Relief from stringent PAN norms may be temporary |
New Delhi, 8 February The relief given to permanent account number (PAN) applicants from furnishing original documents may be temporary. After putting the decision in abeyance within a week after notifying it, the tax department is planning to enforce it again, albeit with some relaxation. The Directorate of Income Tax ( Systems) has written to the finance ministry, conveying its concern about the misuse of PAN cards, and asking it to make the verification process fool- proof. " The decision had to be put on hold because there were a lot of representations from people saying the requirement to show originals along with self- attested documents would slow down the process and make it cumbersome. We have put out I- T department's concerns to the finance ministry," said an official involved in the process, who did not wish to be identified. At present, it takes about 15 days to get a new PAN allotted. However, PAN can be obtained in around five days if application is made through Internet and processing fee paid through credit card. The new verification norms may delay the process. The Central Board of Direct Taxes ( CBDT) is now re- looking at the procedure of PAN allotment and would come up with asolution, which helps address the concerns of the I- T department as well as genuine applicants of PAN. It is considering various options, including making it optional for some category of applicants to furnish the hard copy of original documents. There are about 160 million PAN card holders in India. UTI Infrastructure Technology and Services Ltd ( UTIITSL) and National Securities Depository Limited ( NSDL) are two providers of the PAN card. However, with more than 14 million of new PAN cards issued every year, these agencies are not able to verify details of everyone despite having a huge country- wide network. Officials said the stringent PAN application norms on January 24 were introduced to check false documents, particularly by foreign national and non- resident Indians. Ironically, the decision had to be put on hold on January 30 mainly because of the concerns raised by this very category of people. Since elections are due in a couple of months, the government doesn't want to annoy anyone. So, the new norms may come after the new government takes over after the polls. "There is a lot of resistance. NRIs are asking to whom they would send their original documents. People in the country also have problem in appearing in person as they cannot leave original documents with consultants," said an executive with UTIITSL. PAN cards allotted to a person is a unique identification number that helps tax authorities track compliance by linking all transactions of an individual such as tax payments, tax credits, return of income, wealth, gift and various specified transactions. It works as a proof of identity and helps at places such as opening a bank account. Duplicate PANs help people evade taxes. This prompted the ministry to come out with new PAN norms. To compensate the PAN card providers for the increased workload in view of the new verification norms, the government had increased the processing fee by ₹ 9. At present, if the communication address is within India, the processing fee is ₹ 96 (₹ 85 plus 12.36 per cent service tax). It was increased to ₹ 105 before the decision was put in abeyance. If the communication address is outside India, the fee is ₹ 962plus dispatch charges. The proposed fee is ₹ 971. Income- tax department plans to re- enforce these after elections At present, it takes about 15 days to get a new PAN card |
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Do multiple directorships matter? | ||||||
Recent media reports suggest that the Securities and Exchange Board of India ( Sebi) may limit the maximum number of companies in which a person could serve as an independent director to five, which is below the limit of ten permitted in the yet- to- be- in- force Section 165 of the Companies Act 2013. The extent to which the measure would materialise depends on the view the Sebi board takes on the matter; but the media reports have certainly discountenanced the corporate sector and understandably ruffled more than a few feathers. The disagreements have been on all- toofamiliar grounds like ' the proposal being contrary to the provisions of the Companies Act 2013', ' the companies would face difficulties in finding good directors on account of their supposed paucity', ' a case of overregulation', 'leave it to the directors and companies to decide because they are rational and professional', and so and so forth. Bemusing as the arguments may be, collectively these articulate somewhat imprecise concerns about board governance — and, on a close examination, seem to embed cognitive biases which often lead to systematic and predictable errors. The more pertinent concerns are: do multiple directorships matter? And, if so, what should the limit be — and should that limit be set externally or left to individual judgement? The responsibility of independent directorship is demanding. Good managers who take this responsibility seriously will tell you that to do their job well they have to read the board papers diligently, come well prepared for meetings, do their own research, interact from time to time with senior executives and the CEO outside board meetings, bring their experience, expertise and integrity to bear upon the board discussions, make their voices heard in the meetings and know how to ask ' why' without being confrontational. Analysis of the current director databases in India leaves an impression that such 'serious' directors are vastly outnumbered by ' not- so- serious directors', many of whom have held directorships close to the limit of 20 or 15 as permitted under the Companies Act 1956 at different points of time. Considerable amount of international research is available on multiple directorships. There is one view that claims that directors who serve on multiple boards improve board decision making ability as they have better experience and business connections. But there is an overwhelmingly strong opposite view which says "that directors who overstretch themselves and accept additional seats due to the extra available personal perquisites, tend to spend less time on each individual board, compromise their responsibilities and neglect their duties". Several researchers have argued that in many companies " multiple directors are unable to effectively monitor management because they are overcommitted" and " directors with multiple seats are too busy to mind the business", which creates serious agency problems. They have also found an inverse relationship between the company's performance and the board's busyness. There has also been research on how multiple directors are chosen globally on the boards of companies. For example, Gerald F Davis observes in his paper, ' The Economy of Multiple Board Membership', that " the results overall suggest that success in the market for directors is determined by social connections and to some degree by compliance with management". The Hungarian physicist Albert- László Barabási, who has revolutionised thinking on how realworld networks work, observes in his book, Linked: The New Science of Networks, that " a sparse network of afew powerful directors control all major appointments in the Fortune 1000 companies". It would be reasonable to conclude from these discussions that first, multiple directorships in companies is a subject of debate globally; second, the efficacy of too- busy directors who are overcommitted has been called into question; third, directors take up multiple directorships largely in self- interest; and fourth, in several countries there are moves towards restricting the number of directorships. For example, a Consultation Paper of the Prudential Regulatory Authority on Strengthening Capital Standards for Implementing CRD IV has suggested that by July 1, 2014, directors of firms which are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities should not hold more than one executive directorship with two non- executive directorships; or four non- executive directorships. Some European governments are implementing, albeit reluctantly, European Union rules from July this year, to restrict the number of board positions people in systemically important financial companies. Seen in this perspective, Sebi's proposal to restrict the number of independent directorships cannot be easily dismissed. In India we still have a commandcontrol mindset and are largely rule- driven, so prescription works and may often be desirable. If nothing else, it should weed out the not- so- serious directors and force at least some companies to actively and meaningfully search for serious directors which, contrary to popular understanding, there is no dearth of. Besides, the Standing Committee on Finance on the Companies Bill has, in its 21st Report, observed that Sebi as a sector regulator can set " more detailed or stringent provisions for sectoral companies under their jurisdiction". But is there a magic number for the maximum number of directorships? Possibly not. To get the correct number, one would have to pull a rabbit out of the hat. Globally, even five to seven directorships are being frowned on and data shows that there are very few directors who hold seven directorships or more. Prof Barabási says in his book Linked that Fortune 1000 companies have 10,100 directorships and 7,682 directors, and 79 per cent of them sat on one board, 14 per cent on two boards and only seven per cent on three or more boards. Two caveats are contextually apposite. Governance reforms generally tend to pin responsibilities on independent directors to help achieve higher standards of governance. But this may not always work and is especially difficult in family ownership of businesses or large state ownership (which is the case in India), because it may not be easy for the boards to resolve the conflict between the dominant shareholder and minority shareholders. Academic literature does not conclusively demonstrate a strong relationship between board independence and firm performance, indeed there is often either negative or no relationship between the two in empirical studies. This is possibly because it is unbeknown how boards perform as boards, how the decision making process in the board room works, and the impact of board- room biases. The writer is a former executive director of Sebi. pratipkar21@ gmail. com Overstretched and overcommitted directors may compromise responsibilities and cease to be effective ILLUSTRATION: BINAY SINHA Sebi's proposal to restrict the number of independent directorships may force at least some companies to search for serious directors, of which there is no dearth |
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