessee-company who stated that said expenses did not reflect actual expenditure or transactions - In writ proceedings, assessee did not dispute that employee could have been subjected to cross-examination - Even otherwise, testimony of employee remained unrebutted and unchallenged - Whether on facts, impugned addition made by Assessing Officer deserved to be confirmed - Held, yes [Para 6][In favour of revenue]
Prakash Kumar for the Appellant. Rohit Madan for the Respondent.
ORDER
 
S. Ravindra Bhat, J. - The assessee in this appeal under Section 268 of the Income Tax Act urges that two questions of law arises for consideration. The first, it is submitted, pertains to the correctness of the ITAT directions to add Rs.22 lakhs towards alleged bogus freight and forwarding expenditure by an estimating exercise. The second question of law urged is that the lower authority fell into error in adding Rs.6,84,22,895/- on account of outstanding credit balance in the name of one M/s Smriti Sales Private Limited.
2. The facts necessary for the purpose of deciding the present appeal are that on 14.02.2001, the appellant's premises and other group companies numbering about 250 - were subject to search and seizure proceedings. Subsequently, the appellant and the other concerns which were subject to the search were issued with notice on 30.08.2001 under Section 158 (BC) requiring the furnishing of return of income including undisclosed income for the period 1.4.1990 to 14.2.2001. Apparently, during the course of the proceedings having regard to the complexity of accounts, special audit under Section 142 (2) (A) of the Income Tax Act were also ordered. Though, this Court is not directly concern with details of those facts, yet to the extent it is relevant is worth noticing that the appellant did not cooperate with the Special Auditors who had to proceed with some difficulty and nevertheless filed the report within the time allocated.
3. On 16.10.2013, the Assessing Officer framed the assessment order directing a total addition of Rs.9,71,23,895/-. The appellant in these proceedings challenges the addition on account of alleged bogus freight and forwarding expenditure to the tune of Rs.22 lakhs for the said period and towards unexplained cash credit - added back by the Assessing Officer and upheld by the CIT to the tune of Rs.6,84,22,895/-.
4. It is urged that so far as the addition of Rs.22 lakhs goes, the Assessing Officer and the higher authorities fell into error in relying solely on the testimony and deposition of one Vineet Bhargava who stated that the freight expenses did not reflect actual expenditure or transactions. It was sought to be highlighted that the pre condition for adding back such amounts or disallowing the expenditure so that it could attract Section 68 was the exactitude with which the transaction could be pin pointed. The counsel further submitted that the deposition of Vaibhav Bhargava cannot be termed as conclusive in these circumstances since the answer to question no.5 relied upon by the Assessing Officer and other officials nowhere indicated that the expenditure he was referring to pertains to the appellant.
5. On the second issue, i.e., the addition of Rs.6,84,22,895 under Section 68 of the Act, learned counsel urged that this amount was reflected even in the previous balance sheet, as on 31.3.2000 and is subject to regular assessment. It was submitted that in these circumstances, the Assessing Officer dealt with this amount and concluded that the same have to be added back under Section 68 of the Act.
6. We notice from the reading of the assessment order - which is a fairly detailed one and has discussed threadbare the evidence placed before the authorities. The reference to the sum of Rs.22 lakhs was in the context of amounts claimed to have been spent towards freight and forwarding charges. Although, the succeeding question and answers had mentioned specific companies, neither could the appellant dispute nor is it disputed before us that the sum of Rs.22 lakhs pertains only to the appellant company. This was what was claimed as actual freight and forwarding charges which the concerned employee Vineet Bhargava clearly disclaimed in the course of his deposition. The appellant does not dispute that the Vineet Bhargava could have been subjected to cross examination. His testimony remained unrebutted and unchallenged. In these circumstances, the addition in the opinion of this Court cannot be termed as unwarranted or contrary to law.
7. So far as the addition of Rs.6,84,22,895/- goes, there is no dispute in the first place to the fact that an amount was received towards the credit balance. However, the appellant's submission today appears to be that this credit balance had been reflected in the previous years' books and also subjected to assessment. That too in the opinion of this Court cannot be determinative because as on 14.02.2001 as well as in the revised income tax returns and the relative supporting documents filed by the assessee, said amount appeared and was claimed. That such amount remained unchallenged in the previous proceedings, in the opinion of this Court, no way shifted the burden of proving what the appellant claimed as a credit of Rs.6,84,22,895/- as on the date of search and seizure. It was concededly unable to substantiate such credit in favour of third party concerned, i.e., M/s Smriti Sales Pvt. Ltd. That concern appears to have been a bogus one and part of the Usha Group Devices to claim unwarranted expenditure and thus reduce tax burden.
8. In view of the above discussion, this Court is satisfied that no question of law arises for interpretation in this appeal; the same is consequentially dismissed with no order as to costs.


IT : Section 153A calls for addition on basis of seized material if no assessment was pending on date of search
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[2014] 41 taxmann.com 485 (Delhi - Trib.)
IN THE ITAT DELHI BENCH 'SMC'
Parivar Properties (P.) Ltd.
v.
Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle -12*
B.R. MITTAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER
IT APPEAL NOS. 1011 TO 1015 (DELHI) OF 2013
[ASSESSMENT YEARS 2003-04 TO 2007-08]
DECEMBER  20, 2013 
Section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Search and seizure - Assessment in case of [Computation] - Assessment years 2003-04 to 2007-08 - Whether in course of proceedings under section 153A, addition should be made only on basis of material seized during course of search, particularly when no assessment was pending on date when search had taken place - Held, yes [Para 14] [In favour of assessee]
FACTS
 
 During search operation, certain documents were seized which belonged to the assessee company and the proceedings were initiated by issuing notice under section 153C for the six assessment years. The assessee filed nil return for all the assessment years under consideration.
 The Assessing Officer found that the assessee purchased the old constructed property during the years under consideration, but no business activity was carried out by the assessee company. However, the assessee claimed deduction on account of the expenses comprising mainly of security expenses, legal and professional expenses, interest paid, telephone expenses and electricity expenses and had capitalized the said expenses in the value of fixed assets.
 The Assessing Officer disallowed the said expenses on the ground that the nature of expenses capitalized in the cost of above building were meant for keeping the company or assets in existence and, accordingly, completed the assessment.
 On appeal, the assessee submitted that the assessments framed by the Assessing Officer are bad in law as the assessments had not been framed on the material seized pursuant to search action taken under Section 132.
 The Commissioner (Appeals) held that as per section 153A/153C, Assessing Officer was required to assess the income afresh and it rejected the contention of the assessee regarding validity of assessment under section 153C and also confirmed the action of the Assessing Officer.
 On further appeal:
HELD
 
 There was no merit in the contention of the department that while framing the assessments for the six assessment years, the Assessing Officer has to make the fresh assessment and can make additions/disallowances even not relating to the searched documents or incriminating material found during the course of search where the assessment proceedings are not pending with reference to the date when the Assessing Officer received the requisition from the Assessing Officer of the searched person to set in motion the proceedings under section 153A. Where assessment for any of six assessment years is not (sic) pending on the date when the procedure as prescribed under section 153A/153C is set in motion, Assessing Officer can go beyond search material or incriminating material found during the course of search to make the assessments as if it is a fresh assessment. [Para 14]
 There is no dispute to the fact that in respect of all the assessment years under consideration, the assessments were not pending on the date, the search had taken place, leave aside the date on which the reference was received by the Assessing Officer of the assessee from the Assessing Officer of the searched person, which was received only on 25-3-2010, as stated by the Assessing Officer and, therefore, no assessment was pending in the case of the assessee for all the assessment years under consideration. Hence, no addition can be made while making the assessment in the assessment year by making the disallowances which is not based on seized material or any incriminating material found during the course of search. The Assessing Officer should have closed the assessments without making assessments for the above assessment years under consideration when no incriminating material or seized material was found. Therefore, the grounds of appeal taken by the assessee were allowed for all the assessment years under consideration by deleting the additions made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals). [Para 14]
CASE REVIEW
 
CIT v. Chetan Dass Lachhman Dass [2012] 25 taxmann.com 227/211 Taxman 61 (Delhi) (para 14);CIT v. Anil Kumar Bhatia [2012] 24 taxmann.com 98/211 Taxman 453 (Delhi) (para 14); ACIT v.PACL India Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 2637 (Delhi) of 2010, dated 20-6-2013] and Kusum Gupta v. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal No. 4873 (Delhi) of 2009, dated 28-3-2013] (para 14) followed.
CASES REFERRED TO
 
SSP Aviation Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2012] 346 ITR 177/207 Taxman 260/20 taxmann.com 214 (Delhi)(para 10), ACIT v. PACL India Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 2637 (Delhi) of 2010, dated 20-6-2013] (para 10),MGF Automobiles Ltd. v. ACIT [IT Appeal Nos. 4212 & 4213 (Delhi) of 2011, dated 28-6-2013] (para 10), Kusum Gupta v. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal No. 4873 (Delhi) of 2009, dated 28-3-2013] (para 10),All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2012] 137 ITD 287/23 taxmann.com 103 (Mum.) (SB)(para 10), CIT v. Anil Kumar Bhatia [2012] 24 taxmann.com 98/211 Taxman 453 (Delhi) (para 12),Distributors Baroda (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India [1985] 155 ITR 120/22 Taxman 49 (SC) (para 13),Omar Salay Mohmed Sait v. CIT [1959] 37 ITR 151 (SC) (para 13), CIT v. Mahalakshmi Textiles Mills Ltd. [1967] 66 ITR 710 (SC) (para 13) and CIT v. Chetan Dass Lachhman Dass [2012] 25 taxmann.com 227/211 Taxman 61 (Delhi) (para 13).
Rajiv Saxena and Abhishek Verma for the Appellant. Ramesh Chander for the Respondent.
ORDER
 
1. The assessee has filed all these appeals for assessment years 2003-04 to 2007-08 against separate orders of learned CIT(A), all dated 24th December, 2012 on common grounds (save and except the amount disallowed by the authorities below varies).
2. Since the facts and the issue involved in all these appeals are common, I heard all these appeals together and dispose them of by a common order for the sake of convenience.
3. I consider it relevant to state the grounds of appeal taken by the assessee for AY 2003-04 which are as under:—
"1.  On the facts and the circumstances of the case whether the ld. CIT(A)-XXXI is correct in dismissing the grounds of appeal that the assessment has not been framed on the material seized pursuant to an action taken u/s 132 of the Act but the reassessment has been made not based on search material found in the action taken by the department which is illegal in law in view of the decision of Hon'ble ITAT in the matter of All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd. Vs. DCIT ITA no.5018 to 5022 and 5059/M/2010.
2.  That on facts and in circumstances of the case the ld.CIT(A) XXXI has erred in disallowing the capitalization of expenses of Rs.1,37,153/- in the cost of fixed assets illegally and therefore is liable to be quashed."
4. The relevant facts giving rise to these appeals are there was a search and seizure operation under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in Rajdarbar Group of cases on 31st July, 2008. It is stated that during search operation, certain documents were seized which belonged to the assessee company. In view of the above, the proceedings were initiated against the assessee company by issuing notice under Section 153C of the Act dated 23rd July, 2010 for the six assessment years preceding the assessment year in which the search had taken place. The assessee filed the return for all the assessment years under consideration pursuant to the notice issued under Section 153C of the Act.
5. It is relevant to state that the assessee company is engaged in the business of construction, purchase and sale of properties. The assessee purchased the old constructed property (Jubilee Cinema) at Koria Pool, Delhi for FY 1999-2000 and shown the same as fixed assets. The assessee stated that during the years under consideration, no business activity was carried out by the assessee company. It is relevant to state that for all the assessment years under consideration, no business activity was carried out by the assessee company. It is relevant to state that for the all the assessment years under consideration, the assessee filed the returns under Section 139 of the Act as under:—
(i)  For AY 2003-04 on 18.10.2003
(ii)  For AY 2004-05 on 19.01.2005
(iii)  For AY 2005-06 on 19.12.2005
(iv)  For AY 2006-07 on 24.10.2006
(v)  For AY 2007-08 on 27.10.2007
6. For all the above assessment years, the returns filed declared nil income. It is observed that all the returns were accepted under Section 143(1) of the Act.
7. Pursuant to the notice issued under Section 153C of the income-tax Act, the returns filed by the assessee for all the assessment years under consideration declared nil income. However, the assessee incurred the expenses comprising mainly security expenses, legal and professional expenses, interest paid, telephone expenses and electricity expenses. For all the assessment years under consideration, the assessee capitalized the said expenses in the value of fixed assets and shown the same in the original returns filed under Section 139 of the Act for all the assessment years under consideration. The assessee also stated that during all the assessment years under consideration, no business activity was carried out by the assessee company.
8. However, the Assessing Officer, while making the assessments for the assessment years under consideration, disallowed the expenses on the ground that the nature of expenses capitalized in the cost of above building were meant for keeping the company or assets in existence and accordingly completed the assessment. Being aggrieved, the assessee filed appeals before the first appellate authority. One of the legal grounds taken by the assessee was that the assessments framed by the Assessing Officer are bad in law as the assessments have not been framed on the material seized pursuant to search action taken under Section 132 of the Act.
9. The learned CIT(A), after considering the submissions of the assessee, has held that as per Section 153A/153C of the IT Act, the Assessing Officer is duty bound to issue notice requesting for filing returns separately for each of the assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search has been conducted or requisitioned under Section 132A has been made. That there is a mandate in the Section to assess or reassess the income for all such assessment years. Thus, the Assessing Officer is required to assess the income afresh. That the legislature in their wisdom have deemed it fit not to restrict the assessment under Section 153A/153C to undisclosed income found during the search. That there is no requirement that assessment can be made only if evidences relating to undisclosed income have been seized. There is also no requirement that assessments need to be based only on the evidences gathered in the course of action under Section 132 or requisitioned under Section 132A. The learned CIT(A) further stated that assessment under Section 153A/153C is not comparable to the block assessment under Section XIV-B, where there was a concept of assessment of undisclosed income for the block period as a whole. In view thereof, the learned CIT(A) rejected the contention of the assessee regarding validity of assessment under Section 153C. It may also be stated that the learned CIT(A) also confirmed the action of the Assessing Officer to reject the contention of the assessee to capitalize the expenses incurred, the nature of the expenses has already been mentioned hereinabove. The learned CIT(A) stated that the security charges paid by the assessee company is meant for keeping the company or assets in existence and has no relation either to acquisition or its improvement of the fixed asset in question. Hence, the assessee is in further appeal before the Tribunal. The facts for all the assessment years i.e. AY 2004-05 to 2007-08 are identical.
10. The learned AR submitted that no incriminating material against the assessee was found during the course of search and seizure operation for all the assessment years under consideration and, therefore, the assessment made by the Assessing Officer by disallowing the expenses which were capitalized by the assessee are not valid. He submitted that no assessment for the assessment years under consideration was pending on the date of search. He further submitted that the expenses which the assessee capitalized were shown in the balance sheet and it was also stated that the expenses had been capitalized by the assessee at the time of filing of the returns under Section 139 of the Act and, therefore, the said expenses which were capitalized cannot be disallowed while making the assessments under Section 153C read with Section 143(3) of the Act. The learned AR referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in SSP Aviation Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2012] 346 ITR 177/207 Taxman 260/20 taxmann.com 214 and submitted that the Hon'ble High Court in paragraph 17 observed that if the returns filed by the other persons for the period of six years do not show that the income reflected in the document has been account for, addition will be accordingly made after following the procedure prescribed by law and after giving adequate opportunity of being heard. However, if there is no such material found, the proceedings have to be closed irrespective of the fact that the Assessing Officer is bound to obtain the returns from such other person for six assessment years as per provisions of Section 153A of the IT Act. The learned AR submitted that no such incriminating material was found nor any incriminating material was seized during the course of search, and the Assessing Officer has also not made any additions on the basis of documents seized or incriminating material found, the additions made are not justified and the assessments, thus made have to be held not valid. The learned AR, to substantiate his submissions, also referred to the decisions of ITAT, Delhi Bench as under:—
(i)  ACIT v. PACL India Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 2637 (Delhi) of 2010, dated 20-6-2013].
(ii)  MGF Automobiles Ltd. v. ACIT [IT Appeal Nos. 4212 & 4213 (Delhi) of 2011,dated 28-6-2013]
(iii)  Kusum Gupta v. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal No. 4873 (Delhi) of 2009, dated 28-3-2013].
11. The learned AR also submitted that similar issue was also considered by the Special Bench of ITAT in the case of All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2012] 137 ITD 287/23 taxmann.com 103 (Mum.) wherein it was held that where the proceedings have reached finality before the date of search and in case where no incriminating material has been found indicating undisclosed income and in that case Assessing Officer would not be justified to make the additions by making the disallowances which had already been disclosed by the assessee. The Special Bench held that the Assessing Officer, as per the scheme of the Act and as per Section 153A of the Act, no doubt shall initiate the assessment for all the six years prior to the assessment year in which the search had taken place. He will get the free hand only in respect of those assessments which had not attained finality on the date of search. In those cases, the pending assessments will abate and the Assessing Officer while framing the assessment under Section 153A/153C of the Act will get free hand through abatement and will frame the assessment afresh. But, in a case or in circumstances where the proceedings have reached finality, the assessment under Section 153A read with Section 143(3) has to be made as was originally made/assessed and in a case where certain incriminating documents have been found indicating undisclosed income, then the addition was only to be restricted to those documents/incriminating material and clubbed only to the assessment framed originally as the law does not permit the Assessing Officer to disturb the already concluded issues. The learned AR submitted that since no incriminating material or seized material was found against the assessee in respect of which the additions have been made for the assessments which have already been completed as they were not pending on the date of search, the additions made by the Assessing Officer which are not based on the searched material have to be deleted.
12. On the other hand, the learned DR strongly supported the orders of the Assessing Officer. He referred to the provisions of Section 153A of the IT Act and submitted that there is no requirement in law that addition should be made only on seized material or incriminating material in respect of the assessment years which have been subjected to assessment as per Section153A of the Act i.e. six preceding assessment years prior to the assessment year in which the search had taken place and the addition could be made as if the Assessing Officer is making fresh assessment. To substantiate his submission, the learned DR referred to the decision of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v.Anil Kumar Bhatia [2012] 24 taxmann.com 98/211 Taxman 453 and specifically referred to paragraph 23 which reads as under:—
"23. We are not concerned with a case where no incriminating material was found during the search conducted under Section 132 of the Act. We, therefore, express no opinion as to whether Section 153A can be invoked even in such a situation. That question is therefore left open."
13. The learned DR also filed a note from the book of Dr. Rakesh Gupta on page 473 and submitted that in Section 153A, the word used is "the Assessing Officer shall issue notice" and it makes it mandatory on the part of the Assessing Officer to issue notice and make assessment/reassessment for the previous six years in all cases where search had been initiated. That the assessment/reassessment under Section 153A are not assessments for undisclosed income only. The requirement of making assessment/reassessment under Section 153A has no relation with the nature of incriminating material found or not found in the course of search. Even if there is no incriminating material relating to the person searched found or the incriminating material found is relating to some other person and with respect to such other incriminating material, such other person shall be required to be assessed under Section 153C, still the person searched shall be required to be assessed or reassessed for preceding six years under Section 153A. The learned DR further submitted that the case of Hon'ble Delhi High Court dated 23rd March, 2012 (supra) has also stated in paragraph 17 that once the satisfaction note is recorded by the Assessing Officer of the searched person in respect of the other person and the provisions of Section 153C are set in motion giving the finding that such seized document or books of account or some material represents the undisclosed income of the other person, the Assessing Officer has to make the assessment for six assessment years. The learned DR submitted that the reliance by the learned AR on the decisions of ITAT in the case of PACL India Ltd. (supra), MGF Automobile Ltd. (supra) and Kusum Gupta (supra) are not be considered as those cases have not been correctly decided by not considering the ratio of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case ofAnil Kumar Bhatia (supra) properly and, therefore, the said cases should not be relied upon. The learned DR also submitted that the Special Bench decision in the case of All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd. (supra) also has no relevance particularly when the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has held that while making the assessment under Section 153A/153C of the Act and also the provisions of the Act provide that there is no requirement that the addition should be based only on seized material or incriminating material. The learned DR filed a detailed note and while relying on the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Distributors Baroda (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India [1985] 155 ITR 120/22 Taxman 49 (SC) stated that the Tribunal can apply its mind afresh to the matter irrespective of the earlier decision because to perpetuate the mistake is no heroism. Learned DR also in the said note referred to the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Omar Salay Mohmed Sait v. CIT [1959] 37 ITR 151 (SC) and the decision in CIT v. Mahalakshmi Textile Mills Ltd. [1967] 66 ITR 710 (SC)and stated that for the cause of substantial justice, even if the issues are already covered by the Tribunal's own decisions, the same could be re-examined if they have not been considered properly. The learned DR also referred to the decision of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v.Chetan Dass Lachhman Dass [2012] 25 taxmann.com 227/211 Taxman 61 and submitted that the Hon'ble High Court also stated that while making the assessment under Section 153A, there is no condition in the Section that addition should be strictly made on the basis of evidence found in the course of search or other post search material or information available with the Assessing Officer which can be related to the evidence found. The learned DR submitted that the assessments for the assessment years under consideration have been validly made and the addition should be sustained irrespective of the fact that the said additions are not based upon the search material or incriminating material found during the course of search.
14. I have carefully considered the orders of authorities below and the submissions of the learned representatives of the parties. I have also gone through the cases cited by the learned representatives of the parties and have also carefully considered the written submission/note filed by the learned DR which comprises of five pages. I may state that the learned DR has strongly substantiated his submission to justify the orders of the first appellate authority that for the purpose of making the assessment under Section 153A/153C of the IT Act for each of the six assessment years immediately preceding assessment year, the Assessing Officer has to make the assessment afresh and without restricting himself to the search material or incriminating material found even in respect of those assessment years which had attained finality prior to the date of search. I observed that the learned DR has substantiated his above submission giving stress on the decision of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Bhatia (supra) and Chetan Dass Lachhman Dass (supra). However, I am unable to agree with the conclusion drawn by the learned DR for the reason that in the case of Anil Kumar Bhatia (supra), the Hon'ble Delhi High Court itself has stated in paragraph 23 (which has already been reproduced) that in a case where no incriminating material was found during the course of search conducted under Section 132 of the Act, their Lordships stated that they expressed no opinion as to whether Section 153A can be invoked and left the said issue open. It is also relevant to state that in the said case, the assessment was made for all the six assessment years preceding the assessment year in which search had taken place because during the course of search, the documents were found and in that context, their Lordships discussed the scheme of the Section stating that pursuant to the search, the Assessing Officer is empowered to reopen the assessment for six assessment years preceding the assessment year in which the search had taken place. I also observed that the Tribunal while deciding the case of PACL Ltd. (supra) had also considered at length the said decision of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Bhatia (supra). In the said case, it was observed that where an assessment for any assessment year is pending relating to six assessment years preceding the assessment year in which the search had taken place, the proceedings shall abate and the Assessing Officer will make the assessment not based on incriminating material but will have the power to go outside the scope of incriminating materials. That is the scope of assessment will cover the issues which can arise from the original pending proceedings. I observed that the case ofChetan Dass Lachhman Dass (supra) relied upon by the learned DR has also no relevance to the facts of the case of the assessee before me because, in that case, the seized material was found and on the basis of the seized material, their Lordships held that an inference can be drawn that there could be similar transactions throughout the period of six years covered by Section 153A of the Act and accordingly the additions made by the Assessing Officer for the preceding six years relevant to assessment year in which search had taken place was held to be justified. On the other hand, in the case of SSP Aviation Ltd. (supra), Hon'ble Delhi High Court, after discussing the scheme and scope of making the assessment for the six assessment years preceding the assessment year in which the search had taken place, vide paragraph 14 to 17, have held that when the Assessing Officer of the searched person is satisfied that some documents or valuable assets or books of account belonged to the other person, in whose case search is not conducted, the Assessing Officer of the searched person after recording a satisfactory note will provide the books of account or other valuable article or document belonging to the other person to the Assessing Officer of the other person and thereafter, the Assessing Officer of the other person will have the jurisdiction to proceed against him and issue notice to that person in order to assess or reassess the income of such other person in the manner contemplated by the provisions of Section 153A. Their Lordships have stated that a question may arise as to the applicability of the second proviso to Section 153A in the case of such other person in order to examine the pending proceedings which have to abate. Their Lordships have stated that in the case of the other person, such date will be the date of receiving the books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person and, therefore, the question of pendency and abatement of proceedings of assessment or reassessment to the six assessment years will be examined with reference to such date. Their Lordships have further held that there is no requirement in Section 153C(1) that the Assessing Officer should also be satisfied that such valuable articles or books of account or documents belonging to the other person must be shown to show to conclusively reflect or disclose any undisclosed income. In paragraph 17 of the said order, their Lordships have held that the Assessing Officer of the other person shall obtain the returns for six assessment years, and if he is so satisfied after obtaining the returns from such other person for the six assessment years, the proceedings will be closed. If the returns filed by the other person for the period of six years do not show that the income reflected in the document has been accounted for, addition will be accordingly made after following the procedure prescribed by law and after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to such other person. In view of the above, I do not find merit in the contention of the learned DR that in the said decision, their Lordships have held that while framing the assessments for the six assessment years, the Assessing Officer has to make the fresh assessment and can make additions/disallowances even not relating to the searched documents or incriminating material found during the course of search where the assessment proceedings are not pending with reference to the date when the Assessing Officer received the requisition from the Assessing Officer of the searched person to set in motion the proceedings under Section 153A of the Act. I am of the considered view that where the assessment for any of the six assessment years is not pending on the date when the procedure as prescribed under Section 153A/153C is set in motion, the Assessing Officer can go beyond the search material or incriminating material found during the course of search to make the assessment as if it is a fresh assessment. The same very issue has been considered by the ITAT Delhi Bench in the case of PACL Ltd. (supra) and, that too, having been decided after considering the decision of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Bhatia (supra) on which the learned DR has made his forceful submissions to justify the action of the Assessing Officer and to support the order of the learned CIT(A) but, I hold that the said decision of Hon'ble Delhi High Court does not support the stand of the learned DR and rather supports the submission of the learned AR that only where original assessment proceedings are pending on the date of the search on the date when the reference has been received by the Assessing Officer of the other person from the Assessing Officer of the searched person, the issues outside the scope of search material can be raised as those original assessment proceedings stand merged/abated in the proceedings under Section 153A/153C of the Act but, in the case where the assessments are not pending on the date of the search or on the date of receipt of the reference by the Assessing Officer of the other person, then no addition on the issues which pertained to the original assessment can be raised like those which could be raised when such assessments were pending and abated. I am of the considered view that the decision of PACL Ltd. (supra) as also the decision of ITAT Delhi Bench in the case of Kusum Gupta (supra) squarely apply to the case before me. There is no dispute to the fact that in respect of all the assessment years under consideration, the assessments were not pending on the date, the search had taken place, leave aside the date on which the reference was received by the Assessing Officer of the assessee from the Assessing Officer of the searched person, which was received only on 25th March, 2010, as stated by the Assessing Officer and, therefore, no assessment was pending in the case of the assessee for all the assessment years under consideration. Hence, I hold that no addition can be made while making the assessment for the assessment years under consideration by making the disallowances which is not based on seized material or any incriminating material found during the course of search. The Assessing Officer should have closed the assessments without making assessments for the above assessment years under consideration when no incriminating material or seized material was found. Therefore, I allow the grounds of appeal taken by the assessee for all the assessment years under consideration by deleting the additions made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the learned CIT(A).
15. In the result, all the appeals of the assessee are allowed.


IT: Where assessee received a sum as gift from his family friends but neither could establish any relationship nor able to show occasion to receive such a huge gift, said sum was undisclosed income of assessee
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[2014] 41 taxmann.com 497 (Punjab & Haryana)
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Hanuman Dass
v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Jalandhar*
RAJIVE BHALLA AND DR. BHARAT BHUSHAN PARSOON, JJ.
IT APPEAL NO. 72 OF 1999
NOVEMBER  22, 2013 
Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Cash credit [Gift] - Assessment year 1990-91 - Assessee had received a certain sum as gift from his family friends outside India who had means to make gifts - Neither any relationship was established nor any circumstance was shown to justify that gift was out of natural love and affection of donor for assessee - Moreover there was no occasion to make such gifts to assessee - Whether said sum should be treated as undisclosed income of assessee - Held, yes [Para 9] [In favour of revenue]
FACTS
 
 The assessee had received a certain sum from his family friends living in foreign country.
 The Assessing Officer found that the donors were not related to the assessee by blood and had capacity to pay, but no specific occasion was disclosed by the assessee on which the alleged gifts were received by him. The Assessing Officer made addition to assessee's income treating same as undisclosed income.
 However, the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition.
 On appeal, the Tribunal restored the order of the Assessing Officer.
 On further appeal:
HELD
 
 The gifts had been made by the donors who were neither related to the assessee nor there was any specific occasion on which the alleged gifts could have been given and were to be received by them. These are not small gifts, particularly keeping in view the contemporaneous times when these were given in the year 1989. [Para 7]
 No one would part with such big amounts as gifts even if donors are having capacity to pay. Neither donors nor donees have shown that such gifts of huge amounts had ever been given by the donors to any of their relatives or had been received by the donees from their relatives or from such donors. [Para 8]
 The Tribunal had discussed not only the facts but even law on the point threadbare.
 Taking up the case in hand, even when the donor had the means to make the gifts, there being neither any relationship nor there being any circumstance to show natural love and affection of the donor for the donee nor there being any occasion to make such gifts to the assessee, there is no perversity or impropriety in the impugned order and sequelly the same is upheld. [Para 9]
CASES REFERRED TO
 
CIT v. Puneet Singh [IT Appeal No. 498 of 2005, dated 7-2-2011] (para 8) and CIT v. R.S. Sibal[2004] 269 ITR 429/135 Taxman 492 (Delhi) (para 9).
Aalok Mittal for the Appellant. Vivek Sethi for the Respondent.
ORDER
 
Dr. Bharat Bhushan Parsoon, J. - This income tax appeal under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter mentioned as, the Act), against order dated 18.12.1998 (Annexure P-3) passed by Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar in ITA No.526(ASR)/1992, was admitted for hearing on the following substantial question of law:—
" Whether a gift made by a stranger is valid in law when the capacity to give the gift is not disputed and even if the gift is treated as invalid could the amount be taken as income in the hands of the assessee?"
2. For the assessment year 1990-91, foreign gifts had been received by the assessee from the donors (mentioned against each) from United Kingdom. The details are as under :—
(i) Shri Puran Chand Sharma Rs.50,000/-
(ii) Shri Vijay KumarRs.50,000/-
(iii) Shri Kiran Kumar s/o Shri Vijay Kumar Rs.50,000/-
Claim of the assessee that even though the donors were not related to the assessee by blood yet they were family friends and had capacity to pay, was not accepted by the Assessing Officer on the ground that there was no specific occasion disclosed by the assessee on which the alleged gifts were received by him.
3. In addition to the assessee, even his brother, brother's wife and the mother had also received gifts from two out of three foreign donors, details whereof, are as under:—
Name of family members receiving such gifts Relation with the assesseeAmount received (Rs.) Donor's name
Shri Raj Kumar brother50,000/- Shri Vijay Kumar
Shri Raj Kumar brother50,000/-Shri Vijay Kumar
Smt. Tara Devi (wife of assessee's brother) sister-in-law50,000/-Shri Kiran Kumar s/o Shri Vijay Kumar
Smt. Shanti Devi mother50,000/-Shri Vijay Kumar
It may also be noteworthy that even father of the assessee had received similar gifts.
4. Finding the claim of the assessee to be not genuine by the Assessing Officer, an addition of Rs. 1,50,000/- which represented amount of gifts, was made to his total income, taking it to be a case of concealment of income and of furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Jalandhar disagreeing with the Assessing Officer deleted the addition of Rs. 1,50,000/- made by the Assessing Officer. When the matter came up in appeal by the revenue before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, reversing the order of Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), the order of Assessing Officer regarding addition of Rs. 1,50,000/- made to the total income of the assessee which the assessee claimed on account of foreign gifts from donors of United Kingdom, was restored. It is in these circumstances that the present appeal has been filed by the assessee.
5. Stand of the appellant-assessee is that when there is no dispute regarding capacity of the donors qua payment made by way of gifts to the assessee and the assessee has also confirmed acceptance of such gifts, addition of such amount of gifts to income of the assessee, reversing order of Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) while upholding order of Assessing Officer by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is neither justified nor legal.
6. Per contra, claim of the revenue is that there was neither any occasion nor there was any relationship of blood or otherwise justifying such gifts by donors to the assessee. It is vehemently claimed that capacity of donors to pay is irrelevant in the facts and circumstances of this case.
7. When rival contentions raised by the parties are evaluated, it becomes evident that the questioned foreign gifts had been made by the donors who were neither related to the assessee nor there was any specific occasion qua the donees on which occasion the alleged gifts could have been given and were to be received by them. These are not small gifts, particularly keeping in view the contemporaneous times when these were given in the year 1989.
8. No one would part with such big amounts as gifts even if donors are having capacity to pay. Neither donors nor donees have shown that such gifts of huge amounts had ever been given by the donors to any of their relatives or had been received by the donees from their relatives or from such donors. Relevant extract from the order of Assessing Officer, Annexure A-l, is reproduced as below:—
"4. ... Had the alleged donors such surplus funds available with them and been kind to humanity, they would have made such huge gifts in the shape of donations to some charitable organization/institute including of National importance for a charitable and noble cause where the very purpose for the uplitftment of the suffering/humanity/mankind is served. Even had the alleged donors advanced the said amounts as loans, may be interest free, then the position would have been different, and there could be said to be a fraction of element of truth in such a situation. In these circumstances, the assessee's contention that he received the above amounts as foreign gifts and that too from the distant family friends is absolutely not found to be reliable as true and correct.
To me, it appears that the assessee has arranged the said transactions from the above alleged donors in the garb of gifts by suitably making to them the payments against the said foreign remittances, outside his books of account and as such, it appears to be a case of compensatory payments made for acquiring the alleged foreign remittances by way of gifts, by the assessee out of his income earned from undisclosed sources, for which circumstantial evidence exists. The assessee's case is also hit by the case of Lal Chand Kalra v. CIT [1981] 22 CTR 135 (Punj. & Har.). Therefore, to my mind, the assessee has also failed to prove the genuineness of the credits appearing his bank account as also capital account to the above extent. Under these circumstances, an addition of Rs. 1,50,000/- is hereby made to his total income for which he is also treated to have concealed as also furnished inaccurate particulars."
Vide order dated 17.2.1992 (Annexure A-2), Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had considered only identity and capacity of the donors as also the effect of acceptance of such gifts while coming to the following conclusion :—
"4. ... In the circumstances I hold that the A.O.'s conclusions are contradictory and addition made treating it as a case of compensatory payments without bringing any material on record and also on the basis of not proving the genuineness of the credit was not warranted. The addition of Rs. 1,50,000/-, thus made is hereby deleted."
When we go through the order of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, not only the facts but even law on the point has been discussed threadbare. Relevant findings, after such discussion, returned by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal with approval are as below:—
"7 We are of the considered opinion that CIT(A) was not justified in holding the gifts to be genuine merely because the A.O., has held in his order that the creditworthiness/paying capacity of the alleged foreign donors does not appeal to be doubtful. She has failed to appreciate the observations of the A.O., wherein he stated that these foreign gifts by the donors does not appear to be genuine because the donors were neither related to the assessee nor there was any specific occasion for the donors for making such huge amount of gifts to the assessee. In our opinion, in the present circumstances, when the foreign donors, are not closely related to the assessee there was no specific occasion with the donors for making gifts to the assessee and his family members and so we do not find any justifiable reasons with the donor for making such huge amount of gifts of Rs. 1,50,000/- to the assessee and more so when in addition to these very donor, have made foreign gifts of Rs.2,50,000/- to the brother, mother and sister-in-law of the assessee. We are further of the opinion that the A.O. was justified in rejecting the amount of gifts as non-genuine and accordingly he was also justified in adding this amount as an income of the assessee earned from his undisclosed sources and consequently the order of the CIT(A) deleting the addition of Rs. 1,50,000/- made on account of foreign gifts of Rs.50,000/-, each by S/Shri Puran Chand Sharma, Vijay Kumar and Kiran Kumar in the income of the assessee as his income earned from undisclosed sources is set aside and the order of the A.O. making the addition of the same is hereby sustained."
This aspect has been considered at length by a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction of this Court in IT Appeal No.498 of 2005, dated 7.2.2011 CIT v. Puneet Singh . In the interface of facts of the said case, relevant observations and findings thereof in the said authority, are as under:—
'The aforesaid issue is no longer res integra. This Court in a recent judgment passed in ITA No. 392 of 2005 (The Commissioner of Income Tax, Faridabad v. Sh. Kamal Gupta) decided on 20.1.2011, had laid down as under:—
"The assessee failed to produce the donor as also his bank statement to prove that gift was actually given by the assessee. Financial capacity of the donor was also not established. The assessee, thus, failed to discharge onus which was on him. Reliance has been placed on judgment of this Court dated 15.9.2006 in ITA No. 256 of 2006 Shri Jaspal Singh v. CIT, wherein in similar circumstances, NRI gift from a stranger was held to be bogus relying upon earlier judgment of this Court in Lal Chand Kalra v. CIT [1981] 22 CTR 135 (Punj. & Har.) and judgment of Delhi High Court in Sajan Dass & Sons v. CIT [2003] 264 ITR 435.
We are of the view that the Assessing Officer and the CIT (A) were justified in holding that the gift in question was bogus and the Tribunal committed patent error in accepting the gift as genuine. Admittedly, the donor had no relationship with the assessee. He had no occasion to give the gift. He was not produced. His financial capacity was not established. His bank statement was not produced. The Tribunal failed to appreciate these facts. It, thus, committed patent error of law in holding that the assessee discharged onus on him to prove the genuineness of the gift. Its order is, thus, perverse. In identical situation, this Court held that NRI gift could not be accepted as genuine unless the assessee was able to prove natural love and affection and financial capacity of the donor. Observations of this Court in Jaspal Singh are:—
"It is well settled that mere identification of donor and showing the movement of gift amount through banking channel is not enough to prove genuineness of the gift. The assessee was required to establish that the donor had the means and the gift was genuine, for natural love and affection. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in Lal Chand Kalra v. CIT [1981] 22 CTR 135, judgment of Delhi High Court in Sajan Dass & Sons v. CIT[2003] 264 ITR 435CIT v. Durga Prasad More [1971] 82 ITR 540 (SC) and Sumaati Dayal v.CIT [1995] 214 ITR 801 (SC). "
6. Applying the aforesaid parameters to this case, learned counsel for the assessee was unable to show that there was either any occasion or any relationship or there existed any natural love and affection with the donor to have gifted the amount as claimed by the assessee. Further, the assessee was also required to substantiate that the donor had the means and the gift was genuine which he had failed to establish.'
9. Taking up the case in hand, even when the donor had the means to make the gifts, there being neither any relationship nor there being any circumstance to show natural love and affection of the donor for the donee nor there being any occasion to make such gifts to the assessee and the authority of jurisdictional High Court being against the assessee, the authority cited by the assessee as CIT v.R.S. Sibal [2004] 269 ITR 429/135 Taxman 492 (Delhi) does not support the case of the appellant. Thus, there is no perversity or impropriety in the impugned order and sequelly the same is upheld.
Consequently, there being no merit in the appeal, the same is dismissed.
POOJA

*In favour of revenue.
Arising out of order of Tribunal in ITA No. 526 (ASR.) of 1992, dated 19-12-1998.

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CST & VAT : In case of activity of selling spectacles by fixing glasses in frames, spectacles themselves were not to be treated as a new commodity and, in fact, glasses and frames used in preparation of spectacles were to be treated as taxable commodity and liable to Sales-tax/VAT accordingly
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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 45 (Rajasthan)
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Ward -II
v.
Mehta Opticians*
ARUN BHANSALI, J.
S.B. CIVIL (SALES TAX) REVISION PETITION NOS. 229, 265, 410 & 412 OF 2005
DECEMBER  10, 2013 
Section 3, read with section 4, of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 - Charge/levy - Sales Tax/VAT - Assessee was engaged in manufacture and sale of frames, glasses and spectacles - Assessee had imported frames and lenses from outside State, prepared spectacles and sold them claiming exemption in respect of said spectacles - Department argued that tax was leviable on sale of glasses and frames even if they are sold in form of spectacles - HELD : Tax is leviable on sale of glasses and frames even if they are sold in form of spectacles - Further, whether assessee has paid tax on such sale is a question of fact and that factual enquiry can be conducted only by Assessing Authority to find out whether assessee has paid tax on glasses and frames which are used in spectacles and sold by assessee - In case of assessee's activity of selling commodities (viz. spectacles) by fixing glasses in frames, spectacles themselves were not to be treated as a new commodity and, in fact, glasses and frames used in preparation of spectacles were to be treated as taxable commodity - Therefore, matter was remanded back to Assessing Authority [Paras 9 to 11] [In favour of revenue]
CASE REVIEW
 
ACTO v. Mehta Opticians [S.B. Sales Tax Revision Petition No.202/2002, dated 26-2-2007] (para 10)followed.
CASES REFERRED TO
 
Mehta Opticians v. ACTO [S.B. Civil Sales Tax Revision Petition No.447 of 1993, dated 16-5-1994] (para 5) and ACTO v. Mehta Opticians [S.B. Sales Tax Revision Petition No.202/2002, dated 26-2-2007] (para 8).
V.K. Mathur and D.K. Godara for the Petitioner.
ORDER
 
1. These revision petitions are directed against the judgment dated 26.4.2004 passed by the Rajasthan Tax Board, Ajmer (Tax Board'), whereby the appeals filed by the petitioner against the order dated 30.8.2002 passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Commercial Taxes, Jodhpur were rejected.
2. Despite notice, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondent.
3. The facts in brief may be noticed thus : the respondents-Dealers are, inter-alia, engaged in manufacture and sale of frames, glasses and spectacles. In the returns filed by the respondents in prescribed form, the total sales were shown as exemption from tax and therefore, a notice under Section 29(7) read with Section 81 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 ('the Act') was issued to the assessee by the Assessing Authority to show cause as to why the sales shown to be exempted from payment of tax, which includes the sale of frames and lenses imported from outside the State may not be taxed.
4. After consideration of the contentions raised on behalf of the dealers, the Assessing Authority assessed the liability of tax on frames and glasses; charged interest and imposed penalty by its assessment orders.
5. The appeals were preferred by the assessee before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), who relying on the judgment of this Court in Mehta Opticians v. ACTO [S.B. Civil Sales Tax Revision Petition No.447 of 1993, dated 16.5.1994] and the order passed in the review petition dated 21.4.2009 arising out of the order dated 16.5.1994, came to the conclusion that the order passed in the review, whereby para 5 of the judgment was deleted did not alter the purport of the judgment dated 16.5.1994 and therefore, accepted the appeals preferred by the respondents- dealer and set-aside the assessment orders.
6. Feeling aggrieved the department approached the Tax Board, who by the impugned order upheld the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and dismissed the appeals filed by the petitioner.
7. It is contented by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tax Board clearly fell in error in coming to the conclusion that the frames and glasses used by the respondent-Dealer in preparation of the spectacles sold to the customer were exempted from the tax by virtue of the judgment of this Court in Mehta Optician's case (supra) though the same stood modified by the order passed in review dated 21.4.1999.
8. It was further submitted that the above aspect has been considered by this Court in : ACTO v. Mehta Opticians [S.B. Sales Tax Revision Petition No.202/2002, dated 26.2.2007] and this Court taking into consideration the judgment dated 16.5.1994 passed in the case of Mehta Opticians (supra) and order dated 21.4.1999 passed in the review petition and the order of Hon'ble Supreme Court, whereby the judgment dated 16.5.1994 was upheld, has come to the conclusion that the tax is leviable on sale of glasses and frames even if they are sold in the form of spectacles and has remanded the matter to the Assessing Authority and therefore, the order impugned passed by the Tax Board deserves to be set- aside and the matters be remanded back to the assessing authority.
9. I have considered the submissions and have gone through the record of the revision petitions as well as judgment dated 26.2.2007 passed by this Court in the case of Mehta Opticians (supra).
10. The judgment of this Court in the case of Mehta Opticians (supra) dated 26.2.2007 applies on all fours to the present revision petitions.
11. This Court after considering the entire issue came to the following conclusion :—
"In view of the above, two things are clear that tax is leviable on sale of glasses and frames even if they are sold in the form of spects and second is whether the assessee has paid the tax on such sale is a question of fact and that factual enquiry can be conducted only by the Assessing Authority to find out whether the assessee has paid the tax on glasses and frames which used in the spects and sold by the assessee.
In view of the above, all the revision petitions are allowed. The impugned orders of the Tax Board are set aside and the matter is remanded to the Assessing Authority who may hold an enquiry about the tax liability of the petitioner in relation to the commodities sold by the assessee by fixing the glasses in frames and treating the spects themselves as not a new commodity but treating the glasses and frames used in the preparation of the spects as taxable commodity. The parties shall appears before the Assessing Authority on 9.4.2007."
12. Consequently, these revision petitions are allowed for the same reasons as indicated in the judgment of this Court of Mehta Opticians dated 26.2.2007 (supra). The impugned orders of the Tax Board are set aside and the matters are remanded to the Assessing Authority, who may hold an enquiry about the tax liability of the respondents in relation to the commodities sold by the assessee by fixing the glasses in frames and treating the spectacles themselves as not new commodity but treating the glasses and frames used in the preparation of the spectacles as taxable commodity.
13. No costs.
VINEET

*In favour of revenue.


Cenvat Credit : It would be most unreasonable and unrealistic to expect buyer of such inputs to go and verify accounts of supplier or to find out from department of Central Excise whether actually duty has been paid on inputs by supplier; hence, credit cannot be denied merely because supplier did not pay duty
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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 64 (Jharkhand)
HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND
Commissioner of Central Excise, East Singhbhum
v.
Tata Motors Ltd.*
SUSHIL HARKAULI AND D.N. PATEL, JJ.
TAX APPEAL NO. 5 OF 2008
SEPTEMBER  30, 2010 
I. Rule 9, read with rule 3, of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, read with rules 57G and 57-I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 - CENVAT Credit - Documents on which credit may be taken - Assessee had bought inputs from supplier and paid full amount inclusive of duty to supplier - Department denied credit of said duty on ground that supplier-manufacturer had not paid duty to department - Tribunal held that assessee could not be found fault with - Department argued that credit is allowable only of duty "paid" on inputs - HELD : Once a buyer of inputs receives invoices of excisable items, unless factually it is established to contrary, it will be presumed that when payments have been made in respect of those inputs on basis of invoices, buyer is entitled to assume that excise duty has been/will be paid by supplier on excisable inputs - Buyer will be, therefore, entitled to claim credit on said assumption - It would be most unreasonable and unrealistic to expect buyer of such inputs to go and verify accounts of supplier or to find out from department of Central Excise whether actually duty has been paid on inputs by supplier - No business can be carried out like this, and law does not expect impossible [Para 7] [In favour of assessee]
II. Section 35C of the Central Excise Act, 1944, read with section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994 and section 129B of the Customs Act, 1962 - Appeals - Orders of - Appellate Tribunal - Assessee made certain claims for which there was nothing in order of Tribunal - HELD : Defence of assessee, which was initially taken, appears to have been not pressed before Tribunal - Assessee made certain claims but, if those were so, a few lines of Tribunal devoted to that issue were expected - Because of complete silence in Tribunal's order on said remaining issues, matter was remanded back for consideration afresh [Para 10] [Matter remanded]
CASE REVIEW
 
IDL Chemicals Ltd. v. CCE 1996 (88) ELT 710 (Tri – Cal.) (para 9) overruled.
CASES REFERRED TO
 
IDL Chemicals Ltd. v. CCE 1996 (88) ELT 710 (Tri – Cal.) (para 8).
Ratnesh Kumar for the Appellant. Sumit Kr. Gadodia for the Respondent.
ORDER
 
By Court: We have heard both sides.
2. The brief facts of this case are that an amount of about Rs. 10,00,000/- (rupees ten lacs) was claimed as Modvat credit by the respondent-assessee. Out of the aforesaid amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- (rupees ten lacs), a sum of less than Rs. 5,00,000/- (rupees five lacs) was claimed on the strength of certain invoices, issued to the respondent-assessee by one Clutch Auto Ltd., Mathura in respect of the inputs supplied to the assessee by Clutch Auto Ltd., Mathura.
3. It is not disputed that the full amount of invoices was paid by the assessee to M/s. Clutch Auto Ltd. It is also not disputed that the inputs supplied by M/s. Clutch Auto Ltd. to the assessee were excisable items. The case of the department is that M/s. Clutch Auto Ltd. did not actually deposit the excise duty, which was payable on the said inputs, which were supplied to the assessee.
4. The Tribunal has held in favour of the assessee and against the department, saying that the assessee was not at fault.
5. Learned counsel for the department in this appeal has relied upon firstly upon Rule 57G. It has been urged that the said Rule provides for Modvat credits in these words :
"Every manufacturer intending to take credit on the duty paid on inputs..."
6. Placing reliance upon the underlined words, it has been urged that unless the duty has been paid on inputs, no Modvat credit can be availed by the assessee.
7. This argument does not appeal to us. Once a buyer of inputs receives invoices of excisable items, unless factually it is established to the contrary, it will be presumed that when payments have been made in respect of those inputs on the basis of invoices, the buyer is entitled to assume that the excise duty has been/will be paid by the supplier on the excisable inputs. The buyer will be therefore entitled to claim Modvat credit on the said assumption. It would be most unreasonable and unrealistic to expect the buyer of such inputs to go and verify the accounts of the supplier or to find out from the department of Central Excise whether actually duty has been paid on the inputs by the supplier. No business can be carried out like this, and the law does not expect the impossible.
8. Reliance has been placed by the appellant upon Rule 57-1 and a decision of the Tribunal in the case of IDL Chemicals Ltd. v. CCE 1996 (88) ELT 710 (Tri – Cal.).
9. The aforesaid decision does support the department directly, but we are of the opinion for the reasons given above, that the decision of the Tribunal is not correct. We, therefore, decline to interfere on the aforesaid point with the impugned order of the Tribunal.
10. So far as remaining amount of Modvat credit is concerned, the defence of the assessee which was initially taken, is said to have been not pressed before the Tribunal. The assessee says that the assessee voluntarily deposited the amount of which Modvat credit has been taken wrongly. However, if that be so, we would expect a few lines of the Tribunal devoted to that issue. Because of the complete silence in the Tribunal's order on the said remaining issues, we remand the case back to the Tribunal after setting aside that portion of the impugned order. The Tribunal will decide such of the remaining issues, which are necessary, after giving an opportunity of hearing to both sides.
VINEET

*Partly in favour of assessee.

--
Regards,

Pawan Singla , LLB
M. No. 9825829075


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